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 This thesis examines how relational issues of law in economic integration are being 
approached in Africa. At its core, relational issues deal with the legal interactions among 
community, national, regional and international legal systems within the context of economic 
integration. The theory is that effective economic integration is the product of properly structuring 
and managing – within well-defined legal frameworks – vertical, horizontal and vertico-horizontal 
relations among states, legal systems, laws and institutions. Put differently, an economic 
community must have well-structured and managed relations between itself and other legal 
systems as a necessary condition for its effectiveness. After expounding this theory and applying it 
to the state of affairs in Africa (focusing principally on four regional economic communities), the 
original contribution of the thesis to knowledge on economic integration in Africa can be captured 
in a few words: Africa‘s economic integration processes have not paid systematic or rigorous 
attention to relational issues. The interactions between community and member states‘ legal 
systems, among the various communities, as well as among member states‘ legal systems, have 
neither been carefully thought through nor placed on a solid legal framework. Where attempts have 
been made to provide a legal framework, it has been incomplete, unsatisfactory, and, sometimes, 
grounded on questionable assumptions. The thesis argues that, unless these shortfalls are remedied, 
the progress and effectiveness of Africa‘s economic integration will be seriously undermined. The 
thesis reveals that even if all the infrastructural, socio-economic and political challenges that 
bedevil Africa‘s economic integration were to disappear, - and it is these challenges that most of 
the scholarship on Africa‘s economic integration are devoted to - there remains so much in the 
realm of law which, if unaddressed, will hinder its success and effectiveness. 
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1 CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 Economic integration is defined ‗as the elimination of economic frontiers between two or 
more economies‘.1 In this regard, an economic frontier represents a demarcation – often the 
geographical boundaries of a state – into which the flow of goods, labour and capital is restricted.  
Economic integration involves the removal of obstacles to trans-boundary economic activities 
which occur in the fields of trade, movement of labour, services and the flow of capital. 
Economists identify various stages in the process of economic integration. According to Balassa, 
economic integration passes through five stages.
2
 These stages are, ‗a free trade area, a customs 
union, a common market, an economic union, and complete economic integration‘.3  
 The first three stages involve negative integration. These stages entail the removal of 
discrimination in national economic rules and policies under joint and authoritative surveillance 
and, generally, placing limitations on national economic decision-making.
4
 These are difficult 
stages in integration since they entail restrictions on the sovereign rights of countries to take 
decisions affecting the socio-economic well-being of their residents. An economic union and 
complete economic integration are characterized as positive integration. They involve ‗the transfer 
of public market-rule-making and policy-making powers from the participating polities to the 
union level‘.5 Balassa‘s linear model of economic integration has been criticized,6 but it is still 
                                                          
 
1 Jacques Pelkmans, ―The Institutional Economics of European Integration‖ in Mauro Cappelletti et al. eds., 
Integration through Law Europe and the American Federal Experience bk. 1 (Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, 
1986) at 318 [Pelkmans]. 
2 
Bela Balassa, The Theory of Economic Integration (London: Allen and Unwin, 1962) at 2 [Balassa]. Balassa 
describes the stages as follows. In a free-trade area, tariffs (and quantitative restrictions) between the participating 
countries are abolished, but each country retains its own tariffs against non-members. Establishing a customs union 
involves, besides the suppression of discrimination in the field of commodity movements within the union, the 
equalization of tariffs in trade with non-member countries. A higher form of economic integration is attained in a 
common market, where not only trade restrictions but also restrictions on factor movements are abolished. An 
economic union, as distinct from a common market, combines the suppression of restrictions on commodity and factor 
movements with some degree of harmonization of national economic policies in order to remove discrimination due to 
the disparities in these policies. Finally, total economic integration presupposes the unification of monetary, fiscal, 
social, and countercyclical policies and requires the setting-up of a supra-national authority whose decisions are 




Pelkmans, supra note 1 at 321. 
5
 Balassa, supra note 2 at 2. 
6
 Colin McCarthy, ―Is African Economic Integration in Need of a Paradigm Change? Thinking out of the Box on 
African integration‖ (2008) 8 Monitoring Regional Integration in Southern Africa Yearbook 4 at 24-40. 
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widely followed by economists.
7
 It has shaped many economic integration initiatives including 
some in Africa. Accordingly, the linear model is adopted as the framework for analysis in this 
thesis. 
 Regional economic integration is important to Africa. The urgency with which it must be 
pursued was expressed by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) in these 
words: 
This shift [the global move to integrate economies] is nowhere more urgent than 
in Africa, where the combined impact of our relatively small economies, 
international terms of trade, and the legacy of colonialism, mis-rule, and conflict 




It is envisaged that uniting African economies will permit economies of scale, make them 
more competitive, provide access to wider trading and investment environments, promote exports 
to regional markets, provide the requisite experience to enter global markets, and provide a 
framework for them to co-operate in developing common services for finance, transportation and 
communication.
9
 The economic philosophy that underlies these visions is neo-liberal economic 
thinking that emphasizes, among others, free trade and the removal of obstacles to investment.  
The need to integrate the economies of Africa is widely accepted. But its nature, scope, 
focus and theoretical underpinning remain contested.
10
 More important for this thesis, the legal 
                                                          
 
7 
Pelkmans, supra note 1 at 323, 324-26. 
8 
UNECA, Assessing Regional Economic Integration in Africa (Addis Ababa: UNECA, 2004) at ix. See also United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Economic Development in Africa Report 2009: Strengthening 
Regional Economic Integration for Africa’s Development (Geneva: UNCTAD, 2009).  
9
 UNECA, Economic Report on Africa 2002: Tracking Performance and Progress (Addis Ababa: UNECA, 2002) at 2-
11.  
10
 For example, Boas questions the state-centred formal economy focus of Africa‘s economic integration processes. 
Boas advocates a refocus on informal trading structures that exist within and among African countries. See Morten 
Boas, ―Regions and Regionalisation: A Heretic‘s View‖ in Meagher Bods Page ed., Regionalism and Regional 
Integration in Africa: A Debate of Current Aspects and Issues (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2001) at 27. For a 
critique of Boas‘ approach see Kate Meagher, ―Throwing out the Baby to Keep the Bathwater: Informal Cross-border 
Trade and Regional Integration in West Africa‖ in Meagher Bods Page ed., Regionalism and Regional Integration in 
Africa: A Debate of Current Aspects and Issues (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2001) at 41. A recent study has 
found that informal trade represents a significant proportion of regional cross-border trade in Sub-Saharan Africa. The 
study argues that informal trade is a threat to long-term economic development. See Caroline Lesser & Evdokia 
Moise-Leeman, ―Informal Cross-border Trade and Trade Facilitation in Sub-Saharan Africa‖ (OECD Trade Policy 
Working Paper No. 86, February, 2008). Mazzeo also argues against the market approach to integration and advocates 
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issues arising from economic integration have not yet been fully explored.
11
 Some advocate 
regionalism. Others emphasize the need for immediate continent-wide integration. This debate in 




Regionalism in Africa has benefits.
13
 It will allow for region-specific initiatives. The 
relatively small size of regional economic communities (RECs), in terms of the number of 
countries engaged, also makes for easy management and decision-making. Africa consists of fifty-
three sovereign countries. Thus, perhaps, regionalism is the only manageable option. Competition 
among RECs may also be an avenue for development through efficiency gains. Regionalism in 
Africa also has disadvantages. It can reduce member states‘ commitment to ensure the emergence 
of continent-wide integration. Multiple commitments given by states to RECs, resulting from 
multiple memberships of such organizations, can lead to non-compliance and jurisdictional 
conflicts. Additionally, countries with relatively large and developed economies may benefit at the 
expense of the smaller regional members.  
A difficult problem in economic integration is what I characterize as relational issues of 
law in economic integration (hereinafter termed relational issues). These issues become more 
prominent especially when the economic integration process progresses through the various stages 
of integration. A free-trade area may exist without well-structured and managed relations between 
the community and national legal systems, but a customs union, common market or economic 
union cannot operate effectively without attention to relational issues. This is because the 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
 
co-operation on specific projects in areas such as agriculture, infrastructure and technology. See Domenico Mazzeo, 
―The Experience of the East African Community: Implications for the Theory and Practice of Regional Cooperation in 
Africa in Domenico Mazzeo ed., African Regional Organizations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984) at 
165; Jeggan C. Senghor, ―Theoretical Foundations for Regional Integration in Africa: An Overview‖ in Peter Anyang 
Nyong‘o ed., Regional Integration in Africa: Unfinished Agenda (Nairobi: African Academy of Sciences, 1990) at 17. 
11
 See generally Simon E. Kulusika, ―The Lawyer and the Challenges of Economic Integration‖ (2000) 32 Zambia L.J. 
20; Iwa Salami, ―Legal Considerations for Devising a Governance Structure for the African Union‖ (2008) 16 Afr. J. 
Int‘l & Comp. L. 262; Iwa Akinrinsola, ―Legal and Institutional Requirements for West African Economic 
Integration‖ (2004) 10 Law & Bus. Rev. Am. 493. 
12 
See generally Sungjoon Cho, ―Breaking the Barrier between Regionalism and Multilateralism: A New Perspective 
on Trade Regionalism‖ (2001) 42 Harv. Int‘l L.J. 419; Jagdish Bhagwati, ―Regionalism and Multilateralism: An 
Overview‖ in Jagdish Bhagwati et al. eds., Trading Blocs, Alternative Approaches to Analyzing Preferential Trade 
Agreements (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1999) at 3. 
13
 Teshome Mulat, ―Multilateralism and Africa‘s Regional Economic Communities‖ (1998) 32:4 J. World Trade 115. 
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interactions between legal systems deepen as economic integration progresses through the various 
stages of integration. In Africa, relational issues are further complicated by Africa‘s unique 
approach to achieving continental integration. The approach uses pre-existing RECs as building 
blocks for a continent-wide economic community called the African Economic Community 
(AEC).
14
 Other RECs have adopted an approach that involves expansion through the addition of 
new states to a core of founding members. 
My emphasis on relational issues aims at bringing to the fore the importance of law as an 
instrument for economic integration. A purely economic or socio-political approach to, or analysis 
of, economic integration should be viewed with caution. Such an approach fails to appreciate the 
important fact that obstacles to trans-boundary economic activity are not only economic or socio-
political, but are also sometimes legal. National laws and international agreements limit the 
movement of persons, goods, services and capital. These limitations may be informed by economic 
and socio-political considerations, but it is through the medium of law that the limitations are 
realized. An understanding of economic integration that envisions laws as an instrument for 
integration should immediately position law at the forefront of economic integration processes. As 
Pescatore has observed, ‗[t]he process of integration can have no real consistency and, above all, 
no real stability or lasting force unless we succeed in giving it a sufficiently solid institutional and 
legal framework‘.15 Attention to relational issues is an important aspect of this endeavour. 
 To emphasize the place of law in Africa‘s economic integration processes is not to 
underestimate the importance of socio-economic and political factors in these processes. Indeed, 
economic integration should be well grounded in the socio-economic and political realities of a 
region. As discussed below, these realities can and often do shape the workings or effectiveness of 
law in the processes. The emphasis placed on law on this thesis is meant to challenge the existing 
literature, which is vast and sees progress in economic integration in Africa as being hindered by 
                                                          
 
14
 The Treaty establishing the African Economic Community was adopted by members of the Organisation of African 
Unity (OAU) on 3 June 1991. It set up the AEC as an integral part of the OAU (Article 98). It entered into force on 12 
May 1994. It has not been abrogated by the Constitutive Act of the African Union which replaced the OAU. However, 
under article 33(2) of the Constitutive Act, its provisions have precedence over any inconsistent or contrary provision 
of the AEC Treaty. See Treaty establishing the African Economic Community, 3 June 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1241 [AEC 
Treaty]; Constitutive Act of the African Union, 11 July 2000, (2005) 13 Afr. J. Int‘l & Comp. L. 25 [Constitutive Act].  
15
 Pierre Pescatore, The Law of Integration: Emergence of a New Phenomenon in International Relations based on the 
Experience of the European Communities (Leiden: A.W. Sijthoff Publishing Company, 1974) at 2. 
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socio-economic, political, cultural and infrastructural problems. Without denying the importance 
of these problems, this thesis aims to demonstrate that even if all the problems were to disappear 
today, there are many legal issues, which if unaddressed will hinder the effectiveness of Africa‘s 
economic integration processes. In other words, this thesis focuses on a very narrow and specific 
aspect of economic integration. It does not pretend to offer – and should not be read as an attempt 
to offer - a comprehensive treatise on all the challenges that face or are likely to be faced by 
economic integration processes in Africa. The notion of effectiveness is used in this thesis to refer 
to the extent to which the regional economic communities are and will be able to achieve the 
objectives which they have clearly defined in their respective treaties.  
 The role of law in economic integration can be discussed from multiple perspectives, but 
this thesis focuses mainly on issues of legal structures, processes of law-making, implementation 
and enforcement of laws. Admittedly, one could argue that law should not be given any role or a 
major role to play in economic integration. Rather, emphasis should be placed on informal 
structures, voluntary compliance and the good faith of politicians to implement agreed objectives. 
This is a view which I do not subscribe to and this thesis does not advance it. Indeed, contrary to 
this view, the relational framework which I use in the thesis in essence presupposes or creates a 
very high degree of legal integration and expectation of it. The existence of such a framework is 
advocated as a necessary (but not a sufficient) condition for the effectiveness of economic 
integration in Africa. 
1.2 RESEARCH PROBLEM 
 Relational issues are endemic in economic integration processes. They become more 
visible as the processes progress through the various stages of economic integration. Africans have 
had a long-standing commitment to economic integration. However, it appears that, against the 
background of the professed political enthusiasm to integrate, not much attention has been devoted 
to articulating the relational issues that bedevil Africa‘s economic integration processes, the effect 
they have on the processes, and how they should be approached or resolved. Indeed, the opinion in 
some circles is that Africa‘s economic integration processes have generally shied away from 
addressing the serious legal issues that precede and come with economic integration.
16
 The 
                                                          
 
16
 Most of the leading writings on the subject in Africa have been from a politico-economic perspective. There has not 
been much work on the legal issues in economic integration. See generally Samuel K. B. Asante, Regionalism and 
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processes have been mere political constructs with no attention to the importance of solid legal 
frameworks.
17
 Indeed, a recently concluded report of the UNECA found the existing legal 
framework for Africa‘s integration to be ‗ambiguous and imprecise‘.18 Relational issues are a key 
aspect of the legal issues of economic integration. 
 Perhaps, the best manifestation of Africa‘s economic integration processes‘ inattention to 
relational issues is the disjunction between national and community legal systems. This disjunction 
is, in part, reflected in the absence of national legislation necessary to implement decisions taken 
by Africa‘s RECs.19 As discussed in Chapter Seven, national constitutions and courts also appear 
ambivalent to the demands of economic integration. Existing jurisprudence of courts and national 
constitutional laws appear ill-prepared to accommodate the laws of RECs (community law). 
Obligations assumed by states at the community level have not been translated into domestic rights 
and benefits for individuals. Individuals face formidable legal obstacles when they seek to benefit 
from community law at the national level. In general, national legal systems appear insensitive to 
the demands economic integration makes upon them. 
 A similar lack of attention to relational issues is manifest in the field of interstate and inter-
community relations. For example, the issue of interstate recognition and enforcement of 
judgments, and the general role of private international law as a means of regulating interstate 
relations have not received any systematic attention in the community treaties and related laws. As 
discussed in Chapter Nine, in general, within member states, judgments and laws of other states do 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
 
Africa’s Development (London: Macmillan Press, 1997); Adebayo Adedeji et al. eds., The Challenge of African 
Economic Recovery and Development (London: Frank Cass, 1991); Ademola Oyejide, Ibrahim Elbadawi & Paul 
Collier, Regional Integration and Trade Liberalisation in Sub-Saharan Africa Vols 1, 2, 3 and 4 (London: Macmillan 
Press Ltd, 1999).  
17
 See generally Kofi Oteng Kufour, ―Law, Power, Politics and Economics: Critical Issues Arising out of the New 
ECOWAS Treaty‖ (1994) 6 Afr. J. Int‘l. & Comp. L. 429; Christian Joerges, ―Law, Economics and Politics in the 
Constitutionalisation of Europe‖ (2002-2003) 5 Cam. Ybk. Eur. Leg. Stud. 122; Christian Joerges, ―Taking Law 
Seriously: On Political Science and the Role of Law in the Process of European Integration‖ (1996) 2 Eur. L.J. 105; 
Stefan A. Riesenfeld, ―Legal Systems of Regional Economic Integration‖ (1996-1997) 20 Hastings Int‘l & Comp. L. 
Rev. 539.  
18
 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, Assessing Regional Integration in Africa II-Rationalizing 
Regional Economic Communities (Addis Ababa: UNECA, 2006) at 21. 
19
 Member states of the East African Community have passed national legislation giving effect to the Treaty 
Establishing the East African Community. See Tanzania, Treaty for the Establishment of East African Community 
Act, 2001, (Act No. 4); Kenya, Treaty for the Establishment of East African Community Act, 2000, (Act No. 2); 
Uganda, East African Community Act, 2002. 
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not enjoy any preferential status as far as the principles of private international law are concerned. 
There is also no precise legal framework for regulating the relations between the many RECs in 
Africa. 
 Concomitant with the disjunction between national and community legal systems in 
Africa‘s economic integration processes is the absence of a consideration of the relations between 
the processes and other international economic arrangements. Prominent among these is the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), the organization under whose aegis most present-day international 
trade is conducted. Indeed, the very foundation of most regional economic integration initiatives is 
in Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade or the Enabling Clause,
20
 both of 
which are parts of WTO law. Regional economic integration initiatives must comply with WTO 
law. The relations between the various economic integration processes in Africa and the WTO, the 
status of WTO law within the framework of community law and national law, how the multiple 
commitments of African states under community law and WTO law can be reconciled, and the 
rules for resolving conflicts between WTO law, community law and national law are all important 
issues that have, so far, not been articulated and addressed in writings on Africa‘s economic 
integration processes.  
 These are important issues for the stability of the world trading system and Africa‘s 
economic integration. Irreconcilable differences between community laws and national laws vis-à-
vis WTO law are susceptible to challenge under the WTO dispute settlement system. Currently, 
forty-two African countries are members of the WTO and a number of African RECs have already 
been notified to the WTO.
21
 Thus, although it will not be explored in this thesis, the issue of their 
relations with the WTO is not merely academic. 
  Against this background, this thesis seeks to address a number of issues: 
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 WTO, Differential and More Favourable Treatment Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries, 
28 November 1979, online: WTO <http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/enabling_e.pdf>. 
21
 They include COMESA, EAC, ECOWAS, SADC, Southern African Customs Union, West African Economic and 




A. The extent to which relational issues are visible in Africa‘s economic integration processes 
and how, if at all, the existing community laws and jurisprudence have approached or 
resolved them; 
B. The extent to which national legal systems are attentive to relational issues and how, if at 
all, existing national constitutional laws and jurisprudence have approached or resolved 
them; 
C. The extent to which community and national approaches to relational issues can affect or 
enhance the effectiveness of the economic integration processes;  
D. The extent to which principles of public and private international law can aid the resolution 
of some of the relational issues that confront Africa‘s regional economic integration 
processes; and 
E. Generally, the extent to which attention or the lack of it to relational issues in Africa‘s 
integration processes accounts for their effectiveness or ineffectiveness.  
 It is remarkable that, notwithstanding the importance of relational issues to the effective 
development of Africa‘s economic integration processes, little or no attention has been devoted to 
them. Indeed, works on the legal aspects of Africa‘s economic integration processes are scant. A 
cursory look at the pages of leading African journals reveals this.
22
 Monographs and treatises are 
similarly rare.
23
 This thesis is a unique attempt to fill a void in the discourse on Africa‘s economic 
integration processes by situating law at their heart.  
                                                          
 
22
 See e.g., Journal of African Law, African Journal of International and Comparative Law and Monitoring Regional 
Integration in Southern Africa Yearbook. The Yearbook is the only African journal devoted solely to economic 
integration processes, albeit mainly those of Southern Africa. A recent addition is the African Integration Review 
which is published by the AU Commission. 
23
 Among the few written from the legal perspective are: Peter K. Kiplagat, Legal Dynamics of Regional Integration in 
Developing Countries: A Case Study of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) (JSD Thesis, 
Yale Law School, 2000) [unpublished]; M.A. Ajomo & Omobolaji Adewale eds., African Economic Community 
Treaty, Issues Problems and Prospects (Lagos: Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, 1993); Yash P. Ghai, 
Reflections on Law and Economic Integration in East Africa (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 
1976); S.A. Akintan, The Law of International Economic Institutions in Africa (Leyden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1977). A more 
recent text is Kofi Oteng Kufuor, The Institutional Transformation of the Economic Community of West African States 
(Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2006) [Kufuor, Institutional Transformation]. 
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 Admittedly, other RECs outside Africa have confronted relational issues and address them 
through various means. The body of learning accumulated by these communities is useful 
comparative source for this work. However, this does not make this work less important, 
duplicative or non-original. Its anticipated contributions to academic discourse on Africa‘s 
economic integration are to: draw attention to relational issues; critically examine current attempts 
to address them and their effectiveness; and investigate the extent to which the future progress of 
Africa‘s economic integration processes may be hindered or boosted by attention to relational 
issues. In other words, an assessment of the merits of this work, which begins with citations of 
general or region-specific writings on economic integration, without attention to the state of 
learning on the issues in Africa, is flawed and problematic. 
1.3 METHODOLOGY 
 The methodology for this thesis entails a detailed and comparative consideration of the 
governing laws of selected RECs in Africa, constitutions and statutory laws, and the jurisprudence 
of national and regional courts. In other words, the thesis relies heavily on primary sources. 
Academic commentary and the comparative jurisprudence and experiences of other RECs outside 
Africa are also brought to bear on the work. 
 The RECs which are focused on are the East African Community (EAC),
24
 the Common 
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA),
25
 the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS)
26
 and the African Economic Community (AEC).
27
 These communities do not 
vary too significantly in their structures. Indeed, as Mistry observes, ‗it appears as if the drafting of 
all these arrangements across Africa was done from the same template‘.28 The communities share 
the common objective of creating a larger economic space for trade among their members through 
                                                          
 
24
 See Treaty for the establishment of the East African Community, 30 November 1999, 2144 U.N.T.S. I-37437 [EAC 
Treaty]. 
25
 See Treaty establishing the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, 5 November 1993, 33 I.L.M. 1067 
[COMESA Treaty]. 
26
 See Revised Treaty establishing the Economic Community of West African States, 24 July 1993, 35 I.L.M. 660, 
(1996) 8 Afr. J. Int‘l & Comp. L. 187 [ECOWAS Treaty]. 
27
 See AEC Treaty, supra note 14. 
28




the gradual elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade.
29
 The AEC, which currently 
operates as an integral part of the African Union (AU), is the result of the ultimate merger of all the 
RECs in Africa. As will be discussed in Chapter Three, in principle, the AEC can be envisioned as 
the umbrella organization under whose aegis the other RECs operate with a view to fulfilling the 
AEC‘s ultimate vision of a continent-wide economic integration arrangement. 
 The choice of these communities is apposite. Geographically, they cover all the regions of 
Africa, namely Central, East, North, Southern and West Africa. Cumulatively, they have a 
membership which encompasses thirty-five of the fifty-three African countries.
30
 All of them are 
also active in the field of economic integration. COMESA became a customs union in 2009 and 
plans to be an economic union by 2025. The EAC is already a customs union. It is currently 
negotiating a common market protocol.
31
 ECOWAS has pursued a free-trade area in goods within 
the framework of the ECOWAS Trade Liberalization Scheme. Its plans to introduce a customs 
union in 2008 have been delayed, but it is well advanced on the issue of the free movement of 
persons within the community.
32
 All the selected communities envision progress on the stages of 
economic integration,
33
 which, as will be discussed in Chapter Two, makes the need to address 
relational issues important for them. All of them have also been accepted by the AU as RECs 
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 Institutionally, one major thing which separates COMESA from the EAC and ECOWAS is that COMESA does not 
have a parliament. In terms of objects, a major difference between the EAC, COMESA and ECOWAS is that the EAC 
aims at creating a political federation – a vision which is on the agenda of neither ECOWAS nor COMESA. 
30
 COMESA consists of Burundi, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
ECOWAS comprises Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d‘Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, 
Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. EAC consists of Burundi, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda and 
Tanzania. 
31
 The East African Community Customs Union Protocol entered into force on 1 January 2005. See Protocol on the 
establishment of the East African Customs Union, 2 March 2004, online: Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa 
<https://www.givengain.com/unique/tralac/pdf/20060629_Cuctoms_Union_Protocol.pdf>. 
32
 An ECOWAS protocol on the free movements of persons, the right of residence and establishment was agreed as 
early as in 1979. See Protocol relating to Free Movement of Persons, Residence and Establishment, 29 May 1979, 
1906 U.N.T.S. 32496. There are a number of supplementary protocols to this protocol. 
33
 See e.g. EAC Treaty, supra note 24 art. 2(2). It enjoins member states to establish an East African Customs Union 
and a Common Market as transitional stages to and integral parts of the community; ECOWAS Treaty, supra note 26 
art. 54 where members undertook to achieve an economic union; COMESA Treaty, supra note 25 art. 177 on the 
establishment of an Economic Community for Southern and Eastern Africa. 
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which are, ultimately, to merge and form the African Economic Community.
34
 Finally, all of them 
have undergone some metamorphosis with a view to becoming more effective and rule-oriented.
35
  
 There are limitations on the methodology and the scope of the thesis which should be 
immediately noted. Firstly, because of linguistic limitations, the focus on member states is mostly 
on English-speaking Africa, especially on common law and Roman-Dutch law jurisdictions.
36
 
Secondly, due to the absence of a highly-developed system of law reporting in most of the 
countries, I occasionally rely on ‗unreported‘ cases. Judgments of the courts of the RECs are also 
unreported. However, most of these cases are available online.
37
 Thirdly, it is acknowledged that 
relational issues between RECs and the international legal system (especially, the WTO), and 
among the RECs are important. However, the focus of this work is principally on the relational 
issues between the RECs and member states and the member states inter se in the context of 
pursing the goals of regional economic integration. 
 The thesis draws on the jurisprudence, laws and experiences of other RECs within and 
outside Africa such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the European 
Community (EC).
38
 The European experience offers invaluable insights for the AEC as it is 
                                                          
 
34
 In 2006, the Assembly of the AU suspended, until further notice, the recognition of new RECs with the exception of 
the following eight: ECOWAS; COMESA; EAC; Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS); Southern 
African Development Community (SADC); Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD); Arab Maghreb 
Union (AMU) and; Economic Community of Sahelo-Saharian States (CENSAD). See African Union, Decision on the 
Moratorium on the Recognition of Regional Economic Communities (Assembly/AU/ Dec.112 (VII), 2006). 
35
 COMESA began its life under the 1982 Preferential Trade Area Agreement for Eastern and Southern Africa See 
Eastern and Southern African States: Treaty for the establishment of a Preferential Trade Area, 21 December 1981, 
21 I.L.M. 479; ECOWAS began life under the 1975 Treaty establishing the Economic Community of West African 
States, 28 May 1975, 1010 U.N.T.S. I-14843; 14 I.L.M. 1200; and the EAC is a resurrection of the defunct East 
African Community established under the 1967 Treaty for East African Cooperation, 6 June 1963, 6 I.L.M. 932. See 
generally Michael Gondwe, ―From PTA to COMESA: The Quest for Sub-regional Economic Integration in Eastern 
and Southern Africa‖ (1998) 6 Afr. Y.B. Int‘l L. 3. 
36
 The common law countries are: Gambia; Ghana; Kenya; Malawi; Nigeria; Tanzania; Sierra Leone; Uganda and 
Zambia. The Roman-Dutch law countries are: Botswana; Lesotho; Namibia; South Africa; Swaziland and Zimbabwe. 
37
 For example, most Southern African national courts‘ judgments cited as unreported can be found at 
<www.saflii.org> ; judgments from Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania may be found at 
<http://www.kenyalaw.org/eKLR/>; <http://www.lawafrica.com/; 
<http://www.ugandaonlinelawlibrary.com/default.asp>. Some judgments of the ECOWAS, COMESA and EAC courts 




 See generally L. Alan Winters, ―What can European Experience Teach Developing Countries about Integration‖ 
(1997) 20 World Economy 889. 
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ostensibly modelled on the EC.
39
 However, the European experience is not the centre of this thesis. 
Admittedly, some of the principles discussed in the thesis have been adopted and, one may add, 
perfected in Europe. However, as Chapter Two will reveal, some of the principles exist in other 
RECs. Indeed, some of the principles pre-date the EC. There are factors that counsel for caution 
when relying on insights from Europe. There are differences between the EC and AEC in terms of 
their historical circumstances and the extent of their respective development. Indeed, the AEC is 
still in its formative stages. Additionally, as discussed below, the socio-economic and political 
contexts of Africa‘s integration are obviously very different from those of Europe. The European 
insights are particularly useful when dealing with community-state relations. But, they are of 
limited value when it comes to dealing with the unique African phenomena of having autonomous 




1.4 THE SELECTED REGIONAL ECONOMIC COMMUNITIES: AN OVERVIEW 
1.4.1 Introduction 
Africa is home to a bewildering array of economic integration processes.
41
 The UNECA 
puts the number at fourteen. In its words:  
                                                          
 
39
 See Craig Jackson, ―Constitutional Structure and Governance Strategies for Economic Integration in Africa and 
Europe‖ (2003) 13 Transnat‘l L. & Contemp. Probs. 139 at 139-40. 
40
 The closest Europe came to experiencing this phenomenon was the co-existence of three separate communities 
namely, the European Economic Community, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), and the European 
Atomic Energy Community (EAEC). The ECSC and EAEC had very narrow economic mandates. Also, the ECSC had 
a temporal limit on its existence. Early in their history, the three communities benefited from common membership 
and common institutions (See: A Convention on certain Institutions Common to the European Communities, 25 March 
1957, online: http://europa.eu/abc/treaties/archives/en/entr12.htm; Treaty establishing a Single Council and a Single 
Commission of the European Communities, 8 April 1965, 4 I.L.M. 776). This might have avoided many of the 
complex issues arising from the relations between the AEC and Africa‘s RECs, which are explored in Chapter Three. 
Also, although the EC has historically co-existed with the European Free Trade Area (EFTA), they have enjoyed 
separate memberships. Indeed, most of the founding members of the EFTA moved to join the EC. 
41
 Each geographical region of Africa contains an average of three to four organizations with a mandate to carry out 
economic integration of its members. In West Africa, ECOWAS coexists with the West African Economic and 
Monetary Union (UEMOA), the Mano River Union (MRU), and the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD). 
In Central Africa, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) coexists with the Central African 
Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) and the Economic Community of Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL). In 
Southern Africa, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Southern African Customs Union 
(SACU), and the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) share space with COMESA, which also covers East Africa and 
parts of North and Central Africa. In addition, East Africa has the EAC and Intergovernmental Authority on 
Development (IGAD). North Africa also has the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA). 
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Even though the African Union recognizes only eight [regional economic 
communities], the continent currently has fourteen inter-governmental 
organizations (IGOs), working on regional integration issues, with numerous 
treaties and protocols governing relations among them, and between them and 
the Member States. This proliferation of institutions and protocols means that out 
of the 53 Member States of the African Union (AU), 26 belong to two of the 
fourteen IGOs, 20 belong to three of them, and one country belongs to four.
42
 
This number necessarily presents an academic challenge to works on Africa‘s economic 
integration processes. As noted above, no attempt will be made to cover all the fourteen 
communities; the focus of the thesis will be on three of the eight AU-recognized communities and 
the AEC. The table below provides the membership of the eight AU-recognized communities, as 
well as the countries which are members of the WTO. 
                                                          
 
42




Table 1: African Union Recognized Regional Economic Communities and their Membership 
COUNTRIES ECOWAS EAC COMESA SADC IGAD AMU ECCAS CENSAD AEC/AU WTO 
Algeria      X   X  
Angola    X   X  X X 
Benin X       X X X 
Botswana    X     X X 
Burkina Faso X       X X X 
Burundi  X X    X  X X 
Cameroon       X  X X 
Cape Verde X        X X 
Cen. Afr. Republic       X X X X 
Chad       X X X X 
Comoros   X      X  
Congo       X  X X 
Congo DR X  X X   X  X X 
Cote d‘Ivoire         X X 
Djibouti   X  X   X X X 
Egypt   X   X  X X X 
Equatorial Guinea       X  X  
Eritrea   X     X X  
Ethiopia   X  X    X  
Gabon       X  X X 
Gambia X       X X X 
Ghana X        X X 
Guinea X        X X 
Guinea Bissau X        X X 
Kenya  X X  X    X X 
Lesotho    X     X X 
Liberia X        X  
Libya   X   X  X X  
Madagascar   X X     X X 
Malawi   X X     X X 
Mali X       X X X 
Mauritania      X   X X 
Mauritius   X X     X X 
Morocco      X  X X X 
Mozambique    X     X X 
Namibia    X     X X 
Niger X       X X X 
Nigeria X       X X X 
Rwanda  X X    X  X X 
SaoTome & Principe       X  X  
Senegal X       X X X 
Seychelles   X      X  
Sierra Leone X        X X 
Somalia     X   X X  
South Africa    X     X X 
Sudan   X  X   X X  
Swaziland   X X     X X 
Tanzania  X  X     X X 
Togo X       X X X 
Tunisia      X  X X X 
Uganda  X X  X    X X 
Zambia   X X     X X 
Zimbabwe   X X     X X 
TOTAL 15 5 19 14 6 6 11 18 53 42 
 
ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States                EAC: East African Community                                                  
COMESA: Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa                              SADC: Southern African Development Community 
IGAD: Inter-Governmental Authority for Development                                                                             AMU: Arab Maghreb Union 
ECCAS: Economic Community of Central African States                                           CENSAD: Community of Sahel-Saharan States 
AEC: African Economic Community                                                                      AU: African Union  
WTO: World Trade Organization 
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1.4.2 African Economic Community 
The history of the need for continental economic integration in Africa dates back to the 
formation of the Organisation of Africa Unity (OAU) [now AU] in 1963.
43
 One purpose of the 
OAU was to co-ordinate and strengthen co-operation efforts between member states to improve the 
lives of their people.
44
 To this end, they were enjoined to ‗co-ordinate and harmonize their general 
policies‘ in economic and other fields.45 However, it was not until 1980 that a major continental 
step was taken towards economic integration. Before then, resolutions and declarations were made 
to promote integration, and various RECs emerged and achieved different levels of integration.
46
 
At an extraordinary summit in 1980, the OAU adopted the Lagos Plan of Action which culminated 
in the signing of the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community (AEC Treaty).
47
 The 
AEC Treaty came into force in May 1994.
48
 The treaty envisages an integrated economic area 
covering all of Africa.
49
 Following the establishment of the AU in 2002, the AEC became an 
integral part of its constitutional structure.
50
 
                                                          
 
43 
Charter of the Organization of Africa Unity, 25 May 1963, 2 I.L.M. 766 [OAU Charter]. The OAU has been 
replaced with the African Union. See Constitutive Act of the African Union, supra note 14. For a discussion on the 
structure, characteristics, and workings of the African Union, see generally Konstantinos D. Magliveras & Gino J. 
Naldi, ―The African Union—A New Dawn for Africa?‖ (2002) 51 Int‘l & Comp. L. Q. 415; Nsongurua J. Udombana, 
―The Institutional Structure of the African Union: A Legal Analysis‖ (2002-2003) 33 Cal. W. Int‘l L.J. 69; 
Symposium, ―The African Union and the New Pan-Africanism: Rushing to Organize or Timely Shift?‖ (2003) 13 
Transnat‘l & Contemp. Probs. 1; T. Maluwa, ―From the Organization of African Unity to the African Union: 
Rethinking the Framework for Inter-State Cooperation in Africa in the Era of Globalisation‖ (2007) 5 U. Botswana 
L.J. 4. 
44 
OAU Charter, ibid. art. 2(1)(b). 
45 
OAU Charter, ibid. art. 2(2). 
46 
Examples are EAC and ECOWAS, which were established in 1967 and 1975 respectively. See generally Rene 
N‘Guettia Kouassi, ―The Itinerary of the African Integration Process: An Overview of the Historical Landmarks‖ 
(2007) 1 African Integration Rev. 1. The EAC was, perhaps, the most advanced African REC. Before its collapse in 
1977, a lot of academic interest was devoted to it. See generally Thomas M. Franck, East African Unity through Law 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964); Paulo Sebalu, ―The East African Community‖ (1972) 16 J. Afr. L. 345; 
Kodwo J. Bentil, ―The Legal Framework and the Economic Aspects of the East African Common Market‖ (1969) 4 J. 
L. & Econ. Dev. 27. 
47 
AEC Treaty, supra note 14. 
48
 As of January 2009, fifty-two African countries had signed the treaty and forty-nine had ratified it. However, unlike 
the EAC Treaty, supra note 24, I am unaware of any countries (especially common law countries) that have 
domestically implemented the AEC Treaty through legislation. 
49
 AEC Treaty, supra note 14 preamble. 
50 
Ibid. art. 98. Constitutive Act, supra note 14 art. 33. In this thesis, unless a contrary provision exists in the 
Constitutive Act, references are made to the institutional structures established under the AEC Treaty for consistency 
and clarity. On some of the difficulties of making the AEC an integral part of the AU, see Craig Jackson, 
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The objectives of the AEC include the promotion of economic development and the 
integration of African economies in order to increase self-sufficiency, the promotion of 
endogenous and self-sustained development, and the fostering of the gradual establishment of the 
African Economic Community
51
 through co-ordination and harmonization among existing and 
future economic communities.
52
 To ensure the attainment of these objectives, the AEC is enjoined 
to ensure: (1) the harmonization of national policies particularly in the fields of agriculture, 
industry, transport and communication, energy, natural resources, trade, money and finance, 
human resources education, culture, and technology; (2) the adoption of a common trade policy 
with regard to third-party states; (3) the establishment and maintenance of a common external 
tariff; (4) the establishment of a common market; (5) the gradual removal of obstacles among 




The AEC Treaty provides for the gradual establishment of the African Economic 
Community through six stages over a period of thirty-four years.
54
 This process is to be completed 
in 2028. The first stage involves the ‗strengthening of existing regional economic communities‘.55 
The second involves the stabilization of tariff and non-tariff barriers, custom duties and internal 
taxes at the level of the RECs and the strengthening of sectoral integration at the regional and 
continental level. The third stage envisions the establishment of a free-trade area and a customs 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
 
―Constitutional Structure and Governance Strategies for Economic Integration in Africa and Europe‖ (2003) 13 
Transnat‘l L. & Contemp. Probs 139 at 140. 
51
 The AEC both is and is to be! Understandably, this may sound confusing for the reader. In this thesis ‗AEC‘ will be 
used to refer to the current organization irrespective of the stage in its development, while reference to the ultimate 
stage of the AEC will be written in full as ‗the African Economic Community‘. 
52 
AEC Treaty, supra note 14 art. 4.  
53
 Ibid. art. 4(2) 
54
 Ibid. art. 6(1). The following are the timelines for the evolution of the African Economic Community: 1. Creation of 
regional blocs in regions where such do not yet exist (to be completed in 1999) 2. Strengthening of intra-REC 
integration and inter-REC harmonization (to be completed in 2007) 3. Establishing of a free trade area and customs 
union in each regional bloc (to be completed in 2017) 4. Establishing of a continent-wide customs union and thus also 
a free trade area (to be completed in 2019) 5. Establishing of a continent-wide African Common Market or (to be 
completed in 2023) 6. Establishing of a continent-wide economic and monetary union (and thus also a currency union) 
and pan-African Parliament (to be completed in 2028) 7. End of all transition periods by 2034 at the latest. Source: 
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, Assessing Regional Integration in Africa III: Towards Monetary 
and Financial Integration in Africa (Addis Ababa: UNECA, 2008) at 28 [UNECA, Assessing Regional Integration in 
Africa III]. 
55
 Ibid. art. 6(2). 
17 
 
union at each regional level. The fourth focuses on the co-ordination and harmonization of tariff 
and non-tariff systems among the RECs with a view to establishing a continental customs union. 
The fifth stages calls for the establishment of an African common market through the adoption of 
common policies, harmonization of monetary, financial, and fiscal policies, and the application of 
the principles of the free movement of persons and the right of residence and establishment. 
Finally, the sixth stage focuses on: the strengthening of the African common market; the 
application of the free movement of people, goods, capital and services; the integration of the 
social, economic, political and cultural sectors; the establishment of a single domestic market; a 
Pan-African Economic and Monetary Union; a Pan African Parliament;
56
 and a single African 
currency, among other things.
57
 It is worth noting that these stages follow the Balassian model of 
economic integration.  
A distinct feature of the framework for integration under the AEC Treaty is the use of 
RECs as building blocks for the African Economic Community. With a membership of over fifty 
states, this approach ensures a degree of manageability in the initial development of the 
community. As noted above, there are over fourteen RECs at various stages of development in 
Africa. These communities have their separate institutions, members, objectives and legal 
personalities. It is also not uncommon to find states that are members of more than one of these 
communities. The thesis argues that, from a relational perspective, these pose significant legal 
challenges to the success of the AEC.
58
 
The principal institutions of the AEC are: Assembly of Heads of State and Government; 
Council of Ministers; Pan-African Parliament; Economic and Social Commission; Court of Justice; 
General Secretariat; and Specialised Technical Committees.
59
 The Assembly is the supreme organ 
of the Community.
60
 It is responsible for implementing the Community‘s objectives.61 To this end, 
                                                          
 
56
 See Protocol to the Treaty establishing the African Economic Community relating to the Pan-African Parliament, 2 
March 2001, (2005) 13 Afr. J. Int‘l & Comp. L. 86 [Protocol on Pan-African Parliament]. The Parliament was 
inaugurated in 2003. 
57
 AEC Treaty, supra note 14 art. 6. 
58 P. Kenneth Kiplagat, ―Jurisdictional Uncertainties and Integration Process in Africa: The Need for Harmony‖ (1995-
1996) 4 Tul. J. Int‘l & Comp. L. 43; Jackson, supra note 50 at 151-54. 
59
 AEC Treaty, supra note 14 art. 7. 
60
 Ibid. art. 8(1). Although article 8 is labelled composition and functions, it does not set out who constitutes the 
Assembly. It is, however, obvious that it comprises the Heads of State or Government of the AEC member states. 
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it shall inter alia: determine the general policy and major guidelines of the Community, and give 
directives, coordinate and harmonize the economic, scientific, technical, cultural and social 
policies of member states; take any action to attain the objectives of the Community; oversee the 
functioning of Community organs as well as the follow-up of the implementation of its objectives; 
approve the organizational structure of the Secretariat; elect the Secretary-General, his Deputies 
and, appoint the Financial Controller, the Accountant and the External Auditors; adopt the Staff 
Rules and Regulations of the Secretariat; take decisions and give directives concerning the RECs 
in order to ensure the realization of the objectives of the Community; approve the Community's 
programme of activity and budget, and determine the annual contribution of each member state; 
refer any matter to the Court of Justice when it confirms that a member state or organ of the 
Community has not honoured any of its obligations or has acted beyond the limits of its authority 
or has abused the powers conferred on it by the provisions of the Treaty, by a decision of the 




The Council is responsible for the functioning and development of the Community.
63
 To 
this end, it shall inter alia: make recommendations to the Assembly on any action aimed at 
attaining the objectives of the Community; guide the activities of the subordinate organs of the 
Community; submit to the Assembly proposals concerning programmes of activity and budget of 
the Community as well as the annual contribution of each member state; propose to the Assembly 
the appointment of the Financial Controller, the Accountant and the External Auditors; request the 
Court of Justice to give advisory opinion on any legal questions; and carry out all other functions 
assigned thereto under this Treaty and exercise all powers delegated to it by the Assembly.
64
 
The Pan-African Parliament was set up to ensure that Africans are fully involved in the 
economic development and integration of the continent.
65
 The composition, functions, powers and 
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organization of the Pan-African Parliament are outlined in a protocol adopted after the AEC Treaty 
came into force.
66
 Currently, it has only consultative and advisory powers.
67
 The ultimate aim is 
for it to evolve into an institution with full legislative power, with the members who are currently 
appointed,
68
 elected by universal suffrage.
69
 
The Commission comprises ministers responsible for the economic development, planning 
and integration of each member state. They may be assisted, as and when necessary, by other 
ministers. Representatives of RECs participate in meetings of the Commission and its subsidiary 
organs. The Commission‘s functions include: prepare programmes, policies and strategies for co-
operation in the fields of economic and social development among African countries on the on 
hand, and between Africa and the international community on the other, and make appropriate 
recommendations to the Assembly, through the Council; coordinate, harmonize, supervise and 
follow-up the economic, social, cultural, scientific and technical activities of the Secretariat, of the 
Committees and any other subsidiary body; examine the reports and recommendations to the 
Assembly, through the Council, and ensure their follow-up; make recommendations to the 
Assembly, through the Council with a view to co-ordinating and harmonizing the activities of the 
different RECs; supervise the preparation of international negotiations, assess the results thereof 
and report thereon to the Assembly through the Council. 
The composition and function of the Court of Justice is discussed in detail in Chapter Six.
70
 
The Secretary-General directs the activities of the Secretariat and is its legal representative. The 
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Secretary-General performs the following functions: follow up and ensure the implementation of 
the decisions of the Assembly and the application of the regulations of the Council; promote 
development programmes as well as projects of the Community; prepare proposals concerning the 
programme of activity and budget of the Community and upon their approval by the Assembly 
ensure the implementation thereof; submit a report on the activities of the Community to all 
meetings of the Assembly, the Council and the Commission; prepare and service meetings of the 
Assembly, the Council, the Commission and the Committees; carry out studies with a view to 
attaining the objectives of the Community and make proposals likely to enhance the functioning 
and harmonious development of the Community; recruit the staff of the Community and make 
appointments to defined posts.
71
 
It is important to set out the relationship between the AEC and the AU. In its founding 
treaty, the AEC is described as forming an ‗integral part‘ of the OAU.72 As an integral part of the 
OAU, the AEC is a distinct organization with economic integration as its object. Its budget is 
linked to that of the OAU. In theory, the AEC could have maintained its separate institutions. In 
practice, that did not happen; the functions of its institutions were taken over by the co-ordinate 
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organs of the OAU.
73
 Indeed, articles 11(1) and 15(1) of the AEC Treaty expressly provided that 
the Council of Ministers and Economic and Social Commission [of the AEC] shall be the Council 
of Ministers and Economic and Social Commission of the OAU respectively.
74
 Membership of the 
AU is not coterminous with membership of the AEC; of the fifty-three AU member states, forty-





 has been replaced by the Constitutive Act of the African Union.
77
 In 
the Constitutive Act, member states affirmed their commitment to achieving the objectives of the 
AEC Treaty and promised to work to accelerate the establishment of the African Economic 
Community.
78
 No attempt was made to clarify the relationship between the AEC and the AU. The 
only provision that deals directly with the AEC is article 33(2). It provides that ‗the provisions of 
this Act shall take precedence over and supersede any inconsistent or contrary provisions of the 
Treaty establishing the African Economic Community‘. Undoubtedly, the AEC still constitutes an 
integral part of the AU.
79
 Accordingly, the functions of the AEC institutions have been taken over 
by the co-ordinate organs of the AU.
80
 However, in this thesis, unless an express inconsistency 
exists, in which case the provisions of the Constitutive Act of the African Union will prevail, 
reference will be made to the organs as established under the AEC Treaty. 
1.4.3 Economic Community of West African States 
The ECOWAS currently operates under the Revised
81
 Treaty establishing the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS Treaty). It has fifteen members, namely Benin, 
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Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d‘Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, 
Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. It began life under the Treaty establishing the 
Economic Community of West African States which came into force in June 1975. 
The aims of ECOWAS are to promote co-operation and integration, leading to the 
establishment of an economic union in West Africa in order to raise the living standards of its 
peoples, to maintain and enhance economic stability, foster relations among member states and 
contribute to the progress and development of the African continent.
82
 To these ends, members 
have agreed to ensure, in stages: the harmonization and co-ordination of national policies and the 
promotion of integration programmes, projects and activities, particularly in food, agriculture and 
natural resources, industry, transport and communications, energy, trade, money and finance, 
taxation, economic reform policies, human resources, education, information, culture, science, 
technology, services, health, tourism, legal matters;
83
 the establishment of a common market;
84
 and 
the establishment of an economic union through the adoption of common policies in the economic, 
financial social and cultural sectors, and the creation of a monetary union.
85
 
The principal institutions of ECOWAS are: the Authority of Heads of State and 
Governments; Council of Ministers; Community Parliament; Economic and Social Council; 
Community Court of Justice; Executive Secretariat; Fund for Co-operation, Compensation and 
Development, and Specialized Technical Commissions.
86
  
1.4.4 The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
The Treaty establishing the Common Market for Eastern Southern Africa (COMESA 
Treaty) entered into force in 1994. COMESA currently has nineteen members namely Burundi, 
Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, and 
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Zimbabwe. COMESA began life under the 1982 Treaty for the establishment of the Preferential 
Trade Area for Eastern and Southern African States. 
The objectives of COMESA include: attaining sustainable growth and development of its 
member states; promoting a more balanced and harmonious development of its production and 
marketing structures;
87
 promoting joint development in all fields of economic activity, and the joint 
adoption of macro-economic policies and programmes to raise the standard of living of its peoples; 
and fostering closer relations among its member states.
88
 To these ends, members have agreed to 
establish a customs union, abolish all non-tariff barriers to trade among themselves, establish a 
common external tariff and co-operate in customs procedures and activities.
89
 
The principal institutions of COMESA are the: Authority of Heads of State and 
Government; Council of Ministers; Court of Justice; Committee of Governors of Central Banks; 
Intergovernmental Committee; Technical Committees; Secretariat; and Consultative Committee.
90
 
1.4.5 East African Community 
The Treaty of the East African Community,
91
 which entered into force in 2001, established 
a community consisting of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. In 2008, the community was expanded to 
include Burundi and Rwanda. The history of the EAC dates back to colonial times.
92
 In its present 
form, the EAC is a resurrection of the East African Community established under the 1967 Treaty 
on East African Co-operation.
93
 
The objectives of the EAC include developing policies and programmes aimed at widening 
and deepening co-operation among the partner states in political, economic, social and cultural 
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fields, research and technology, defence, security, and legal and judicial affairs for the states‘ 
benefit.
94
 The EAC Treaty envisages a customs union, a common market and, ultimately, a 
political federation of the states involved.
95
 Currently, the EAC operates as a customs union and 
negotiations for a protocol on developing it into a common market are underway. 
 The principal institutions of the EAC are the Summit of Heads of State and Government, 
Council of Ministers, Co-ordination Committee, Sectoral Committees, East African Court of 
Justice, the East African Legislative Assembly and the Secretariat.
96
 
1.5 SOCIO-ECONOMIC MATRIX OF AFRICA’S ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
 The focus of this thesis is on relational issues of law in economic integration in Africa. 
However, a proper understanding of these issues will be enhanced with a background on the socio-
economic and political context of Africa‘s economic integration. The socio-economic and political 
factors provide the raison d’être for Africa‘s regional economic integration and, sometimes, 
condition their progress and effectiveness.  
 The RECs examined in this thesis comprise countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Except for 
COMESA, the communities consist of geographically-contiguous countries. Geographical 
proximity is often combined with common colonial experience such as with the EAC where all the 
founding members – Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda – were British colonies.97 From the perspective 
of the legal aspects of economic integration, this experience often translates into a common legal 
infrastructure – an important complement to economic integration. Many of the states examined 
adhere to the common, Roman-Dutch law or civil law tradition because of their colonial 
associations with Britain and France, and to a lesser extent Belgium, Portugal, Germany and the 
Netherlands.  
 As will be shown in parts of this thesis, the colonial legal legacy sometimes constrains 
economic integration. This is reflected in, for example, the approach of the common law countries 
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to giving effect to international law which has been extended to community law. But, at the same 
time, the colonial legacy can be meaningfully harnessed in addressing some of the challenges in 
integration, for example, on the issue of harmonization of laws.
98
 Geography is important to 
Africa‘s economic integration in another respect. Many African countries are landlocked; they 
depend on their neighbours with coastlines for access to transportation for their exports and 
imports. This creates a natural bond of inter-dependency.
99
  
 The communities share a common vision of promoting trade and economic development 
within their respective sub-regions. This vision is to be achieved through progress through the 
various stages of economic integration. To date, progress has been slow, especially for COMESA 
and ECOWAS, both of which have been in existence for decades. As noted above, COMESA 
became a customs union in 2009, ECOWAS is edging closer to creating a customs union and the 
EAC is already a customs union. The next stage for these communities would be to evolve into 
common markets. Indeed, the EAC is currently negotiating a common market protocol.
100
 The 
slow progress made by these communities can be attributed to a number of factors, including their 
size, internal political conflicts and multiple commitments of member states, which sometimes lead 
to legally-irreconcilable duties. For example, progress toward a customs union between COMESA 
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 The economic conditions in most of the member states of the communities are nothing to 
write home about.
102
 Some countries, such as Lesotho, Swaziland and Gambia, are so small that it 
is sometimes difficult to contemplate their economic survival as independent economic entities. 
Admittedly, the experiences of some ‗small states‘ such as Luxemburg, Liechtenstein indicate that 
size is not necessarily an obstacle to economic development. However, in Africa, this has not been 
the case. Indeed, the economic development of Lesotho and Swaziland is fostered by their close 




 The levels of intra-African trade are generally low.
104
 This is not because there are no 
reciprocal markets for each other‘s exports. Rather, it is due to numerous obstacles to trade. These 
include governments‘ unwillingness to surrender macro-economic policy-making to the dictates of 
a regional group, fear of tariff revenue loss, inadequate infrastructure, cumbersome customs 
procedures, political instability, and currency inconvertibility.
105
 Recent studies have shown that 
regional integration has generated significant increases in trade among African countries.
106
 
Indeed, a suggestion that the level of intra-African trade is low should be approached with caution. 
Official national trade statistics in Africa are often difficult to come by and the level of unrecorded 
trans-border trade is estimated to be high, if not higher than recorded trade.
107
 
 A key to successful integration is political stability, democratic governance, and the rule of 
law. A number of countries in the RECs examined in this thesis have suffered from political 
instability, undemocratic regimes and abuse of power. Political instability, which sometimes 
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translates into regional conflicts and frequent undemocratic changes in government, has been a 
drain on the progress of Africa‘s RECs. Their attentions have been directed more towards conflict 
resolution and prevention and diverted from promoting economic integration.
108
 For over a decade, 
ECOWAS through the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) struggled with conflicts in 
Liberia and Sierra Leone. The persistent conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo has also 
been a trouble spot in the southern African region.  
 Arguably, political instability can provide a boost to Africa‘s integration. It is difficult for 
economic allies to be at war with each other. Also, political instability suggests that governments 
committed to the course of integration should agree more readily to community policies. This 
averts the risk of the rejection of those policies when there is a change in government. Indeed, 
Kufuor notes that internal domestic strife threatened the ECOWAS member states‘ ruling elites 
and called for strong intervention from ECOWAS. He theorizes that these in part accounted for the 
revision of the 1975 ECOWAS Treaty to strengthen the community‘s institutions.109 It is also 
worth remembering that security considerations arising from threats posed by Apartheid South 
Africa informed the formation of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference, 
which is now the Southern African Development Community. 
1.6 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
 Chapter Two develops the thesis that effective economic integration is the product of 
properly structuring and managing, within well-defined legal frameworks, vertical, horizontal and 
vertico-horizontal relations among states, legal systems, laws and institutions. The chapter draws 
on the comparative jurisprudence, treaties and experiences of RECs, including some in Africa.  
 Chapter Three addresses the complex relationship between the AU, AEC and Africa‘s 
RECs. It draws on the emerging scholarship on international regime complexity. It argues that, to 
an extent, the character of international institutional density in Africa on the issue of economic 
integration is unique and presents its own challenges. It examines some of these challenges. 
Chapter Four focuses on the AEC. It examines aspects of the AEC Treaty with an eye on issues 
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such as the nature of the AEC‘s legal system, supremacy of community law, and harmonization of 
national laws. Without underplaying the importance of the issues examined it Chapters Three and 
Four, it must be cautioned that, given the state of development of the AEC – it is still in formation 
and its development is largely contingent on the development of the constituent RECs – a lot of the 
issues examined in both chapters will become more concrete in future.  
 Chapter Five draws on the concrete experiences of COMESA, EAC and ECOWAS with 
relational issues. It uses their constitutive treaties and the jurisprudence of their respective 
community courts. Although the jurisprudence is comparatively scant and has mainly dealt with 
issues not directly related to economic integration, the few that have offer very useful insights. The 
chapter examines how the RECs have approached relational issues and the limitations on their 
approach. Chapter Six will return to the AEC. With the experiences of COMESA, EAC and 
ECOWAS in mind, and against the background of the theory that structured relations between 
community and national institutions are important for effective economic integration, the chapter 
examines the adequacy of the institutions of the AEC. It devotes particular attention to the 
structure and jurisdiction of the African Court of Justice and examines whether it is adequately 
designed to meet the needs of economic integration. 
 Individuals play a central role in relational issues arising from economic integration. Their 
actions, especially through litigation, bring to the fore the existence and importance of the 
relational issues. They serve as mediums for creating relations between legal systems. This 
provides the background to Chapter Seven. The chapter assesses the implementation of community 
law within member states. This is an issue of direct concern to individuals who seek to benefit 
from community law in those member states. The chapter examines how national implementation 
of community law is approached within Africa‘s RECs and member states. It also assesses how 
national constitutions and jurisprudence may constrain or enhance the communities‘ vision of the 
place of their laws in member states. 
 The issue of the relations between community and member states is largely addressed by 
principles of public international law and national public or constitutional law. However, a place 
exists for private international law in approaching that particular issue. Accordingly, Chapter Eight 
addresses some relational issues arising from provisions in the treaties and other laws of the RECs 
on which public and private international law principles may have an impact. The chapter 
examines the impact that public and private international law may have on the effective operation 
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of community institutions. The focus is mainly on the judicial institutions of the RECs. Among the 
issues examined are: arbitral jurisdiction of the community courts; enforcement of their judgments; 
conflict of jurisdiction between community courts; and international jurisdiction co-operation 
between community and national courts. 
 Effective economic integration must strengthen horizontal relations between the constituent 
national legal systems. This is conducive for economic transactions. Chapter Nine uses private 
international law as a barometer to measure the extent to which African national legal systems 
currently relate to each other through the medium of litigation. The aim is to provide us with a 
sense of how African national legal systems are ‗integrated‘. Private international law principles 
co-ordinate or regulate relations between legal systems. It can aid or constrain economic 
integration processes and economic transactions which take place within them. A principal issue 
addressed in the chapter is the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. Enforcing 
foreign judgments is, perhaps, the best manifestation of how sovereign legal systems relate to the 
other; they validate and give effect to each other‘s norms. Chapter Ten provides the conclusion. 
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2 CHAPTER TWO: LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR ADDRESSING RELATIONAL 
ISSUES IN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
At present, the international community is witnessing a proliferation of RECs. They have 
become a predominant mode for organizing international trade.
1
 Each differs in its ultimate goal; it 
may create a free trade area, customs union, common market, economic union or complete 
economic integration.
2
 Whichever stage a REC is at, it is undeniable that economic integration 
results in a juxtaposition of states, laws, legal systems and institutions for the purpose of achieving 
a common economic vision. This creates a complex web of relations in which the principal actors 
are the community, member states, individuals and other international organizations. Accordingly, 
a fundamental challenge in economic integration is that of structuring and managing the relations 
between and among these actors. 
Relational issues of law in economic integration (relational issues)
3
 take on various forms. 
Among them are: the relations between the laws of a community (community law), its institutions 
and those of its member states; mechanisms for normative exchange or communication between a 
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absence of mutual trust among the relevant state parties, diversity in political ideology and political systems, lack of 
homogeneity in the level of economic development, and how to distribute evenly the benefits of economic integration. 
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community and its member states and member states inter se; jurisdictional conflicts between a 
community and its member states; the allocation of competences between a community and its 
member states; access of individuals to community institutions; and the recognition and 
enforcement of member state and community normative acts. The extent to which these issues are 
present in a community, how they are approached, and the urgency with which they are addressed 
have a direct relationship with the stage of integration reached or envisioned. The further economic 




This thesis argues that effective economic integration is the product of properly structuring 
and managing, within well-defined legal frameworks, vertical, horizontal and vertico-horizontal 
relations among states, legal systems, laws and institutions. In other words, a community must 
have well-structured and managed relations between itself and other legal systems as a necessary 
condition for its effectiveness. By structured relations, I am referring to a legal framework that: 
defines the relations between community and national laws; spells out the modalities for 
implementing community law in member states; defines the respective competences of the 
community and member states; and anticipates and provides rules for resolving conflicts of laws 
and jurisdictions. The object of such a legal framework should be to ensure the overall 
effectiveness of the community.  
The management of relational issues looks beyond the legal framework. Reciprocal trust 
and harmonious political co-existence among member states, education on community law and 
objectives, building up or nurturing constituencies with interest in the integration process, 
accessibility, the presence and free flow of information on community matters, and a general sense 
of the need for co-operation are all important in this regard. For example, a legal framework which 
allows individuals to rely on community law in member states will be useless unless it is 
complemented with education on and accessibility to community law. Also, that framework must 
be utilized by constituencies to champion their individual causes and the cause of promoting 
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integration. Similarly, a legal framework which gives national courts discretion to refer issues of 
interpretation of community law to a court established by a community (community court) will be 
ineffective if there is no reciprocal trust or co-operation between both courts. 
This chapter explores comparatively how communities all over the world have attempted to 
provide a legal framework which uses various principles and mechanisms of law to address 
relational issues. In general, these principles and mechanisms have their foundations in public and 
private international law. They are also influenced by domestic constitutional laws.
5
 I characterize 
them as relational principles of law for economic integration (relational principles). The chapter 
identifies and assesses relational principles used by communities to provide a legal framework for 
the relations between themselves and their member states, as well as among the member states. 
Without pretending that the list is exhaustive, the chapter argues that the identified relational 
principles are a necessary part of the constitutional architecture of communities and should 
influence their design, especially as they progress through the stages of economic integration. 
However, using the principles is not a sufficient condition for ensuring an effective community. 
Accordingly, the chapter examines the social-matrix within which the principles operate and 
argues that it often conditions their effectiveness.  
2.2 RELATIONAL ISSUES, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
For centuries, the relations between states and international organizations as well as among 
states have been addressed by public and private international law.
6
 International organizations and 
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states expect that their laws, or at least some of them, will be given effect and observed in other 
states. However, this expectation is often limited. A state cannot expect that its laws will be 
automatically applied in a foreign court. Indeed, at common law, foreign revenue, penal and other 
public laws will not be applied in a national court.
7
 A state cannot also expect that a foreign court 
will refer an issue of interpretation of its laws back to its courts for determination, or that its law 
will be accorded a status superior to the lex fori. From a dualist perspective, international law, 
especially treaty law cannot also claim to be directly part of, let alone superior to, national law. 
National courts can refuse to apply or put their own varying interpretations on international law. 
They are under no obligation to seek clarification from the international organization which 
adopted that law or an institution established by it. In other words, within a dualist state, foreign 
and international law enjoy no autonomous or privileged status. Individuals cannot have any 
directly enforceable rights, or directly imposed duties under international law, except those 
expressly created or imposed by national law. In other words, even though rights and 
responsibilities could be created for individuals at the international level, they remain ineffective at 
the national level unless they are so recognized under national law. Similarly, a right founded on 
foreign law is enforceable in another state only at the discretion of that state. Surely, this state of 
affairs affects the effectiveness of international law and foreign states‘ laws in other states. 
For international organizations, international lawyers have found ways of addressing this 
challenge to the effectiveness of international law. Firstly, in monism, they argue that international 
and national law are part of one legal order. Secondly, they have designated specialist norms such 
as ius cogens from which no derogations can be made, and customary international law, which 
some countries consider as automatically part of their laws. Finally, and more importantly for this 
chapter, they have elevated some organizations to the status of supranational organizations.  
Hay describes supranational organizations as organizations that ‗possess both independence 
from and power over their constituent states to a degree which suggests the emergence of a new 
federal hierarchy and which goes beyond traditional intergovernmental cooperation in the form of 
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international organizations‘.8 There are no accepted criteria of supranationlism. Independence of 
the organization from member states, the adoption of binding decisions by majority votes, the 
direct and binding effect of the organizations‘ laws on individuals in member states, financial 
autonomy, the impossibility of unilateral withdrawal from the organization, the power to enforce 
the organization‘s decisions even without the co-operation of governments such as by using 
national courts, parliaments or other member states, and the transfer of sovereign powers to the 
organization have all been suggested as relevant criteria.
9
 To Hay, the key to supranationalism is 




Supranationalism is not a static feature of international organizations. It is dynamic in 
nature. It may evolve with an organization. It may be limited to specific areas of an organization‘s 
activities; in other words, supranationalism and intergovermentalism may co-exist within the same 
organization but on different issues or subject matters. Supranationalism inversely relates to the 
sovereignty of member states of a supranational organization; the greater the loss of sovereignty, 
the more supranational the organization is. As Hay has argued, ‗with few exceptions ... the criteria 
for loss of sovereignty coincide with those which much of the literature regards as the elements of 
supranationalism. Thus, the concept of transfer of sovereignty may be the legal-analytical 
counterpart of the political-descriptive notion of supranationlism‘.11 
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Significantly, the international organizations that first demonstrated supranational 
characteristics were economic communities, namely the European Communities,
12
 and 
subsequently, the East African Community.
13
 The work of some international organizations may 
not directly affect many internal policies of member states. In contrast, the activities of economic 
communities have a direct impact on policies in member states. Their effectiveness may require a 
transfer of sovereign powers to the community as regards those activities. The European 
Communities and the East African Community were products of international law; they were all 
created by treaties.
14
 But, it was realized that, as regards their legal relations with member states‘ 
laws, a legal framework very different from that hitherto existing between international 
organizations and member states would be required to ensure their effectiveness.
15
 In his work on 
the subject, Weiler uses the concept of ‗normative supranationalism‘ to describe an aspect of this 
legal framework. Normative supranationalism is ‗concerned with the relationships and hierarchy 
which exist between community policies and legal measures on the one hand and competing 
policies and legal measures of the member states on the other‘.16 He provides three key elements or 
core attributes of the concept, namely direct effect, supremacy and pre-emption.
17
  
Weiler‘s analysis of normative supranationalism is important. He provides very useful 
analysis of the principles of direct effect and supremacy which are discussed below. But, to 
provide a more comprehensive and broader legal framework, it is helpful to look beyond ‗legal 
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measures‘ and focus on the broader notion of relations between legal systems,18 namely the 
community‘s and member states‘, international and regional. A robust legal framework for 
successful integration should not concentrate only on the relations between a community and its 
member states. It is equally important to provide a framework for the relations among member 
states of the community, as well as for the community‘s relations with legal systems outside its 
member states. Indeed, even as regards the relations between the community and member states, 
there are principles other than direct effect, supremacy and pre-emption, which are important.  
As noted above, the traditional rules of private international law, which determine the 
relations between state laws, sometimes affect the domestic effectiveness of foreign laws. To 
overcome this, and for the purposes of ensuring effective integration, some communities have 
made reform of traditional private international rules a key part their agenda. The reforms by the 
communities provide supranational coordination for the principles of a subject which, despite its 
name, is part of municipal law. For example, within the European Community (EC), a very 
restricted meaning is given to public policy – a concept which is often used in traditional private 
international law to exclude the application of foreign laws or deny recognition of foreign 
judgments.
19
 Certainly, an unrestricted invocation of public policy to deny the recognition of other 
member states‘ judgments, or the application of their laws, can restrict the free movement of 
persons, services and capital within the community.
20
 Also, there is the principle of mutual 
recognition, which, like choice of law, determines whether and to what extent domestic effect 
should be given to another member state‘s laws.21 Furthermore, the scope for the domestic 
application of other member states‘ laws is enhanced through definite and uniform choice of law 
rules on defined subject matters. 
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In summary, an effective legal framework to regulate community-state and interstate 
relations may have to depart from some traditional public and private international law principles. 
This should be borne in mind when creating a legal framework which aims at addressing the 
vertical, horizontal and vertico-horizontal relational issues arising in economic integration 
2.3 AN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY AS A LEGAL SYSTEM 
An economic community is not a state. However, an attribute it shares with states, which is 
important as far as its relations with member states and other entities is concerned, is that it 
constitutes a legal system with law-making and enforcement powers. The concept of a legal system 
is a difficult concept, but four elements are generally considered necessary for the existence of a 
legal system or legal order.
22
 Firstly, rules for conduct must be present. Secondly, there must be 
defined entities to which the rules apply or relate. These are the subjects of the legal system. The 
legal system confers benefits and imposes burdens on the subjects. Thirdly, there must be a source 
from which one can identify the rules that form part of the legal system. It is not every norm that 
can claim a legitimate place within a legal system. Finally there is the element of obligation to 
obey the norms of the legal system.
23
 This obligation is enforceable through both public and 
private means. The subjects must generally adhere to the rules of the legal systems. However, 
occasional infractions of specific rules do not necessarily negate the existence of the entire legal 
system. Hart captured these elements when he argued the following as the conditions for the 
existence of a legal system. They are: the existence of a union of primary rules of obligation and 
secondary rules of change, adjudication and recognition; the acceptance by officials of the system 
that the rule of recognition provides the standards of official behaviour; and the existence of 
general compliance with the rules that are valid under the system‘s rule of recognition.24 
These elements do not exhaust what may actually comprise a legal system. For example, 
Dworkin has ably demonstrated the importance of principles and policies to the operation of a 
legal system. To him, an undue emphasis on rules provides an inadequate account of a legal 
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 Additionally, the obligation to obey the laws of the legal system may be attributed to the 
legal subjects‘ appreciation of the benefits obedience brings, rather than any inherent force of the 
law or sanctions attached to it. In many instances, co-operation and compromise, rather than 
coercion, may be more effective methods for eliciting compliance with obligations imposed by the 
legal system.
26
 These are important considerations, especially when one applies the concept of 
legal system to institutions which consist of sovereign states such as economic communities. As 
Dowrick has observed in the context of the EC, one of its salient features is that ‗for the most part 
it is essentially a co-operative, a consensual system, not a coercive order‘.27 Member states‘ 
commitment to a community and their preparedness to make it work, more than anything else, 
guarantees the success of a community through compliance with its laws. 
Although jurists differ on the characteristics of a legal system, there is near unanimity, at 
least among legal positivists, on the requirement of an ultimate and unrivalled source for the valid 
norms of the legal system. Norms from this source cannot be contradicted or made subordinate to 
any other norm, except where that source so decrees. Thus, not only is the source important but 
also there must be clear rules on how norms emanating from it relate to other norms. As noted 
above, Hart, in The Concept of Law, described a legal system as a unity of primary and secondary 
rules, the latter comprising the rules of adjudication, change and recognition.
28
 The rule of 
recognition helps identify rules that are a valid part of the legal system‘s set of norms.29 John 
Austin wrote that a legal system must contain a determinate human superior, a ‗sovereign‘, who 
will issue commands to his subjects.
30
 Hans Kelsen also conceived of a legal system as a series of 
hierarchical norms that rest on the ‗grundnorm‘, which is the ultimate source of authority.31 The 
existence of an ultimate authority is not enough to constitute a legal system; however, its absence 
is fatal.  
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For an economic community, the fact that it should be the ultimate and unrivalled source of 
law on matters within its competence is particularly important. If member states exercise 
competences reserved for a community or interpret and apply community law without uniformity it 
can be inimical to a community‘s development. As will be discussed below, a number of relational 
principles such as supremacy of community law, interpretive autonomy and a preliminary 
reference procedure aim at ensuring that a community remains the ultimate and unrivalled source 
of law. The above conceptualizations of a legal system offer useful insights into understanding 
how economic communities relate to member states‘ legal systems. Indeed, commentators have 
applied these conceptualizations to the study of economic communities and other trade regimes. A 
similar exercise is undertaken as regards the African Economic Community in Chapter Four. For 
example, Jones argues that Hart‘s theory of a legal system provides a model and framework of 
analysis that illustrates, explains and supports the European Court of Justice‘s claim that there 
exists an autonomous European Community legal system.
32
  
There is need for caution in treating economic communities as legal systems. The 
traditional conceptualizations of a legal system have often been made from the perspective of 
states and not the organizations resulting from their coming together. Indeed, Kelsen conceived of 
only two legal systems – the many national legal systems and one international legal system. He 
did not extend the idea of a legal system to international organizations. Surely, a legal system 
which derives from several states will look different from that of a single state. For example, it will 
raise more complicated questions as to who its subjects are, and how it relates to them.  
In summary, like a state‘s legal system, an economic community is norm-generating. It is 
endowed with institutions with ultimate powers granted by treaty to make laws and enforce them. 
Its subjects are the member states, institutions and individuals to whom its laws may be directed. 
The founding treaty of a community – its grundnorm – often provides for sanctions for non-
compliance with its laws. But what is most important is member states‘ voluntary adherence to 
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community law. Relational principles are adopted by communities with the aim of enhancing their 
law-making and enforcement powers as a legal system. 
2.4 RELATIONAL PRINCIPLES FOR ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
2.4.1 Introduction 
As noted above, economic integration progresses through various stages – free trade area, 
customs union, common market, economic union and complete economic integration. The stages 
are not watertight. Nor is progress through them necessarily sequential. A community may 
manifest features which straddle the various stages.
33
 The extent to which relational principles are 
significant and merit application within the legal framework governing community-state and 
interstate relations varies with the stage of integration attained. A community which is merely a 
free trade area or customs union may apply a modest number of relational principles. But a 
common market or economic union is unlikely to be effective without utilizing many of them. This 
is because, the further one progresses through the stages of integration, the deeper the level and 
scope of community-state and interstate legal interactions become. And, the more immediate the 
need for a robust legal framework to regulate those interactions becomes. 
This section examines relational principles used by communities all over the world to 
regulate those interactions. It exposes the inadequacies of traditional public and private 
international laws in dealing with the relational issues faced by communities. It assesses the 
contribution each relational principle makes to ensure that community-state and interstate relations 
enhance the effectiveness of a community. 
2.4.2 The Relational Principles and Mechanisms 
2.4.2.1 Community Autonomy as the Foundation of Relations 
The autonomy of an international organization is a multifaceted concept. It covers a wide 
range of issues, including its separateness from member states, the independence of its institutions, 
finances and personnel, its ability to control the making, nature and effects of its law, and its ability 
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to act using its own legal personality. As with some international organizations, the autonomy of 
some economic communities is expressly provided for in their founding treaties.
34
 The treaty may 
confer a separate legal personality on a community to emphasize its separateness from member 
states.
35
 It may provide for the neutrality and independence of personnel of specific institutions 
within the organization. It may also confer exclusive or final jurisdiction to its judicial institutions 
to interpret community laws.
36
 Schilling characterizes this as ‗interpretive autonomy‘, and defines 
it to mean that only the institutions of the particular legal order are competent to interpret its 
constitutional and legal rules.
37
 Interpretive autonomy prevents institutions outside a community 
from interfering with the law-making and interpretation prerogatives of a community, and 




More often than not, one has to infer a community‘s autonomy from its founding treaty by 
examining its law-making powers, its legal status, modes for the application of its laws, and the 
character of its dispute settlement institutions. Seldom, if at all, will one find an express provision 
in a community‘s founding treaty that the community constitutes an autonomous and separate legal 
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 Indeed, a community‘s autonomy must often be earned through the decisive work of its 
institutions and personnel. It must also be supported by forces outside the community if it is to be 
sustained. In other words, attaining the status of an autonomous legal system will always involve 
legal and political contestation.  
Autonomy lies at the heart of any legal framework designed to regulate community-state 
relations. The relations between a community and its member states and, indeed, with other 
international organizations should be founded on the community‘s autonomy.40 Autonomy should 
be a key aspect of the supranational character of the organization. It provides the foundation for 
adopting and applying relational principles, which ensure the effectiveness of community laws vis-
à-vis their relations with the laws of other legal systems.
41
 In summary, pragmatically and 
theoretically, autonomy is a sine qua non for the creation and effective existence of a community 
legal system. 
Accordingly, an economic community which aims to be effective should strive for 
autonomy. But its legal system should not be self-contained; it should not be sealed off from the 
legal systems of member states and the international community. Indeed, it must interact with 
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 For example, the jurisprudence of a community‘s court should not be developed in ‗clinical 
isolation‘ from the jurisprudence of other international courts or international law generally.43 
However, community-state relations and the relations between a community and other 
international organizations should have as their ultimate object the enhancement of the objectives 
of the community. 
2.4.2.2 Direct Applicability of Community Law 
For international lawyers, a principal problem with international law is implementation at 
the national level or becoming part of national law. In dualist countries, as opposed to monist 
countries, the solution lies in transformation; international law must be implemented nationally 
using national constitutional procedures or measures. This opens the way to a number of 
difficulties: states may not implement international law at all; they may delay in implementing it; 
or they may implement it incompletely or partially.  
Some communities have found ways of bypassing these difficulties through the principle of 
direct applicability.
44
 It allows for the integration of community law into member states‘ legal 
systems without intervening national implementation procedures or measures.
45
 To the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ), direct applicability means that the entry into force of community law is 
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‗independent of any measure of reception into national law‘.46 This implies that direct applicability 
is concerned with how community law enters member states‘ legal systems, it is silent on the effect 
of community law once it so enters.
47
 
In community-state relations, direct applicability enhances community law in a number of 
ways. Firstly, a community may consist of monist and dualist countries. For such a community, 
direct applicability provides a uniform platform or procedure for the reception of community law 
into member states‘ legal systems. Community law takes effect in member states at the same time 
and without potentially varying preconditions based on national laws. By using direct applicability, 
delay in implementation, non-implementation and partial implementation of community law are 
avoided. Secondly, direct applicability maintains the specificity of community law in member 
states. It avoids a negative consequence of the dualist mode of nationally implementing 
international law, which is through an act of transformation such as with an Act of Parliament, 
parliamentary resolution, executive or legislative instrument. An Act of Parliament implementing 
international law is national law. Unless expressly stated, the Act does not enjoy any privileged 
status in national law. Accordingly, the Act is subject to national rules on the hierarchy of laws. 
Conflicts between the Act and another national law may be resolved by using internal conflict of 
laws rules such as lex posterior derogat priori. The same applies to using parliamentary 
resolutions, executive or legislative instruments to implement international law. 
The application of the lex posterior derogat priori rule to resolve conflicts between 
community and national laws can be inimical to vertical community-state relations.
48
 Direct 
applicability ensures that this does not happen. This is because even where community law 
conflicts with a national law, because each is of a different genus or to borrow from Hart‘s theory 
of legal system, each is subject to a different rule of recognition, it will be inappropriate to resolve 
the conflict using the lex posterior derogat priori rule.
49
 Also, by maintaining the distinct character 
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of community law, direct applicability enhances the prospect of using the preliminary reference 
procedure if the procedure is provided for in the community legal system. In other words, issues 
involving community law become more visible as a result of the distinct nature of the community 
laws involved. 
2.4.2.3 Direct Effect of Community Law 
It is largely insignificant if international law becomes part of national law but individuals 
cannot rely on it, or reliance on it is contingent on preconditions that make such reliance largely 
illusory. An example of the former is section 102(c) of the USA‘s Uruguay Round Agreements 
Act.
50
 Under section 101 of the Act, Congress approved the Uruguay Round Agreements, in other 
words, Congress gave the force of law to the Agreements in the USA. However, under section 
102(c) of the Act: 
No person other than the United States shall have any cause of action or defense 
under any of the Uruguay Round Agreements or by virtue of congressional 
approval of such an agreement, or may challenge, in any action brought under 
any provision of law, any action or inaction by any department, agency, or other 
instrumentality of the United States, any State, or any political subdivision of a 
State on the ground that such action or inaction is inconsistent with such 
agreement. 
Canada‘s World Trade Organization Agreement Implementation Act51 illustrates the latter 
position. Arguably, section 8 of the Act gives that Agreement the force of law in Canada. However 
under sections 5 and 6 of the Act:  
5. No person has any cause of action and no proceedings of any kind shall be 
taken, without the consent of the Attorney General of Canada, to enforce or 
determine any right of obligation that is claimed or arises solely under or by 
virtue of Part I or any order made under Part I. 
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6. No person has any cause of action and no proceedings of any kind shall be 
taken, without the consent of the Attorney General of Canada, to enforce or 
determine any right or obligation that is claimed or arises solely under or by 
virtue of the Agreement 
The above means of giving effect to international law, in this instance WTO law, when 
extended to community law renders it potentially ineffective, or subject to variable ‗force‘ in 
member states. The principle of direct effect, which is adopted in some communities, overcomes 
this.
52
 Direct effect enables individuals to invoke community law before a national court.
53
 It 
brings home to individuals rights created at the community level without subjecting the 
enforcement of those rights to varying nationally determined preconditions. It allows a national 
court to use community law as an independent, direct, and autonomous basis of its decision. Direct 
effect integrates community law into member states‘ legal systems by turning national courts and 
individuals into enforcers of community law. 
This should clarify the difference between the principles of direct applicability and direct 
effect.
54
 Direct applicability deals with the processes or means by which community law is 
implemented nationally. Direct effect deals with the legal enforceability of rights created by the 
laws which have become part of national law. Thus, although all directly effective laws are part of 
national law, not all directly applicable laws are directly effective; indeed, it is trite that not all 
laws are enforceable. A directly applicable law may be so vague, ambiguous, conditional, or so 
targeted at a particular group or issue, that a legally enforceable right cannot be founded on it. 
Surely, this does not mean that such a law is useless in a state. It might, for example, inform a 
court‘s interpretation of another national law, or be a basis for political agitation for reform and 
change.  
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2.4.2.4 Supremacy of Community Law 
Community-state relations extend beyond the issues of how community law becomes part 
of national law, and whether community law can be enforced in national courts. An equally 
important issue to be taken into account in providing a legal framework to regulate community-
state relations is the prospect of conflict between community and national laws. As regards public 
international law, states often rely on ordinary rules of statutory interpretation, such as the lex 
posterior derogat priori and lex specialis derogat generali principles, which rely on the nature of 
the conflicting laws (e.g. an Act of Parliament versus a subsidiary legislation), or constitutional 
provisions which declare international law as superior or subordinate in cases of conflict. States 
vary in their approach to resolving internal conflict of laws. And, not all approaches are or will be 
favourable to maintaining vertical community-state relations. 
The principle of supremacy of community law overcomes this challenge to vertical 
community-state relations. It provides a uniform and community interest-oriented solution to 
conflicts between community and national law. Supremacy may be enshrined in a community‘s 
founding treaty,
55
 or it may be judicially decreed through a teleological interpretation of the 
treaty.
56
 The principle of supremacy enhances community law in that it bypasses potentially 
inimical national internal conflict of laws rules. It affirms the autonomy of the community legal 
system, ensures that the community law is not overridden by national law, and fosters a coherent 
community legal system.  
To an extent, the principle of supremacy operates like choice of law rules in private 
international law; in cases of conflict, it mandates a choice of community law as the applicable 
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law. But, unlike in private international law, the mandate admits no exceptions or limitations. A 
national court cannot exclude or deny the application of community law on the grounds that it 
violates the forum‘s public policy or that it is a penal or revenue law. Thus, the principle is 
designed to enhance community law by moving beyond traditional private international law 
principles on the relations between the lex fori and lex causae.  
The principle of supremacy should also be distinguished from provisions often found in the 
founding treaties of communities which oblige member states to ensure the conformity of their 
laws with community law.
57
 In theory, such provisions are not conflict of laws resolution 
provisions. They could be characterized as law-implementation provisions. They look to the 
executive and legislature rather than the judiciary for action. Their violation will often be a breach 
of an international obligation remediable at the international rather than the national level. What 
the principle of supremacy declares is that where national law is not in conformity with community 
law, national courts should give preference to and apply community law. 
2.4.2.5 Preliminary Reference Procedure 
The application of law often entails issues of interpretation and the concomitant problem of 
who should be the ultimate interpreter of a particular law. For example, in some states, the 
interpretation of the national constitution is reserved for the Supreme Court. A lower court faced 
with an issue of interpretation relating to the constitution must refer that issue to the Supreme 
Court. International law has no such ultimate interpreter: a national court is not barred from putting 
its own meaning on words in an international treaty which has been implemented domestically; it 
has no jurisdiction nor, indeed, standing to refer interpretive problems to the International Court of 
Justice; and the state in which the interpretive problem has arisen cannot, on its own, request an 
advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice.
58
 Extending this state of affairs to 
community law will imply that although national courts may give effect to community law, they 
can interpret it differently. Accordingly, community law will not be applied uniformly in member 
states.  
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A preliminary reference procedure as part of the legal framework regulating community-
state relations helps to overcome this challenge. In general, it is a procedure in the administration 
of justice which allows a lower court to seek interpretive guidance from a superior court on a point 
of law before making a final determination consistent with the superior court‘s ruling. In the 
context of economic integration, it unites community and national courts in an integrated system of 
judicial decision-making. In other words, it creates an organic or institutional link between 
community and national courts. The procedure provides a means through which the meaning of 
law is diffused into member states to be applied by their courts.  
The efficacy of the procedure depends on whether or not it is mandatory, the willingness of 
national courts to find an interpretive problem and make a reference, the ability of a community 
court to influence national courts to make reference, and whether the interpretation given by a 
community court is binding on all national courts within the community. Within the EC, the 
influence of the ECJ has been achieved largely through the use of this procedure. Indeed, 
Richemont describes it as the ‗keystone of the Communities legal structure‘.59 More recently, the 
importance of the procedure has also been demonstrated in the Andean Community.
60
 Because the 




Another procedure for institutionalizing relations between community and national legal 
systems akin to the preliminary reference procedure is to allow national institutions to seek 
advisory opinion from community institutions, including its courts, on issues of community law. 
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This procedure is reflected in article 2020 of the North American Free Trade Agreement.
62
 It 
provides in part: 
If an issue of interpretation or application of this Agreement arises in any 
domestic judicial or administrative proceeding of a Party that any Party considers 
would merit its intervention, or if a court or administrative body solicits the 
views of a Party, that Party shall notify the other Parties and its Section of the 
Secretariat. The [Free Trade Commission] shall endeavor to agree on an 
appropriate response as expeditiously as possible. The Party in whose territory 
the court or administrative body is located shall submit any agreed interpretation 
of the Commission to the court or administrative body in accordance with the 
rules of that forum 
2.4.2.6 Individuals’ Participation and Standing 
Historically, individuals were not considered subjects of international law; only states were. 
Individuals did not have standing before international courts and could not participate on their own 
in international decision-making. Increasingly, this is ceasing to be so; individuals are now 
potential subjects of international law, they have standing before international courts and can 




For communities which aim to strengthen their relations with member states, individuals 
are a particularly important medium. Admittedly, a community that envisions its subjects as only 
member states may not necessarily be concerned with integrating individuals into its activities. For 
such an ‗inter-governmental‘ organization, there is no direct role for individuals. On the other 
hand, a community that envisions individuals as its subjects will have avenues to encourage and 
facilitate their participation in its activities. Through various means, such communities strive to 
enhance individuals‘ participation in their economic integration processes. For a community‘s 
legal system, this is important. A legal system thrives on its legitimacy. It must be legitimate in the 
eyes of its subjects to merit their adherence to its laws. In the context of economic integration, 
participation ensures the legitimacy of the community legal system. It is also a means by which the 
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community and national legal systems interact with each other. The laws generated as a result of 
individuals‘ participation in the law-making processes of the community can in turn become a 
source of normative change within member states. For example, a finding by a community court 
that national law is inconsistent with community law may lead to reform, review or abolition of 
that national law. 
International organizations have seldom made use of legislative organs whose membership 
is drawn directly from parliaments of member states, or elected through universal suffrage from 
member states. However, increasingly, community parliaments, such as the European Parliament 
and East African Legislative Assembly, are being used by communities to ensure people‘s 
participation in community legislative processes. Both have full legislative powers, and members 
of the former are elected by universal suffrage. Other community parliaments, such as the 
Economic Community of West African States‘ Parliament and the Pan-African Parliament, have 
only advisory roles.  
Another means of participation increasingly used by communities is granting individuals 
standing before their respective community courts. Indeed, as a departure from the historical 
position in international law, a number of communities currently allow individuals to litigate 
directly against member states and the organizations‘ institutions before their community courts.64 
The communities vary in the preconditions to standing before the community courts, and also over 
what measures can be challenged. Some communities provide for unconditional and direct 
individual standing,
65
 others provide standing but with the leave of the community court,
66
 and 
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These preconditions to standing sometimes pose difficulties for individuals. But, from the 
perspective of community-state relations, they could be important. The exhaustion of local 
remedies rule is illustrative of this. This rule of international procedural law provides that ‗a state 
should be given the opportunity to redress an alleged wrong within the framework of its own 
domestic legal system before its international responsibility can be called into question at [the] 
international level‘.68 In other words, national mechanisms for the redress of alleged wrongs 
should be resorted to prior to invoking international avenues. In classical international law, the rule 
serves as a source of deference to states; it upholds and protects state sovereignty.
69
  
In economic integration, the rule creates relations between a community and member 
states. It regulates jurisdictional interactions between national and community courts. It allows 
national courts to have a ‗first bite at the cherry‘ in cases involving community law before the 
community court has the last word.
70
 In the words of Amerasinghe, ‗national courts perform 
functions as agents of the international legal order... ‘.71 Through this, national courts become 
engaged and familiar with community law, indeed the rule sometimes performs an educational 
function. Also, national courts become validated and legitimized when their decisions are 
ultimately upheld by a community court. It has been argued that this encourages national courts to 
forge a stronger bond with the community legal system.
72
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2.4.2.7 Inter-system Jurisprudential Communication 
Apart from relational principles which integrate community law into the legal systems of 
member states through direct implementation, a legal framework on community-state relations 
should also emphasize indirect ways of exchanging norms. Whilst the direct means of 
implementation such as direct effect and direct applicability are uni-dimensional – from 
community to member states – indirect means of implementation emphasizes mutual exchange. An 
example of an indirect means of implementation is what I characterize as inter-system 
jurisprudential communication. This is a process by which law flows between legal systems. 
Civilizations thrive on borrowing; so do legal systems. Inter-system jurisprudential communication 
emphasizes comparativism and should take place at both legislative and judicial levels. Inter-
system jurisprudential communication strengthens the relational bond between a community and 
member states; both become sensitive to each other‘s jurisprudence. This enhances the prospect 
that community law will fit into or be well received in member states.
73
 
In making community law, the community legislator or court may take as its starting point 
the laws of member states. It may also borrow from the jurisprudence of other communities or 
generally from international law. Indeed, in some instances, community law expressly enjoins 
reliance on national law in the resolution of disputes before community institutions.
74
 But, even in 
the absence of this express mandate, the use of extra-community laws may be legally supported. 
The founding treaties of some communities mandate their courts to ensure that, in the 
interpretation and application of the treaty, ‗the law is observed‘,75 or to ‗ensure adherence to 
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law‘.76 This suggests that there is a wider legal context within which the treaty and law made under 
it should operate. In other words, the treaty and laws made under it are the nucleus of a more 
extensive legal order.
77
 Arguably, this legitimizes resorting to general principles of law
78
 as well as 
other legal principles developed in member states, other communities and international 
organizations. 
Because of the importance of inter-system jurisprudential communication, a community 
should have institutional mechanisms designed to facilitate communication between it and member 
states. For example, the fact that judges of a community court are drawn from national courts, that 
representatives in a community parliament are nominated from national parliaments, and that there 
are institutionalized workshops and seminars which bring together community legislators and 
judges and their national counterparts is important in this respect. In addition to communication 
between a community and its member states, member states should also communicate with each 
other. National legislators and judges may draw on jurisprudence from other states in making laws 
or deciding cases.
79
 This promotes the harmonization of laws across the community. 
Communication between states is enhanced if they all adhere to the same legal tradition. However, 
the diversity of legal traditions should not necessarily hinder it.
80
 In summary, jurisprudential 
communication and mechanisms which enhance it should be key components of a legal framework 
designed to regulate community-state and interstate relations. 
2.4.2.8 Interpretive and Adjudicative Relational Principles 
Legal systems possess interpretive and adjudicative principles that allow them to take 
account of foreign laws in resolving disputes. Examples of these principles are the principle of 
consistent interpretation, choice of law, the doctrine of judicial notice and rules of evidence on 
foreign law. Considerations of justice, comity, effectiveness and efficiency in the administration of 
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justice influence the use of these principles. These principles can be applied to community law to 
enhance its effectiveness in member states. The utility of these principles is that, compared with 
other modes of implementing community law such as direct applicability, the relevant community 
law need not already part of national law. In other words, even without direct applicability or a 
national statute implementing community law, it can still be used beneficially in member states.  
The principle of consistent interpretation enjoins national courts to interpret national law in 
conformity with public international law so as to give effect to the latter.
81
 There are constitutions 
and statutes that endorse this principle. For example, article 233 of the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa, 1996, provides that ‗when interpreting any legislation, every court must prefer any 
reasonable interpretation of the legislation that is consistent with international law over any 
alternative interpretation that is inconsistent with international law‘.82 The absence of a 
constitutional or statutory endorsement of the principle is not fatal to its application. Indeed, it has 
been suggested that, on the whole, the application of the principle is only marginally influenced by 
constitutional provisions, and can be relied on by national courts in most instances.
83
 Community 
law may also enjoin national courts to apply the principle of consistent interpretation.
84
  
The principle of consistent interpretation enables courts to escape the strictures of the 
monist-dualist approaches to the relationship between international and national law. It can be 
applied by national courts under either tradition. Unlike other means for giving effect to 
                                                          
 
81
 Katrine Sawyer, ―The Principle of ‗interpretation conforme‘: How far can or should National Courts go when 
Interpreting National Legislation Consistently with European Community Law‖ (2007) Statute L. Rev. 165; Garrit 
Betlem & Andre Nollkaemper, ―Giving Effect to Public International Law and European Community Law before 
Domestic Courts: A Comparative Analysis of the Principle of Consistent Interpretation‖ (2003) Eur. J. Int‘l L. 569 at 
571. 
82
 This provision was invoked to ‗give effect‘ to article 11 of the WTO Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1994 in Progress Office Machines v. South African Revenue Services 
2008 (2) S.A. 13. See generally Gray S. Eisenberg ―The GATT and the WTO Agreements: Comments on their Legal 
Applicability to the Republic of South Africa‖ (1993-4) 19 South Afr. Y. B. Int‘l L. 127. 
83
 Betlem & Nollkaemper, supra note 81 at 571. 
84
 Von Colson and Kamann v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, Case 14/83, [1984] E.C.R. 1891. The foundation of this 
European Court of Justice decision is in article 10 of the EC Treaty which provides that ‗Member States shall take all 
appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of this Treaty or 
resulting from action taken by the institutions of the Community. They shall facilitate the achievement of the 
Community's tasks. They shall abstain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the objectives of 
this Treaty‘. Similar provisions are found in a number of other regional economic integration treaties. See e.g. 




community law, there is no justiciability test for the community law that is to be given effect under 
the principle. In other words, community law need not be of any specific quality; indeed, it is 
suggested that a court can look beyond ‗law‘ and take account of a community‘s goals and 
objectives. It must be noted that there are limitations on the use of the principle of consistent 
interpretation. Its application is contingent on the national text which is being interpreted; where 
there is no question of interpretation or where national law is not open to an interpretation which 
can be in conformity with community law, the principle cannot be applied. 
National courts may take judicial notice of the existence of a community, its objectives and 
goals or particular community laws.
85
 These may be may be treated as a fact which needs not be 
proved.
86
 In other words, the failure of a party to plead them should not prevent the court from 
taking account of them and allowing them to influence the courts‘ decisions. Also, unlike the way 
common law courts treat foreign law, the meaning, effect and proof of community law can be 
deemed questions of law, and, accordingly, a party need not prove it with expert evidence. This 
will reduce litigation costs and enhance the prospect of individuals relying on community law. In 
summary, what is being argued here is that a court can, subject to limitations imposed by national 
law, remedy the ignorance of counsel or a party about the possibilities that community law, goals 
and objectives offer to its case. 
It is also possible for courts to apply community law as the applicable law if parties have so 
chosen. To be sure, this presumes the existence of a body of substantive community law on the 
issue and a judicial philosophy which upholds party autonomy. In such an instance the relevant 
community law need not have been implemented in national law.
87
 For example, with a view to 
enhancing intra-community trade, a community can adopt a set of principles on contract law which 
are not directly applicable and which member states need not incorporate into their national laws. 
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These principles can be chosen by individuals as the applicable law of their contracts, and have 
that choice respected by the courts. 
2.4.2.9 Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Normative Acts 
The phrase ‗normative act‘ is used here to cover judicial decisions, laws, and administrative 
and executive acts which produce legal consequences. The recognition and enforcement of foreign 
normative acts, a key aspect of private international law, is a means through which legal systems 
interact. In economic integration, the recognition and enforcement of state and community 
normative acts facilitate their effective implementation and enhances cross-border economic 
transactions. Accordingly, a regime for the recognition and enforcement of foreign normative acts 
should be a key part of a community‘s legal framework on community-state as well as interstate 
relations. Indeed, as Professor Casad has observed, ‗an effective scheme for the mutual recognition 
and enforcement of civil judgments‘ is a feature of any economic integration initiative ‗likely to 
achieve significant integration‘.88 
Already, many states have regimes regulating the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
normative acts. These regimes are often imbued with discretionary elements, may be founded on 
reciprocity, and may exclude certain normative acts from recognition and enforcement. For 
example, in common law countries, the courts will not apply foreign revenue, penal or other public 
law. Also, aside from the many defences available to a judgment-debtor, there is no automatic right 
to have a foreign judgment recognized and enforced. Where statutes exist to regulate foreign 
judgment enforcement, they may be founded on reciprocity and only a few community member 
states may be designated. It is also important to note that state regimes on the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign normative acts have often been developed for normative acts emanating 
from other states. Accordingly, their extension to community normative acts, such as community 
court judgments, may be problematic. All these can pose difficulty for the free circulation of 
normative acts within a community and concomitantly adversely affect economic transactions. 
Accordingly, a legal framework to regulate relational issues in integration should pay attention to 
the regimes for the recognition and enforcement of normative acts which exist in the member 
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states. Indeed, some communities have developed or encouraged schemes
89
 or principles aimed at 
ensuring the free circulation of normative acts.
90
 
2.5 RELATIONAL PRINCIPLES – FEATURES, INTER-RELATIONS AND THE 
IMPORTANCE OF CONTEXT 
2.5.1 Introduction 
 In the preceding sections, I have argued that a fundamental challenge for economic 
integration is structuring and managing relations between states, laws, legal systems and 
institutions. It has been suggested that, in structuring these relations, a legal framework is needed. 
Various principles and mechanisms that should be part of this framework have been discussed. 
Admittedly, the principles and mechanisms discussed above are all legal in nature. This is not 
meant to deny or underplay the importance of ‗non-legal‘ factors that serve to strengthen 
community-state and interstate relations. Examples of these factors are education and awareness 
creation about the work of a community, a commitment to common values and the degree of socio-
cultural and ethnic homogeneity of a community‘s citizens. Ignorance and socio-cultural diversity 
engender a sense of alienation and indifference which can weaken community-state and interstate 
relations.
91
 This section assesses the features and relationships between relational principles, and 
the importance of the socio-cultural and political context within they operate. 
2.5.2 Features and Interrelationships 
 A defining feature of relational principles is that they intrude into national legal systems 
and could potentially be construed as eroding sovereignty. The extent of intrusion will vary from 
country to country. For example, a number of states, especially of the civil law tradition, have 
already made international law part of their law, granted it precedence over conflicting national 
laws, and allowed courts to directly apply it.
92
 For such countries, direct applicability, direct effect 
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and supremacy may not be entirely unfamiliar principles. Also, in some common law countries, 
customary international law is often considered as being automatically part of national law. But, it 
must be admitted that community law will hardly ever qualify as customary international law. 
Also, many countries have procedures akin to the preliminary reference procedure which allows 
lower courts to seek interpretive guidance from superior courts on defined points of law. From a 
private international law perspective, the principles of direct applicability, direct effect and 
supremacy have some affinity with how foreign law is treated in states. Courts allow parties to 
found claims on foreign laws (direct effect). These laws need not be, indeed are not, implemented 
domestically (directly applicable), and, in some instances, the court may give effect to a foreign 
law even though it is inconsistent with a substantive law of the forum (supremacy). In other words, 
in almost all states within a community, there will be principles and procedures akin to some of the 
relational principles discussed above. The existence of these pre-existing national principles and 
procedures can be deployed as analogies in invoking relational principles in states. 
 A careful look at relational principles also reveals that some contain elements of deference 
to states. For example, with direct effect, the enforcement of community laws begins and 
potentially ends at the national level. A state is not dragged, at the first instance, to a community 
forum for its breaches of community laws to be ‗exposed‘. The exhaustion of local remedies rule 
contains a similar deferential element. The same case can be made for the principle of supremacy 
of community law. Its effect is to compel the disapplication and not the abrogation of the national 
law to the issue at stake. The national law remains intact and could be applied to cases falling 
outside the scope of the relevant community law, as for example in cases involving non-member 
states of a community. A state may decide, in the light of the conflict, to amend the affected law, 
but in principle, the principle of supremacy of community law does not require that. Furthermore, 
direct effect and direct applicability need not be extended to all community laws; some community 
law may be in a form that allows member states to implement it in a manner appropriate to them 
without defeating community objectives. 
 At the community level, the adoption of principles such as supremacy and direct 
applicability suggests the need for attention to detail and sensitivity in law-making. This is 
necessary to ensure the smooth integration of community law into national law. This is especially 
important in a community in which member states belong to different legal traditions. In other 
words, the intrusiveness of relational principles can be mitigated by attention to national exigencies 
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in the community law-making creation processes. Indeed, inter-system jurisprudential 
communication and the participation of individuals in a community‘s lawmaking processes can be 
helpful in achieving this. 
 Another important feature of relational principles is their interconnectedness. Often, one 
cannot be effectively deployed without its complement. For example, the principles of direct effect 
and supremacy are ‗tightly connected‘.93 The principles of direct applicability and supremacy 
create favourable conditions for the effective operation of direct effect. The enforcement of rights 
created by a community becomes illusory if a conflicting national law prevailed. Similarly, direct 
effect and the preliminary reference procedure create a trilateral relationship among individuals, 
national courts and the community court for the effective enforcement of community law. A legal 
framework to regulate community state relations must pay attention to the interconnectedness of 
these principles. 
2.5.3 Importance of Context 
 The social-matrix within which a legal system operates is as important as its substantive 
contents. Socio-cultural, economic and political conditions affect the extent to which relational 
principles can be effectively adopted or made to operate within a community and its member 
states. Indeed, they condition the extent to which states will be receptive to community law and 
normative acts of other member states. Merely providing for relational principles in treaties – as 
has been done in the founding treaties of many communities, often with inspiration from Europe – 
will not guarantee their use or effectiveness.  
 Indeed, to date, it appears that it is only within the EC that many of the relational principles 
operate most effectively. A recent study on the Andean Community by Helfer, Alter and 
Guerzovich suggests that whilst the overall experiment of economic integration may be judged 
unsuccessful, the use of some relational principles can enhance integration on specific subject 
matters.
94
 Arguably, apart from the EC, communities, including those in Africa, that have adopted 
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relational principles in their founding treaties are at an early stage of development. For the African 
communities, an appreciable body of community law and case law has yet to emerge. It is too early 
to make a detailed and objective assessment of the success or otherwise of the principles adopted 
by them. As revealed in this thesis, the obstacles to their effective implementation are many. 
However, the Helfer, Alter and Guerzovich study suggests that these principles, or at least some of 
them, can be made to work outside Europe. 
 The architecture of national legal systems as well as domestic institutional and socio-
cultural features affects the extent to which community and national legal systems can be 
integrated. Neither the fact that relational principles contain elements of deference to states nor that 
they are complementary imply that they will be adopted wholesale or that their application will not 
meet resistance at the national level. Resistance could be the result of existing socio-cultural and 
political conditions in member states.
95
 A country‘s legal system is part of its cultural heritage. It is 
an aspect of the state‘s social life and may be resistant to outside ‗intrusions‘. For example, studies 
have shown that, within the European Community, the effective implementation of community law 
is inextricably linked with social and cultural processes within member states.
96
 In the words of 
Wallace, ‗legal culture constitutes a significant factor in the process of European integration‘.97 
More recently, Biukovic has demonstrated the importance of local practices and cultural norms in 
Japanese and Chinese compliance with WTO norms.
98
 
 Indeed, legal culture – the assemblage of a society‘s attitudes, perceptions and ways of 
dealing with the law – may influence the extent to which states comply with community law or 
become legally integrated. A culture that favours respect for the rule of law and international law, 
emphasizes litigation and the pro-active use of law as an instrument of change and development, is 
endowed with an activist and independent judiciary and lawyers with international perspectives, 
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and is possessed of national actors and forces interested in the integration process, is more likely to 
favour the effective integration of community law into member states for the achievement of the 




 Relational issues are an endemic challenge in economic integration. How they are 
approached affects the effectiveness of the integration process, especially as regards the 
implementation of community law. There have been varying responses from communities to this 
challenge. It has been noted that, in meeting the challenge, communities have deployed various 
relational principles and mechanisms. These principles and mechanisms often depart from the 
traditional private and public international law modes of giving effect to foreign and international 
law. At first sight, relational principles and mechanisms appear very intrusive of national legal 
systems. But, it has been noted that they also contain elements of deference to states. The effective 
deployment of these principles and mechanisms demand constitutional accommodation in member 
states. It requires a rethink of existing national laws and procedures, and the legislature, judiciary 
and executive have a crucial role to play in this regard. In addition, there are various socio-cultural, 
economic and political factors that may affect the effective use of relational principles in regulating 
community-state relations. 
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3 CHAPTER THREE: THE AU, AEC AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC COMMUNITIES: 
A COMPLEX WEB OF LEGAL RELATIONS 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Africa is awash with regional economic communities (RECs). Indeed, as far back as 1976, 
Ajomo picturesquely described the ‗mercurial proliferation and disappearance‘ of regional 
economic institutions in Africa.
1
 For political, economic and strategic reasons many countries 
belong to more than one REC. The multiplicity of RECs and the concomitant multiple state 
memberships have created a complex patchwork that complicates decision-making for states, 
community officials, individuals and businesses. In what is, to date, the only detailed continent-
wide empirical study into the effect of the twin phenomena of many RECs and multiple 
memberships, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) concluded that the 
phenomena impact negatively on the achievement of the goals of the African Economic 
Community (AEC).
2
 In June 2009, some member states could not join the newly formed 
COMESA customs union due to the fact they belonged to other RECs. The phenomena also impact 
negatively on Africa‘s international trade relations. In the recent European Union led Economic 
Partnership Agreements negotiations, countries in Eastern and Southern Africa – the regions where 




Against this background, a fundamental issue with Africa‘s economic integration is the 
relationship between the African Union (AU), RECs and AEC. This is a complex question. But, so 
far, it has not received any systematic examination in the discourse on Africa‘s economic 
integration.
4
 Finding answers to it and clarifying the relationship are important for the success of 
economic integration in Africa. 
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The proliferation of RECs in Africa is part of a wider international phenomenon, the 
proliferation or increased density of international institutions. Against the background of this 
phenomenon, scholars have recently begun to discuss in great detail theories on ‗regime 
complexes‘5 or ‗international regime complexity‘.6 A regime complex is an ‗array of partially 
overlapping and non-hierarchical institutions governing a particular issue-area‘.7 The components 
of a regime complex are the ‗elemental regimes‘.8 International regime complexity refers to the 
presence of nested, partially-overlapping, and parallel international regimes that are not 
hierarchically ordered.
9
 International regime complexity empowers and dis-empowers.
10
 It may 
work to the advantage of certain groups by providing opportunities for ‗forum shopping‘ and 
arbitrage.
11
 It may also disadvantage certain states or groups, such as on the basis of the sheer 
volume of information that has to be processed from the various regimes. 
Studies on regime complexes help in understanding the relations between the many RECs 
in Africa. These RECs are non-hierarchical regimes with overlapping membership and jurisdiction. 
However, in terms of the focus of this chapter, there is one limitation in the studies I have so far 
examined which is worth pointing out to avoid a misreading. The existing studies have focused 
mainly on the evolution and interactions between rules or norms generated by elemental regimes of 
a regime complex. However, this chapter focuses principally on the institutional aspects of the co-
existence of elemental regimes. In other words, the focus is mainly on institutions, not the norms 
generated by the institutions. Specifically, the chapter addresses the issue: how do the RECs as 
regional institutions relate to each other and with the AU and AEC? Also, the issues discussed in 
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this chapter arise largely from the specific and apparently unique character of institutional density 
on economic integration in Africa. That is, the RECs ostensibly operate under an umbrella regime, 
the AEC, and their activities should be geared towards the realization of one objective, the creation 
of an African Economic Community. Thus, unlike other complex regimes, what exists in Africa is 
a complex regime on economic integration consisting of many elemental regimes (the RECs) and 
an umbrella regime (the AEC) all working towards a common and singular treaty mandated vision. 
3.2 THE EXISTING REGULATORY LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
International regime complexity on many issues, such as intellectual property protection, 
human rights, international security and environment do not have an overarching or umbrella 
regime that regulates the multiple regimes dealing with the particular issue. Arguably, as regards 
international trade in goods and services and regional trade agreements, an overarching regime 
apparently exists in the World Trade Organization (WTO).
12
 WTO law provides the legal 
foundation for regional trade agreements on goods and services. The WTO has mechanisms for 
notifying such agreements, reviewing them and for monitoring their compliance with WTO law. 
Such mechanisms do not affect the non-hierarchical nature of regional trade agreements. But, the 
mechanisms could have ensured a measure of co-ordination and harmonization among them 
through their compliance with a higher norm - WTO law. However, as scholars have noted, the 




Unlike with the WTO and regional trade agreements, international regime complexity on 
economic integration in Africa benefits from an umbrella regime, the AEC, and a modest 
regulatory framework under the Protocol on Relations between the African Union and the 
Regional Economic Communities [Protocol on Relations].
14
 The framework aims at harmonizing 
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and co-ordinating the activities of the RECs.
15
 This is important since, unlike regional trade 
agreements established with the imprimatur of the WTO, the aim of Africa‘s RECs is to evolve 
and ultimately be absorbed into the African Economic Community.
16
 The Protocol on Relations 
aims to formalize, consolidate and promote close co-operation among the RECs, and between them 
and the AU through the co-ordination and harmonization of their policies, measures, programmes 
and activities in all fields and sectors.
17
 Another object of the protocol is to establish a framework 
for co-ordinating the activities of RECs in their contribution to the realization of the objectives of 
the Constitutive Act of the African Union
18
 and the AEC Treaty.
19
  
To ensure the realization of these objectives, the parties to the protocol, namely the AU and 
the RECs, have undertaken to co-operate and co-ordinate the policies and programmes of the 
RECs with those of the AU.
20
 Specifically, the RECs have undertaken to establish an organic link 
with the AU with a view to strengthening their relations with the AU and provide for their eventual 
absorption into the African Common Market as a prelude to the African Economic Community.
21
 
To enhance cooperation among the RECs, there are also provisions mandating or advocating 
entering into co-operation arrangements,
22
 and participation in each other‘s meetings.23 The RECs 
and the AU can attend and participate in, without voting rights, each other‘s meetings.24 The 
Protocol of Relations establishes the Committee on Co-ordination and the Committee of 
Secretariat Officials as the institutions responsible for ensuring the co-ordination of policies and 
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activities of the RECs and the implementation of the protocol.
25
 The AU is also expected to open a 
liaison office at the Headquarters of each REC.
26
 
The regulatory framework under the Protocol on Relations is complemented by provisions 
in the treaties founding the RECs dealing with their relations with other RECs and the AEC. For 
example, the EAC Treaty provides that the member states ‗shall foster co-operative arrangements 
with other regional and international organisations whose activities have a bearing on the 
objectives of the Community‘.27 The COMESA Treaty also allows the organization to ‗enter into 
co-operation agreements with other regional communities‘.28 A similarly worded provision is 
contained in the ECOWAS Treaty.
29
 Obviously, these provisions are empowering, and some RECs 
have relied on them to establish co-operation arrangements with other RECs.  
The first and perhaps the most historic was the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Summit 
of Heads of State and Government held in Kampala, Uganda in October 2008 under the theme: 
Deepening COMESA-EAC-SADC Integration. In a joint communiqué issued after the summit,
30
 it 
was noted that the Heads of State and Government reviewed the activities of the three RECs, 
agreed on a programme of harmonization of their activities, and expressed their resolve to co-
operate in the future. It was also resolved that the three RECs should immediately start working 
towards a merger into a single REC with the objective of fast tracking the attainment of the 
African Economic Community. A taskforce was set up to design a roadmap for this merger.
31
 The 
Heads of State and Government also approved the expeditious establishment of a free trade area 
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encompassing the member states of the three RECs with the ultimate aim of establishing a single 
Customs Union.
32
 In line with a mandate from the Heads of State and Government, a 
Memorandum of Understanding on Interregional Co-operation and Integration has been signed 
among the three RECs. 
As regards relations with the AEC, the founding treaties of the RECs acknowledge the 
existence of the AEC and undertake to facilitate its goals.
33
 However, they do not provide much 
detail on how and what form their relations with the AEC are or should be. The COMESA Treaty, 
the most detailed as far as this issue is concerned, affirms that its ultimate objective is to facilitate 
implementation of the AEC Treaty.
34
 It enjoins member states to implement the provisions of the 
COMESA Treaty with due consideration to the provisions of the AEC Treaty,
35
 and convert the 
organization, at a time to be agreed between it and the AEC, into an organic entity of the African 
Economic Community.
36
 It enjoins the Secretary General of the Community to co-ordinate the 
activities of COMESA with the AEC and report regularly to the Council of Ministers.
37
 Indeed, in 
the preamble to the COMESA Treaty, the foundation of COMESA is traced to article 28(1) of the 
AEC Treaty which called for the strengthening and creation of RECs as the first stage in the 
evolution of the African Economic Community. Also, ‗the establishment, progress and the 
realisation of the objectives of the African Economic Community‘ are stated as the aims and 
objectives of COMESA.
38
 These very generous provisions demonstrate a level of attention to 
problems of the relations between the AEC and COMESA. Admittedly, they still leave many hard 
issues unresolved. But, compared with other RECs, they are an advance. In the EAC Treaty, the 
EAC is described as ‗a step towards‘ the achievement of the objectives of the AEC Treaty.39 In the 
ECOWAS Treaty, members undertake to facilitate ‗the co-ordination and harmonization‘ of the 
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community‘s policies and programmes with those of the AEC.40 However, none of the treaties 
provide concrete details on its relations with the AEC. In other words, they do not address specific 
issues such as: the legal nature of their relations with the AEC; whether they are bound by 
decisions of the AEC; and whether AEC law will prevail over their law in cases of conflict. 
The above framework for regulating relations among the RECs as well as their relations 
with the AEC is short on detail and leaves many issues unaddressed. The next section discusses 
some of these issues and argues that, unless addressed, they could undermine the effectiveness of 
Africa‘s economic integration. 
3.3 UNADDRESSED INTER-COMMUNITY RELATIONAL ISSUES 
3.3.1 Legal Status: RECs within the AEC, AEC within the AU 
Perhaps, one of the greatest mysteries about Africa‘s economic integration is the legal 
status of the RECs within the AEC, and the AEC within the AU. The treaties do not shed much 
light on the issue and academic commentary on it is largely non-existent.
41
 The starting point to 
unravelling this mystery, if it can be done at all, is the idea of legal personality.
42
 All the RECs are 
endowed with legal personality in their founding treaties.
43
 Although the AEC Treaty does not 
expressly say so, the legal personality of the AEC can be inferred from article 98(2), which 
provides that, in his capacity as the legal representative of the community, the Secretary-General 
may, on behalf of the community, enter into contracts and be a party to judicial and other legal 
proceedings. The Constitutive Act of the African Union [Constitutive Act]
44
 is silent on the legal 
personality of the AU. This may, however, be explained by the fact that, under the General 
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Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the Organization of African Union, the OAU (now 
AU) possesses ‗juridical personality‘.45 
With these provisions, the legal separateness of the RECs, AEC and AU is established in 
international law. Accordingly, the legal status of one within the other should be defined by 
agreement to which both are parties, or, at least, in some definite and binding agreement. As 
regards the AEC and the AU, the AEC Treaty is very clear that the AEC is an ‗integral part‘ of the 
AU.
46
 The Constitutive Act further provides that its provisions take precedence over and supersede 
any inconsistent or contrary provisions of the AEC Treaty.
47
 If one envisions the AU as a political 
and umbrella organization championing the course of Africa unity – social, cultural, political and 
economic – then the AEC is that part of the AU solely devoted to the issue of economic 
integration. In other words, it is the economic leg of the AU. Comparatively, the relationship 
between the AEC and the AU is akin to that between the European Community (EC) and the 
European Union (EU). But, it must be admitted that even the relationship between the EC and EU 
is not without difficulty.
48
  
A difficult issue concerning the idea of the AEC as an integral part of the AU is how the 
idea appears to have been interpreted and applied. Like many words, ‗integral‘ has multiple 
meanings. To the extent relevant here, the word describes component parts which, together, 
constitute a unity. It emphasizes divisibility, separateness and unity at the same time. As regards 
the relations been the AEC and the AU, it seems unity has been overemphasized and this has led to 
the complete or near complete loss of the separateness or distinct identity of the AEC. Laws and 
policies dealing with AEC-related issues are adopted by the AU instead of the AEC.
49
 Also, as will 
be discussed in Chapter Six, institutions of the AU, have been co-opted to perform the functions of 
institutions of the AEC. But, there has neither been a clear separation of mandates nor examination 
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of whether, as designed, the AU institutions are equipped to manage effectively the economic 
integration agenda.  
An equally difficult issue is the legal status of the RECs within the AEC. Although the 
AEC Treaty contains over twenty references to ‗regional economic communities‘, and provides 
that the African Economic Community shall be established through the co-ordination, 
harmonization and progressive integration of the activities of the RECs, and imposes many duties 
with exact timelines on them, there is not a single provision on the status of the RECs within the 
AEC. Are they mere institutional observers within the AEC? Are they its organs, members, agents 
or subjects? Commentators on Africa‘s integration have assumed, and rightly so, that the RECs are 
the building blocks of the AEC. But, so far, none has investigated this important issue. The 
Protocol on Relations does not address this issue either.
50
 It is an issue of both theoretical and 
practical importance. For example, it is legally difficult to suggest that a REC is bound by 
decisions of the AEC
51
 unless one is able to prove that the former is an organ, member, agent or 
subject of the latter. 
The AEC Treaty does not set out a membership criterion, but it is implicit in article 2 that 
states which are parties to the treaty are the members of the AEC. There is no provision limiting 
membership of the AEC only to states.
52
 However, membership of an international organization 
cannot be inferred; there must be a conscious act on the part of a prospective member to become a 
member of an international organization and an acceptance of its membership application by the 
organization.
53
 In the absence of a definite agreement to that effect, it cannot be suggested that the 
RECs are members of the AEC. Nor, can it be argued that the RECs are organs of the AEC; article 
7 of the AEC Treaty clearly does not mention them.
54
 It can, however, be argued that, from a 
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purposive reading of the AEC Treaty, to which the RECs are not parties and the Protocol on 
Relations, to which they are parties, the RECs are subjects of the AEC. They are also agents of the 
AEC with a mandate to work towards the realization of the African Economic Community. 
3.3.2 The Future Merger of the Regional Economic Communities 
As noted in Chapter One, the foundation of the AEC is the RECs; progress by the RECs is 
one step closer to the African Economic Community. This unique and hitherto unexplored 
approach to forming the African Economic Community raises numerous legal challenges. The size 
of the AEC makes the approach of using RECs as its building blocks almost inevitable. But this 
approach comes at a price. For example, a recent UNECA study suggests that there is often tension 
between member states‘ commitment to the goals of the RECs and those of the AEC.55 Also, 
concurrent membership of RECs creates tension among member states and between the RECs.
56
 
The RECs are ultimately expected to merge or be ‗absorbed‘57 to form the African 
Economic Community. Under article 88(1) of the AEC Treaty, the African Economic Community 
‗shall be established mainly through the co-ordination, harmonization and progressive integration 
of the activities of [RECs]‘.58 The simplicity of this provision masks the complexity of the 
engagement of merging or absorbing international organizations such as RECs. Firstly, it is a 
unique and quite complicated approach to economic integration. To my knowledge, it has not been 
experimented with anywhere else. Usually, countries form economic communities – free trade 
areas, customs union, economic unions, or complete economic integration. Indeed, to date, it 
appears the only known case of a successful ‗merger‘ of RECs has been the merger of the 
European Community with the European Free Trade Area to form the European Economic Area.
59
 
A more recent attempt is the Union of South American Nations
60
 which is a continent-wide free-
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trade zone that unites the Common Market of the Southern Cone and the Andean Community. 
Secondly, the status of the RECs after the formation of the African Economic Community is not 
free from doubt. Whether they will disappear entirely or would continue to operate as a mid-level 
legal system is not dealt with in the AEC Treaty or any protocol.
61
 Nor do the founding treaties of 
the RECs shed any brighter light on these issues.  
The COMESA Treaty envisages the conversion of COMESA into an organic entity of the 
African Economic Community.
62
 This suggests that COMESA does not envision the formation of 
the African Economic Community as its demise. The treaty provides that the Authority of Heads of 
State and Government may, on the recommendation of the Council of Ministers, terminate the 
operations of the COMESA.
63
 This suggests that a legal mandate exists for bringing COMESA to 
an end, if that is what is envisioned under the AEC Treaty after the formation of the African 
Economic Community. Neither the ECOWAS Treaty
64
 nor the EAC Treaty
65
 contains any 
provision directly relevant to their status after the formation of the African Economic Community. 
Indeed, the EAC Treaty is of perpetual duration.
66
 Also, some of the RECs have and pursue 
objectives beyond economic integration such as conflict prevention and political unification. 
According, it is difficult to suggest that the formation of the African Economic Community will 
represent the end of the RECs. 
The founding treaties of the RECs were drafted after the AEC Treaty. Therefore, one would 
have expected them to address the issue of their status after the formation of the African Economic 
                                                          
 
61
 The UNECA conceives the future relationship between the AEC and the RECs in this way: After the RECs have 
achieved a customs union and a common market, they will merge to form the African Common Market, and the fully-
fledged African Economic Community intervention will follow. The African Economic Community will take the lead 
on dealing with member countries, and the functions and structures of the regional economic communities will be 
revised to serve as its implementation arms. See UNECA, Rationalizing Regional Economic Communities, supra note 
2 at 94. 
62
 COMESA Treaty, supra note 28 art. 178(1)(c). 
63
 Ibid. art. 192(1). 
64
 Article 2(1) provides that the member states have decided that ECOWAS shall ultimately be the sole economic 
community in the region for the purpose of economic integration and the realization of the objectives of the African 
Economic Community. 
65
 In the preamble to the treaty, the member states affirmed their desire for a wider unity of Africa and regarded the 
Community as a step towards the achievement of the objectives of the Treaty Establishing the African Economic 
Community. 
66
 EAC Treaty, supra note 27 art. 144. This provision modifies the wording of article 92(2) of the Treaty for East 
African Co-operation, 6 June 1967, 6 I.L.M. 932, which provided that the treaty ‗shall have indefinite duration‘. 
74 
 
Community more comprehensively and, perhaps, uniformly. As organizations created by treaties, 
the state parties retain an inherent right to terminate the treaties
67
 if that is what will be needed for 
them to merge and form the African Economic Community. As the RECs are progressing further 
through the stages of integration, the merger issue should engage the attention of the AEC. A 
merger protocol is needed. Indeed, I would suggest that negotiating a merger protocol should start 
now, given the complexity and size of the undertaking. It should address inter alia issues relating 
to: the post-merger legal status of the RECs; their assets and liabilities after the merger; whether 
the merger is compulsory or voluntary and, if compulsory, how that is going to be enforced; when 
the merger is to occur (simultaneously for all the communities or incrementally after each reaches 
the necessary stage of integration); status of their personnel and institutions such as the various 
community courts; and the status of active RECs, such as the Southern African Customs Union, 
which is not an AU-recognized REC and, accordingly, will not, in my opinion, participate in the 
anticipated merger of the RECs.  
The anticipated merger of the RECs to form the African Economic Community raises other 
issues. Some RECs, like the EAC, are at an advanced stage of development. It is difficult to predict 
whether they would willingly merge with the AEC or with their less progressive counterparts such 
as the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development. Indeed, one may query whether the AU has 
the political will, legitimacy and wherewithal to impose its vision of an African Economic 
Community on the RECs. They are not parties to the AEC Treaty. Additionally, as shown in 
Chapters Five and Six, the treaty provisions of some of them on issues such as the jurisdiction of 
their community courts, locus standi for private parties, supremacy of community law, and the 
relations between community courts and national courts are superior to those of the AEC Treaty. 
Arguably, these advancements in community law and economic integration could be lost when 
they merge with the AEC if AEC law is not amended to incorporate those advances. 
It is also debatable whether a merger of the RECs will be supported by interest groups 
within the RECs. Public choice theorists characterize international organizations as bureaucracies 
that are more responsive to the demands of organized interest groups, including their staff. As 
Vaubel notes, ‗like all bureaucracies, international organizations fight for their survival and for 
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more powers and resources. Thus, it is more difficult to abolish an international organization than 
to establish it, or to reduce its powers and resources than to increase them‘.68 Indeed, already, an 
appreciable number of staff cases have appeared before the community courts. This is evidence of 
people trying to protect their ‗turf‘.69 The number of staff cases, and the tenacity with which they 
appear to have been litigated, lends some credence to Rasul‘s thesis that economic integration has 
become a job-generating venture for Africa‘s educated elite,70 and raises the prospect of 
obstructionist litigation before, during, and, perhaps, after the merger. 
Additionally, the RECs are legal systems in their own right. Unlike the AEC, they are 
expressly endowed with separate legal personality.
71
 Thus, even before the merger, there is the 
need to structure and manage the relations between the AEC and RECs‘ legal systems as well as 
among the RECs.
72
 The current legal framework on the relations between the AEC and the RECs 
does not go very far in addressing these complicated issues. 
3.3.3 Conflict of Laws and Jurisdictions 
A central issue in the relations between the AEC and RECs‘ legal systems is the prospect of 
conflict of jurisdictions and laws. Alter and Meunier have observed that international regime 
complexity, such as that which exists in Africa on the issue of economic integration, reduces the 
clarity of legal obligations by introducing overlapping sets of legal rules and jurisdictions 
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 To Raustiala and Victor, ‗regime complexes are marked by the existence of 
several legal agreements that are created and maintained in distinct fora with participation of 
different sets of actors. The rules in ... elemental regimes functionally overlap, yet there is no 
agreed upon hierarchy for resolving conflicts between rules‘.74 In the area of international trade, 
especially against the background of the proliferation of regional trade agreements, this is 
becoming a very prominent issue.
75
 
The AEC appreciates the potential for these conflicts. The Protocol on Relations
76
 is meant 
to provide the institutional framework for co-ordinating and harmonizing relations between the 
AEC and the RECs. It emphasizes the co-ordination and harmonization of their activities. 
However, characteristic of the minimal significance given to relational issues in Africa‘s economic 
integration processes, there are no definitive provisions in the protocol addressing the issue of 
conflict of jurisdictions and laws. Does AEC law enjoy supremacy over conflicting laws of the 
RECs? Are the RECs also enjoined to ‗observe the legal system‘77 of the AEC? Are there any 
areas where only the AEC can legislate? How are breaches of AEC decisions and directives to the 
RECs to be enforced?
78
 Are the RECs competent before the AU Court of Justice? And can the 
AEC intervene in an action before a REC‘s community court where the interest of the AEC is 
affected? The answers to these important questions remain largely unknown.
79
  
The protocol‘s lack of attention to these complex relational issues is disheartening. This is 
because it explicitly recognizes that external and internal policies of the RECs may conflict with 
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the objectives of the AEC Treaty.
80
 In this, we witness, yet again, another manifestation of 
inattention to relational issues; the possibility of conflict of jurisdictions and laws is acknowledged, 
but concrete steps have not been taken to address them. 
3.3.4 The Relations between the Regional Economic Communities 
An important issue for the RECs and AEC is the need to rationalize relations between the 
RECs in the light of the fact of their multiple memberships. It is arguable that this issue is short-
term; as they progress along the stages of integration, a process of natural selection will take place. 
It will be difficult for a state to maintain membership of two custom unions – apply two different 
external tariffs – unless the policies of the customs unions are harmonized. At that stage, each state 
will have to decide, taking into account political, economic and geographic considerations, which 
community it wants to be part of. Thus, some scholars speculate that if the Southern African 
Development Community‘s customs union succeeds, the Southern African Customs Union ‗would 
fall away‘.81  
However, this is a too optimistic vision. The trajectory of Africa‘s integration suggests that 
it is not only legal and economic considerations that dictate membership of RECs.
82
 A more 
dominant consideration is political. Indeed, the only case I know of, of REC demise, was that of 
the first East African Community in 1977. Even with this, its demise was due mainly to political 
mistrust between the members. Therefore, it has to be accepted that unless there are structured 
mechanisms instituted and enforced to eliminate the problem of multiple memberships, the vision 
of some communities ‗dying a natural death‘ will not materialize. 
3.4 ADDRESSING THE PROBLEMS – THE TWO STEPS SOLUTION 
Effectively and boldly addressing the problems resulting from multiple memberships and 
the troubling relational issues between the RECs and AEC requires legal imagination, economic 
thought, and strong institutional and political will. There is an urgent need for the AEC actively to 
rationalize the relations among the RECs, and between the RECs and itself. This is important for 
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the development of the African Economic Community. The 2006 AU moratorium on the 
establishment and recognition of more RECs was an important first step.
83
 So far, it has been 
heeded. Another important step is for the AEC to adopt a protocol founded on the principle of ‗one 
country-one community‘ of the eight AU recognized RECs. With the help of national institutions 
and commissioned experts, countries should be guided to decide on predominately economic 
criteria, which REC best suits their needs taking into account the fact that the ultimate realization 
of the vision of an African Economic Community may help address some of the needs. This should 
be viewed not as an inappropriate infringement on state sovereignty, but as a measure needed to 
pool state sovereignty effectively for the common good. 
The legal foundation for this protocol can be found in article 5(1) of the AEC Treaty. In it, 
member states undertook to ‗create favourable conditions for the development of the Community 
and the attainment of its objectives, particularly by harmonising their strategies and policies‘, and 
to ‗refrain from any unilateral action that may hinder the attainment of the said objectives‘. I argue 
that the unilateral decision of AEC member states to be members of more than one REC creates 
unfavourable conditions for the development of the AEC.  
Admittedly, getting support for and enforcing this protocol will be difficult. It will be the 
ultimate test not only of the enforcement powers of the AEC, but also member states‘ commitment 
to the realization of its vision beyond their political rhetoric of support. It is suggested that non-
complying states should be threatened with expulsion and, ultimately, expelled from the AEC and 
all but one of the RECs of which they are members.
84
 I dare say that the vision of an African 
Economic Community should not be founded on the ideal of all African countries as members. The 
European Community does not consist of all the states in Europe. The North American Free Trade 
Agreement does not include all countries on the North American continent. And the World Trade 
Organization comprises less than all the countries of the world. There is no legitimate reason why 
an African Economic Community cannot consist of something less than all of Africa! For a 
continent consisting of fifty-three states, a few of them dysfunctional, collapsed or collapsing, and 
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many with different levels of socio-economic, legal and political development, the pursuit of this 
ideal will delay, indeed thwart, the timely realization of a noble economic vision. 
Writing in the context of the collapse of the OAU, Kufuor perceptively observed that 
‗unrestricted access in the form of virtually no entry requirements led to the tragedy of the regional 
commons, the degrading of the OAU as an organization of any value‘.85 Wouldn‘t the stature, 
integrity and effectiveness of the OAU/AU be enhanced if it consisted of, say, twenty democratic, 
human-rights-respecting, socially- and economically-developed states which extend the benefits of 
the organization to non-members on defined conditions? Like Kufuor, I argue here that Africa‘s 
economic integration is being devalued, delayed and diluted due to the fact that countries are able 
to sign up at will without strict, previously-defined and continuous commitments to 
implementation. An African Economic Community which consists of a few African states can 
extend, through conditioned agreements, the benefits of integration to other countries that need not 
necessarily be members. The expansion of economic space need not be a concomitant of the 
expansion of institutional space. 
The ‗one country-one community‘ principle advocated above should be combined with full 
integration of the RECs into the legal framework of the AEC by making them members. It is 
unfortunate that neither the Protocol of Relations between the AEC and the RECs, nor the new 
Protocol of Relations, does this. For the RECs to become members of the AEC, it may demand an 
amendment to the AEC Treaty. Currently, the treaty does not have a membership provision or 
criterion, but it appears to assume that all African states are potential members. By becoming fully 
signed-up members of the AEC, the RECs will be bound by all AEC laws including laws aimed at 
rationalizing and co-ordinating their activities. They will become subject to AEC-enforcement 
processes and active and interested participants in its decision-making processes. This will help 
eliminate, or at least minimize, the potential for conflicting laws, policies and jurisdictions. When 
the RECs become members of the AEC, decisions being taken which are within the competence of 
the RECs should be taken by the RECs rather than the individual member states who are also 
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members of the AEC. In other words, as regards matters within the competence of the RECs, they 
should be the decision-makers during discussions at the AEC level.
86
 
The two steps advocated above, as solution to the problem of multiple memberships and 
multiple RECs, and the latter‘s relations with the AEC differ in material respects from the five 
potential solutions advocated by the UNECA.
87
 Central to the two steps is the principle of ‗one 
country-one community‘, the view that membership of RECs should be determined largely on the 
basis of an economic criterion, and a call to abandon the ideal of an African Economic Community 
consisting of all African states. It should be emphasized that although the RECs have independent 
legal personality, they exist because they have states as members. Therefore, any solution to the 
above problem should begin with the members, or at least pay very close and immediate attention 
to them. Although the two steps are radical and will demand a lot of political will to be taken, in 
my opinion, it is the only sure and rapid path to achieving an African Economic Community using 
states and RECs that are genuinely committed to that object. 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
 In this chapter, the complexity of the path to the formation of the African Economic 
Community has been discussed. The approach of using RECs as building blocks of the AEC is 
fraught with legal challenges most of which have not been adequately addressed by the existing 
legal framework. The chapter provides means of overcoming some of the challenges. More 
generally, this chapter shows that one of the ways of overcoming the challenges posed by 
international regime complexity is to provide for an umbrella regime responsible for co-ordinating 
and harmonizing the activities of elemental regimes within the complex regime. However, 
providing for such a regime, if deemed necessary at all, comes with difficulty: defining the legal 
status and mandate of the regime and ensuring the binding effect and compliance with its laws are 
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potentially difficult issues. The AEC as an apparent umbrella regime for the elemental regimes of 
African RECs is a case in point. 
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4 CHAPTER FOUR: RELATIONS BETWEEN COMMUNITY AND NATIONAL 
LEGAL SYSTEMS IN AFRICA’S ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 Economic integration results in a juxtaposition of legal systems. These legal systems 
include the legal system of the organization responsible for the integration process (community), 
the legal systems of the member states, the legal systems of regional organizations, and the 
international legal system, which often provides the legal basis for the integration initiative.
1
 This 
juxtaposition of legal systems requires an examination of the relations between them. What is the 
relation between community and national legal systems? What is the place of national law in the 
community legal system?
2
 What is the place of community law in national legal systems? What are 
the rules for resolving conflicts between and among these systems?
3
 Effective and successful 
integration depend, in part, on properly structuring and managing these relational issues.  
 This chapter argues that Africa‘s economic integration processes have neglected the 
importance of relational issues. It investigates relational issues which have not received any 
systematic discussion in the discourse on Africa‘s economic integration, and proposes new 
directions for dealing with some of these. To what extent have Africa‘s integration initiatives 
attempted to address the relational problems inherent in integration? Are there national conditions 
that may hinder a structured community-state relationship? Has the place of community law in 
national law and vice versa been properly defined? Are there clear rules for resolving potential 
conflicts between community and national laws? The chapter discusses the idea of the African 
Economic Community (AEC) as a legal system. It examines the relations between the community 
and member state‘s legal systems. 
 The chapter uses the AEC as its principal focus. It, however, draws on the constitutive 
treaties and experiences of other economic integration organizations within and outside Africa. 
The goal of the comparative exercise is to identify and analyze the relational principles that 
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promote success in these organizations and determine if, and how, they are reflected in the AEC 
Treaty or whether they can be adopted by the AEC.   
4.2 LEGAL ISSUES IN INTEGRATION AND THE AEC TREATY 
 From a legal perspective, the approach to economic integration adopted by the AEC raises 
important issues which are yet to be addressed in practice and in the discourse on Africa‘s 
integration. These include the legal status of community institutions and law within member states‘ 
legal systems, the effectiveness of community institutions as enforcers of community law, the role 
of the judicial branch as an arbiter of jurisdictional conflicts between and among the constituent 
legal systems, and the co-ordination and harmonization of the laws of member states. These issues 
form part of the more profound and broader problem that bedevils all economic integration 
processes: what are, or should be, the legal relations between the economic community and the 
member states?  
 In this regard, one cannot but notice the conspicuous absence in the AEC Treaty of an 
emphasis on legal issues in the integration process. Indeed, in the sixty-five page treaty,
4
 the word 
‗law‘ appears only three times.5 None of these references relates to the laws of members states or 
to the impact of the AEC on their legal systems. Of the seven specialized technical committees the 
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 none is specifically mandated to deal with the legal issues of integration 
including the relational issues noted above.
7
  
 As noted in Chapter Three, even an issue as important as the legal status of the AEC is left 
in doubt. It is provided that the AEC forms an integral part of the Organization of African Unity 
(OAU) which is now the African Union (AU).
8
 But, this leaves unanswered the question as to 
whether the AEC has its own legal personality.
9
 Under the principles of international law, the lack 
of an express provision on the legal personality of the AEC should not be problematic. In the 
Reparations case,
10
 the International Court of Justice held that the legal personality of an 
international organization can be inferred from the provisions of its constitutive treaty. According 
to Brownlie, the criteria for legal personality of organizations are: a permanent association of states 
with lawful objects and equipped with organs; a distinction in terms of legal powers and purposes 
between the organization and its members; and the existence of legal powers exercisable on the 
international plane and not solely within the national legal systems of one or more states.
11
 The 
AEC meets these criteria. 
 It is possible that the specialized technical committees may deal separately with some of 
the issues identified above. However, such a fragmented approach may lead to unnecessary 
difficulties in the integration process. Generally, the treaty reveals a lack of appreciation of the 
need for a comprehensive legal framework for economic integration. Such a legal framework 
would set out the relevant jurisdictional parameters, define the legal relations between the 
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community and member states, and pay attention to the broader international legal context within 
which economic integration operates. 
 It is difficult to fathom the minimal emphasis on legal issues in the AEC Treaty. As shown 
in Chapter Three, other important legal issues such as the sources of AEC law, its status within 
member states, and the status of the regional communities – the building blocks of the AEC – after 
their merger to form the African Economic Community are all left unaddressed. Admittedly, not 
every issue can be anticipated and addressed in a treaty, but some issues are just too important to 
be left unattended to. Comparatively, the regional communities‘ treaties do not fare any better. The 
adoption of the AEC Treaty was not preceded by any form of wider consultation with interested 
parties including lawyers or law associations in the member states.
12
 This is ironic for a treaty that 
sets as one of its guiding principles ‗popular participation in development‘.13 Kulusika‘s 
observation that lawyers‘ participation in drafting regional integration treaties and economic 




 Notwithstanding the above, the AEC Treaty contains an innovative provision which is 
interesting from a legal perspective and merits discussion. Article 3(e) enjoins member states to 
‗observe... the legal system of the Community‘. It can be argued that this positively affirms the 
AEC as a legal system and imposes an obligation on member states to promote its objectives. 
However, characteristic of the treaty‘s lack of attention to relational issues, we are left in doubt 
about the true character of this legal system and its relations with member states‘ legal systems. Is 
it an aggregation of the member states‘ legal systems, the RECs‘, or a distinct legal system? What 
is the relation between it and other legal systems – national, regional and international? What is 
entailed in the obligation to ‗observe‘ the legal system? Does the obligation to observe the legal 
system of the community extend to other institutions of member states such as the judiciary? What 
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are the implications of this for their work? Article 3(e) and the difficult questions it raises appear 
not to have captured the attention of commentators on the AEC. Their focus has been on the legal 
personality of the AEC,
15
 a concept which, compared with ‗legal system‘, is inferior both in scope 
and effect. The next section addresses some of the issues arising from article 3(e). 
4.3 SOVEREIGNTY AND THE AEC’s LEGAL SYSTEM 
4.3.1 AEC as a Legal System 
The existence of rules and rule-making institutions is an essential component of any legal 
system. In my opinion, the AEC is a legal system, but, as will be shown below, this is not an 
assertion free from difficulty. Like any domestic legal system, the AEC has these institutions. Its 
law-making institutions are the Assembly of Heads of State or Government (Assembly), the 
Council of Ministers (Council), and the AEC Court of Justice, which is now the African Court of 
Justice and Human Rights [African Court of Justice].
16
 In addition to these institutions, one may 
add the Pan-African Parliament which currently has only an advisory role in the AEC‘s legislative 
process, but is ultimately to have legislative powers. Aside the African Court of Justice, whose 
protocol is not yet in force, the remaining institutions are operating.
17
 
The AEC Treaty is silent on what the sources of law of the community will or should be. 
This is no idle omission. By failing to be explicit on its sources of law, one is left in doubt not only 
as to the sources, but also to the relations between them. Undoubtedly, the AEC Treaty and 
protocols constitute the basic sources of law of the AEC. Decisions of the Assembly and 
regulations of the Council are also considered sources of law. The judgments of the African Court 
of Justice represent another source of community law. The general principles of law recognized by 
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member states, as well as general principles of international law, may also be important sources of 
AEC law.  
The Statute of the African Court of Justice
18
 remedies, in part, the omission on sources of 
law in the AEC Treaty. Article 31 of the statute lists various sources of law the court ‗shall have 
regard to‘, but it is not clear on how the sources relate to each other as, for example, in situations 
of conflict. Ultimately, the African Court of Justice will have to lay down principles for resolving 
internal conflict of laws problems within the AEC legal system. In doing this, the court should be 
cautious in applying and, if possible avoid, mechanical rules (e.g. the last in time prevails rule) for 
resolving these problems. Rather, it should look at the substantive content of the laws in conflict 
and allow the law whose substance best promotes the objectives of Africa‘s economic integration 
to prevail.
19
 Indeed, the promotion of integration should be the cornerstone of the court‘s 
interpretation and application of all laws. 
Comparatively, it is worth recalling that, unlike the AEC Treaty, there was no express 
provision in the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, 1957 (Treaty of Rome),
20
 
declaring that the EC was a legal system. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) inferred from the 
text and purpose of the Treaty of Rome that the EC exists as a distinct legal order. In Van Gend en 
Loos v Neder-Landse Tariefcommissie,
21
 the ECJ held that the EC ‗constitutes a new legal order of 
international law, for whose benefit the States have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within 
limited fields, and the subjects of which comprise not only Member States but also their 
nationals‘.22 The court did this through a teleological interpretation of the Treaty of Rome. For the 
AEC, the judgment teaches that, even in the absence of an express treaty provision characterizing 
the AEC as a legal system, inferences could be drawn from the treaty to support a claim that it 
constitutes a new legal system with sovereign characteristics.  
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As will be discussed below, whether through a treaty provision or judicial declaration, the 
existence of an international organization as a legal system has implications for national legal 
systems which should be conditioned, legally, socially and politically, for such implications to 
work. These conditions include an activist and independent judiciary, a culture of respect for the 
rule of law, judicial decisions and international law, favourable constitutional laws, and the 
political will to legislate to allow the implications to prevail or to abstain from legislating to 
counteract them. These conditions, which prevailed in Europe, are not wholly present in most 
African countries. But some countries are making progress on these conditions; South Africa‘s 
judiciary is noted for its independence and the quality of its judgments. In 2008, Ghana 
democratically changed government for the fifth time since 1992. Botswana, Namibia and 
Tanzania have been democratic, peaceful and stable for a very long time. Sadly, the success stories 
in Africa do not make it into the international media.
23
 It must be remembered that the acceptance 
of the full implications of the ECJ declaration that the EC was a legal system was gradual in each 
member state. The same is likely to be the case in Africa. 
The existence of the AEC as a legal system distinct from the legal systems of the member 
states can also be teleologically derived from the text of the AEC Treaty and its institutional 
arrangements. The preamble to the treaty acknowledges the need to secure the ‗well-being‘ of the 
people.
24
 Article 14 establishes a Pan-African Parliament to ensure that the people of Africa are 
fully involved in the economic development and integration of the continent.
25
 The treaty also 
establishes institutions to make decisions which are binding on and automatically enforceable in 
the member states.
26
 Presumably, and as discussed in Chapter Seven, these decisions are 
enforceable without any national implementation measures such as incorporation by an Act of 
Parliament. The institutions and their competence represent derogations from national sovereignty. 
                                                          
 
23
 See generally Daniel N. Posner & Daniel J. Young, ―The Institutionalization of Political Power in Africa‖ (2007) 18 
Journal of Democracy 126. 
24
 See AEC Treaty, supra 5 note preamble. 
25
 Ibid. art 14. See also Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to the Pan-
African Parliament, 2 March 2001, (2005) 13 Afr. J. Int‘l & Comp. L. 86; Konstantinos D. Magliveras & Gino J. 
Naldi, ―The Pan-African Parliament of the African Union: An Overview‖ (2003) 3 Afr. Hum. Rts. L.J. 222 at 222-23. 
A recent judgment of the East Africa Court of Justice reveals the crucial role these community parliaments can play in 
the integration process. See Mwatela v. East African Community, Application No. 1 of 2005 (East African Court of 
Justice, 2005). 
26
 See AEC Treaty, supra note 5.  
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Additionally, the fact that AEC member states are expressly enjoined to observe ‗the legal 
system of the Community‘ makes any claim that it does not have a distinct legal system untenable. 
Such a claim offends the text of the AEC Treaty and fails to appreciate the unique place that 
community legal systems have in economic integration agreements.
27
 The existence of an 
economic community as a legal system has socio-economic and legal benefits. It constitutionalizes 
the community by granting it an identity with the autonomy and independence it needs to pursue 
its objectives. Having an independent existence reduces national governments‘ interference with 
the community. It also stabilizes the level of economic integration and reduces the risk and 
uncertainty associated with intra-community economic transactions. This is due to the fact that 
defined categories of economic activity within the community can be subject to only one legal 
regime that is independent of national legal systems. Even on economic matters regulated by 
national regimes, the community may set out the parameters of the national rules or play a 
superintending role. This promotes economic interaction and development within the community.
28
 
Socially, the fact that people live under one legal system may foster a sense of belonging and unity 
among the inhabitants of the community. 
If these benefits are not to elude the AEC, the integrity of its legal system at the community 
level and its status within member states must be well defined and respected. But, so far, that has 
not been done. Without structured relations between the AEC and national legal systems, the 
effectiveness or success of the AEC will be undermined. The goals enumerated in article 4 of the 
AEC Treaty, require a strong role for law and effective institutions capable of taking the decisions 
that will bind member states and be effective within national legal systems. These are facilitated by 
the surrender of state sovereignty to the AEC and its institutions. As on writer has noted: 
The depth of legislative coordination required to achieve these economic goals [the 
goals of a common market, including that of free movement of people, capital, and 
services] would appear to require the member states of a common market to cede 
large portions of sovereignty to an institutional structure capable of not only 
implementing such integration but also policing whether member states follow 
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through with their obligations. Without a strong institutional structure, a common 
market could only be created by countries capable of achieving a political consensus 
on the content and implementation of each common commercial policy.
29
 
4.3.2 Sovereignty as a Challenge to the AEC’s Legal System 
From a positivist perspective, a legal system is more than a set of laws. As discussed in 
Chapter Two, there must be an ultimate source whose laws directly bind its subjects. Also, these 
laws cannot be contradicted or subordinated either by its subjects or any other external source. The 
absence of an ultimate source of law represents a serious challenge to the effectiveness of a legal 
system. Indeed, it calls its legal existence into question. It is in this regard that the AEC, as a 




States have their own legal systems and enact laws which directly bind their subjects. The 
laws cannot be contradicted or subordinated by any other law within or outside their legal systems. 
States seldom surrender this sovereign power. Indeed, as discussed in Chapter Seven, there are 
often constitutional provisions proclaiming the national constitution as the ultimate source of law 
and legality within the state‘s legal system.31 The idea of a legal system, like the AEC legal 
system, existing independently of the state yet having its norms directly binding on the state (and 
its subjects), being directly applicable within the state‘s legal system or prevailing over 
contradictory laws of the state‘s legal system, sits ill within this framework. It is only through a 
surrender of sovereignty at the international level and the legitimization of that surrender at the 
national level that such an idea can operate.
32
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the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, 1957, the United Kingdom (UK) government would 
irreversibly surrender in part the sovereignty of the Crown in Parliament and in so doing would be acting in breach of 
the law. The action was dismissed for disclosing no reasonable cause of action. However, Lord Denning admitted that, 
if the UK should go into the Common Market [European Economic Community] and sign the Treaty, it would mean 
that an irreversible step had been taken. The sovereignty of the UK would thenceforward be limited. 
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A manifestation of the surrender of state sovereignty is to allow for the direct application 
and supremacy of laws generated by extra-state institutions. In other words, surrendering 
sovereignty is more than a mere delegation or abdication of decision-making powers to external 
institutions. Decisions made should become part of the delegating state‘s legal system and have 
binding effect within it. Sovereignty may be surrendered in whole or in part. A mere political 
association of states may exist without even a partial surrender of sovereignty, but no strong 
economic community may exist under such circumstances. It is impossible to envisage a common 
market or economic union in which member states have not partially ceded sovereignty and 
created a new legal order. Integrated economies like Australia, Canada, the EC, Nigeria and the 
USA exist because of the partial surrender of sovereignty by the member states.
33
 In these 
economies, the laws made by the community (or federal government) in their areas of defined 
competence are generally directly applicable and supreme in the constituent states or provinces.  
The AEC Treaty is largely silent on the issue of member states‘ sovereignty and how it 
relates to the AEC‘s legal system.34 As discussed in Chapter Seven, neither does it appear that 
existing national constitutions have taken notice of the potential impact of AEC law, and are 
prepared to treat it differently from ordinary international law.
35
 Indeed, the word ‗sovereignty‘ is 
not used in the AEC Treaty,
36
 although ‗sovereign equality‘ is affirmed as one of the governing 
principles of the AU under its Constitutive Act.
37
 Consequently, one can only draw inferences 
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 In theory, it can be argued that because the federating ‗states‘ in Canada, USA and Nigeria were not sovereign states 
before the formation of their respective federations this point does not apply to them. However, the reality is that they 
(USA and Nigeria) have ceded some powers to the federal government in a manner akin to the surrender of 
sovereignty to an external entity. In Canada, a more accurate description is that the constitution divides sovereignty. 
34
 It can be argued that the fact that the treaty establishes institutions with powers to make decisions that are 
automatically enforceable in member states‘ suggests that it is not silent on the issue of state sovereignty. However, as 
will be shown Chapter Seven, one difficulty with this argument is that the concept of ‗enforceable automatically‘ is not 
free from doubt. Indeed, its implications for member states are yet to be worked out. 
35
 What exist are general constitutional provisions supporting continental unity and economic integration. See e.g. 
Constitution of the Republic of Nigeria, 1999, art. 19(b), which declares that one of the foreign policy objectives of the 
government is the promotion of African integration and support for African unity; the Constitution of the Republic of 
Ghana, 1992, art. 40(b)(ii)(iv), which provides that the government shall adhere to the principles, aims and ideals of 
the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity (now AU) and the Treaty of the Economic Community of West 
African States; the Sierra Leone Constitution, 1991, art. 10(b), which provides that the foreign policy objectives of the 
state shall be the promotion of sub-regional, regional and inter-African co-operation and unity. 
36
 AEC Treaty, supra note 5. 
37 Constitutive Act of the African Union, 11 July 2000, (2005) 13 Afr. J. Int‘l & Comp. L. 25 [Constitutive Act], art. 4. 
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from the text of the AEC Treaty as to whether its member states have partially surrendered 
sovereignty to it.  
The silence in the AEC Treaty should be contrasted with the ECOWAS Treaty which 
explicitly acknowledges in its preamble that ‗the integration of the Member States into a viable 
regional Community may demand the partial and gradual pooling of national sovereignties to the 
Community within the context of a collective political will‘.38 Admittedly, it does not appear that 
the fact that the ECOWAS Treaty is more explicit on the question of sovereignty has placed 
ECOWAS law in a better position within the member states than AEC law. ECOWAS law still has 
minimal presence within member states and is seldom invoked before national courts.
39
 This 
suggests that while there may be significant provisions in international treaties, their true effect is 
often conditioned by social and political situations in states which are parties to them. Indeed, it 
can be argued that a formal declaration that states have surrendered sovereignty to the community 
is unnecessary, especially in the early stages of integration. States may find this politically 
unpalatable. Successful integration necessarily eats into member states‘ sovereignty, and in that 
sense a gradual surrender of sovereignty, even if not expressly provided in a treaty is inevitable. 
Although the AEC Treaty is silent on the issue of sovereignty, it can be argued that AEC 
member states are required to cede sovereignty partially to it because they are enjoined to observe 
its legal system. As already noted, the presence of an ultimate source of authority is indispensable 
for a viable legal system. By affirming and declaring in article 3(e) of the AEC Treaty that they 
will observe the legal system of the community, therefore implicitly acknowledging that the legal 
system exists, member states have accepted the community as, at least, partially sovereign. The 
characteristics of such sovereignty include the ability to bind its subjects and to override ‗private‘ 
laws. A state cannot be held to have observed the legal system of the community when community 
laws have no effect in its legal system or are overridden by its laws. Ultimately, the sovereignty 
issue will be presented to the African Court of Justice. Indeed, as discussed in Chapter Five, the 
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 Revised Treaty establishing the Economic Community of West African States, 24 July 1993, (1996) 8 Afr. J. Int‘l & 
Comp. L. 187-227 [ECOWAS Treaty], preamble.  
39
 My search of law databases and reports in Ghana and Nigeria did not reveal any significant cases in which 
ECOWAS law has been invoked before national courts. It is possible that ECOWAS law is invoked in administrative 
and executive channels. I have not been able to access cases from Gambia, Liberia and Sierra Leone. However, I 
speculate that given the political instability experienced over the past decade in Liberia and Sierra Leone – conflicts 
which have had significant impact on the progress of integration in the sub-region – it is unlikely any such cases made 
their way to the courts. 
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relationship between state sovereignty and the goals of economic integration has already become 
an issue before the courts of Africa‘s RECs. 
4.3.3 Surrendering Sovereignty – the Existing Evidence 
Already, some African states have realized the need sometimes to surrender sovereignty 
partially in order to promote economic development through regionally co-ordinated policies. The 
Treaty establishing the East African Community (EAC Treaty) accords sovereignty to EAC 
institutions and organizations and elevates community laws above national laws.
40
 This 
development within the EAC, which represents a great leap towards the collective exercise of 
sovereignty through a distinct institution, is worth emulating in Africa.
41
  
The Treaty establishing the Organisation for the Harmonization of Business Laws in Africa 
(OHADA Treaty)
42
 represents another example of the willingness of African governments to 
surrender sovereignty partially to promote economic development. Under the treaty, OHADA 
member states have partially given up national sovereignty in order to establish a single regional 
regime of uniform business laws called Uniform Acts.  Uniform Acts are directly applicable and 
overriding in the member states, notwithstanding any conflict they may give rise to in respect of 
previous or subsequent enactment of municipal laws.
43
 In other words, they are automatically and 
immediately applicable in member states and abrogate contrary national laws.
44
 The treaty also 
establishes the Common Court of Justice and Arbitration as the final authority on the interpretation 
and enforcement of the treaty, its regulations, and the Uniform Acts.
45
 The court hears appeals on 
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Treaty for the establishment of the East African Community, 30 November 1999, 2144 U. N. T. S. I-37437, art. 8(4) 
[EAC Treaty]. 
41
 It also represents a significant advance in international law. Even within the European Union, where the principles of 
supremacy of community law and direct effect are accepted doctrines, these principles still have ‗the status of unwritten 
principles of law‘. Bruno de Witte, ―Direct Effect, Supremacy, and the Nature of the Legal Order‖ in Paul Craig & Gráinne 
de Búrca eds., The Evolution of EU Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 177 at 194. Article 10 (1) of the unadopted 
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe provides that ‗The Constitution, and law adopted by the Union's institutions in 
exercising competences conferred on it, shall have primacy over the law of the Member States‘.  
42
 Treaty on the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa, 1997, online: Organization for the Harmonization of 
Business Law in Africa <http://www.ohada.com/traite.php> [OHADA Treaty]. 
43 
Ibid. art. 10. 
44 Claire Moore Dickerson, ―Harmonizing Business Laws in Africa: OHADA Case Calls the Tune‖ (2005) 44 Colum. 
J. Transnat‘l L. 17, 55 n.151 (citing decisions from the Court of Justice of OHADA). 
45 
OHADA Treaty, supra note 42 art. 14. 
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referral from national courts or directly from aggrieved individuals.
46
 The court‘s decisions are 
‗final and conclusive‘ and are entitled to enforcement and execution within member states.47 
Given the appalling under-development and economic marginalization of Africa, its 
governments should realize the urgency with which they must put aside their national and personal 
interests to forge a common course through the AEC. The threat of Communism, and the 
devastations caused by World War II propelled Europe to integrate. So too should the tragic 
economic conditions in Africa motivate leaders to work together. Africa‘s underdevelopment and 
marginalization in the face of world prosperity should be enough, without any external force, to 
propel African governments to unite and confer supranational decision-making powers onto the 
AEC to pursue the common economic agenda laid out in the AEC Treaty. The benefits of 
economic integration in other regions of the world should encourage African leaders to approach 
the AEC integration initiative with zeal. Admittedly, success on this front will not come easily. 
But, with the necessary legal framework, institutional arrangements, political support and a 
favourable social, economic and political climate, it can be done. 
To be sure, the above exposition is founded on a vision of the AEC as a supranational 
organization. However, not all commentators support the idea of supranational institutions to push 
forward Africa‘s economic integration processes. In his pioneering work, Institutional 
Transformation of the Economic Community of West African States, Kufuor argues that there is 
probably very little real demand for supranational institutions and organizations within 
ECOWAS.
48
 He provides a number of reasons to support this stance. However, as I argued in a 
review of the book,
49
 a careful assessment of the reasons provided suggests that, while he might 
have been successful in demonstrating that the conditions conducive for supranationalism are not 
yet present in West Africa, a reader would still be left unconvinced as to whether such institutions 
are not demanded. Indeed, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa has identified the 
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Ibid. art. 15. 
47 
Ibid. art. 20. 
48
 See also Domenico Mazzeo, ―The Experience of the East African Community: Implications for the Theory and 
Practice of Regional Cooperation in Africa‖ in Domenico Mazzeo ed. African Regional Organizations (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1984) at 164-165 where he notes: ‗Regional institutions among developing countries 
should, consequently, be conceived not as centres of supranational authority, a notion which runs counter to the 
developing countries‘ basic concern with nation-building, but as forums for consultation and coordination of policies‘. 
49
 (2008) 16 Afr. J. Int‘l & Comp. L. 115. 
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absence of supranational authority
50
 to enforce the commonly agreed policies of the communities 
as a principal weakness of African economic communities.
51
 It is also arguable that conditions 
conducive to supranationalism, such as the rule of law and democratic governance, are gradually 
emerging in some African countries. 
 To summarize, I have argued that the AEC is a legal system; it should be conceived and 
made to operate as a supranational legal system. It should be the ultimate source of law in matters 
within its competence. The member states of the AEC are its primary subjects. Arguably, 
individuals are its secondary subjects. These subjects must observe its laws and institutions.   
4.4 RELATIONS BETWEEN AEC AND NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS 
4.4.1 Introduction 
Regional economic integration creates and operates within the context of vertical, vertico-
horizontal and horizontal relations. Vertical relations exist between a community and its member 
states. Vertico-horizontal relations exist between a community and the international legal system. 
Horizontal relations exist among member states of a community. Establishing, defining and 
managing these relations are important for a community‘s success and effectiveness. This is 
especially so as it progresses through the various stages of economic integration. Where these 
relations are not clearly defined, structured and managed, they can result in uncertainty, 
jurisdictional conflicts, non-uniform application of community law and, ultimately, destabilization 
of the community. Important issues in this regard are the status of community law in member 
states, and how to overcome the challenge posed to economic integration by differences in national 
laws. This section addresses both issues. 
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 In addition to this, one must note the absence of strong state ‗powerhouses‘ within the communities to push forward 
politically and be the paymasters for the integration processes. Within the EAC and ECOWAS, this role is weakly 
performed by Kenya and Nigeria respectively. The success and endurance of the Southern African Customs Union 
can, in part, be attributed to the leadership and financial commitment of South Africa. 
51
 UNECA, Assessing Regional Integration in Africa II: Rationalizing Regional Economic Communities, (Addis 
Ababa: UNECA, 2004) at 7 [UNECA, Rationalizing Regional Economic Communities]. The UNECA suggests that 
this weakness has opened up a substantial gap between the aspirations of the member countries expressed in the 
treaties and protocols creating the RECs and the reality on the ground. Ibid. at 7 
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4.4.2 Supremacy of AEC Law 
4.4.2.1 An Overview 
Conflicts between national and community laws occur in economic integration. From the 
perspective of community-state relations, such conflicts are part of the broader issue of the 
relations between national and international law. Accordingly, the rules developed in the latter 
context are useful in addressing the former. However, this should be done with caution. Automatic 
application of the traditional rules on the relationship between national and international law can 
work against a community‘s interests and development.  
The relations between national and international law are often discussed from a monist-
dualist perspective.
52
 Monists view international and national law as part of a single legal system. 
To them, international law is directly applicable in national legal systems. In other words, there is 
no need for any domestic implementing legislation; international law automatically becomes part 
of the national legal system. Indeed, to monists, international law is superior to national law.
53
 The 
dualists, on the other hand, view international and national law as separate legal systems. To them, 
for international law to be applicable in states, it must be received through domestic legislative 
measures, which transforms the international rule into a national one. It is only after such a 
transformation that individuals may benefit from or rely on the international (now national) law. 
To dualists, international law cannot claim supremacy within states although it is supreme in the 
international legal system. As discussed in Chapter Seven, constitutions of African states reflect 
both schools.
54
 In that chapter, I argue that effective economic integration in Africa demands a 
rethink of constitutional laws, especially with regard to the methods for giving effect to 
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 Janne E. Nijman & Andre Nollkaemper eds., New Perspectives on the Divide between National and International 
Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
53
 Not all monists adhere to such a conception of the relationship between national and international law. For example, 
although Hans Kelsen was an advocate of monism, he did not argue that international law was superior to national law. 
In his view, international law may be subjected to particular norms within national legal systems. In other words, to 
him, monism required that legal norms be part of a single system of law, but left open the question of the relationship 
between the norms. See Hans Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law 328-47 (Max Knight trans., 1967). 
54 
See generally Richard F. Oppong, ―Re-Imagining International Law: An Examination of Recent Trends in the 
Reception of International Law into National Legal Systems in Africa‖ (2007) 30 Fordham Int‘l L.J. 297; P.F. 
Gonidec, ―The Relationship of International Law and National Law in Africa‖ (1998) 10 Afr. J. Int‘l. & Comp. L. 244. 
 97 
international laws, rules on resolving conflicts between international and national laws, and the 
doctrines of sovereignty and supremacy of national constitutions.
55
 
The AEC Treaty does not provide that community law enjoys supremacy over national 
laws. Indeed, of all the African economic integration treaties I have examined, only the EAC 
Treaty contains such provision.
56
 Some writers have attempted to infer the supremacy of AEC law 
over national laws by using the text, structure, and objectives of the AEC Treaty.
57
 The treaty 
requires the harmonization of policies. Conflicting national laws hinder the achievement of the 
AEC‘s objectives. Article 5 requires member states to refrain from acts that hinder the attainment 
of the AEC‘s objectives. Community decisions and regulations are also automatically enforceable 
in member states. These, together with the fact of the community‘s division of competence 
between itself and the member states, are cited as logically implying that community law is 
supreme.
58
 The existing literature has not gone beyond these inferences to examine, as I do here, 
whether such a claim to supremacy is sustainable under prevailing constitutional and political 
conditions. Surely, these inferences are easily made in academic circles. But, in the absence of an 
express treaty provision, it will take an activist African Court of Justice to assert the supremacy of 
AEC law, strong and supportive national judicial will and favourable constitutional laws to 
internalize in member states, and a general political culture of respect for international law to 
sustain it. It is debateable whether these conditions are currently present in Africa, but there is 
nothing to suggest that these conditions can never be present. 
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 See generally Tiyanjana Maluwa, ―The Incorporation of International Law and Its Interpretational Role in Municipal 
Legal Systems in Africa: an Exploratory Survey‖ (1998) 23 S. Afr. Yearbk. Int‘l L. 45 [Maluwa, Incorporation of 
International Law]; Tiyanjana Maluwa, International Law in Post-Colonial Africa (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
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Municipal Law‖ (1971) 34 M.L.R 481 at 485-487 for a survey of these amendments. 
56
 Article 8(4) provides that community organs, institutions and laws shall take precedence over similar national ones 
on matters pertaining to the implementation of this Treaty. Article 8(5) envisaged that the member states would make 
the necessary laws to confer precedence on community organs, institutions and laws over similar national ones. So far, 
it appears that no such laws have been enacted. The national statutes incorporating the EAC Treaty are silent on the 
issue. See Tanzania: Treaty for the Establishment of East African Community Act, 2001; Kenya: Treaty for the 
Establishment of East African Community Act, 2000; Uganda: East African Community Act, 2002. 
57 
See e.g. Gino J. Naldi & Konstantinos D. Magliveras, ―The African Economic Community: Emancipation for 




In this regard, the experience of the EC merits examination.
59
 The Treaty of Rome, like the 
AEC Treaty, was not explicit on whether EC law enjoyed supremacy over member states‘ laws. 
Nonetheless, the ECJ was able to constitutionalize the Treaty of Rome and elevate it above 
national laws. In Van Gend en Loos,
60
 the ECJ held that the EC constituted a new legal order that 
was separate and distinct from its members‘ legal order. But it was in Flaminio Costa v. E.N.E.L. 
61
 that the court, relying on teleological interpretation, elevated EC law above national laws. It held 
that:  
The law stemming from the Treaty, an independent source of law, could not, 
because of its special and original nature, be overridden by domestic legal 
provisions, however framed, without being deprived of its character as 




At present, the doctrine of supremacy of EC law is firmly entrenched; not even a 
fundamental rule of national constitutional law can be invoked to challenge an EC law.
63
 In the 
sobering words of Weatherill: ‗Even the most minor piece of technical Community legislation 
ranks above the most cherished national constitutional norm‘.64  
It took some time before EC member states accepted the supremacy of EC law. It was 
resisted on the ground that it challenged national sovereignty and rested on ‗weak‘ textual 
arguments.
65
 National courts initially provided mixed responses.
66
 Even though now well accepted 
and entrenched in member states, courts have often explained their acceptance in terms of the 
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Making of an International Rule of Law in Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2001). 
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Van Gend en Loos, supra note 21 at 129. 
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Flaminio Costa v. E.N.E.L., Case 6/64, [1964] E.C.R. 585 at 592-593. 
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Ibid. at 592-93. 
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Paul Craig & Gráinne de Búrca, EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2003) at 279. 
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 instead of any inherent superior power attributed to EC law by the 
ECJ.
68
 Indeed, to this day, there are still occasional judicial dicta from English courts suggesting 
that they may uphold an Act of Parliament which expressly overrides EC law.
69
  
The idea of a supreme AEC law would be good for Africa‘s economic integration. It would 
ensure that community law is consistently applied across member states. This will be important for 
the stability of the AEC and create a secure and certain legal framework for business decision-
making. It will also ensure the equal treatment of all people affected by AEC law. It remains to be 
seen whether, when an opportunity is presented, the African Court of Justice will adopt a 
teleological approach to interpreting the AEC Treaty and assert the supremacy of AEC law over 
national laws. Since the court is yet to be operational, we have no cases from it from which we can 
infer its jurisprudential vision for community law. However, the EAC Court of Justice has 
considered the issue. In Peter Anyang’ Nyongo v. The Attorney General of the Republic of Kenya, 
one issue it had to decide was the legal position when an EAC Treaty provision conflicts with 
national law.
70
 The court held, in apparent disregard of article 8(4) of the EAC Treaty,
71
 that the 
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 See e.g. Macarthys Ltd. v. Smith [1981] Q.B. 180 at 200 in which Lord Denning held ―It is important now to declare 
– and it must be made plain – that the provisions of article 119 of the E.E.C. Treaty take priority over anything in our 
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other part which is inconsistent with it.‖ 
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 Craig & de Búrca, supra note 65 at 285–314; Regina v. Secretary of State for Transp. ex parte Factortame Ltd., 
Case C-213/89, [1991] 1 A.C. 603. 
69
 See e.g. Macarthys Ltd. v. Smith [1979] I.C.R. 785 at 789, Lord Denning said, ‗If the time should come when our 
Parliament deliberately passes an Act - with the intention of repudiating the Treaty or any provision in it – or 
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the duty of our courts to follow the statute of our Parliament‘. Thoburn v. Sunderland City Council [2003] Q.B. 151 at 
184-185, Lord Justice Laws held that ‗ …there is nothing in the 1972 Act which allows the Court of Justice, or any 
other institutions of the EU, to touch or qualify the conditions of Parliament's legislative supremacy in the United 
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legislative and judicial institutions of the EU cannot intrude upon those conditions. The British Parliament has not the 
authority to authorise any such thing. Being sovereign, it cannot abandon its sovereignty. Accordingly, there are no 
circumstances in which the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice can elevate Community law to a status within the 
corpus of English domestic law to which it could not aspire by any route of English law itself. This is, of course, the 
traditional doctrine of sovereignty. If it is to be modified, it certainly cannot be done by the incorporation of external 
texts‘.  
70
 Anyang’ Nyong’o v. Attorney General [2008] 3 K.L.R 397 [Anyang’ Nyongo-2008]. The judgments of the 
ECOWAS court also contain dicta that one may interpret as supporting the supremacy of community law. In Frank 
Ukor v. Alinno, Suit No. ECW/CCJ/APP/01/04 (ECOWAS Court of Justice, 2005) at [21], the court held that the 
treaty is ―the supreme law of the ECOWAS, and it may be called its Constitution.‖ In Jerry Ugokwe v. The Federal 
Republic of Nigeria, Case No. ECW/CCJ/APP/02/05 (ECOWAS Court of Justice, 2005) at [32] it held that the 
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treaty did not provide an explicit solution for such conflicts!
72
 Rather, it looked at basic principles 
of international law
73
 and the persuasive jurisprudence of the ECJ
74
 for answers. The court rightly 
came to the conclusion that the treaty prevailed in the event of conflict with national law.
75
 
However, its apparent disregard of the clear words of article 8(4) is troubling. There is no stronger 
foundation for a judicial decision than a legislative provision. 
4.4.2.2 The Response of National Courts 
It is unclear how national courts will respond to an assertion by the African Court of Justice 
that AEC law is supreme over national laws. The effectiveness of such an assertion will depend, in 
part, on their responses. The existing national jurisprudence reveals two approaches both of which 
appear inimical to the supremacy of community law within national legal systems. The first 
outrightly rejects the supremacy of community law. The second, a refined version of the first, 
suggests a rigid separation of community and national legal systems. For this approach, 
community law is supreme only at the community level. It cannot override domestic laws, and 
remedies for breaches of community laws must be sought at the community level. Both approaches 
reflect the dualist school‘s perspective on the relations between international and national laws – a 
perspective prevalent in the former British colonies. 
Kenya v. Okunda
76
 illustrates the first approach. At issue was the supremacy of EAC law 
over Kenyan law. Two individuals were prosecuted under the EAC‘s Official Secrets Act of 1968 
without the consent of the counsel for the EAC. Under section 8(1) of the Act the consent was 
necessary. The issue was whether the Attorney General of Kenya could institute the proceeding 
without that consent. Resolving this issue involved examining the relationship between EAC law 
and section 26(8) of the Kenyan Constitution, which provides that, in the performance of his duty, 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
 
distinctive feature of the community legal order of ECOWAS is that it sets forth a judicial monism of first and last 
resort in community law.  
71
 It provides that ―community organs, institutions and laws shall take precedence over similar national ones on matters 
pertaining to the implementation of this Treaty.‖ 
72
 Anyang’ Nyong’o-2008, supra note 70. 
73
 That is, a state party to a treaty cannot justify a failure to perform its treaty obligation by reason of its internal law. 
74
 The court referred to Van Gend en Loos, supra note 21; Flaminio Costa, supra note 61; Simmenthal, supra note 63.  
75
 Anyang’ Nyong’o-2008, supra note 69 at 430-431. 
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Kenya v. Okunda (1969) 91 I.L.M. 556 [Okunda]. 
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‗the Attorney-General shall not be subject to the direction or control of any other person‘.77 
Counsel for the EAC submitted that the conflict between the two provisions should be resolved in 
favour of community law. He argued that under the Treaty for East African Co-operation, 
members agreed to take all steps within their power to pass legislation to give effect to the treaty 
and to confer the force of law upon acts of the community within their territory. Furthermore, 
under article 4 of the treaty, the members were enjoined to ‗make every effort to plan and direct 
their policies with a view to creating conditions favourable for the development of the Common 
Market and the achievement of the aims of the Community‘.78 Counsel argued that, by these 
provisions, member states agreed to ‗surrender part of their sovereignty‘.79  
The court held that Kenya did nothing to breach these obligations and that the laws of the 
community are, under the Kenyan Constitution, part of the laws of Kenya. In the event of conflict, 
EAC laws are void to the extent they are inconsistent with the national constitution.
80
 The 
constitution is the supreme law of the land. An appeal from this decision was dismissed by the 
Court of Appeal for East Africa.
81
 The court recognized that the case raised an issue of 
fundamental importance. It held that ‗the Constitution of Kenya is paramount and any law, whether 
it is of Kenya, of the Community or any other country which has been applied in Kenya, which is 
in conflict with the Constitution, is void to the extent of the conflict‘.82 This decision of the Court 
of Appeal can be criticized. But, one may rationalize it with an argument that the court heard 
appeals from decisions of national courts on issues designated by national law.
83
 The power to 
interpret and apply the treaty was entrusted to the Common Market Tribunal.
84
 Accordingly, the 
Court of Appeal did not necessarily have to take account of the promotion of the objects of 
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economic integration in deciding cases.
85
 Like a national court, domestic legal considerations 
should be paramount even if such an outlook on issues in which community law is engaged can be 
detrimental to the objective effective economic integration. 
Another case which again affirmed the supremacy of Kenya law was In the Matter of an 
Application by Evan Maina.
86
 It arose under the East African Customs and Transfer Management 
Act, a community legislation, which defined a number of offences. Section 174 provided that, if 
the Commissioner of Customs was satisfied that any person has committed an offence against the 
Act in respect of which a fine was provided, he may compound the offence and summarily order 
him to pay a sum not exceeding 200 shillings. The section was held inconsistent with section 77(1) 
of the Kenyan Constitution which provides that, ‗if any person is charged with a criminal offence, 
then, unless the charge is withdrawn, the case shall be afforded a fair hearing, within a reasonable 
time, by an independent and impartial court established by law‘. The court rejected the contention 
for the customs‘ authorities that the offence under consideration was a ‗customs‘ rather than a 
‗criminal‘ offence and therefore section 77 of the Constitution had no bearing on the case. Other 
subsections of section 77 required the trial to proceed only in the presence of the accused, unless 
he agreed otherwise, or his conduct made it difficult. Also, the accused had to be provided with an 
opportunity to defend himself in person or by a legal representative of his choice. Both these 
provisions were held inconsistent with section 174. Moreover, the Commissioner of Customs was 
not a ‗court‘ within the meaning of section 77 of the Constitution. There was therefore a clear clash 
between section 174 of the community Act and section 77 of Kenya‘s Constitution. The court held 
that community law could not be upheld since the Constitution provides that ‗if any law is 
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inconsistent with this Constitution, this Constitution shall prevail and the other law shall to the 
extent of inconsistency be void‘. 
It was, perhaps, to avoid similar judgments in future that article 8(4) of the EAC Treaty was 
introduced. However, so far, this provision appears to have gone unnoticed by courts within the 
EAC.
87
 In Peter Anyang’ Nyong’o v. Attorney General88 the High Court of Kenya again held that if 
a treaty is in conflict with the Constitution, the municipal court‘s first duty is to uphold the 
supremacy of the Constitution.
89
 Given that the EAC Treaty has the ‗force of law‘ in Kenya90 and 
article 8(4) of the treaty does not exclude national constitutions from the scope of its supremacy 
provision, this holding by the High Court of Kenya is arguably a breach of EAC law.  
The second approach, which suggests a rigid separation between community and national 
legal systems, is also reflected in the Kenya case of Peter Anyang’ Nyong’o v. Attorney General.91 
The central issue was whether amendments of the EAC Treaty should follow the procedure laid 
down in the Kenyan Constitution or that set out in the EAC Treaty. A peripheral issue was whether 
the applicant could bring a suit relying on provisions of the EAC Treaty. The court held that 
individuals could not enforce any rights under the treaty because the state was not their agent or 
trustee; remedies for alleged breaches of EAC law should be sought at the community level. This 
was so notwithstanding the fact that the treaty had been incorporated into Kenya law and, as the 
court rightly recognized, the municipal Act was to provide ‗an enabling climate for the objectives 
of the Treaty to be implemented‘.92 According to the court, incorporation did not make the treaty 
lose its independent existence at the international level,
93
 such that it should be amended in 
accordance with municipal law. Certainly, this interpretation is right. However, I suggest that the 
reasoning of the court should be approached with caution. A rigid separation of community and 
national legal systems in an economic integration process can undermine the effectiveness of 
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community law. In general, the above judgments reflect inattention to the interconnectedness of 
both legal systems in economic integration. 
At present, it appears that only the Kenyan courts and the EAC Court of Justice have dealt 
with the issues of supremacy and conflict between community and national laws, including 
national constitutions. Generally, their responses do not portend well for establishing a proper 
nexus between community and national laws with a view to strengthening economic integration. 
Their approaches suggest that community law is treated as another kind of international law. The 
traditional judicial approaches to the place of international law in states have been automatically 
extended to community law. I argue that this is wrong. As far back as 1974, Pescatore cautioned 
against the ‗ …tendency to transfer in rather too facile a manner to community law the solutions – 
good or bad – which had previously been worked out in relation to the domestic application of 
international law‘.94 It is a caution which African courts should take notice of when dealing with 
community law. 
To an extent, it is difficult to criticize the Kenya courts on their decisions in Okunda, 
Maina and Anyang’ Nyong’o. Indeed, in all three cases, the courts‘ task was not made any easier 
by the fact that the cases involved conflicts between community law and the constitution – the 
highest law of the land. As discussed further in Chapter Seven, national courts‘ responses to 
community law will be influenced and constrained by domestic constitutional imperatives. This 
appears to have been a paramount consideration in the Kenya cases. In those countries where the 
constitution is declared as the supreme law of the land and any other law found to be inconsistent 
with it is void, it will take a great deal of judicial imagination to accept the supremacy of 
community law. It is possible that the three decisions might have been different had the conflicts 
involved ‗ordinary‘ domestic legislation. Apart from Okunda, it also does not appear that the 
specific demands EAC law makes on Kenya‘s legal systems were argued in court. Surely, if 
community law is to assume a paramount and superior place in states, lawyers have a crucial role 
to play. 
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This raises a broader issue, which is, the extent to which African lawyers and judges are 
aware of the national implications of Africa‘s economic integration agreements.95 The 
development of community consciousness in these professionals is essential to ensuring that 
community law occupies a superior place in member states. In this regard, it is a welcome 
development that law societies of EAC member states successfully challenged a decision of the 
community and member states before the EAC Court of Justice.
96
 The litigation evidences an 
awareness of the existence and importance of the EAC and demonstrates a willingness to defend 
its values. Many more of such legal challenges are needed to advance Africa‘s economic 
integration through law. 
It is inappropriate to suggest that other African courts will follow the Kenyan courts on the 
issue of conflicts between community and national law. It must be admitted, however, that the 
prospect does not look good for community law unless national courts appreciate its unique 
character and do not treat it as just another type of international law. Indeed, making AEC law take 
precedence over national law implicates national sovereignty. This is likely to be resisted. 
Intensive judicial and legal education is needed on the distinct nature of community law (as 
opposed to public international law), its appropriate relations with national laws, and the role 
expected of judges and lawyers in their approach to community law issues. In this regard, national 
seminars, conferences, workshops and the inclusion of the legal aspects of economic integration in 
the curriculum of law schools are important.
97
 This education will definitely take time to bear 
fruits. But, one can be cautiously optimistic, especially if the benefits of economic integration are 
felt directly in the lives of peoples and industry.  
4.4.2.3 The Political Reaction 
Apart from national judicial response to an assertion by the African Court of Justice that 
AEC law supersedes national laws, the domestic socio-political climate is also important. The 
issue is whether there is a general political culture of respect for international law to sustain this 
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assertion and, especially, its full legal implications for national legal systems. In Europe, Alter has 
demonstrated how socio-political forces shaped and enhanced the influence the ECJ exercises over 
the EC‘s integration process through its jurisprudence.98 Her comparative work with Helfer on the 
Andean Community Tribunal also reveals how ‗the environment‘ of that community constrains the 
Tribunal‘s jurisprudence.99 
An investigation into political reactions to international law and judicial decisions can 
provide some guidance on the future role of the African Court of Justice in Africa‘s economic 
integration. There has been occasional resistance to international law in some African countries. 
Maluwa discusses an amendment to the Constitution of Zimbabwe that was introduced ostensibly 
to prevent judges from relying on international law.
100
 More recently, an unfavourable decision 
from the EAC Court of Justice
101
 was met with amendments to the EAC Treaty.
102
 The 
amendments have subsequently been found by the court to have been effected in a manner 
inconsistent with the procedures laid down in the EAC Treaty.
103
 This political reaction towards 
community law is inimical and should be condemned. On the other hand, I have argued elsewhere, 
using national constitutions and international treaties, that Africa is becoming more ‗international 
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law-friendly‘.104 Indeed, in the unadopted Proposed Constitution of Kenya, 2005, EAC law was 
listed as part of the laws of Kenya.
105
 This provision could have had profound impact on the status 
of EAC law in Kenya‘s legal system.  
It must be admitted that the real political reaction to international law, especially decisions 
of international courts, such as the African Court of Justice, is difficult to assess.
106
 In countries 
such as Botswana, Namibia and South Africa where international law occupies a respected place in 
their legal systems,
107
 it is likely that community law and an assertion that community law 
supersedes national law may be well received. In countries where democracy and the rules of law 
are absent, the reaction may be hostile. For example, a recent decision of the SADC Tribunal 
declared Zimbabwe‘s policy of seizing farms of the applicants as a breach of the Southern African 
Development Community Treaty.
108
 In his reaction to the decision, President Mugabe has said that 
the Tribunal had no right to intervene on the farmers‘ behalf. In his words: ‗Some farmers went to 
the SADC, but that‘s nonsense, absolute nonsense, no-one will follow that. We have courts here in 
this country that can determine the rights of people. Our land issues are not subject to the SADC 
tribunal‘.109 International law resisted by politicians often takes the form of international human 
rights laws, which act as constraints on state action. Community laws need not always be of such 
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character. The fact that supremacy of community law does not imply the abrogation of the national 
law, but rather its disapplication in the specific issue at stake should make it a little easier to 
accommodate. 
It remains to be seen whether, when the African Court of Justice becomes operational and 
the opportunity presents itself, the court will assert the supremacy of AEC law. If it does, the next 
challenge will be the national judicial and political responses. The responses may vary from 
country to country. Indeed, it may take considerable time for all to be in favour of the supremacy 
of AEC law. In the meantime, there is a need for the AEC and the RECs to conduct studies on their 
members to ascertain how their legal systems relate to the communities‘ and what should be done 
by member states to ensure the supremacy of community law. A potential route will be for states 
nationally to legislate the supremacy of AEC law. An example of this is section 102(1) of 
Zimbabwe‘s Customs and Excise Act, which provides that trade agreements concluded by the 
President under the provisions of the Act ‗shall have force and effect notwithstanding anything 
inconsistent therewith contained elsewhere in this Act or in any other law or instrument having 
effect by virtue of any law‘. 
4.4.3 Harmonization of Law 
4.4.3.1 Differences in National Laws 
A key interstate relational issue in economic integration is how to overcome the challenges 
posed by differences in legal traditions and laws. These differences, which exist in substantive and 
procedural laws, may even extend to legal culture and mode of legal thought. In Africa, differences 
in national laws are attributable to the diversity of legal traditions, namely common law, civil law, 
Roman Dutch law, customary law and Islamic law. The legal traditions of the former colonizers of 
Africa still prevail in their former colonies.
110
 
The extent to which laws vary from country to country in Africa should not be exaggerated. 
Geographical proximity, common colonial experience, and the legislative draftsman‘s penchant to 
copy legislation from neighbouring countries have led to a situation where, as between countries 
adhering to the same legal tradition, their laws are very similar. A Ghanaian lawyer who moves to 
Nigeria will not be bewildered by the principles of the Nigerian legal system. Nor will a Namibian 
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lawyer who moves to South Africa. The same cannot be said of a Ghanaian lawyer who moves to 
South Africa. This presents advantages and challenges for Africa‘s economic integration. 
Differences in national laws are manifest in many areas of law. For example, on jurisdiction in 
international matters, the Roman Dutch law countries
111
 have attachment as the basis of 
jurisdiction. The common law states
112
 have service as the foundation of jurisdiction. These 
differences in national laws will become more significant as economic integration progresses and 
cross-border economic activities increase. Differences in national laws complicate business 
decision-making. Persons transacting in many countries may have to seek legal advice on different 
legal regimes. It may mean they would have to adhere to different national standards. These add to 
the cost of doing business.  
Differences in national laws may lead to the concentration of investments in countries with 
well-developed legal systems or favourable rules to the detriment of other members of an 
economic community. For example, in the Roman Dutch law countries, an investor‘s assets can be 
attached to found jurisdiction and he will not be able to deal with the assets until the end of the 
litigation.
113
 This is a relevant consideration when investing in those countries, especially if the 
country is plagued with delays in trials as is the case with many African states. In common law 
countries, the assets will still be available for the investor‘s use during the litigation unless 
specifically prevented from dealing with them through the granting of a pre-trial Mareva 
injunction.
114
 It is no happenstance that the powerhouses of Africa‘s RECs – South Africa, Kenya 
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and Nigeria – have relatively developed legal systems compared with their neighbours. 
Concentration of investments in specific countries in an economic community breeds jealousy. 
This can lead to the disintegration of the community,
115
 especially if there is no community fund 
available to offset any losses states may incur from membership of the community. Differences in 
national laws also do not afford equal legal protection to citizens of a community since legal rights 
on the same issue may vary between states.  
4.4.3.2 The Call for Harmonization 
Harmonization or unification of national laws within an economic community overcomes 
the above problems. Harmonization involves synchronizing the laws in the member countries. It 
reduces differences in laws to the barest minimum, but it does not eliminate them. Harmonization 
allows countries to take account of their diverse national needs when implementing the 
harmonized laws. Unification, on the other hand, provides a single and uniform body of law for the 
participating countries. In my opinion, with fifty-three countries of diverse legal traditions and 
laws, harmonization of laws should be the path for African countries.  
Harmonization (indeed some may argue unification) of laws is an important part of the 
legal infrastructure of integrated economies.
116
 In my opinion, it should be a key component of 
Africa‘s economic integration processes. Harmonization promotes certainty. It subjects trans-
boundary transactions to the same, or similar, substantive or procedural laws. It engenders equality 
of legal treatment, and potentially reduces transaction costs. If law is the cement of society, then it 
is also arguable that people living under a harmonized system of law will feel more interconnected. 
Thus, harmonization provides an avenue for social integration, and can be an important 
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complement to political and economic integration. It is therefore little wonder that harmonization 
of laws has been suggested as being essential to Africa‘s economic integration processes. 
Differences in national laws are seen as an obstacle to economic integration.
117
 
As early as 1965, and just two years after the formation of the OAU, Professor Allott 
concluded that the international harmonization of laws in Africa was a key aspect of the ‗pan-
African spirit in action‘.118 He anticipated that the rebuilding of regional institutions, such as the 
East African Community, would make ‗a limited contribution to harmonization of laws‘ in areas 
which affect trade, taxation and the movement of people. However, this has not happened
119
 even 
though article 2(j) of the Treaty for East African Co-operation, 1967, called for the approximation 
of the commercial laws of the member states. In recent times, numerous calls, within and outside 
the context of economic integration, have been made for the harmonization of laws in Africa.
120
  
Unlike other African economic integration treaties,
121
 the AEC Treaty is not explicit on the 
importance of states harmonizing their laws. The importance of this issue appears not to have 
attracted the attention of the drafters of the AEC Treaty. However, the treaty contains references to 
harmonization of policies.
122
 It is suggested that ‗policy‘ should be broadly interpreted to 
encompass law. Characteristic of the general lack of attention to relational issues in Africa‘s 
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economic integration processes, even for those treaties that make provision for the harmonization 
of laws, no meaningful efforts have been made in that direction.
123
  
However, there is currently one laudable initiative towards the harmonization of 
substantive laws among some sixteen countries.
124
 The initiative is being pursued under the aegis 
of the Organisation for the Harmonization of Business Laws in Africa (OHADA), which is not an 
economic integration organization. Most of the members of OHADA are francophone states in 
West Africa, and they all share a civil law tradition. The objective of the OHADA Treaty
125
 is to 
harmonize the business laws in the contracting states through the elaboration and adoption of 
simple, modern and common rules adapted to their economies.
126
 The states‘ willingness to 
abandon their disparate national laws in favour of harmonized rules represents a triumph for 
international co-operation in Africa. But, so far, it is an isolated example. 
From the perspective of using legal harmonization as a means of defining the relations 
between laws in different legal systems, two principal areas of law for harmonization are 
recommended for African countries to consider. These are the harmonization of substantive rules 
and the harmonization of private international law rules. Harmonization of substantive law 
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on the Harmonization of Contract Law in Africa‖ (2007) 13 Ann. Surv. Int‘l & Comp. L. 157. 
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involves ensuring a degree of similarity in the substantive laws of the countries concerned. 
Harmonizing private international law rules implies that the substantive laws of the states remain 
intact, but harmonized choice-of-law, jurisdiction and foreign judgment enforcement rules are 
provided to ensure that parties transacting across national boundaries can be well-informed of the 
governing law and the court(s) with jurisdiction in case of disputes.  
Harmonizing either area has merits and faults. Substantive harmonization of laws brings 
certainty because people transacting across national boundaries will be subject to the same 
substantive law. Indeed, to some, substantive harmonization is preferred to the harmonization or 
unification of private international law rules.
127
 Although substantive harmonization of law reduces 
the scope for private international law problems, it requires great effort to achieve. Even when 
successful, ‗private international law will remain of considerable importance in the resolution of 
cross border disputes‘.128 Accordingly, it is important that both areas are addressed. Harmonizing 
private international law rules generally entails only a minimal disturbance in national legal 
systems as private international law addresses only matters involving foreign elements. 
Consequently, it is more likely to appeal to the politician with an eye for preserving his country‘s 
unique or perceived superior legal system. The process is considered simpler because a whole 
branch of substantive law may be covered by a few choice-of-law clauses.
129
  
Given that no attempt has been made towards continent-wide harmonization of substantive 
laws, private international law may be the place to start. This is especially so in the area of 
commercial law, which is of immediate importance to the promotion of regional economic activity 
in the Africa, and for which national values may not be too diverse. As Allott has perceptively 
observed, in Africa it is those areas of law with ‗less peculiar local content‘ that are more likely to 
be susceptible to transnational harmonization.
130
 As suggested in Chapter Seven, the Institute for 
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Private International Law in Africa,
131
 which is part of the University of Johannesburg, could be 
given a role to play. Also, the efforts of OHADA
132
 to harmonize substantive law can be adopted 
by the AEC and made a continent-wide initiative. This would be consistent with, albeit an 
extension of the philosophy of using regional economic communities as building blocks of the 
AEC. Indeed, it is reported that the AU has taken interest in the OHADA initiative, and is studying 
the approximation of OHADA law and the common law.
133
 
Harmonization of either substantive or private international law requires a choice as to the 
character of the legal instruments to be used. The OHADA approach, which relies on hard law 
instruments, binding and directly applicable, could be used by the AEC. An alternative to hard law 
instruments are model laws which will subsequently be adopted with adaptations by national 
parliaments. At these formative stages of the development of the AEC, model laws may be 
particularly apposite. Model laws allow for legislation to be made taking into account specific 
national demands. A limited, albeit useful, addition will be for the AEC to encourage member 
states to be more active in international initiatives on the unification of private law and for them to 
be parties to instruments generated from the initiatives. 
4.4.3.3 Paths to Harmonization of Laws 
A path to harmonizing laws in Africa is to organize it along legal traditions under what I 
characterize as a pyramid scheme for harmonization. This scheme takes as its foundation the idea 
that the legal principles of countries with the same legal tradition are very similar. Accordingly, 
harmonization should begin among countries belonging to the same legal tradition. With the 
appropriate institutional support and enthusiastic legal personnel, this should proceed fairly quickly 
and easily. It should end with the harmonization of the outcomes of the intra-legal traditions 
harmonization process. This stage should also move fairly quickly since it will entail dealing with 
small numbers of legal instruments.  
Applying the pyramid scheme to the ECOWAS and using contract law as the object, 
Gambia, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone should constitute one harmonization group 
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(common law group). Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d‘Ivoire, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, 
Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo would constitute another group (civil law group). A similar 
approach can be adopted for harmonizing laws within the COMESA and EAC. To avoid 
unnecessary duplication and conflicts resulting from the fact that states are often members of more 
than one regional community, it is suggested that under the pyramid scheme a country participates 
in only one community of its choice. 
The table below provides a procedural outline for a harmonized law on jurisdiction and the 
Recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments for members of COMESA, EAC, ECOWAS 
and SADC using the pyramid scheme for harmonization. Countries which are members of more 
than one community have been assigned into one community only. The process covers almost all 
Sub-Saharan African countries. 
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Table 2: COMESA, EAC, ECOWAS and SADC: Pyramid Harmonization for Convention on 
Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments 




Civil Law Burundi, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Madagascar and Rwanda 
Islamic/Mixed Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Libya and Sudan  








Common Law Gambia, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone 
Civil Law Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d‘Ivoire, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Mali, 




Roman Dutch Law Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland and Zimbabwe 
Civil Law Angola, Mozambique, Democratic Republic of Congo 
 













Harmonized Judgment Enforcement 
Convention (ready for adoption) 
COMESA, ECOWAS, EAC 









COMESA Mixed Legal 
Systems group 
COMESA, ECOWAS, SADC 
civil law groups 




It is suggested that, using the pyramid scheme as a model, the AEC should immediately 
embark upon the task of promoting the harmonization of both the substantive and private 
international laws in Africa. In this regard, it is significant that the Pan-African Parliament is 
currently seeking an expansion of its purely advisory role to that of a legislative role with a view 
to, inter alia, aiding the harmonization of national laws across Africa.
134
 The Assembly of Heads 
of State and Government, in exercising powers conferred on it by article 25(2) of the AEC Treaty, 
should establish a specialized technical committee to look into legal issues involved in integration. 
This committee would have a specific mandate to look into the implications of these issues for the 
success of the AEC. Additionally, one of the principal responsibilities of the Committee on 
Coordination is the co-ordination and harmonization of ‗integration legislation‘. This Committee 
was established by the Protocol on the Relations between the African Union and the Regional 
Economic Communities [Protocol on Relations].
135
 It is suggested that the Committee should 
interpret this responsibility broadly to include not only legislation but also the impact of existing 
legal regimes in member states on the success of the AEC. 
Another path to harmonization of laws in Africa, which should be explored, is to rely on 
the courts. I characterize it as the judicial path to harmonization. A radical step on this path is to 
establish regional courts with jurisdiction to hear appeals from decisions, civil and criminal, of 
national courts. The jurisdiction of the existing community courts can be expanded to 
accommodate this role.
136
 This step will entail amendments of national constitutions and the 
founding treaties of the communities. Surely, it will be difficult to achieve. But, such a court is not 
without precedent in Africa. The East African Court of Appeal and the West African Court of 
Appeal served as appellate courts for decisions from the British colonies in East and West Africa 
respectively. Such a court provides a forum from which a ‗common jurisprudence‘ – harmonized 
laws – on legal issues can be fashioned for decisions of national courts. In this way, a slow but 
appreciable level of harmonization can be achieved.  
Admittedly, one may argue that there are so many regional courts in Africa, some largely 
inactive, that the appetite for another court would be low. However, a strong case exists, even 
                                                          
 
134
 <http://www.pan-africanparliament.org/home.aspx>.  
135 
July 2007, (2010) 18 Afr. J. Int‘l & Comp. L. (forthcoming), art. 7. 
136
 A regional court currently operating with such jurisdiction is the Court of Justice of the Caribbean Community 
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outside the harmonization context, for a community court with appellate jurisdiction. Given the 
character of its jurisdiction – hearing appeals from decisions of national courts – the court is bound 
to be active. Also, such a court can boost peoples and investors confidence in the communities. It 
would provide investors with a forum outside the ordinary state judicial structure in which disputes 
could ultimately be settled. It needs emphasizing that this confidence can materialize only if the 
independence of the community courts and their processes are guaranteed in a manner that is 
superior to those existing nationally. A community court with appellate jurisdiction should be 
impervious to local or national pressures. At present, the idea of reviving the East African Court of 
Appeal is being discussed.
137
  
 A less ambitious step on the judicial path to harmonization is through jurisprudential 
communication. Courts should be more attentive to the jurisprudence of each other in deciding 
cases with a view to achieving uniformity of outcomes. I explore in Chapter Nine whether this is 
occurring using some private international law cases. 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
 The initiative to integrate the economies of African states through the AEC is laudable and 
must be encouraged. It is one of the surest paths to economic development of Africa. The success 
of the AEC will depend on its ability to overcome the demands and challenges of integration, be 
they economic, political, social or legal. This chapter, and indeed the remainder of this thesis, 
reveal the absence of legalism at community, regional and national levels as an important problem 
for Africa‘s integration.  
 A key legal issue identified in this chapter is that of structuring and managing community-
state relations. Unfortunately, the chapter reveals a lack of attention in the AEC Treaty and related 
instruments to complex relational issues. Unless strong relations are established with member 
states, the stability of the AEC will be endangered. Such relations can develop only with strong 
community institutions, including an active judicial branch, supportive national courts, a 
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bureaucracy committed to the goals of integration, the existence of political will favourable to 
integration, and an active role for individuals in regional economic integration processes.  
 It is recommended that that a committee be established by the Assembly to look into 
relational issues of law affecting Africa‘s economic integration processes. The committee should 
be charged with the responsibility of examining, among others: the place of AEC law within 
member states; areas where there is potential for conflicts between community and national law; 
how these conflicts may be addressed; and how community law will impact and relate to the legal 
systems of member states. At the present stage in the development of the AEC, the difficulties 
arising from the lack of attention to these issues have not been very prominent. But, this by no 
means suggests they will not arise. The opportunity exists for them to be addressed before they 
become stumbling blocks on the path to a stable and effective African Economic Community. In 
Chapter Five, I will examine how some of these issues have actually arisen in the COMESA, 
ECOWAS, and EAC, and how their courts are addressing them. 
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5 CHAPTER FIVE: RELATIONAL ISSUES, INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES AND 
JURISPRUDENCE OF COMMUNITY COURTS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 Relational issues in economic integration take various forms and arise in different forums. 
A vehicle for addressing relational issues is the founding treaty of an economic integration process. 
However, given the complexity and continuing character of economic integration, these issues, and 
the problems resulting from them, may continue to haunt the process. Community courts are legal 
guardians of an economic integration process, enforcers of the benefits it brings, agents for 
deciding when a breach has occurred and the remedy for it, and arbiters of the institutional tensions 
inherent in it.
1
 They are often called upon to solve these problems. As Shany has observed, ‗... 
economic integration/trade liberation courts ... have been created primarily in order to help sustain 
a very delicate equilibrium between the states parties and other stakeholders participating in a 
special legal regime, and between the states and other stakeholders and the regime‘s institutions‘.2 
In addition to dispute settlement, community courts are responsible for norm-advancement and 
regime maintenance.
3
 This chapter assesses how community courts in Africa have been confronted 
with relational issues and their response.  
The chapter uses the founding treaties of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
Africa (COMESA),
4
 the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
5
 and the East 
African Community (EAC),
6
 plus the community courts established by them as the focus.
7
 A key 
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 Admittedly, these functions go beyond what one would ordinarily expect of a court. However, it is arguable that 
community courts have both judicial and ‗political‘ functions. Compared with national courts, their role resembles 
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2
 Yuval Shany, ―No Longer a Weak Department of Power? Reflections on the Emergence of a New International 
Judiciary‖ (2009) 20 Eur. J. Int‘l L. 73 at 82. 
3
 Ibid. at 81. 
4
 Treaty establishing the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, 5 November 1993, 33 I.L.M. 1067 
[COMESA Treaty]. 
5
 Revised Treaty establishing the Economic Community of West African States, 24 July 1993, (1996) 8 Afr. J. Int‘l & 
Comp. L. 187 [ECOWAS Treaty]. In Frank Ukor v. Alinnor, Suit No. ECW/CCJ/APP/01/04 (ECOWAS Court of 
Justice, 2005) at [21] [Frank Ukor], the ECOWAS court held that the treaty is ‗the supreme law of the ECOWAS, and 
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6
 Treaty for the establishment of the East African Community, 30 November 1999, 2144 U.N.T.S. I-37437 [EAC 
Treaty].  
7
 Another important community court is the Southern African Development Community Tribunal. Its constitutive 
treaty and jurisprudence will occasionally be referred to. For a comprehensive treatment see Oliver C. Ruppel & 
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to a community court‘s ability effectively to address the challenges of economic integration is its 
jurisdiction and institutional set-up. Accordingly, the chapter begins with a comparative survey of 
the institutional structures of the COMESA, ECOWAS and EAC courts. This is followed by a 
descriptive account of some decided cases in which relational issues and the problems resulting 
from them were articulated or addressed. The jurisprudence from these cases is then critically 
evaluated.  
5.2 INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES OF THE COMMUNITY COURTS 
5.2.1 Introduction 
Courts are important in studying relational issues in economic integration. Indeed, in a 
complex regime, such as that generated by economic integration, the presence of a robust court to 
superintend aspects of the regime through dispute settlement is essential.
8
 Dispute settlement is a 
key aspect of governance in economic integration. It improves the chances of state compliance 
with their treaty obligations and instils business confidence. However, their potential to restrict 
governmental discretion, especially as regards domestic policy, conditions the extent of powers 
entrusted to them by states.
9
  
Schneider has categorized, into four groups, the dispute settlement regimes used by 
international trade organizations.
10
 These are the negotiation, investor arbitration, international 
adjudication and supranational court regimes. She distinguishes these regimes using the criteria of 
direct effect, supremacy of the institution‘s law over domestic law, locus standi, transparency and 
enforcement. The choice of regime in a given organization is influenced by a number of socio-
economic, political and legal considerations. These include the level of integration desired, 
political systems in the member states, degree of control they want to exercise over the dispute 
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settlement process and legal culture.
11
 Smith also classifies dispute settlement institutions along a 
spectrum that flows from the diplomatic to the legalistic.
12
 The later is characterized by automatic 
third party rulings and review, directly binding and effective decisions, permanent tribunals and 
standing for individuals, states and institutions of the organization.
13
  
The discussion below reveals that the institutional structure of the African community 
courts under review can be characterized as supranational and legalistic. To use the words of 
Helfer and Slaughter, the founding treaties contain provisions which allow ‗the tribunals to interact 
directly with the principal players in national legal systems‘.14 This is remarkable for a continent 
that is traditionally perceived as having no litigation culture and with a fetishist attachment to state 
sovereignty. However, it is explainable on the grounds that the levels of economic integration 
envisaged by the communities demand a supranational and legalistic court regime.
15
  
It is worth emphasizing that institutional design is separate from the issue of whether the 
institution actually functions as envisaged.
16
 It is possible for states to design a supranational court 
on paper, while at the same time be conscious of the fact that existing (but changeable) socio-
economic, political and cultural conditions may prevent it from operating as such. These 
conditions may include overt and covert political interference with the court‘s work, underfunding 
of its work, the prohibitive cost of international litigation, the absence of a supportive domestic 
constituency, and the absence of a litigation culture. Thus, it is important to look beyond the 
balance between the quest for treaty compliance and the desire for autonomy in domestic policy 
making
17
 when one tries to account for the choice of a particular regime for dispute settlement in 
economic integration. 
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5.2.2 Structure of the Community Courts 
The COMESA, ECOWAS, and EAC treaties establish courts of justice as one of their 
principal institutions.
18
 Each court is charged with ensuring adherence to law in the interpretation 
and application of the treaty.
19
 The COMESA court became fully operational in 1998. It is located 
in Lusaka, Zambia, but ultimately, it will have a permanent seat in Khartoum, Sudan. The 
ECOWAS court was inaugurated in 2001 and sits in Abuja, Nigeria. The EAC court was 
inaugurated in 2001 and sits in Arusha, Tanzania.
20
  
The COMESA, ECOWAS, and EAC courts consist of seven, seven and six judges 
respectively.
21
 Judges for the COMESA and ECOWAS courts hold office for five years and are 
eligible for reappointment once.
22
 Judges for the EAC court hold office for a maximum of seven 
years.
23
 The judges are appointed from among persons recommended by the community institution 
consisting of Heads of State and Government.
24
 This process of appointing judges raises questions 
as to their independence, and how insulated they are from the influence of their appointing 
authority.
25
 Some economic integration processes outside Africa have explored alternative modes 
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note 6 art. 24(1). 
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 See generally Ruth Mackenzie & Philippe Sands, ―International Courts and Tribunals and the Independence of the 
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of appointing judges with a view to guaranteeing their independence.
26
 To insulate community 
judges from governmental influence, it is suggested that the appointment of judges of the 
community courts should be entrusted to an independent body consisting of people not 
representing the member states. This is possible only through an amendment of the treaties and 
protocols regulating the courts. Membership of the appointing body can be drawn from the 
respective Bar Associations, Judicial Councils, Law Faculties, Chambers of Commerce, and civil 
society organizations. Admittedly, this suggestion will be difficult to market. Executive and 
political domination of the economic integration processes and their institutions is the norm in 
Africa and, as in other parts of the world the appointment of international judges is an executive 
privilege.
27
 However, independence is a key to ensuring that community courts are able to perform 
effectively their superintending function in economic integration – something which Africa‘s 
integration processes need. 
Under the treaties, judges must be persons of proven integrity, impartiality and 
independence. They must fulfil the conditions required in their own countries to hold high judicial 
office or must be jurists of recognized competence.
28
 In practice, judges of the community courts 
are appointed from serving judges of national courts.
29
 This provides a linkage between the 
national and community legal systems. Also, from a relational perspective, it is significant that 
among the persons qualified to be appointed to the ECOWAS court are ‗jurisconsults of 
recognized competence in international law‘.30 This lays a foundation for forging a relationship 
between the ECOWAS and international legal systems. A judge with an international law 
background is more likely to bring the norms of the international legal system to bear on his or her 
decisions. Indeed, article 20 of the ECOWAS Court Protocol, unlike the other treaties, specifically 
enjoins the court to have regard to the body of laws contained in article 38 of the Statutes of the 
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International Court of Justice in its decision-making.
31
 The importance of this was borne out in the 
jurisprudence of the ECOWAS court in which reliance is often placed on international law.
32
 The 
absence of such a provision in the COMESA and EAC treaties has, however, not prevented their 
respective courts from relying on international law. 
Judges of the COMESA, EAC and ECOWAS courts may be removed by the appointing 
authority for misconduct or inability to perform the functions of their office due to infirmity of 
mind or body.
33
 The ECOWAS Court Protocol and the EAC Treaty have built in mechanisms to 
ensure that the process of removing judges is not arbitrary. Under the EAC Treaty, a judge‘s 
removal should occur only after an ad hoc independent tribunal, set up for the purpose and 
consisting of three eminent judges drawn from the Commonwealth, has recommended it.
34
 A 
recent amendment has sought, however, to deal a death blow to this pioneering provision for 
ensuring the independence of judges of the court. Under the new provisions, an ‗ad hoc 
independent tribunal‘, appointed by the Summit of Heads of State and Government, would be 
responsible for recommending a judge‘s removal from office to the Summit.35 Under the 
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Permanent Court of International Justice on the principle of non-retrospectivity of statutes. Jerry Ugokwe v. The 
Federal Republic of Nigeria, Case No. ECW/CCJ/APP/02/05, (ECOWAS Court of Justice, 2005) at 30-[31] [Jerry 
Ugokwe] referring to article 38 of the Statutes of the International Court of Justice, decisions by the European Court of 
Justice and the International Court of Justice. Tokumbo Lijadu-Oyemade v. Executive Secretary of ECOWAS, Suit No. 
ECW/CCJ/APP/01/05 (ECOWAS Court of Justice, 2005) at [49] citing a decision of the International Court of Justice 
on provisional measures. 
33
 EAC Treaty, supra note 6 art. 26, ECOWAS Court Protocol, supra note 18 art. 4, COMESA Treaty, supra note 4 
art. 22. 
34
 EAC Treaty, ibid. art. 26(2)(3). 
35
 Amendment of the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community, 14 December 2006, East African 
Community Gazette Vol. AT 1-No. 006 [EAC Treaty Amendment]. In September 2008, the EAC court held that the 
processes leading to the amendments were inconsistent with the provisions of the treaty. The court, however, declined 
to make a declaration to that effect. It rather ‗recommended that the said amendments be revisited‘. See East African 
Law Society v. Attorney General of Kenya, Reference No. 3 of 2007 (East African Court of Justice, 2008) [East Africa 
Law Society-Amendment]. As these amendments have already been ratified by the member states, the court‘s decision 
leaves us in a perplexing legal situation: What is the legal status of the amendments within the EAC? In this thesis, I 
have assumed that they remain in force until they are revisited. 
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ECOWAS Court Protocol, the court must assess, in a plenary session, the grounds of removal and 
make a recommendation to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. This provision 
allows for the removal process to be monitored and controlled by a body consisting of the judge‘s 
peers. This is essential to ensuring the independence and impartiality of judges.
36
 The COMESA 
Treaty provides less protection for the judges of the COMESA court. Under article 22(1) of the 
treaty, they can be removed by the Authority of Heads of State and Government for stated 
misbehaviour or inability to perform the functions of their offices due to infirmity of mind or body 
or due to any other specified cause. The treaty is silent on how the Authority should arrive at its 
determination. Compared with the ECOWAS Court Protocol and EAC treaty‘s provisions, the 
COMESA provision represents a threat to the independence of the court and needs to be revisited. 
One factor that contributes to judicial independence and, indeed, the integrity of a court as 
an institution, is financial security. Under article 29 of the ECOWAS Court Protocol, the 
remuneration, allowances and other benefits of the court‘s judges are determined by the Assembly 
of Heads of State and Government.
37
 The salary and other conditions of service of the EAC court‘s 
judges are determined by the Summit of Heads of State and Governments on the recommendation 
of the Council of Ministers.
38
 The COMESA Treaty is silent on this important issue.
39
 
There are two worrying aspects in the financial provisions of the community courts. Firstly, 
it is uncertain whether the salary and other conditions of service of the judges can be varied to their 
disadvantage while they are in office. In some African countries, judges are constitutionally 
protected from adverse variations in their conditions of service.
40
 It is submitted that a similar 
approach in the communities will enhance the independence of their judges. There is no legitimate 
                                                          
 
36
 There have been two decided cases where allegations of bias (unrelated to governmental influence) have been 
leveled against judges of the COMESA and EAC courts. In both cases, the courts rejected the allegation. See Eastern 
and Southern African Trade and Development Bank v. Ogang (No. 2) [2002] 1 East Afr. L.R. 54; and Attorney 
General of the Republic of Kenya v. Anyang’ Nyong’o, Application No. 5 of 2007 (East Africa Court of Justice, 2007).  
37
 The budget of the ECOWAS court is subject to the approval of the Council of Ministers. See article 30 of the 
ECOWAS Court Protocol, supra note 18 and article 69 of the ECOWAS Treaty, supra note 5. 
38
 EAC Treaty, supra note 6 art. 25(5). The budget of the EAC court is subject to the approval of the Council of 
Ministers. See article 132 of the EAC Treaty. 
39
 It only provides that the terms and conditions of service of the Registrar and other staff of the court shall be 
determined by the Council of Ministers on the recommendation of the court. See article 41(3) of the COMESA Treaty, 
supra note 4. The Council approves the budget of the court. 
40
 See e.g. Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1992, art. 127(5); Constitution of the Republic of Malawi, 1994, art. 
114(2). 
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reason why judges of the community courts should be less protected than their counterparts in 
national courts. Secondly, the fact that the budget of the courts is tied to the communities‘ budget 
and subject to the approval of political institutions can undermine the courts‘ independence. 
Preferably, a separate fund, independently managed and financed, from which their expenditure is 
charged, would be more appropriate.
41
 
5.2.3 Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
A community court‘s jurisdiction influences its ability to guide an economic integration 
process and to arbitrate tensions inherent in the relations resulting from it.
42
 Indeed, as Taylor has 
observed, ‗it is impossible to assess the role played in an economic integration arrangement by a 
dispute settlement mechanism without review of its jurisdiction‘.43 There is considerable 
convergence between the treaties on the community courts‘ jurisdiction. But, there are also some 
notable differences. 
The jurisdiction of the courts falls into four categories. Firstly is the jurisdiction over the 
interpretation and application of the treaty.
44
 Secondly is the jurisdiction to hear and determine 
disputes between the community and its employees.
45
 Thirdly, they have jurisdiction to determine 
cases referred to them as a result of parties – be they the community, its institutions or natural and 
legal persons – choosing any of them as a forum for the arbitration of disputes.46 For the purposes 
of pushing forward economic integration through law, and allowing individuals to be active 
participants in the integration processes, this arbitral jurisdiction is welcomed.
47
 It allows 
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 The Caribbean Court of Justice benefits from such a fund. See Revised Agreement establishing the Caribbean Court 
of Justice Trust Fund. Online: Caribbean Court of Justice <http://www.caribbeancourtofjustice.org/legislation.html>.  
42
 Equally important are the mechanisms for enforcing the courts‘ decisions. This issue is addressed in Chapter Seven. 
43
 Cherie O‘Neal Taylor, ―Dispute Resolution as a Catalyst for Economic Integration and as Agent for Deepening 
Integration: NAFTA and MERCOSUR?‖ (1996-1997) 17 Nw. J. Int‘l L. & Bus. 850 at 875. 
44
 See EAC Treaty, supra note 6 art. 27(1); COMESA Treaty, supra note 4 art. 19; ECOWAS Court Protocol, supra 
note 18 art. 9(1)(a). 
45
 See EAC Treaty, ibid. art. 31; COMESA Treaty, ibid. art. 27; ECOWAS Court Protocol, ibid. art. 9(1)(f), 10(e). 
46
 See EAC Treaty, ibid. art. 32 and COMESA Treaty, ibid. art. 28. Article 16 of the ECOWAS Treaty establishes an 
Arbitration Tribunal of the Community. The status, composition, powers, procedure and other issues concerning the 
Arbitration Tribunal is to be set out in a Protocol. Until that time, article 9(5) of the ECOWAS Court Protocol provides 
that the court should exercise the powers of the Tribunal. 
47
 Compare COMESA Treaty, ibid. art. 28. It limits such jurisdiction to contracts and disputes to which the 
community, its institutions or member states are party. And article 9(6) refers to any agreement where the parties 
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individuals to access the community courts for the determination of their disputes through 
arbitration. The subject matter may even be a commercial contract which does not engage 
community law or community interest in any way.
48
 Finally, it is envisaged that the jurisdiction of 
the EAC court will be extended to include original, appellate, human rights and other jurisdictions 
as will be determined by the Council of Ministers at a suitable future date.
49
  
The member states of the EAC are expected to conclude a protocol to give effect to this 
extended jurisdiction. But, so far, no such protocol has been concluded. However, as regards 
jurisdiction over human rights matters, the EAC court has held that, while it will not assume 
jurisdiction to adjudicate on human rights disputes, it will not abdicate from exercising its 
jurisdiction of interpretation under article 27(1) merely because the case before it includes 
allegations of human rights violation.
50
 This offers an indirect route by which human rights issues 
may be brought before the court. For example, article 6(d) of the EAC Treaty stipulates ‗good 
governance including adherence to the principles of democracy, the rule of law, accountability, 
transparency, social justice, equal opportunities, gender equality, as well as the recognition, 
promotion and protection of human and peoples‘ rights‘ as fundamental principles of the 
community. An action alleging a breach of article 6(d) – which is within the jurisdiction of the 
court – will in many instances qualify as an action alleging a violation of human rights, which in 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
 
provide that the court shall settle disputes arising from the agreement. The scope and complexity of the jurisdiction to 
arbitrate is discussed further in Chapter Eight. 
48
 These courts can be a viable forum for individuals who seek a neutral forum for dispute settlement. Indeed, this 
jurisdiction can be used to develop the courts into forums for the resolution of international commercial disputes in 
Africa. However, the jurisdiction raises a number of issues, which will be explored in Chapter Eight. They include: 
whether in case of individuals, they should be resident within the community; the law which governs such arbitrations, 
especially where the parties do not specify a governing law; and enforceability of any subsequent award. 
49
 EAC Treaty, supra note 6 art. 27(2). No such provision is found in the COMESA Treaty. Under article 9(4) of the 
ECOWAS Court Protocol, supra note 18, the court has jurisdiction over violations of human rights in member states. 
The ECOWAS Court has heard a number of cases alleging human rights violation in member states. See e.g. In Jerry 
Ugokwe, supra note 32 (The applicant alleged a breach of the right to fair hearing. The application was dismissed. The 
court found that what was at issue was really an electoral dispute over which it had no jurisdiction); Etim Moses Essien 
v. Republic of Gambia Judgment, Case No. ECW/CCJ/APP/05/07 (ECOWAS Court of Justice, 2007) (The applicant 
alleged a violation of the right to receive equal pay for equal work. The court found no violation of the right); Frank 
Ukor, supra note 5 (The plaintiff alleged a violation of the fundamental human rights to free movement of goods. The 
action was dismissed for lack of standing.); Alhaji Hammani Tidjani v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, Suit No. 
ECW/CCJ/APP/01/06 (ECOWAS Court of Justice, 2007) (The plaintiff alleged a violation of the right to a fair trial, 
liberty and security of person. The court held that it was incompetent to hear the case since no rights violation had 
occurred). 
50
 James Katabazi v. Secretary General of the East African Community, Reference No. 1 of 2007, (East African Court 
of Justice, 2007). 
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theory is outside the court‘s jurisdiction.51 It is important that, until its jurisdiction is extended to 
include human rights claims,
52
 the court exercises caution in admitting indirectly human right 
claims. Too many human rights claims are likely to burden the court and distract it from the 
economic integration agenda. It is also likely to breed tensions between the court and already 
established forums for vindicating human rights, such as national courts, which should be allies of 
the court in promoting economic integration. 
A jurisdictional issue on which there is significant variation in the approaches of the 
community treaties relates to actions for damages against the communities. Under the ECOWAS 
Court Protocol, only the court has authority to determine any non-contractual, and, arguably, 
contractual liability of ECOWAS.
53
 The COMESA and EAC treaties are silent on this issue. 
However, it appears that their provisions that disputes to which the community is party should not, 
on that ground alone, be excluded from the jurisdiction of national courts will allow for tortious 
actions and contractual claims against the community to be instituted in them.
54
  
From a private and public international law perspective, these provisions raise difficult 
issues. Firstly, in non-contractual or contractual litigation before the ECOWAS court, what will be 
the applicable law? Will it be the national laws of the member states which, owing to the many 
legal traditions they embrace, are likely to vary? Or, will it be a yet-to-be developed ECOWAS law 
on contractual and non-contractual liability? The closest one comes to finding a solution to this 
problem is the reference in article 20 of the ECOWAS Court Protocol to article 38 of the Statute of 
the International Court of Justice as a potential source of law for decisions of the court. However, 
it is arguable that given the international character of the sources listed in article 38 they cannot 
provide the corpus needed to resolve contractual and non-contractual claims. Ultimately, the court 
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 See e.g. Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd. v. The Republic of Zimbabwe, SADC (T) Case No. 2/2007 (SADC Tribunal, 
2008) [Mike Campbell 2008]. The Tribunal held that article 4(c) of the SADC Treaty which provides that SADC and 
member states are required to act in accordance with ‗human rights, democracy and the rule of law‘ granted it 
‗jurisdiction in respect of any dispute concerning human rights, democracy and the rule of law‘. 
52
 I argue that the extension of jurisdiction to include human rights is an unnecessary move and should be avoided. 
National courts, national human rights commissions, the African Commission on Human and Peoples‘ Rights and 
African Court of Justice and Human Rights (when it is operational) have jurisdiction over human rights violations. 
Aggrieved individuals can resort to one of these forums. 
53
 ECOWAS Court Protocol, supra note 18 arts. 9(1)(g), 9(2). 
54
 COMESA Treaty, supra note 4 art. 29(1); EAC Treaty, supra note 6 art. 33(1). 
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will have to fall back on a careful synthesis of national laws.
55
 Secondly, if contractual and non-
contractual disputes involving the communities are litigated before national courts, as envisaged 
under the COMESA and EAC treaties, will the communities automatically lose their immunity? If 
immunity is successfully claimed, from where can an individual seek remedy? From a relational 
perspective, one can also query the propriety of subjecting a community to what can, potentially, 
be the application of national law before a national court. 
5.2.4 Standing and Preconditions 
Access to the community courts is granted to member states, defined community 
institutions, legal and natural persons, and national courts. A member state may make a reference 





 The secretaries of the COMESA, ECOWAS and EAC may also make a similar 
reference to the courts.
57
 Actions by member states and community secretaries are unlikely to be a 
major source of cases before the courts. Indeed, to date, the judgments of the courts reveal very 
few instances in which states
58
 or community institutions
59
 have sued each other. 
All the community courts allow for natural and legal persons‘ (individuals) access.60 In 
other words, individuals can bring claims before the courts. In economic integration, direct 
individual access to community courts is important for a number of reasons: it increases the 
number of persons that may potentially bring cases; it provides a means for overcoming the 
traditional reluctance of states to sue each other; it performs the constitutional function of limiting 
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 Compare Consolidate version of the Treaty establishing the European Community, 29 December 2006, [2006] O.J. 
C 321 E/37 art. 288 [EC Treaty]. It provides that the determination of the non-contractual liability of community 
organs is to be determined in accordance with the general principles common to the laws of the member states 
56
 EAC Treaty, supra note 6 art. 28; COMESA Treaty, supra note 4 art. 25. 
57
 COMESA Treaty, ibid. art. 25; ECOWAS Court Protocol supra note 18 art. 10; EAC Treaty, ibid. art. 29.  
58
 See e.g. Eritrea v. Ethiopia [1999] LawAfrica L. R. 6. 
59
 See e.g. Parliament of ECOWAS v. Council of Ministers, Suit No. ECW/CCJ/APP/03/05 (ECOWAS Court of 
Justice, 2005) [Parliament of ECOWAS]. 
60
 COMESA Treaty, supra note 4 art. 26; EAC Treaty, supra note 6 art. 30; ECOWAS Court Protocol, supra note 18 
art. 10. Before the amendment of the ECOWAS Court Protocol, the court had no jurisdiction to hear cases from 
individuals. See Olajide Afolabi v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2004/ECW/CCJ/04, (ECOWAS Court of Justice, 
2004) [Olajide Afolabi]. Even after the amendment the court held in Frank Ukor, supra note 5 that the amendment was 
not retrospective. Accordingly, the action, which was instituted before the amendment came into effect, and which 
alleged a violation of the fundamental right to free movement of goods was declared inadmissible. See generally 
Adewale Banjo, ―The ECOWAS Court and the Politics of Access to Justice in West Africa‖ (2007) XXXII: 1 Africa 
Development 69. 
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the power of governments to decide which disputes warrant litigation; it minimizes governments‘ 
control over which claims can be brought; and potentially guarantees greater governmental 
compliance with community law since governments are aware that breaches will not go 
uncontested. In other words, individual access provides a layer of private enforcement to 
complement public enforcement mechanisms such as states‘ reporting on compliance or 
enforcement actions by community institutions.  
Individual access also enhances the legitimacy of the communities‘ legal system. It grants 
them a stake in the evolution of community law and creates a national constituency for community 
law. Through litigation on issues of community law, they can effect legal change both domestically 
and at the community level. Also, by sometimes beginning the process of litigation in national 
courts while exhausting local remedies, they help create to a nexus between national and 
community legal systems. Through this means, community courts become an ‗appellate‘ forum for 
judgments of national courts. Generally, individual access provides a mechanism for bridging the 
disjunction between community and national legal systems. 
Although all the community courts allow for individual access, they vary as to the 
conditions precedent to access. Similar variations exist as regards what, who or which community 
institution can be challenged in the courts in actions by individuals. Article 27 of the EAC Treaty 
provides that ‗any person who is resident in a Partner State may refer for determination by the 
Court, the legality of any Act, regulation, directive, decision or action of a Partner State or an 
institution of the Community on the grounds that such Act, regulation, directive, decision or action 
is unlawful or is an infringement of the provisions of this Treaty‘. Article 26 of the COMESA 
Treaty has a similar provision, but limits challenges to acts, regulations directives or decisions of 
‗the Council or of a Member State‘. Prima facie, this excludes actions of a number of important 
community institutions from individual challenges.
61
 Article 26 severely constrains the scope of 
actions amenable to challenge by individuals.
62
 For example, it insulates from individual 
challenge, the decisions of the Authority of Heads of State and Government, the highest decision-
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 The principal organs of the COMESA are the Authority of Heads of State and Government, Council of Ministers, 
Court of Justice, Committee of Governors of Central Banks, Intergovernmental Committee, Technical Committee, 
Secretariat and Consultative Committee. See COMESA Treaty, supra note 4 art. 7. 
62
 The ECOWAS Court Protocol, supra note 18 has a more limiting provision. Under article 10(c) individuals can only 
bring an action for the determination of whether ‗an act or inaction of a community official‘ violates their rights. 
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making organ of the COMESA. Additionally, under the COMESA Treaty, where the challenge 
relates to a member state‘s action, the individual must first exhaust the local remedies of its 
national courts or tribunals.
63
 
Exhausting local remedies before international litigation poses significant problems for 
individuals, but, as was argued in Chapter Two, it can be harnessed to promote economic 
integration.
64
 In Republic of Kenya v. Coastal Aquaculture,
65
 the applicant had, for over eight 
years, been unsuccessful in completing the domestic legal processes for challenging or seeking 
compensation for the compulsory acquisition of his land. The COMESA court ‗sympathized‘ with 
his plight but held that he had not exhausted local remedies and lacked locus standi. This was an 
unfortunate outcome for the applicant.
66
 From a relational perspective, exhausting local remedies 
can be an important avenue for linking national and community legal systems. Individual actions 
before national courts on matters involving community law are likely to raise questions of treaty or 
community law interpretation. This raises the prospect of a reference to the COMESA court for a 
preliminary ruling.
67
 Requests for preliminary rulings will facilitate closer co-operation between 
national courts and the COMESA court. It will ensure that national courts become active players 
and knowledgeable in community law, and reduce the workload on the COMESA court. 
References to the COMESA court can also become a source of legitimacy for national courts and 
their decisions as the latter are ‗validated‘ at community level. 
A significant aspect of individual standing under the COMESA and EAC treaties is that 
individuals do not have to show any personal interest affected by the action being challenged. This 
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 COMESA Treaty, supra note 4 art. 26. The ECOWAS court has held that exhaustion of local remedies is not a 
prerequisite for actions before it. See Mme Hadijatou Mani Koraou v. The Republic of Niger, ECW/CCJ/JUD/06/08 
(ECOWAS Court of Justice, 2008) at [36]-[53]. 
64
 In Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd. v. The Republic of Zimbabwe, SADC Tribunal Case No. SADCT: 2/07, (SADC 
Tribunal, 2007) [Mike Campbell 2007] the Tribunal held that an individual who seeks an interim measure of protection 
pending the final determination of a dispute need not exhaust local remedies. In this instance, the fact that an action 
was pending before the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe did not prevent the court from granting the interim measure 
requested. 
65
 Republic of Kenya v. Coastal Aquaculture [2003] 1 East Afr. L.R. 271. 
66
 Even if the court concluded that the applicant had locus standi, it would still have been debatable whether it had 
jurisdiction to grant an injunction restraining the Kenyan government from compulsorily acquiring the applicant‘s land 
and how that injunction was to be enforced. 
67
 COMESA Treaty, supra note 4 art. 30.  
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has subsequently been confirmed in decisions of the EAC court.
68
 On this, the ECOWAS Court 
Protocol parts company with them. Article 10 of the protocol allows individuals and corporate 
bodies to access the court, but only for the acts or omissions of community officials that violate 
their rights. This provision prevents what, potentially, could have been public interest litigation by 
corporations, NGOs and other legal persons. Public interest litigation can boost economic 
integration.
69
 It is hoped that corporations and NGOs will explore alternative means of indirectly 
accessing the court. For example, they can actively recruit and sponsor people who have standing 
or lobby governments to bring actions relevant to their cause.
70
 
National courts may seek preliminary rulings from the community courts on questions 
relating to the interpretation or application of their respective community treaties or the validity of 
community regulations, directives or decisions.
71
 National courts within the EAC and ECOWAS 
have discretion in seeking such rulings. Under the COMESA Treaty, national courts or tribunals, 
from whose judgment there is no judicial remedy under national law, must seek such a ruling when 
issues as to the interpretation or validity of community acts are raised.
72
 So far, no national court 
has requested a preliminary ruling from any of the community courts although some have faced 
issues which merited a reference.
73
  
The Summit or Authority of Heads of State and Government, the Council of Ministers or a 
member state may also request an advisory opinion regarding a question of law arising under their 
community treaty from their respective community courts.
74
 Under the ECOWAS Court Protocol, 
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 East African Law Society v. Attorney General of Kenya [2008] 1 East Afr. L.R. 95. 
69
 See generally Rachel A. Cichowski, The European Court and Civil Society: Litigation, Mobilization and 
Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
70
 So far, that has not happened within the ECOWAS. Almost all of the cases decided by the ECOWAS court have 
been brought by natural persons. Non-governmental Organizations have been actively behind two of the human rights 
cases heard by the court. See Chief Ebrimah Manneh v. The Gambia, ECW/CCJ/JUD/03/08 (ECOWAS Court of 
Justice, 2008); Mme Hadijatou Mani Koraou, supra note 63. See generally Gregory C. Shaffer, Defending Interests: 
Public-Private Partnerships in WTO Litigation (Washington D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 2003). 
71
 COMESA Treaty, supra note 4 art. 30; ECOWAS Court Protocol, supra note 18 art. 10(f); EAC Treaty, supra note 
6 art. 34. 
72
 Compare EC Treaty, supra note 55 art. 234. 
73
 See e.g. Peter Anyang’ Nyongo v. Attorney General [2007] eKLR (Kenya: High Court, 2007). The issue was 
whether an amendment to the EAC Treaty should be made in accordance with national or community law. 
74
 COMESA Treaty, supra note 4 art. 32; EAC Treaty, supra note 6 art. 36. 
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the Executive Secretary or any other community institution can also request advisory opinion.
75
 So 
far, only one advisory opinion has been given.
76
 
The examination in this section portrays the COMESA, EAC and ECOWAS courts as 
supranational and legalistic court regimes. Whether they have actually operated and will operate as 
such is difficult to judge. For example, there have been instances where decisions affecting 
member states have been complied with. Other decisions have been met with resistance. What is 
certain is that the courts appreciate their role in economic integration and, as discussed below, they 
have responded to its challenges through their jurisprudence. The above examination also reveals 
the extent to which ECOWAS, COMESA, and EAC treaties have been attentive to relational issues 
in designing their judicial institutions. Among these issues were the courts‘ jurisdiction, their 
relations with national courts, their sources of law and whether and how individuals can access the 
courts.
77
 In general, the treaties provide largely similar responses to these issues.  
5.3 RELATIONAL ISSUES BEFORE THE COMMUNITY COURTS 
5.3.1 Introduction 
There have been cases before the community courts in which relational issues in integration 
have been raised and discussed. The jurisprudence of the COMESA, ECOWAS and EAC courts 
reflects the myriad of legal problems associated with economic integration. This part provides a 
mainly descriptive account of a selection of the cases that address issues directly affecting 
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 ECOWAS Court Protocol, supra note 18 art. 11. 
76
 In 2008, the Council of Ministers of the EAC has directed the Secretariat to seek an advisory opinion of the EAC 
court on the application of the principle of variable geometry. See East African Community, Report on the 16th 
Meeting of the Council of Ministers, 13 September 2008 (AICC: Arusha, 2008) at 40-42. The rationale for the request 
is that the EAC Treaty provides as an operational principle the ‗principle of variable geometry which allows for 
progression in co-operation among groups within the Community for wider integration schemes in various fields and 
at different speeds‘. To the Council, this provision, read together with the relevant interpretation of this principle in the 
treaty, suggests: (a) flexibility in the progression of integration activities, projects and programmes; and (b) 
progression of such activities, projects and programmes in co-operation by some of the member states as opposed to 
the entire member states simultaneously. However, to the Council, this interpretation is contestable on the basis of the 
fundamental requirement, under the treaty and relevant annexes, for consensus as a basis for decision-making by the 
Summit of Heads of State and the Council of Ministers. For the opinion of the court see In the Matter of a Request by 
the Council of Minister of the East African Community for an Advisory Opinion, Application No. 1 of 2008 (East 
African Court of Justice, 2009). 
77
 Two other issues which fall within this area are the enforcement of community court judgments and judicial 




 The cases reveal the potential place of community law in member states, 
the proper role of national courts in giving meaning to community law and the important, albeit 
sometimes constrained, role of community courts as guardians of community law and legality. 
5.3.2 The Community Courts – Selected Cases 
5.3.2.1 Calist Andrew Mwatela v. East Africa Community 
The EAC court‘s decision in Calist Andrew Mwatela v. East Africa Community79 was a 
reference under article 30 of the EAC Treaty by three members of the East African Legislative 
Assembly (EALA). The applicants challenged the validity of a meeting of the Sectoral Council on 
Legal and Judicial Affairs (Sectoral Council)
80
 held 13-16 September 2005 and the decision taken 
at the meeting to withdraw four private member bills that were pending before the EALA.
81
 The 
Council of Ministers (Council) acting on the Sectoral Council‘s report and in the light of its earlier 
decision
82
 decided that protocols rather than legislation enacted by the EALA were more 
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 A sizable proportion of the cases from these courts, especially the ECOWAS and COMESA courts, were either staff 
cases or cases alleging violations of human rights with no direct bearing on economic integration. See e.g. Muleya v. 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (No. 3) [2004] 1 East Afr. L.R. 173; Muleya v. Common Market for 
Eastern and Southern Africa (No. 2) [2003] 2 East Afr. L.R. 623; Muleya v. Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
Africa [2003] 1 East Afr. L.R. 173; Ogang v. Eastern and Southern African Trade and Development Bank [2003] 1 
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(ECOWAS Court of Justice, 2006); Chief Ebrimah Manneh, supra note 70; Mme Hadijatou Mani Koraou, supra note 
63. From the Southern African Development Community Tribunal, see Ernest Francis Mtingwi v. The SADC 
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Africa‖ (Hamburg Inst. Of Int‘l Econ., Discussion Paper No. 316, 2005) at 6-7. For a commentary on the human rights 
related jurisprudence of the courts, see Solomon T. Ebobrah, ―A Rights Protection Goldmine or a Waiting Volcanic 
Eruption? Competence of, and Access to the Human Rights Jurisdiction of the ECOWAS Community Court of 
Justice‖ (2007) 7 Afr. Hum. Rts. L.J. 307; Solomon T. Ebobrah, ―Litigating Human Rights before Sub-regional Courts 
in Africa: Prospects and Challenges‖ (2009) 17 Afr. J. Int‘l & Comp. L. 79; Helen Duffy, ―Hadijatou Mani Koroua v. 
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The council was established by the Council of Ministers from among its members under Article 14 of the EAC 
Treaty to deal with specific issues. The Sectoral Council on Legal and Judicial Affairs was created at a meeting on the 
Council of Ministers in 2001.
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Private Member Bills are allowed under article 59 of the EAC Treaty. The Bills were the East African Community 
Trade Negotiations Bill, the East Africa Community Budget Bill, the East African Immunities and Privilege Bill, and 
the Inter-University Council for East Africa Bill.
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In November 2004, the Council decided that policy oriented bills, such as those with implications for the member 
states‘ sovereign interests and on the budgetary aspects of the community, ought to be submitted to the EALA by the 
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appropriate for two of the bills and that they should accordingly be withdrawn.
83
 For the remaining 
bills, a request was made using a Ministerial Statement for a stay of their consideration by the 
EALA to enable consultation with the member states.  
The applicants sought an order declaring that the report of the Sectoral Council upon which 
these decisions were made was void ab initio, and that all decisions, directives and actions taken 
under it were similarly void. The court considered three issues namely, (a) the establishment of the 
Sectoral Council and its meeting; (b) the status of the contentious Bills; (c) and the relations 
between the Council and the EALA as regards legislation.  
The court held that the Sectoral Council had not been properly constituted from its 
inception in that it comprised people not qualified under the treaty. Under the treaty, the Council 
was to establish sectoral councils from among its members. But the Sectoral Council at issue 
consisted of the partner states‘ Attorneys General who were not qualified members of the Council. 
Consequently, the meeting and the decisions taken were unlawful. The court, however, applied the 
doctrine of prospective annulment and saved the decisions which the Sectoral Council had taken 
from its inception.  
It was further held that a Ministerial Statement was an ineffective means of withdrawing 
the bills from the EALA. At the time of the statement, the bills had become the EALA‘s property 
and could be withdrawn only by a motion under the EALA‘s rules. Although the decision to 
withdraw the bills was ultimately a Council decision (in some instances, decisions of the Council 
bind the EALA), the court held that, under the treaty, regarding matters in the Assembly‘s area of 
jurisdiction,
84
 the decisions of the Council had no precedence. According to the court, ‗the 
Assembly is a representative organ in the Community set up to enhance a people-centred co-
operation‘ and therefore its independence should be preserved.85 The court reaffirmed the rights of 
private members to introduce bills subject to limits defined in the treaty. In this instance, the 
character of the limitations meant that to determine whether the bills fell outside the limitations 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
 
Council under article 14(3)(b) of the EAC Treaty as opposed to being submitted as Private Members Bills under article 
59 of the Treaty. 
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These bills were the East African Immunities and Privilege Bill and the Inter-University Council for East Africa Bill. 
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See EAC Treaty, supra note 6 arts. 14 and 16.
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 Calist, supra note 79 at  249. 
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would have required the court to delve into their provisions in great detail. Given that the bills 
were pending before the EALA, the court deemed it unwise to undertake such an exercise for fear 
of encroaching on the EALA‘s jurisdiction. 
5.3.2.2 Peter Anyang’ Nyong’o v. Attorney General of the Republic Kenya (I & II) 
In Peter Anyang’ Nyong’o v. A.G. of the Republic of Kenya,86 the applicants contended that 
the process by which Kenya‘s representatives to the EALA were nominated contravened article 50 
of the EAC Treaty because no elections were held to elect the representatives. They sought inter 
alia an interpretation of article 50 and a declaration that the Treaty for the Establishment of the 
East African Community (Election of Members of the Assembly) Rules, 2001 (Kenya election 
rules) applied by the Kenya National Assembly contravened article 50 and, hence, that they should 
be declared void. Pending the determination of the substantive issues, they sought an injunction 
restraining the respondents from recognizing and inducting the representatives into office.  
The respondents raised preliminary objections to the court‘s jurisdiction. They argued that 
the court‘s jurisdiction under article 27(1) of the treaty was restricted to the interpretation and 
application of the treaty. It did not extend to determining questions arising from the election of 
EALA members. In their view, that jurisdiction was reserved under article 52(1) of the treaty for 
an appropriate national institution, in this instance, the Kenya National Assembly and, in cases of 
dispute, the High Court of Kenya.
87
 To the respondent, it was in the High Court that the applicant 
should have sought remedy, at least in the first instance.  
 The court swiftly rejected the objections. It held that the combined effect of articles 27 and 
30 of the treaty was that the court had jurisdiction to determine the legality of any act, regulation, 
directive, decision or action of a partner state or community institution on the ground that it 
infringed a provision of the treaty. Accordingly, since the applicants were challenging the validity 
                                                          
 
86 
[2007] 1 East Afr. L. R. 5.
 
87
 See article 44 of the Constitution of the Republic of Kenya. Currently, there exists no right of appeal from a decision 
of a national court to the EAC court.  
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of the Kenya election rules in the light of the provisions of the treaty, the matter fell squarely 
within its jurisdiction.
88
 The court granted the injunction.
89
  
The substantive determination of the case came in March 2007. In Peter Anyang’ Nyongo 
v. A.G. of the Republic of Kenya [Anyang II],
90
 the court identified three issues for determination. 
These were: (1) Does the complaint disclose any cause of action within the meaning of article 30 
of the EAC Treaty? (2) Was an election undertaken within the meaning of article 50 of the treaty? 
(3) Do the Kenyan election rules comply with article 50 of the treaty?  
The court held that article 30 of the treaty conferred jurisdiction on it. Additionally, 
although article 33(2) also envisaged interpretation of treaty provisions by national courts, this 
jurisdiction should only be incidental to the determination of cases before them. Thus, contrary to 
the respondent‘s position, an individual could not directly refer a question of treaty interpretation 
to national courts. This decision is important from a relational perspective. Treaty interpretation by 
national courts is likely to result in varying national interpretations and thus undermine the unity of 
community law and its meaning. The court further held that article 30 created a special cause of 
action which did not require the claimant to show a right or interest that was infringed, damaged or 
suffered as a result of the matter complained of; an allegation of infringement was enough. Article 
30 granted the individual the right of direct access to the court. There was no requirement to 
exhaust local remedies; there was no such remedy to exhaust.  
Finally, the court held that elections under article 50 of the treaty should involve a voting 
procedure. This might be accomplished through secret ballot, show of hands or acclamation. It 
may also involve campaigns, primaries and/or nomination. But, ultimately, the decision to elect 
should be that of the national assemblies of the partner states. In this instance, the court held that 
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the circumstances surrounding the sending of the list of Kenya‘s representatives was not an 
election within the meaning of article 50 of the treaty. The court held that the purpose of article 50 
was to constitute each national assembly into an electoral college as a deliberate step to ensure the 
constitution of an EALA comprising the peoples‘ representatives. The national assemblies, as 
institutions of peoples‘ representatives were, second to the peoples, the next best alternative for 
electing representatives to the EALA. To the court such an approach to electing representatives 
was consistent with the fundamental principle of good governance including adherence to the 
principle of democracy that underlies the treaty.
91
  
The court concluded that Kenya‘s election rules infringed article 50 of the treaty since they 
did not provide that the National Assembly should elect members to the EALA. Rather, it provided 
that a list of nominated candidates should be submitted to the House Business Committee. The 
committee ensured that the requirements of article 50 were fulfilled and then tabled the names of 
the nominees before the National Assembly. The nominees so tabled were ‗deemed elected‘ to the 
EALA. According to the court, this legal fiction circumvented the express provisions of article 50. 
Kenya has amended its election rules to bring them into line with the court‘s ruling.92 Kenya‘s 
expeditious compliance with the decision of the court is commendable.
93
 
5.3.2.3 Eastern and Southern African Trade and Development Bank v. Ogang 
In Eastern and Southern African Trade and Development Bank v. Ogang
94
 the COMESA 
court affirmed its role as the guardian of the limits of institutional competence under the COMESA 
Treaty. The respondent, an employee of the Preferential Trade Area Bank, sought, in an 
application, an order suspending a decision of the bank‘s board of directors. The bank raised a 
preliminary objection against the application on the grounds that the court had no jurisdiction over 
it. The bank was established under the 1982 Treaty establishing the Preferential Trade Area for 
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Eastern and Southern African States and continued in existence under article 174 of the COMESA 
Treaty. To the bank, it was an autonomous institution, not an organ of COMESA, and hence not 
answerable to COMESA‘s laws and regulations.  
The court rejected this argument. It held that under article 174 of the COMESA Treaty, the 
bank was one of the constituent institutions of COMESA. The court was entrusted with the 
function of ensuring that the organs and institutions of COMESA adhered to law in the 
interpretation and application of the treaty. Accordingly, as the bank was an organ of COMESA, 
the court had jurisdiction over it.  
The court further held that article 7(4) of the COMESA treaty, which provides that the 
organs of the COMESA shall perform their functions and act within the limits of the powers 
conferred on them by or under the treaty, would be superfluous without the superintending 
jurisdiction of the court or national courts.
95
 The courts define and enforce the limits on those 
powers. It is significant that a supervisory role for national courts is envisioned by the COMESA 
court as a possibility, even on an issue as delicate as superintending the conduct of community 
organs. However, to maintain the vertical relations between community and national legal systems, 
this supervisory jurisdiction should be exercised with great care.  
5.3.2.4 Olajide Afolabi v. Federal Republic of Nigeria 
In Olajide Afolabi v. Federal Republic of Nigeria,
96
 the applicant, a Nigerian businessman, 
was to purchase and take delivery of some goods in the Republic of Benin. He was prevented from 
doing so due to the closure of the Nigeria-Benin border by the Nigerian government. He alleged 
that he had suffered loss as a result of the border closure. He brought an application before the 





 of the ECOWAS Treaty, and violated the fundamental rights to freedom of 
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 2004/ECW/CCJ/04 (ECOWAS Court of Justice, 2004). 
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 ECOWAS is to ensure the establishment of a common market through the removal of obstacles to the free 
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rights in accordance with the provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. 
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movement of persons and goods guaranteed by the ECOWAS Treaty and the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples‘ Rights.99  
The respondent successfully raised a preliminary objection to the applicant‘s standing. The 
respondent argued that under article 9 of the protocol on the ECOWAS court, only states can be 
parties before the court.
100
 The court rejected counsel for the applicant‘s argument that it should 
emulate the activist judicial stance of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and admit claims by 
individuals. The court reasoned that the ECJ‘s approach of filling gaps in the European 
Community Treaty has attracted criticism and it ‗do[es] not want to toe the same line‘.101 In this 
case, the court was right in declining to go down the route advocated by counsel for the applicant; 
the jurisdiction of a court, especially an international court, must be conferred by legislation. The 
court‘s dictum should, however, be confined to the facts of the case. An important function for the 
community courts will be to fill the gaps in the treaties and other laws of the communities. This 
function derives from their jurisdiction over the interpretation and application of the treaties. It will 
not serve the cause of economic integration in Africa well if, for fear of being criticized, the courts 
backtrack from this role. 
5.3.3 Community Courts - Analysis of their Jurisprudence 
5.3.3.1 Introduction 
The jurisprudence of the community courts, which is reflected in their judgments,
102
 
represents important first steps as they fulfil their mandate and define their role in Africa‘s 
economic integration processes.
103
 It is a novel engagement for them; there are no precedents in 
Africa for their role. Comparatively, the African community courts are not alone in dealing with 
the challenges thrown at them by economic integration.
104
 Happily, they have the rich experiences 
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of other courts working on issues of regional and international economic law, such as the ECJ and 
the WTO panels and Appellate Body bodies, to draw on, but always bearing in mind their own 
unique regional contexts. 
For any court, its initial jurisprudence sets the stage or tone for its future work, and 
provides a glimpse into its approaches, goals and challenges. As the first ‗active‘ community 
courts in Africa operating on economic integration issues, their jurisprudence can also provide a 
source of comparative law for the African Court of Justice.
105
 It is in this light that the courts‘ 
jurisprudence is important. They address difficult, sometimes politically-sensitive, issues in 
Africa‘s economic integration processes, but they still leave unanswered potentially troubling 
questions.  
5.3.3.2 Individuals’ Roles in Economic Integration 
Individuals have a crucial role to play in economic integration. Indeed, there can be no 
economic community or successful regional trade without involving them. They are the vessels 
through which trade is pursued and economic integration enhanced. As liberal international 
relations theorists suggest, individuals influence states‘ choices and their voices and actions can 
condition the extent to which a state becomes actively involved in economic integration.
106
 They 
are the human medium that links the multiple legal systems operating in the context of economic 
integration. An economic integration process pursued by politicians without their active 
involvement suffers from inertia. It becomes an institutional edifice without meaningful impact on 
their lives, save, perhaps, those employed by community institutions. A key to enhancing 
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individuals‘ roles in economic integration is to grant them direct or indirect access to community 
institutions, including the courts.
107
  
Historically, individuals have not been granted access to community courts under Africa‘s 
economic integration treaties. They have also seldom relied on community law before national 
courts. Indeed, generally, Africa‘s early attempts at economic integration did not make provision 
for judicial institutions, or the institutions provided were never established.
108
 The recent wave of 
economic integration treaties, including the COMESA, ECOWAS and EAC treaties, remedy this 
defect.
109
 There is also an emerging body of national cases, albeit mainly in east and southern 
Africa, in which individuals have actively relied on community law or national courts have made 
use of community law.
110
 
The wisdom of providing for individual access is revealed in the community courts‘ 
judgments. Almost all their judgments resulted from actions instituted by individuals alleging 
breaches of community law. Only one of the cases I have examined involved interstate 
litigation.
111
 Another involved inter-institutional litigation.
112
 Indeed, counsel‘s arguments in some 
of the cases indicated that, left to the affected governments, the actions would not have been 
instituted. The Attorney General of Kenya‘s argument that the issues involved in the Anyang cases 
were of public interest and, therefore, should have been instituted by the Attorney General as 
guardian of the public interest is an instance of this. The Attorney General‘s discretion to institute 
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112
 Parliament of ECOWAS, supra note 59. 
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actions is seldom reviewable. Accordingly, a great blow would have been dealt to economic 
integration in East Africa had this argument prevailed. The community courts‘ judgments represent 
a triumph for individual rights in Africa‘s economic integration, and a vindication of the treaty 
drafters‘ wisdom. 
From a relational perspective, individual access to community courts affects inter-
institutional relations, the balance of power within communities, as well as community-state legal 
relations. It also provides an avenue through which a community court can effect normative 
change in member states. The combination of a proactive court with individuals willing to enforce 
rights inuring to them under community law is a fundamental challenge to executive and 
legislative powers. In theory, this combination gives a court the final word. It makes it a powerful 
‗political‘ actor in the sense that, although absent from the decision-making table, its jurisprudence 
exerts a subtle influence on outcomes. States and community institutions bargain in the shadow of 
the court‘s jurisprudence. In Africa‘s economic integration processes, this judicial power could be 
an important complement to the work of the communities‘ secretariats which have been relegated 
to performing mainly administrative functions with few enforcement powers.
113
 In other words, the 
community courts could provide a counterbalance to executive domination of the economic 
integration processes.
114
 They could complement the minimal enforcement powers of the 
administrative branches. To be able to do this, their independence should be guaranteed in 
community law, and respected in practice by other community institutions and the member states. 
The community courts‘ judgments reflect the above issues. For example, the EAC court has 
upheld individual right of action, but has not clearly articulating any limitations on such right. This 
shifts the balance of power within the EAC heavily in the court‘s favour. As long as individuals are 
prepared to litigate, member states and other community institutions will no longer have the final 
say, the court will. The fact that under article 30 of the EAC Treaty, as confirmed by the court, 
individuals do not have to exhaust local remedies, or show any personal interest affected by the 
challenged action, makes for a frightening prospect for member states and other community 
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 Quite unsurprisingly, the political reaction to this judgment – which came in the 
form of amendments to the treaty - was swift and, arguably, aimed in part at curtailing the court‘s 
powers.
116
 The ECOWAS court has also held that exhaustion of local remedies has no relationship 
to the procedures for accessing it.
117
 By holding in Anyang II that the Kenya‘s election rules did 
not comply with EAC Treaty provisions, the EAC court provided the foundation for developing a 
new national rule or regime for elections in Kenya. Through the judgment, the court became a 
messenger calling for electoral law reform within Kenya‘s legal systems. As noted above, Kenya 
subsequently amended its legislation to bring it into line with the judgment.
118
  
A worrying aspect of the EAC court‘s jurisprudence, as far as individual access is 
concerned, relates to standing. The extremely liberal standing rules will pose fundamental 
challenges for the court.
119
 It may potentially be overwhelmed by cases in a manner that will tax its 
administrative capabilities. Additionally, where individuals bypass national courts and run to the 
EAC court invoking article 30, it is likely to antagonize national courts who should be its close 
allies. Tensions between national and community courts may impact negatively on community-
states relations. Admittedly, in the initial stages of integration, liberal standing for individuals 
should be encouraged to ensure people‘s involvement in the integration processes and for the 
courts also to be engaged. 
Already, the possibility of tensions between national and community courts is reflected in 
some cases. But, so far, the latter have been careful not to collide with the former. The COMESA 
court resisted a potential source of tension when it rejected an application which sought to reverse 
a decision of the Kenya Court of Appeal.
120
 In Alhaji Hammani Tidjani v. Federal Republic of 
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 the ECOWAS court held it had no power to act as an appeal court for decisions of 
national courts, nor would it embark on such a venture for the sake of judicial comity. The EAC 
court also held that an action seeking a declaration that two persons were improperly elected and 
that they were not members of the Tanzania Legislative Assembly was within the remit of the High 
Court of Tanzania.
122
 Given the conditions for individual standing in the community courts, they 
will increasingly be faced with cases that require great sensitivity to the jurisdiction of national 
courts. In instances of potential tension, the community courts may have to show deference to 
national courts, with a view to strengthening their relations with national courts. This is especially 
important in these initial stages of the development of the community courts. They should, 
however, be always mindful of their duty as guardians of the community treaties and laws.  
It is important for the EAC court (and for the COMESA and ECOWAS courts in dealing 
with standing) to define the limits of article 30 in a manner that balances the competing interests of 
member states, national courts, individuals, the court and the ultimate goals of the community. 
This is a delicate task for which the comparative experiences of other international courts will be 
useful. The legitimacy of the community courts‘ role will depend on the political sensitivity they 
show in the face of the multiple, and often conflicting, interests of the member states, national 
institutions, the communities, community institutions and individuals.  
Except for a recent action instituted before the EAC court by the law societies in East 
Africa,
123
 all the cases involved natural persons. What has been absent, both at national and 
community levels, are actions instituted by legal persons (e.g. companies) and interest groups to 
champion the cause of economic integration.
124
 Generally, interest groups‘ participation in and 
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influence on Africa‘s economic integration has been minimal,125 especially when it comes to using 
litigation to promote economic integration. Happily, the community treaties define person as any 
natural or legal person,
126
 and also envisage a role for civil society.
127
 As already noted, in 
litigating before the EAC court, a person does not have to show personal interest affected by an 
alleged breach of the treaty. This opens up the prospect that, under article 30 of the EAC Treaty, 
legal persons who are resident in the EAC can bring actions directly before the EAC court without 
facing very restrictive standing rules.  
The huge cost of international litigation may prevent natural persons from directly litigating 
before the community courts. But, so far, there is no empirical study which suggests that this is the 
case. Legal persons, especially companies and businesses, can benefit greatly from the community 
courts‘ jurisprudence and the realization of the goals of economic integration in the form of 
improved market access and expanded investment opportunities. It is suggested that they should 
become more actively involved in the economic integration processes, including making use of the 
standing granted them by the community treaties. They should challenge national measures that 
hinder intra-community trade before the community courts.  
Apart from direct litigation, another avenue for legal persons and interest groups‘ 
participation is through the submission of amicus curiae briefs. Through these briefs, they can 
shape the community courts‘ jurisprudence. In this regard, it is significant that the East African 
Law Society appeared as amicus curiae in the Calist and Anyang cases. Indeed, article 40 of the 
EAC Treaty allows a resident of a member state to intervene in a case before the court with the 
leave of the court. However, the submission of an intervening party should be limited to evidence 
supporting or opposing the arguments of a party to the case. 
The minimal participation of interest groups in Africa‘s economic integration processes is 
troubling. They have devoted considerable attention to human rights issues and human rights 
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litigation in Africa. But, they have spent little on the economic integration agenda. It can be argued 
that this is so because, while the importance of human rights and good governance have been 
‗sold‘ to domestic and foreign donors and attract huge funding for interest groups, Africa‘s 
economic integration has not been similarly marketed. Nor does economic integration appear to be 
a priority for donor funds. Even where interest groups have taken an interest in economic 
integration issues, they have emphasized mainly the human rights dimensions. For example, their 
involvement in advocating an amendment to the protocol of the ECOWAS court to allow for 
individual standing was motivated largely by a desire to litigate, in the court, states‘ violations of 
human rights. A similar movement is underway to extend the jurisdiction of the EAC court to 
cover human rights issues. It is suggested that the vigour and passion with which interest groups 
have championed the human rights cause should equally be made available to that of economic 
integration. The links between economic development and human rights are obvious. Indeed, there 
is a human right to development. Successful economic integration and the concomitant prosperity 
it brings may be the panacea to many of Africa‘s human rights ills. 
5.3.3.3 National Courts’ Roles in Economic Integration 
Like individuals, national courts have a crucial role to play in Africa‘s economic 
integration.
128
 They provide an institutional medium through which community norms can be 
translated into domestic benefits for individuals. They are an essential complement to the 
communities‘ law-enforcement mechanisms. Historically, national courts‘ role in economic 
integration has not been recognized in Africa‘s economic integration treaties.129 At present, this is 
being remedied. As noted above, the COMESA, ECOWAS and EAC treaties envisage a role for 
national courts. They can seek preliminary rulings from the community courts on questions of 
interpretation or application of the treaties, or the validity of community regulations, directives or 
decisions.
130
  Although to date national courts have not made use of the preliminary rulings 
procedure, the fact that it has been provided for represents a remarkable shift in approach to 
economic integration in Africa. 
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Bebr has identified some factors in the European context which made national courts 
initially reluctant to seek preliminary rulings.
131
 They included uncertainty as to the legal nature of 
the European Court of Justice, especially as regards its place in the hierarchy of national judicial 
structures, the novelty of the procedure, and the lack of a national equivalent. These reasons are 
equally relevant in Africa. Procedures for reference exist in some African states, especially on 
issues of constitutional interpretation.
132
 However, the procedure of reference to a court outside the 
ordinary national judicial structure is unknown. Accordingly for the procedure to work in Africa, 
the jurisdiction of national courts should be expanded. But, so far, I am unaware of any state that 
has done that. Put differently, the national legal infrastructure for the community-decreed 
procedure to ‗take off‘ is non-existent. 
It is inevitable that, as part of exercising jurisdiction, national courts may have to address 
issues which engage community law. As the body of community law expands and individuals 
become more aware of it, they will seek to rely on it before national courts and these issues will 
increase. There may be parallels between this anticipated development and the current resolve of 
individuals to invoke international human rights norms in domestic claims. Individuals will lay 
claim to and enforce a law, whatever its source, which confers a personal advantage on them as 
long as they are aware of it and the legal system allows effect to be given to that law. Indeed, there 
are, currently, emerging cases in which individuals have relied, sometimes unsuccessfully, on 
community law before national courts.
133
 For example, in Movement for Democratic Change v. 
President of the Republic of Zimbabwe,
134
 the applicant sought a declaration that Zimbabwe‘s 
Electoral Commission Act and the Electoral Act did not incorporate sections of the SADC 
Principles and Guidelines adopted in Mauritius in 2004. Also, sections of the Public Order and 
Security Act, the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, and the Broadcasting Act 
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were incompatible with the provisions of the SADC Principles and Guidelines. The court rejected 
both requests.  
The court held that the applicant appeared to have elevated the SADC Principles and 
Guidelines to a law and placed that law in a position superior to domestic law. To the court there 
was no legal principle that made a regional instrument in the nature of the SADC Principles and 
Guidelines binding on member states. They were model rules with no binding force. In addition, 
the SADC Principles and Guidelines had not been incorporated into domestic law and were, 
accordingly, not enforceable by the court. To the court, the SADC Principles and Guidelines were 
not a source of domestic law. Although these pronouncements are legally correct, they are 
nonetheless remarkable. Earlier in the judgment, the court found that subsequent to and following 
the summit at which the principles were adopted and signed by the Zimbabwean government, the 
government initiated, and piloted through Parliament, two specific pieces of legislation aimed at 
regulating the conduct of elections in Zimbabwe in accordance with the SADC Principles and 
Guidelines. These were the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission Act and the Electoral Act, the very 
legislation at issue in the case. The case demonstrates the importance of national laws and 
institutions for the effective implementation of community law; it is not enough to adopt 
community law if national legal systems have not been conditioned for its reception. 
In the Kenyan case of Republic v. Kenya Revenue Authority, ex parte Aberdare Freight 
Services Ltd.,
135
 the applicant argued that the respondent‘s decision to detain its sugar consignment 
was illegal and contrary to the COMESA Free Trade Area Rules and the COMESA Treaty to 
which Kenya is party. The consignment had been detained with a view to imposing duties which 
the applicant wanted to avoid. An issue the court had to determine was whether section 27 of 
Kenya‘s Sugar Act, No. 10/2001, which vested power in the Kenya Sugar Board to control imports 
in order to safeguard national interests concerning the importation of sugar, was consistent with the 
COMESA Treaty. The court held that the treaty applied to the quota that had been imposed on the 
applicant‘s import. It considered the relevant treaty provisions, namely articles 3(a), 45, 49(1)(2) 
and 61 and held that the Sugar Act did not contravene them. The court reasoned that the measures 
taken by the respondent were an articulation of the national interest in the allocation of quota for 
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sugar imports, and were safeguards aimed at protecting local industry. In the court‘s opinion, such 
measures did not violate the COMESA Treaty.
136
 
The reliance on community law within member states by individuals is a welcome 
development. Admittedly, the response of national courts has been varied and, indeed, sometimes 
unfavourable. Nevertheless, it is important that this development is encouraged with a view to 
strengthening economic integration in Africa through the integration of community law into 
member states‘ laws. National courts are forums through which individuals can seek the benefits of 
integration and community laws. The reliance on community law in states offers the prospect of a 
preliminary reference to the community courts. The ability of the community courts to forge a link 
with national courts will be essential to the former‘s development.  
The cases also demonstrate a level of awareness of the potentially beneficial impact of 
community law. However, we cannot be over-enthusiastic about their numbers. They are relatively 
few compared with the number of years economic integration has been going on in Africa and the 
significant (albeit still relatively small) number of laws it has produced.
137
 It is troubling that after 
years of economic integration, many more of the benefits it brings and the challenges it poses have 
not found their way into national courts. The potential cost of litigation, a lack of awareness of the 
economic integration processes and the rights existing as a result, low intra-African trade, the fact 
that lawyers have neither integrated community law into their practice nor developed it as a 
specialized area of practice, and a perceived absence of a litigation culture in Africa may together 
account for this. In addition, member states have not provided the legal infrastructure necessary for 
individuals to rely on and give legal effect to community laws.  
In this regard, and as discussed in Chapter Seven, there are formidable constraints on 
individuals‘ reliance on community law before African national courts. The constraints can affect 
the participation of both individuals and national courts in the economic integration processes. At 
the community level, the constraints take the form of the absence of direct effect and direct 
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applicability provisions in the community treaties. At the national level, they take the form of 
inimical constitutional provisions and unfavourable judicial precedents. If proper community-state 
relations are to exist, and domestic effect given to community law, it will demand rethinking the 
existing constitutional laws and jurisprudence of national courts.  
From a relational perspective, and against the background of the importance of the inter-
system jurisprudential communication discussed in Chapter Two, an interesting aspect of the 
community courts‘ judgments is the fair amount of jurisprudential borrowing and judicial dialogue 
between community and national courts. The ECOWAS court has confirmed that it can rely on 
decisions from ‗member states‘ courts and regional courts‘ in deciding cases.138 The community 
courts‘ judgments contain references to numerous decisions of national courts.139 This provides 
another avenue for forging mutually beneficial reciprocal relations. The reputation of a court 
depends in part on the reach of its jurisprudence and the respect accorded it by other courts. As 
decisions of national courts are used by community courts, the former‘s position within their 
national legal systems is enhanced through the community affirmation of the quality of their 
jurisprudence. National courts may equally reciprocate by drawing on the jurisprudence of the 
community courts and giving effect to their judgments. 
It is, however, imperative that jurisprudential borrowing is done with circumspection. 
Where it is possible, community courts should draw on cases from all the member states and not 
only a few.
140
 Unless this is so, they risk alienating some states. The fact that judges of the 
community courts are drawn from member states, and must be persons who fulfil the conditions 
required in their own countries to hold high judicial office, may facilitate judicial dialogue and 
jurisprudential borrowing between community and national courts.
141
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The community courts have also found useful the jurisprudence of other more experienced 
international and regional courts outside Africa. As noted above, given the novelty of the mandate 
entrusted to them, they must seek the benefit of the decades-long experiences of these courts. The 
jurisprudence of the ECJ has been a fertile source of comparative law for the community courts. In 
Muleya v. Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa,
142
 Justice Ogoola sought guidance 
from ‗the rich jurisprudence‘143 of the ECJ on an ambiguous point on pleadings. He noted that 
decisions of the ECJ did not bind the COMESA court, but are nonetheless of ‗enormous persuasive 
value‘.144 With its rich experience on issues of economic integration, the jurisprudence of the ECJ 
can be highly relevant in the settlement of disputes before the community courts. 
Regrettably, it appears the community courts have been unaware of each other‘s 
jurisprudence or at least have not been borrowing from each other‘s jurisprudence.145 The 
judgments examined did not contain a reference to decisions of other African community courts or 
legal developments or laws in other communities. This is unfortunate. Attentions to each other‘s 
judgments would have enriched some of the judgments, even if it might not have changed their 
outcome. For example, in Afolabi,
146
 the ECOWAS court could have used other African economic 
integration treaties to demonstrate how ECOWAS stood alone on the question of individual access 
to community courts, and how, given that the communities were the building blocks of the AEC, 
such an isolationist stance was unacceptable.  
Indeed, since the communities are building blocks of the AEC, one expects that judicial 
dialogue among their courts would be an important part of ‗building‘ the AEC. Also, the fact that 
there are considerable similarities across the communities‘ constitutive treaties and objectives 
should encourage more dialogue. As Mistry has observed, ‗it appears as if the drafting of all these 
arrangements across Africa was done from the same template‘.147 At present, the difficulty of 
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accessing each other‘s judgments owing to the absence of systematic law reporting may account 
for lack of judicial dialogue among the community courts. It is suggested that jurisprudential 
borrowing among them should be encouraged to facilitate the gradual development of a continental 
jurisprudence on economic integration.  
This can be done by facilitating access to their judgments and fostering regular interactions 
between their officers. It is recommended that each court should approach councils for law 
reporting in member states about officially publishing its judgments. Publication of the judgments 
should be considered a public good, aimed at promoting economic integration in Africa and the 
effectiveness of the courts. Publication of judgments enhances the international and domestic 
visibility of the community courts. With limited access to judgments, it is little wonder that some 
writers perceive the courts as existing ‗mostly on paper‘.148 Kenya‘s National Council for Law 
Reporting has published one judgment of the EAC court.
149
 It would also be possible for an 
academic institution to take up this task on a continental scale.
150
 It is unlikely that, at this stage, 
and given the volume of cases, a law report devoted solely to the courts judgments will be 
commercially viable such that it can attract a private commercial publisher.
151
 A continental 
jurisprudence on economic integration will immensely benefit Africa. 
5.3.3.4 International Law’s Role in Economic Integration  
Regional economic integration processes operate within the context of an overarching 
international legal system.
152
 It is therefore not surprising that international law is often deployed 
in the settlement of disputes by judicial institutions, such as the WTO panels and Appellate Body 
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and the ECJ, working in the field of international economic law. This field of learning, although 
epistemologically distinct, still maintains its international law foundations. Accordingly, the 
WTO‘s Appellate Body has held that the WTO agreements cannot be read in clinical isolation 
from public international law.
153
 Reliance on international law in adjudication before the WTO 
panels and Appellate Body has been contentious. However, it is generally recognized that it is 
beneficial.
154
 When a community court relies on international law, it makes the community and 
international legal systems interact. 
As noted above, of the community treaties under review, only the ECOWAS Treaty makes 
a direct reference to international law as a source of law for the court.
155
 Also, one of the principal 
qualifications for appointment to the ECOWAS court is to be a jurisconsult ‗of recognized 
competence in international law‘.156 It was suggested that this offers a greater prospect that 
international law would be brought to bear on the court‘s decisions. Indeed, the judgments of the 
ECOWAS court, with their constant reference to the decisions of the international courts, provide 
evidence that this may be true. Unlike the ECOWAS Treaty, there is only one reference to 
international law in the EAC Treaty. It is in the preamble, and provides that the countries resolve 
to adhere to the principles of international law governing relationships between sovereign states. 
Notwithstanding this absence of an express reference to international law as a source of law, both 
applicants and respondents in the Anyang case relied on it in their arguments and so did the court 
in its judgment. Indeed, a recent judgment of the EAC court on the consistency of amendments to 
the treaty with the procedures for amendment laid down in the treaty reveals, once again, the 
court‘s heavy reliance on international law.157  
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To date, reliance on international law by the community courts appears uncontested. 
However, with time, more fundamental questions as to the relations between international law, 
international law commitments of member states, and the community treaties will become issues 
for determination. One problematic issue will be conflicts between the obligations of member 
states under the community treaties and their obligations under the WTO agreements or other trade 
agreements. Admittedly, a state may not invoke its internal law as justification for the non-
fulfilment of its international treaty obligation.
158
 But, it is arguable whether it can invoke before a 
community court its international obligations as an excuse for the non-fulfilment of its regional 
treaty obligations, or, before an international court, its regional obligations as a justification for not 
fulfilling its international obligations.
159
 As regards WTO law, the response to this question before 
a community court will, in part, depend on the extent to which WTO law will be considered an 




Although the present reliance on international law by the community courts has not been 
contested, we must caution against unthinking invocation of international law in the interpretation 
of the community treaties. An instance of this is the EAC court‘s ruling in Anyang II that the EAC 
Treaty did not provide an explicit solution to the issue of conflicts between community treaty 
provisions and national laws.
161
 This ruling was given without regard to the clear provisions of 
article 8(4) of the treaty which provides that, ‗community organs, institutions and laws shall take 
precedence over similar national ones on matters pertaining to the implementation of this Treaty‘. 
This provision obviously implies that, in cases of such conflicts, community law should prevail 
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over national law. Thus, contrary to the court‘s suggestion, the solution did not lie in a basic 
principle of international law,
162
 or the persuasive jurisprudence of the ECJ.
163
 The solution lay in 
article 8(4) of the EAC Treaty! The fact that the court glossed over this important provision is 
particularly troubling given that, as noted in Chapter Four, the article appears to have been 
introduced
164
 as a direct reaction to previous judicial decisions such as Okunda v. Republic, which 
rejected the subordination of national law to community law.
165
 The EAC court and, indeed, the 
national courts within the EAC, must recognize the revolutionary nature of this supremacy 
provision and use it to strengthen community law. 
Another issue the community courts will ultimately have to address is the problem of 
overlapping jurisdictions among themselves, and, internationally, with the WTO dispute settlement 
bodies or other dispute settlement systems in which member states are parties.
166
 Multiple-state 
membership of communities is a key feature of Africa‘s economic integration processes. Countries 
are often members of more than one community in addition to being members of the WTO. For 
example, Burundi, Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda, all members of the EAC, are also members of 
COMESA and the WTO. What happens if, in a hypothetical scenario, Kenya sues Uganda before 
the EAC court, Uganda sues Kenya before the COMESA court, and Egypt petitions for a WTO 
panel to be set up over what is, essentially, the same dispute? Currently, and unlike other 
agreements outside Africa,
167
 there are no community treaty provisions for resolving the issue of 
conflicting jurisdictions and forum shopping. As will be discussed in Chapter Eight, in the absence 
of such provisions, the community courts will have to work out doctrines and rules to regulate the 
issue of conflicting jurisdictions. In doing so, private international law principles may be useful. 
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5.3.3.5 Sovereignty and Inter-Institutional Relational Problems  
In the formative stages of the development of an international organization, its institutions 
try to define their roles within it and protect their prerogatives. Accordingly, inter-institutional 
relational problems are prominent at these formative stages. A classic illustration of this is the case 
of Parliament of ECOWAS v. Council of Ministers of ECOWAS,
168
 in which the applicant 
unsuccessfully challenged decisions of the Council of Ministers which, according to the applicant, 
violated the independence and financial autonomy it enjoyed.
169
 A less direct instance is the Calist 
case which, although not instituted by the EALA, was aimed in part at maintaining its right to have 
a voice in the EAC‘s law-making process.170 Concomitant with inter-institutional relational 
problems, when member states begin to experience the practical national impact of what they have 
agreed, their enthusiasm in joining the international organization becomes tempered by a growing 
unwillingness to surrender sovereignty to it. This reluctance is particularly strong where decisions 
made by the organization have significant national impacts. Accordingly, a defining challenge for 
the court of the organization is how to mediate the relational problems between the organization‘s 
institutions, as well as between member states and the organization.
171
 The court becomes the 
arbiter of inter-institutional problems and a moderator of the relations between the organization 
and member states.  
The judgments of the community courts reveal an attempt to address some of these 
problems. The proper resolution of these problems is important for the effective development of 
the communities. A significant source of the problems between member states and the 
communities was the scope of national prerogatives in economic integration; what can states 
continue to do and what are they prevented from doing as a result of becoming parties to the 
community treaties? In Anyang II, the EAC court characterizes this as the hurdle of ‗balancing 
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individual state sovereignty with integration‘.172 It is a hurdle which all economic integration 
processes struggle with. Indeed, as noted in Chapters Two and Four, state sovereignty challenges 
the very idea and existence of a community legal system. In Africa, striking the right balance is 
likely to be more challenging since the community treaties do not clearly lay out the communities‘ 
competences vis-à-vis those of member states: What matters, if any, are within the exclusive 
competence of the communities? What matters are within the exclusive competence of member 
states? Are there any areas of shared competence? In case there is a dispute, who decides whether a 
community or member state is competent as regards a defined issue? The ability of the community 
courts to strike the right balance in overcoming this hurdle will be fundamental to the success of 
Africa‘s economic integration processes.  
Sovereignty-based arguments are used by states in their attempt to constrain the decision-
making powers of community courts. Such arguments aim at shaping a court‘s jurisprudence in a 
manner perceived to be more in line with states‘ interests and cut back the extent of a community‘s 
competences. However, as the EAC court held in Anyang II, ‗while the [EAC Treaty] upholds the 
principle of sovereign equality … by the very nature of the objectives they set out to achieve, each 
partner state is expected to cede some amount of sovereignty to the Community and its organs 
albeit in limited areas to enable them play their role‘.173 In Calist, the court had earlier noted that 
‗the competence of the Community is restricted to matters which are within its jurisdiction. Any 
matter which is still under the exclusive sovereignty of the Partner States is beyond the legislative 
competence of the Community‘.174 Definitely, this will not be the last time the sovereignty 
argument will be put before the community courts. The ultimate test for them is how, tactfully, to 
push back the threats of sovereignty and, at the same time, maintain the trust and confidence of the 
member states in the economic integration processes and the jurisprudence of the courts. 
Concomitant with the relational problems between the communities and the member states 
are similar problems between community institutions. A number of inter-institutional relational 
problems are revealed in the community courts‘ judgments. We have already noted how the liberal 
individual locus standi rules affect the balance of power within the communities and can be 
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potentially problematic. Another example was the issue of the sufficiency or otherwise of protocols 
as the legislative medium for the purposes which the private members‘ bills sought to achieve in 
Calist.
175
 We should also recall the bank‘s argument in Ogang176 that the COMESA court lacked 
jurisdiction over it because it was an autonomous institution, not an organ of COMESA, and, 
accordingly, not answerable to the laws and regulations of COMESA. All these are manifestations 
of inter-institutional relational problems. They are very weighty problems which merit careful 
scrutiny. They often aim at bolstering certain institutional interests at the expense of the interests of 
other institutions. 
For example, the issue of the appropriate legislative instrument in the Calist case was not 
an insignificant one. At the heart of that issue was the question of which community institutions 
may participate in the EAC‘s law-making processes. As in states, the choice of legal instrument 
(e.g. executive instrument, constitutional instrument, Act, Order etc.), defines the law-making 
procedure and the participating institutions. Protocols and Acts are the two main modes of 
legislating within the EAC. Protocols supplement, amend or qualify the EAC Treaty.
177
 They are 
legislation pursuant to the treaty. The member states conclude protocols as may be necessary in 
each area of co-operation and spell out the objectives and scope of institutional mechanisms for co-
operation and integration. They are approved by the Summit of Heads of States and Government 
on the recommendation of the Council of Ministers.
178
 Unlike Acts of the community,
179
 the 
EALA is clearly excluded from the negotiation and adoption of protocols.  
This shows that, beneath the argument that protocols were best suited for the purposes for 
which the private members‘ bills in Calist were directed, there was a careful and subtle attempt to 
exclude the EALA altogether from the issues addressed in the bills. It is arguable that this attempt 
was informed by the culture of executive domination of Africa‘s economic integration processes. 
While the EAC Treaty stipulates a number of defined areas where a protocol must be adopted, it 
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does not set those areas as the limit. Thus, theoretically, the scope of matters over which protocols 
can be adopted is undefined. The thought that the EALA, which consists of the people‘s 
representatives, can be excluded from participating in community law-making simply through the 
use of protocols represents a frightening prospect for good governance within the EAC, an ideal 
which is espoused as a fundamental principle of the organization.
180
  
One troubling aspect of this prospect is that under the EAC Treaty, and unlike other organs 
of the community, the EALA is not one of the institutions which can challenge other institutions 
before the EAC court.
181




 may sue the EALA as a 
community institution. But, there is no equivalent power in the EAC Treaty for the EALA to sue a 
member state or other community institution to protect its prerogatives in areas such as law-
making
184
 and control over the community budget.
185
 Unless this limitation is circumvented or 
remedied, the possibility of the EALA being consigned to irrelevance in the face of unbridled 
‗protocolism‘ is real. The ability of individual members of the EALA to bring actions to challenge 
other institutions before the court, as happened in Calist, is one, albeit inadequate, means of 
addressing this limitation. In this area, the interpretive approaches of the court will be crucial in 
protecting the prerogatives and competence of the EALA.
186
 Whether the EAC court will be able 
to do this, or we will have to wait for a treaty amendment, remains to be seen. 
The doctrine of prospective annulment has become an important balancing tool for the 
EAC court. It has been used authoritatively to state the law to guide future decisions and, at the 
same time, ensure that past unlawful decisions of community institutions and member states are 
not sanctioned in a manner that adversely affects the EAC‘s work. In two instances, the court 
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invoked the doctrine to save decisions which would otherwise have been void ab initio.
187
 This 
balancing tool is important to maintaining harmonious inter-institutional and community-state 
relations in the formative stages of the communities‘ development. But, community courts must be 
more circumspect in invoking and applying it. It could send a wrong signal to community 
institutions and member states that breaches of community law would be ‗condoned‘ by the courts. 
It is essential that inter-institutional and community-state relational problems are 
appreciated as part of the evolutionary process in the growth of an international organization. The 
responses to these problems should be measured and well thought through to ensure that they do 
not generate more problems or lead to institutional paralysis. It is in this regard that the recent 
amendment to the EAC Treaty, ostensibly a response to the EAC court‘s ‗anti-government‘ 
jurisprudence, is worrying. The amendments have: restructured the Court into two divisions, i.e. a 
First Instance Division and an Appellate Division; expanded the grounds for removing judges from 
office; provided for suspension of a judge who is under investigation for removal or is charged 
with an offence; limited the court‘s jurisdiction so as not to apply to jurisdiction conferred by the 
treaty on institutions of member states; provided time limits within which a reference to the court 
by individuals may be instituted; provided grounds on which appeal may be made; and deemed 





The above discussion reveals the importance of strong judicial institutions in economic 
integration processes. They act as guardians of the processes and arbiters of inter-institutional and 
community-state relational problems inherent in them. A court has a crucial role to play in 
advancing economic integration through law. It has to evolve its own jurisprudence which ensures 
compliance with treaty obligations, checks excesses on the part of community institutions, 
engenders investor confidence, and nurtures a sense of judicial discipline and legitimacy among 
national courts.
189
 Indeed, an activist community court with broad subject matter and personal 
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jurisdiction can sometimes push forward integration in the face of political inertia. Nowhere has 
this been truer than within the European Community. The jurisprudence of the ECJ has been 
critical to the community‘s development. The character of a community court reflects the depth of 
integration desired and how much of a role is given to law in the integration process. A limited role 
for courts reflects an unwillingness to relinquish sovereignty, and may hamper the attainment of 
deeper integration.  
This chapter has argued that the COMESA, EAC and ECOWAS courts have a crucial role 
in nurturing and managing the various relations that result from the economic integration processes 
of their respective sub-regions. However, without the active support of national courts and 
individuals, they cannot effectively perform this role. The chapter suggests that a trilateral relation 
among individuals, national courts and community courts is important to ensure the effectiveness 
of Africa‘s economic integration processes. The jurisprudence of COMESA, EAC and ECOWAS 
courts points to the importance of this trilateral relation. Their jurisprudence offers useful lessons 
to the African Court of Justice when it becomes operational. But, it is doubtful whether the African 
Court of Justice is equipped to address effectively the issues faced by the COMESA, EAC and 
ECOWAS courts. It will be argued in the next chapter that there are provisions in the Protocol on 
the Statute to the African Court of Justice and Human Rights which require amendment before the 
court can truly develop this trilateral relation. This will enable the African Court of Justice perform 
effectively its role in Africa‘s economic integration. 
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6 CHAPTER SIX: ENFORCEMENT OF COMMUNITY LAW THROUGH 
STRUCTURED RELATIONS: THE CASE OF THE AFRICAN ECONOMIC 
COMMUNITY 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
An integral part of any legal system, and a key to its effectiveness, are the enforcement 
mechanisms provided to ensure compliance with its laws. From a relational perspective, 
enforcement mechanisms are avenues through which community and national legal systems are 
linked. In the context of economic integration, enforcement of community law strengthens a 
community‘s legal system at both community and national levels. It allows individuals to benefit 
from the integration process. This enhances the legitimacy of the community legal system, creates 
a national constituency with interest in community law, and provides a focal point of interaction 
between national and community legal systems. 
Enforcement of community law occurs at both national and community levels. Indeed, 
unless there is effective enforcement at both levels and a high level of co-ordination between them, 
community law will become ineffective. A disjunction will be created between community and 
national legal systems, and the success of the community will be endangered. A key feature of an 
enforcement mechanism that is likely to ensure the effective implementation of community law is 
its ability to take advantage of pre-existing law enforcement regimes in member states. As Shaw 
has observed, ‗ …it is precisely because of the inadequate enforcement facilities that lie at the 
disposal of international law [community law] that one must consider the relationship with 
municipal law as more than of marginal importance‘.1  
This chapter takes as its premise the idea that structured relations between a community 
and pre-existing national law-enforcement mechanisms are important for community law‘s 
effectiveness. It examines the extent to which this idea is reflected in the design of institutions 
responsible for the enforcement of the laws of the African Economic Community.
2
 It assesses how 
the mechanisms established by the AEC Treaty for the enforcement of its laws may fail in ensuring 
their effectiveness. 
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6.2 INSTITUTIONS FOR ENFORCEMENT OF AEC LAW 
6.2.1 Executive Institutions 
Under the AEC Treaty, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government (Assembly) is the 
supreme institution of the community.
3
 It is responsible for implementing the community‘s 
objectives.
4
 From the perspective of making available to the AEC the enforcement mechanisms 
existing in member states, entrusting this function to the Assembly appears to be a good approach. 
As heads of the executive in their respective states, they may be able easily invoke the mandate of 
national institutions such as the police, customs and immigration to enforce community law, or 
propose the enactment of laws giving effect to community law. However, there are disadvantages 
in this approach. 
As regards decision-making at the community level, because the Assembly comprises 
politicians who represent individual member states‘ interests, it is probable that political 
considerations, rather than the ultimate success of the AEC, will be paramount in their 
deliberations. This is especially so since the success of the AEC may lie in adopting domestically 
unpalatable decisions, which must be enforced in member states. A similar arrangement under the 
Treaty for East African Co-operation, 1967, was described as ‗negative‘ since it defeated the aim 
of achieving a ‗vigorous Community‘.5 Under the current Treaty establishing the East African 
Community,
6
 the Summit of Heads of State and Government is responsible for giving ‗general 
directions and impetus as to the development and achievement of the objectives of the 
Community‘.7 An assembly of politicians may seek political compromises rather than the strict 
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enforcement of laws. With their heavy national and international schedules, and numerous 
domestic socio-economic and political problems, it is unlikely heads of state and government can 
forcefully implement the AEC‘s objectives. This ultimately dilutes or slows down the economic 
integration process.
8
 Indeed, the current state of inertia in the development of the AEC may be 
evidence of this. 
At the national level, political pressure from domestic constituencies, coupled with a 
personal motivation to maintain political power, may undercut the willingness or ability of the 
executive to implement community law. For example, there have been instances where 
governments have bowed to domestic pressure and closed their national borders or expelled 
foreigners, thus hindering trade and free movement of persons as agreed under various ECOWAS 
protocols. 
9
 Recently, Ghana closed its border with Togo two days prior to the country‘s 28 
December 2008 general elections. This decision, which was roundly condemned by the 
ECOWAS,
10
 appeared to have been directed at preventing non-nationals voting in the Volta 
region, which is traditionally an opposition (now government in power) stronghold. 
Also, an overbearing Assembly may dominate the agenda of other community institutions 
such as the council of ministers and the secretariat.
11
 This is especially likely as, apart from the 
Court of Justice, none of the major decision-making institutions is guaranteed independence under 
the AEC Treaty. The Council of Ministers is responsible for the ‗functioning and development of 
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the Community‘.12 It is composed of ministers of state who hold their positions at the pleasure of 
their respective president, prime minister or king. Although the Secretary General and the staff of 
the Secretariat are ‗accountable only to the Community‘, the Secretariat is not a decision-making 
institution and cannot push the economic integration agenda on its own.
13
 
The absence of an independent institution to push the agenda of economic integration 
leaves the process entirely in the hands of politicians. This may delay the integration process, 
especially given the history of politics in Africa. Both the Assembly and the Council are comprised 
of members who lack the expertise and security of tenure needed to take or propose bold measures. 
Although great advances are being made, politics in Africa is still characterized by the 
personalization of power, abrupt changes in government, personal and ideological differences 
among leaders, and decisions made on the bases of immediate and short-term objectives. These 
adversely affect the rigorousness of decision-making and the stability in governance which the 
AEC needs to progress. Within the European Community (EC), the European Commission has 
been described as the ‗single most important political force for integration, ever seeking to press 
forward to attain the Community‘s objectives‘.14 It is the EC‘s motor of integration. It is able to do 
this not only because it consists of technocrats, but also because members are required to be 
persons whose ‗independence is beyond doubt‘, and who neither ‗seek nor take instructions from 
any government or from any other body‘.15 It is the European Commission‘s sole responsibility to 
‗ensure that the provisions of [the EC Treaty] and measures taken by the institutions pursuant 
thereto are applied‘.16 It can be argued that its decision-making powers are minimal compared to 
the EC‘s Council of Ministers. But that understates the European Commission‘s role in shaping 
and developing the community. The executive, legislative, judicial and administrative functions of 
the European Commission are not matched by any of the AEC‘s institutions.  
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In contrast to the approach under the AEC Treaty, the European Council, which consists of 
the European Union (EU) countries‘ Heads of State and Government, only recently became a 
formal part of the institutional structure of the European Union. It is responsible for providing the 
EU, of which the EC is an integral part, with ‗the necessary impetus for its development and shall 
define the general political guidelines thereof‘.17 But, it is ultimately the members of the Council 
of Ministers that commit their governments in decisions taken within the EC, and the European 
Commission that sees to the implementation of those decisions. The effective combination of 
independent technocrats with wide enforcement powers and politicians partly account for the EC‘s 
success. These technocrats have wide powers to propose policies and enforce decisions taken on 
those proposals by the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament.  
The role strong institutions play in the success of economic integration should not be 
underestimated. The absence of strong, independent institutions to counterbalance political inertia 
is, no doubt, a major reason behind the slow pace of economic integration in Africa.
18
 Personal 
differences between leaders of the East African Community led to a situation whereby there was 
no meeting of the East African Authority, the supreme organ of the community, between 1971 and 
1977. The collapse of the former East African Community has, in part, been attributed to this 
institutional paralysis.
19
 As far back as 1991, Johnson suggested that for the success of economic 
integration in Africa, ‗major operational decisions of a union should not be taken by organs which 
contain the top political leadership of the member-states‘.20 
6.2.2 The Pan-African Parliament 
Legislative institutions are not often thought of as principal agents when it comes to the 
enforcement of law; they make law, and its implementation resides with the executive. An 
emerging feature of Africa‘s economic integration processes is the use of community 
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 In the context of economic integration, community parliaments offer 
two channels that aid implementation of community law. Firstly, they can ensure people‘s 
participation in their legislative processes. This enhances the legitimacy of laws enacted and 
improves the prospects of compliance. Secondly, they can engage with national parliaments, who 
may be the ultimate decision-makers on the issue of nationally implementing community law. 
The Pan-African Parliament was envisaged under article 14 of the AEC Treaty and, 
subsequently, under article 17 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union.
22
 The full details on 
the Parliament are, however, contained in the Protocol to the Treaty establishing the African 
Economic Community relating to the Pan-African Parliament.
23
 The Pan-African Parliament was 
inaugurated in 2004 and is fully operational.
24
 It is currently an advisory and consultative body.
25
 
Members are drawn from national parliaments.
26
 It is ultimately to evolve into an institution with 
full legislative powers. Members will be elected through universal adult suffrage. The fact that 
Pan-African parliamentarians are drawn from national parliaments provides an opportunity for 
creating a relationship between the AEC and member states. Indeed, the Pan-African Parliament is 
enjoined to work in ‗close co-operation‘ with national parliaments.27 The knowledge Pan-African 
parliamentarians have about the AEC and its legislative processes may be used to influence their 
national colleagues, when it comes to implementing AEC law at the national level. 
The absence of universal adult suffrage limits the extent to which the Pan-African 
Parliament engages with Africans. However, one of the objectives of the Pan-African Parliament is 
to familiarize Africans with the objectives and policies aimed at integrating the African 
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 This can be done through educational campaigns, workshops, lectures and seminars. 
As has already been argued, the presence of a domestic constituency with interest in Africa‘s 
economic integration is one of the surest ways of ensuring the implementation and effectiveness of 
community law. Interested individuals, including businesses, can lobby governments to implement 
community law, report breaches to community institutions, and try to remedy those breaches 
through litigation at both national and community levels. It is important that in the Pan-African 
Parliament‘s engagement with Africans, these roles are stressed. This should be in line with its 
objective to facilitate the implementation of the policies and objectives of the AEC.
29
 
6.2.3 The African Court of Justice 
6.2.3.1 Composition and Independence 
The Court of Justice of the AEC
30
 is an important institution for the enforcement of AEC 
law. It is independent of all other community institutions. Its mandate is to ‗ensure the adherence 
to law in the interpretation and application of [the AEC Treaty] and shall decide on disputes 
submitted thereto pursuant to [the AEC Treaty].‖31 The detailed law regulating the court was to be 
set out in a protocol. But, as was argued in Chapter One, its functions will now be performed by 
the African Court of Justice and Human Rights [African Court of Justice].
32
 The African Court of 
Justice consists of sixteen judges who must all be nationals of states that are parties to the Protocol 
on the African Court of Justice.
33
 This is a practical way of ensuring that the community court 
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relates with national judicial systems. Some of the court‘s members might already have held 
positions in the superior courts of their respective countries.
34
  
As was discussed in Chapter Five, the structure, independence and jurisdiction of courts are 
significant factors in enhancing their ability to meet the challenges of economic integration. There 
are provisions in the Protocol on the African Court of Justice that seek to secure the independence 
and effectiveness of the court. Under article 12 of the Statute of the African Court of Justice, the 
independence of judges shall be fully ensured in accordance with international law. Judges are 
enjoined to act impartially, fairly and justly, and they are not subject to the direction or control of 
any person in the performance of their duties. 
Judges are elected by the Council of Ministers from a list of nominees submitted by state 
parties to the Protocol on the African Court of Justice,
35
 and appointed by the Assembly of Heads 
of State and Government for a period of six years.
36
 They cannot be removed from office except by 
a two-thirds majority decision of the judges of the court that the affected judge no longer fulfils the 
requisite conditions of the position.
37
 The Assembly gives final approval to any recommendation to 
remove a judge.
38
 Judges enjoy diplomatic immunity in accordance with international law.
39
 They 
are immune from legal proceedings both during and after their term of service for acts performed 
in the discharge of their judicial functions.
40
  
The Assembly determines the salaries, allowances and compensation of judges on the 
recommendation of the Council of Ministers.
41
 These payments cannot be decreased during terms 
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of office of a judge.
42
 The court prepares its own budget and submits it to the Assembly through 
the Council of Ministers.
43
 The budget of the court is borne by the African Union.
44
 The Protocol 
on the Court of Justice is silent on whether the Assembly can reduce the court‘s budget. The 
Assembly‘s control over the court‘s budget is a potential threat to the independence of the court. 
It is open to question whether the above provisions on the appointment, removal, 
independence and remuneration of judges are adequate to guarantee a strong and independent court 
that will be up to the challenges of promoting economic integration in Africa. These provisions are 
very similar to those relating to the COMESA, EAC and ECOWAS courts of justice, which were 
discussed in Chapter Five. To an extent, and without purporting to diminish the importance of 
institutional guarantees of independence, the strength of a court depends on the character and 
intellectual strength of its judges.
45
 We noted in Chapter Five a number of decisions from the EAC 
court of justice that demonstrated remarkable independence of judgment, and an ability tactfully to 
balance competing interests in their jurisprudence. Whether the African Court of Justice will 
follow a similar trajectory remains to be seen. 
The Caribbean Court of Justice, which is established under the Agreement establishing the 
Caribbean Court of Justice,
46
 provides an interesting comparative alternative on how to structure 
an international court with a view to facilitating its work and guaranteeing its independence. The 
appointment of the judges of the court and the determination of their remuneration are entrusted to 
the Regional Judicial and Legal Services Commission (Regional Commission) and not member 
states.
47
 To insulate the Regional Commission from government interference, no government 
                                                          
 
42
 Ibid. art. 23(1). 
43
 Ibid. art. 26(1). 
44
 Ibid. art. 26(2). 
45
 Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, ―Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication‖ (1997-
1998) 107 Yale L.J. 273 at 318-323. 
46
 Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice, 2001, online: Caribbean Court of Justice 
<http://www.caribbeancourtofjustice.org/legislation.html>. [Caribbean Court Agreement]. See Sheldon A. McDonald, 
―The Caribbean Court of Justice: Enhancing the Law of International Organizations‖ (2004) 27 Fordham Int‘l L.J. 930 
at 970-1015. For an introduction to the operation and institutional dimension of CARICOM, see Karen E. Bravo, 
―CARICOM, the Myth of Sovereignty, and Aspirational Economic Integration‖ (2005) 31 N. C. J. Int‘l L. & Com. 
Reg. 145; P.K. Menon, ―Regional Integration: A Case Study of the Caribbean Community [CARICOM]‖ (1996) 24 
Korean J. Comp. L. 197. 
47
 Caribbean Court Agreement, ibid. art. 4(7). 
173 
 
representative is a member, and the members of the commission are not appointed by 
governments. Rather, the Regional Commission consists of representatives of the bar, Judicial 
Services Commission, Public Service Commission, civil society and specified faculties of law.
48
 
The commission is also responsible for exercising ‗disciplinary control over Judges of the Court‘.49  
Additionally, the Revised Agreement establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice Trust 
Fund
50
 has created a trust fund to insulate the court from political interference or manipulation of 
its finances. The purpose of the fund is to provide the resources necessary to finance the capital 
and operating budget of the court and the Regional Commission in perpetuity.
51
 The fund is 
financed by contributions of member states, income accruing to the fund, and third party 
contributions.
52
 It is expressly provided that third party contributions should not prejudice the 
independence or integrity of the court.
53
 Also, the fund shall not solicit or accept any grant, gift or 
other material benefit from any source except with the consent of all the member states.
54
 A board 
of trustees, on which there are no government representatives, manages the fund.
55
  
This Caribbean model is still developing and its efficacy appears so far not to have been 
adequately tested. However, it represents a unique and interesting innovation in structuring 
international courts. The model merits close study by the AEC. It presents novel solutions to the 
problems of interference and underfunding, which are perennial challenges to African courts. 
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6.2.3.2 Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Applicable Law 
The subject matter jurisdiction of the African Court of Justice is broad. In theory, it covers, 
potentially, any international dispute arising between states which are parties to the Protocol on the 
African Court of Justice. Under article 28 of the Statute of the African Court of Justice: 
The Court shall have jurisdiction over all cases and all legal disputes submitted to 
it in accordance with the present Statute which relate to: (a) the interpretation and 
application of the Constitutive Act; (b) the interpretation, application or validity 
of other Union Treaties and all subsidiary legal instruments adopted within the 
framework of the Union or the Organization of African Unity; (c) the 
interpretation and the application of the African Charter, the Charter on the 
Rights and Welfare of the Child, the Protocol to the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples‘ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, or any other legal 
instrument relating to human rights, ratified by the States Parties concerned; (d) 
any question of international law; (e) all acts, decisions, regulations and 
directives of the organs of the Union; (f) all matters specifically provided for in 
any other agreements that States Parties may conclude among themselves, or 
with the Union and which confer jurisdiction on the Court; (g) the existence of 
any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an obligation owed to 
a State Party or to the Union; (h) the nature or extent of the reparation to be made 
for the breach of an international obligation. 
The scope of article 28 brings within the jurisdiction of the African Court of Justice the 
AEC Treaty and any laws adopted by the AEC. In carrying out its functions, the court is enjoined 
to have regard to: the Constitutive Act of the African Union; international treaties which have been 
ratified by the contesting States; international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as 
law; the general principles of law recognized universally or by African States; judicial decisions 
and writings of the most highly qualified publicists of various nations as well as the regulations, 
directives and decisions of the African Union, as subsidiary means for the determination of the 
rules of law; any other law relevant to the determination of the case.
56
 If the parties agree, the court 
may also to decide a case ex aequo et bono.
57
 
An issue arising from the list of applicable laws in article 31 is the status of judgments of 
the court. In other words, what is the precedential value of the court‘s judgments to the court itself? 
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Do judicial decisions in article 31(e) include decisions of the court? In discussing this issue, one 
must distinguish between judgment as remedy and judgment as principle. The former is the redress 
provided for the parties such as an injunction, damages or a declaration. The latter is the legal 
foundation of the remedy. It will definitely serve the AEC legal system well, by providing 
certainty and predictability in outcomes, if there is internal coherence in the jurisprudence of the 
African Court of Justice. This partly results from following previous decisions, albeit not slavishly. 
Indeed, other international courts, faced with similar provisions have not found it limiting. They 
strive towards achieving an internally coherent body of jurisprudence by following previous case 
law.
58
 But, perhaps, the treaty could have been more explicit on the precedential value of 
judgments of the court.
59
 
  In this respect, it is significant that an earlier provision in the Protocol on the Court of 
Justice of African Union that ‗judgments of the Court shall be binding on the parties and in respect 
of that particular case‘ was dropped in the Statute of the African Court. The provision appears to 
have been borrowed from article 59 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice which 
provides, ‗the decision of the Court has no binding force except as between the parties and in 
respect of that particular case‘. The International Court of Justice has held that, ‗the object of 
[Article 59] is simply to prevent legal principles accepted by the Court in a particular case from 
being binding on other States or in other disputes‘.60 Admittedly, in practice, the International 
Court of Justice has not applied strictly this understanding of article 59 and it was unlikely the 
Court of Justice of the African Union would have done so either. 
6.2.3.3 Personal Jurisdiction 
The strength of a court depends not only on its independence but also on the scope of its 
subject matter and personal jurisdiction. Under article 29 of the Statute of the African Court of 
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Justice, the following entities are entitled to submit cases to the court on ‗any issue or dispute‘61 
provided for in article 28: states that are parties to the Protocol on the African Court of Justice; the 
Assembly; the Parliament and other organs of the AU authorized by the Assembly; and a staff 
member of the AU. A state that is not party to the protocol may not submit a case to the African 
Court of Justice;
62
 the court has no jurisdiction to hear a dispute involving such a party.  
The fact that the court has no jurisdiction over states that are not parties to the protocol, 
even though they may be parties to the AEC Treaty, poses a challenge to judicial enforcement of 
the treaty.
63
 Surely, in international law, states, as an attribute of their sovereignty, cannot be 
dragged to an international tribunal without their consent.
64
 But, in the context of economic 
integration,
65
 this jurisdictional gap will not aid the uniform application and enforcement of 
community law in member states. This jurisdictional gap is a reflection of a lack of attention to the 
importance of relational issues in integration. A foundation for instability is laid where uneven 
obligations, in terms of the enforcement and enforceability of community law, are imposed on 
member states. It is difficult to conceive of a stable community where community law is not 
uniformly applicable within and enforceable against member states. Indeed, the very essence of 
integration is defeated; ‗uniformity in the meaning of law is part of the constitutional glue that 
holds the Community together‘.66 
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6.2.3.4 Limitations on Personal Jurisdiction 
In Chapter Five, we discussed the importance of individuals as a medium through which 
community and national legal systems interact. We saw that the COMESA, EAC and ECOWAS 
treaties provide fairly liberal rules on individuals‘ participation in the communities‘ judicial 
processes. Individuals have been responsible for almost all the disputes settled by the courts to 
date. The Statute of the African Court of Justice adopts a radically different approach. Except for 
human rights claims, individuals have no standing before the African Court of Justice. On matters 
relating to the interpretation, enforcement and validity of AEC laws, individuals cannot bring an 
action in the African Court of Justice. A provision in the earlier Protocol on the Court of Justice of 
the African Union,
67
 which allowed individuals to access the court under conditions determined by 
the Assembly and with the consent of the state concerned, has been omitted from the Statute on the 
African Court of Justice. With this approach, the African Court of Justices resembles the 
international adjudication regime category in Schneider‘s typology of dispute settlement systems.68 
Such a regime is ill-suited to the level of integration envisaged under the AEC Treaty, although it 
may adequately serve the needs of the AU – the political organization.69 
This absence of locus standi for individuals restricts the number of potential disputes that 
may be brought before the African Court of Justice. It makes the dispute settlement process 
unavailable to some of the most important players in the integration process including consumers, 
traders, corporate bodies and investors. It fails to utilize a principal medium through which 
community-state relationship is strengthened in economic integration. A plausible alternative, 
which is still more restrictive compared to the standing rules of the COMESA, EAC and 
ECOWAS courts, would be to allow individuals to litigate before the African Court of Justice with 
special leave of the court,
70
 or after exhausting local remedies. Another alternative is to create a 
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reference procedure between national courts and the African Court of Justice. This alternative 
would provide individuals with indirect access to the African Court of Justice. 
Admittedly, no legal system grants individuals unlimited access to its courts. However, 
every advanced legal system recognizes the important role private litigation plays, not only in 
sustaining the system but also in its development. Legal systems have two principal means of 
enforcing norms. These are public enforcement through the state and its institutions, and private 
enforcement by individuals. The combination of these two enforcement mechanisms ensures a 
legal system‘s effectiveness. In economic integration, private enforcement complements public 
enforcement by community institutions. It appears, however, that under the Statute on the African 
Court of Justice this complementing role is constrained by the unduly restrictive standing rules for 
individuals. The above should not be read to mean that the African Court of Justice will be useless 
because it does not provide for individual standing. What is being suggested here is that, to the 
extent that the court is expected to perform a role which will aid economic integration in Africa, its 
ability to do that will be constrained by the lack of standing for individuals who could have been 
its principal source of cases. Surely, there are international courts like the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) before which individuals have no standing. However, it is important to note that the 
ICJ is not superintending the enforcement of an economic integration treaty and its works and 
jurisprudence is not meant to facilitate an economic integration process. 
In general, governments are reluctant to submit to binding interstate dispute resolution 
processes.
71
 Indeed, in Chapter Five, we noted that, of all the cases so far brought before the 
COMESA, EAC and ECOWAS courts, only one was interstate.
72
 In the absence of a private right 
of action, the African Court of Justice might be underused and may be consigned to ‗abject 
inactivity and irrelevance‘.73 One can only imagine what would have happened to the COMESA, 
ECOWAS and EAC courts if there were no individual standing rights before them. Granting 
private right of action will ensure the use of the African Court of Justice, and prevent its descent 
into inactivity and irrelevance.  
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Arguably, the absence of individual rights of action reflects a desire of states to dominate 
the African Court of Justice, even if only indirectly, and cut it off from any relations with those 
most affected by economic integration. It may also be an indirect attempt to shape the court‘s 
jurisprudence and reduce its potential role as a legislator of community norms; ‗control over 
litigation entails a degree of control over the type of law that is made‘.74 States can do this by 
shaping the type of arguments that come before the court to suit particular ends. As noted already, 
the absence of individual rights of action is inconsistent with the position in other African regional 
economic treaties.
75
 It also defies recommendations of scholars.
76
 It is recommended that any 
revisions of the Statute of the African Court of Justice should provide for individual rights of 
action either directly, through special leave of the court or after exhausting local remedies, or 
indirectly through reference from national courts.
77
 
Another medium for enhancing community-states relations is national courts. They provide 
an avenue for giving domestic effect to community law apart from executive and parliamentary 
acts such as ratification, publication of community instruments, and administrative action.
78
 Using 
national courts to enforce community law has advantages. It is cheaper for litigants as they are 
more widely and easily accessible than community courts. As forums of first resort, their work 
could also reduce significantly the workload of community courts. In Chapter Five, we noted that 
they have been given a significant role to play under the COMESA, EAC and ECOWAS treaties 
through the procedure of preliminary reference. But, so far, the procedure has not been used. As 
will be discussed in Chapter Eight, national courts also have a role in the enforcement of 
judgments of the COMESA, EAC and ECOWAS courts. This is not the case with the African 
Court of Justice; there is no express provision in the AEC Treaty or the Statute of the African 
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Court of Justice for relations between national courts and the African Court of Justice. There is no 
preliminary reference procedure between the African Court of Justice and national courts. Nor is it 
envisaged that they will aid the enforcement of judgments of the African Court of Justice. This 
disjunction between both courts may seriously hamper the effectiveness of the African Court of 
Justice.  
The absence of some form of relations between the African Court of Justice and national 
courts is particularly ironic since, as already noted, a number of African regional economic 
integration treaties envisage a role for national courts.
79
 One would have expected that the drafters 
of the Protocol on the African Court of Justice would have been inspired by these treaties. This is 
because the communities created by these treaties are the building blocks of the African Economic 
Community. As the AEC develops and community law expands into member states, national 
courts will definitely be faced with cases that engage aspects of community law and for which a 
reference to the African Court of Justice for interpretation would be helpful. The fact that it is not 
envisaged that national courts will aid the enforcement of judgments of the African Court of 
Justice is explainable on the grounds of the very limited rights of access individuals have to the 
court. In the absence of cases from individuals, it is unlikely that many judgments will be for 
pecuniary compensation,
80
 the kind of judgments national courts are best suited to enforce. 
The absence of relations between national courts and the African Court of Justice will pose 
a challenge for the uniform application of AEC law, and hence its effectiveness. Through 
incorporation, treaties become part of member states‘ laws. National courts may resort to them in 
adjudication, and private parties may rely on them in litigation. The absence of relations between 
the African Court of Justice and national courts implies that there may not be uniform 
interpretation of AEC laws in member states. Nothing could be more destabilizing for the AEC‘s 
legal system than varied application of its laws. The goals of free movement of persons, capital and 
services, the right of establishment, taxation, transport and communication, which are envisaged by 
the AEC Treaty,
81
 are intrinsically bound to national legal systems. The absence of defined 
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relations between the African Court of Justice and national courts may undermine the realization of 
these goals.  
Even more destabilising will be the fact that judgments of the African Court of Justice do 
not appear to be binding on national courts.
82
 This creates the prospect of conflicting judgments 
between national courts and the African Court of Justice. It also opens up the possibility that 
governments will avoid, at the national level, their international obligations. Developments 
surrounding recent judgments of the Southern African Development Community Tribunal and the 
Supreme Court of Zimbabwe illustrate this prospect. In Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd. v. Republic of 
Zimbabwe,
83
 the SADC Tribunal restrained the Zimbabwean government from compulsorily 
acquiring the agricultural land of the applicant. At the time of this decision, an action relating to 
the same land was pending before the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe. The Supreme Court, in 
apparent disregard of the SADC Tribunal‘s injunction, ruled in favour of the government,84 and the 
government has declared its intention to go ahead with the seizure of the applicant‘s land.85 While 
Zimbabwe will incur responsibility at the community level if it goes ahead with the seizure, this 
offers no hope at the national level for the applicant whose right was vindicated at the community 
level.  
It is recommended that a role for national courts, including a procedure of reference for 
preliminary rulings, similar to article 234 of the EC Treaty, be adopted by the AEC.
86
 Indeed, as 
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noted already, some African economic integration treaties allow national courts to seek 
preliminary rulings from their respective community courts.
87
 As noted above, as far as economic 
integration issues are concerned, individuals have no standing in the African Court of Justice. In 
such a situation, allowing national courts to seek preliminary rulings will provide a substitute. 
Individuals can litigate at the national level in the hope that community law issues arising from 
their action may be resolved at the community level. This system of reference should be matched 
by appropriate restrictions on the type of courts which can make a reference so as to reduce the 
judicial workload. Currently, the African treaties that allow for preliminary rulings have no such 
limitation. For the AEC, this limitation would be important due to its size and the fact that 
resolving human rights disputes is part of African Court of Justice‘s competence.88 
In addition to formal procedures, it is also important that the African Court of Justice 
cultivates healthy ‗personal‘ relations with national courts through consultations and workshops to 
help national judges familiarize themselves with community law. As already noted, judges of the 
African Court of Justice may, potentially, be drawn from national courts. This should become an 
important means for forging relations with national judges.
89
 The African Court of Justice can also 
draw on the jurisprudence of member states‘ courts. International courts often make use of general 
principles of law developed in national courts. In Chapter Five, we noted how the COMESA, EAC 
and ECOWAS courts use national jurisprudence in deciding disputes. In this regard, it is 
significant that the Statute of the African Court of Justice lists general principles of law recognized 
universally or by African states, as well as judicial decisions as sources of law for the court.
90
 
Arguably, a cautious reliance on general principles of law and decisions of national courts may 
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encourage national courts to ‗reciprocate‘ by borrowing from or applying the jurisprudence of the 
African Court of Justice.  
To be sure, the adjudicatory approach of relying on decisions of foreign courts as 
persuasive authority, especially prevalent in common law countries is, ordinarily, not extended to 
international courts given their unique character and often specific mandates. It is not often that a 
national court will make reference to a decision of, for example, the International Court of Justice. 
However, it is increasingly advocated that there must be interaction, dialogue, or transjudicial 
communication between national and international courts.
91
 Indeed, already, some African national 
courts demonstrate a willingness to rely on decisions of international courts in deciding cases.
92
 
Hopefully, they will extend this jurisprudential outlook to decisions of the African Court of Justice. 
This will provide an indirect means of enforcing community law. A court expands its authority by 
expanding the reach of its jurisprudence; national courts‘ reliance on decisions of the African 
Court of Justice will enhance the latter‘s effectiveness.  
The Ugandan case of Shah v. Manurama Ltd.
93
 illustrates concretely the instrumental role 
national courts can play in securing the benefits of community law for individuals and, at the same 
time, act as a medium through which community law influences national legal systems. In Shah, 
the defendant brought an application seeking an order requiring the plaintiff to pay security for the 
defendant‘s costs. The plaintiff was a resident in Kenya, and thus outside of the jurisdiction of the 
Uganda High Court. The defendant argued that the plaintiff was resident abroad and this was ‗a 
prima facie ground for ordering payment of costs‘.94 The defendant relied on well-established 
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domestic common law principles to support this claim. In reply, the plaintiff argued that, given the 
re-establishment of the EAC and the legal regime it had created, the question of residence for the 
purpose of ordering security for costs should be re-examined.
95
 The court denied the application. It 
held that in East Africa, ‗there can no longer be an automatic and inflexible presumption for the 
courts to order payment of security for costs with regard to a plaintiff who is a resident in the East 
African Community‘.96 The court stated that the establishment of the EAC ‗beg[ged] for a fresh re-
evaluation of our judicial thinking‘ as regards the law requiring plaintiffs to pay security for 
costs.
97
 Among the factors that influenced the court in its decision were the following: 
 All three countries, Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania, are partner states in the 
East African Community (‗EAC‘). 
 The East African Community Treaty (like the European Community Treaty) 
seeks to establish a customs union, a common market, and a monetary union 
– as integral pillars of the community – and, ultimately, a political union 
among the partner states. In particular, the East African Community Treaty 
makes express provision for the unification and harmonization of the laws of 
the partner states, including the ‗standardization of the judgments of courts 
within the community‘ (article 126), and establishment of a common bar 
(cross-border legal practice) 
 The underlying objective of undertaking all the initiatives described above – 
and many more not discussed in this ruling – are stated in article 5 of the East 
African Community Treaty as being the need to develop policies and 
programmes aimed at widening and deepening cooperation among the partner 
states in political, economic, social and cultural fields, research and 
technology, defence, security and legal and judicial affairs, for their mutual 
benefit 
 Article 104 of the East African Community Treaty provides for the free 
movement of persons, labour, services, and the right of establishment and 
residence. The partner states are under an obligation to ensure the enjoyment 
of these rights by their citizens within the community. In this regard, the 
court is mindful of the fact that the East African Community Treaty has the 
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force of law in each partner state (article 8(2) (b)) and that this treaty law has 
precedence over national law (article 8(5)).
98
 
This case demonstrates an appreciation of the importance of community law and its impact 
on national law. It shows how national courts can become a medium for giving effect to 
community law and the community‘s objects.99 The case also provides a refreshing example of 
how individuals can domestically enforce their right to the benefits of community law. It is 
suggested that the AEC should make individuals and national courts its allies. 
As was the case in Shah, the existence and objects of the AEC should begin to elicit a re-
evaluation of national judicial thinking with regard to matters in which AEC law and community 
goals may be involved. Admittedly, the AEC is still in its formative stages and has not developed 
an appreciable amount of substantive law. However, as in Shah, national courts can still draw on 
its goals and broad principles and advance them through their judgments. A number of decisions at 
the community level have also made use of broad principles in adjudication.
100
 Indeed, in Chapter 
Seven, cases in which national courts have made use of the goals and principles of communities in 
Africa are discussed. 
As discussed further in Chapter Seven, as regards national courts drawing on the goals and 
principles of the AEC and advancing them, comparative lessons can also be drawn from the 
willingness of African courts to rely on unincorporated international human rights conventions.
101
 
Through this, an aspect of the international legal system, that is international human rights law, is 
made relevant in states. It is suggested that in cases where community issues are engaged, national 
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courts should interpret statutes in the light of community principles and goals. This may entail 
interpreting domestic law to promote rather than undermine community goals, affording remedies 
that enhance or facilitate rights envisaged by community objectives such as the free movement of 




From a comparative perspective, the ECJ‘s ruling that national courts are also responsible 
for the fulfilment of the obligation imposed on member states by article 10 of the EC Treaty to take 
measures necessary to attain the objectives of the European Community is relevant here.
103
 It is 
significant that article 10 of the EC Treaty is strikingly similar in language and substance to article 
5 of the AEC Treaty.
104
 If Africa‘s economic integration processes are to succeed, then there is a 
need for more engagement among the communities, national courts and individuals. The AEC 
Treaty and the Statute of the African Court fail to satisfy this need. 
6.3 AU INSTITUTIONS DOUBLING AS AEC INSTITUTIONS 
The above exposition raises a fundamental question: why have Africans structured 
institutions to address the challenges of economic integration in a manner which ill-equips them 
for the challenges? In my opinion, this is because there has been a convolution of the economic 
integration agenda with the political integration agenda under a nebulous idea variously described 
as ‗African Union‘, ‗African Unity‘, ‗Union Government for Africa‘, and ‗United States of 
Africa‘.  
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For the AEC, the problem began when its founding treaty declared in article 98(1) that ‗the 
Community shall form an integral part of the [Organisation of African Unity]‘.105 Article 99 went 
on to declare that the treaty and protocols adopted under it shall form an integral part of the OAU 
Charter. With these provisions, it appears the drafters thought it unnecessary to expressly give the 
AEC a separate legal personality; accordingly, the treaty is silent on this issue.
106
 The immediate 
understanding and effect of these provisions was that the institutions of the OAU were co-opted to 
perform the functions of the institutions of the AEC. There appears to have been no careful thought 
as to whether, as then structured, the OAU institutions suited the needs of economic integration. 
The Constitutive Act of the African Union
107
 did not address this problem. After passing 
references to the African Economic Community in the preamble, it simply provided that the ‗Act 
shall take precedence over and supersede any inconsistent or contrary provisions of the Treaty 
establishing the African Economic Community‘.  
Historically and comparatively, it is worth recalling that the Treaty for East African Co-
operation
108
 which established the East African Community had ‗as an integral part of the 
Community‘109 the East African Common Market. However, unlike the situation with the AEC, the 
Treaty for East African Co-operation established at least two institutions devoted specifically to 
the East African Common Market, namely the Common Market Council and Common Market 
Tribunal.
110
 More recently, Asante decried the use of the organs of the OAU (now AU) as the basic 
organs of the AEC.
111
 These organs are ill-equipped to meet the challenges of integration. The 
effect has been the loss of identity of the AEC. Indeed, as Asante graphically puts it, the AEC has 
no ‗letterhead of its own‘, it ‗has, in fact, become just a division, albeit an important one, of a 
                                                          
 
105
 AEC Treaty, ibid. 
106
 However, in his capacity as the legal representative of the Community, the Secretary-General is given power to, on 
behalf of the Community, enter into contracts and be a party to judicial and other legal proceedings. See AEC Treaty, 
ibid. art. 98(2). 
107
 Constitutive Act of the African Union, 11 July 2000, (2005) 13 Afr. J. Int‘l & Comp. L. 25. 
108
 6 June 1967, 6 I.L.M. 932. 
109
 Ibid. art. 1(1) 
110
 Ibid. arts. 3, 30-31 and 32-42. 
111
 S.K.B. Asante, ―Towards an African Economic Community‖ in S.K.B. Asante et al. eds., Towards an African 
Economic Community (Pretoria: African Institute of South Africa, 2001). 
188 
 
continental political institution‘.112 In his view, which I endorse, ‗the AEC surely requires distinct 
and separate institutional arrangements‘.113 Or, at worst, in my opinion, there should be clear 
institutional role splitting. 
The African Court of Justice is, perhaps, the best example of the inappropriateness of the 
convolution of institutional roles. As a court for the political organization, the African Union, it is 
unproblematic; its structure and jurisdiction closely resembles the International Court of Justice of 
the United Nations Organization. But, as a court which also has jurisdiction over economic 
integration issues, its structure and jurisdiction are highly inadequate. To my knowledge, it is the 
only court with jurisdiction over an economic integration agreement whose jurisdiction is not 
compulsory; a party to the AEC Treaty which has not ratified the Protocol of the African Court of 
Justice is not subject to the jurisdiction of the court.
114
 As has been argued above, this will 
seriously affect the application and enforcement of AEC law. Also, individuals and national courts, 
key players in the success of any economic integration process, have no direct or indirect relations 
with the court. 
6.4 LOOKING BEYOND INSTITUTIONS 
In seeking to enhance community-state relations with a view to ensuring a community‘s 
effectiveness, there is a need to complement law and legal approaches with other non-law 
mechanisms.
115
 There is a need for greater co-ordination between national institutions such as 
parliaments, the ministries of trade and foreign affairs, and AEC institutions. The AEC must build 
strong relations with these institutions by ensuring a mutual flow of information between them.  
An important first step is identifying these institutions, as they may vary, not only from 
country to country, but also in regard to particular policies or issues. Already, in some countries, 
there are ministries whose specific mandate relates to economic integration.
116
 Many more of these 
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national executive institutions will be needed to ensure the effective implementation of the goals of 
the AEC. The presence of community consciousness and an awareness of community law on the 
part of these institutions can further the implementation of community law.  
Community consciousness must also exist among residents of the AEC. Individuals are the 
direct beneficiaries of community law. They serve as an effective means for monitoring 
compliance with community law through their vigilance and reporting of breaches. Education on 
the role of the AEC and creating an accessible means for filing complaints would strengthen their 
monitoring role. In the absence of individual rights to bring actions before the African Court of 
Justice, the AEC can establish a well-designed, publicized and accessible compliant procedure. 
The Secretariat of the African Union, which serves as the Secretariat of the AEC could be the 
forum for this procedure. Implementation of community law would also be greatly enhanced when 
community law is accessible, ‗comprehensible, clear and coherent‘.117 Complex rules create 
difficulties for implementation and raise difficult interpretation questions. This may result in non-
compliance or varied application of community law. To ensure the effectiveness of the AEC, it is 
important for it to actively engage the people who are the beneficiaries of its activities. 
An important means to foster community consciousness among individuals is to enhance 
and ensure access to information on the community. At present, it is very difficult accessing 
information on the AEC and, indeed, other African economic communities. While the founding 
treaties are easily accessible online, other community laws and judgments of their respective 
community courts are not. In this present age, the effective deployment of modern technology, 
including use of the Internet, should be part of the communities‘ information dissemination 
arsenal. 
6.5 CONCLUSION 
Institutions matter for effective economic integration. The extent to which they are able to 
facilitate economic integration depends in part on how they relate to institutions in member states. 
This chapter reveals that although the institutional link between the Assembly of the AEC and the 
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executive in member states is useful, it can have an adverse impact on decision-making at the 
community level and decision-implementation at the national level. An independent institution 
with powers to propose policies and ultimately implement the decisions of the AEC would have 
been preferable. The African Court of Justice is even less equipped for the challenges of 
integration. The fact that its jurisdiction is not compulsory, that individuals have no standing 
before it as far as economic integration issues are concerned, and that it has no formal relations 
with national courts are profound shortfalls in its structure. Successful economic integration of 
Africa will surely demand a restructuring of the court.  
Also, there is the need to clearly isolate Africa‘s economic integration processes from the 
political integration agenda (not the same as politics). With Africa‘s fifty-three sovereign states, 
the political integration agenda is manifestly unachievable; sovereign states break up, they seldom 
join up to form another state. The record of pre-existing internationally recognized sovereign states 
voluntarily coming together to form a political union is almost non-existent.
118
 I argue that when 
the economic integration processes are isolated from the political integration agenda, Africans 
would be better able to focus on the former and achieve remarkable success. 
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7 CHAPTER SEVEN: IMPLEMENTING COMMUNITY LAW WITHIN AFRICAN 
STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL AND JUDICIAL CHALLENGES 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
The success of economic integration depends largely on how it is received and 
implemented within member states. It is through this that the divide between the community and 
national legal systems is bridged. As far back as 1971, Akiwumi noted that ‗where economic 
integration is established, the relationship between the rules that shall govern its activities and the 
domestic laws of the member states is quite crucial to its development‘.1 Residents in a community 
and national institutions should be receptive to the objectives of economic integration and prepared 
to champion them. How economic integration is received nationally depends on a number of 
factors, of which the legal infrastructure is only one.  
A principal challenge in economic integration is ensuring the implementation of 
community law in member states. Community law takes the form of treaty provisions, protocols, 
regulations and judicial decisions.
2
 Various mechanisms exist that render non-domestic laws 
enforceable or applicable within states. Examples of these mechanisms are national incorporation 
of international law, the use of foreign laws as aids to construction, the use of foreign laws as the 
applicable law under the rules of private international law, and taking judicial notice of foreign 
laws. The use of these mechanisms to implement community law aims to enhance the effectiveness 
of the economic integration process. They decentralize a community‘s law enforcement machinery 
and make it accessible to residents in the community. Administratively, these mechanisms reduce 
the burden on the institutions set up to monitor and seek remedy for violations of community law. 
The absence or under-utilization of these mechanisms to implement community law leads to a 
disjunction between community and member states and the alienation of individuals from the 
economic integration process. In general, it undermines a community‘s effectiveness. 
A number of factors influence the extent to which community laws can be effectively 
implemented in member states. They include constitutional laws, judicial philosophy and legal 
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 This chapter examines, from constitutional
4
 and case-law perspectives, how the challenge 
of implementing community law is approached in Africa‘s economic integration processes. It 
draws on materials from East, Southern and West African countries, and the founding treaties of 
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Common Market of Eastern 
and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the East African Community (EAC), More broadly, the 
chapter examines how the founding treaties of COMESA, EAC and ECOWAS, as well as national 
constitutions and judicial philosophy, address the issue of the relations between community and 
national laws. It argues that, on the whole, the community treaties, national constitutions and case 
law are not conducive to facilitating the implementation of community law in member states. The 
chapter recommends a number of things that can be done to ensure the implementation of 
community law at the national level. Key aspects of these recommendations are the need to rethink 
existing national constitutions and the judicial philosophy which informs judicial determination of 
cases in which community issues are involved. 
7.2 COMMUNITY TREATIES AND LAW IMPLEMENTATION 
7.2.1 Community Treaties and Law Implementation in Member States 
7.2.1.1 Introduction 
The founding treaties of regional economic communities (RECs) often contain provisions 
which define the relations between community and national law, and how the former can be made 
effective in member states. In the absence of these provisions, one must look for answers in 
national constitutions and the jurisprudence of the courts. Indeed, even where these provisions 
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 one still has to look to national constitutional laws and jurisprudence to determine whether 
the approach adopted by the treaty can be accommodated by member states. This is because states 
are sovereign and, for the ‗intrusion‘ of foreign laws into their legal systems to be accommodated, 
it must have the imprimatur of the sovereign state. For example, a provision in a community‘s 
treaty that individuals have rights under it cannot be effective nationally unless national laws and 
judicial decisions allow for the enforcement of such an internationally created right. 
7.2.1.2 The Principles of Direct Applicability of Community Law 
As discussed in Chapter Two, the principle of direct applicability of community law 
enables community law to become part of national law without intervening national 
implementation measures. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) defines it to mean that the entry 
into force of community law is ‗independent of any measure of reception into national law‘.6 The 
measure of reception can be a resolution or Act of parliament or an executive act such as cabinet 
approval.
7
 From a constitutional law perspective, the character of the measure of reception 
determines the domestic application or enforceability of the relevant international law. In general, 
and especially in common law countries, an Act of Parliament is required before international 
treaties
8
 become enforceable in a state;
9
 mere ratification by parliament is not enough.
10
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Direct applicability maintains the specificity of community laws within member states. 
This renders issues involving community law more visible.
11
 Direct applicability circumvents a 
consequence of the traditional international law modes for giving effect to international law in 
states, which is subjecting the international law to national hierarchy of laws. Within a state‘s 
sources of law, internal conflict of laws is resolved using national rules such as ‗this source (e.g. 
the constitution) trumps all others‘ and lex posterior derogat priori.  
In the context of economic integration, the application of, for example, the lex posterior 
derogat priori rule to community law will upset the vertical relations between a community and its 
member states, hinder the uniform application of community law, and generally make community 
law ineffective. This is because the rule implies that a subsequent Act of Parliament can render 
ineffective a community law that has been incorporated into national law by a prior Act while that 
community law remains in force in another member state. For example, article 39(2) of the 
Protocol on the establishment of the East African Customs Union, which provides that ‗the 
customs law of the Community shall apply uniformly in the Customs Union‘ is unlikely to be 
effective when conflicts between an ‗incorporated customs law‘ and national laws are resolved 
using the lex posterior derogat priori rule.
12
 Happily, unlike the COMESA
13
 and ECOWAS 
treaties,
14
 the EAC Treaty provides for the principle of supremacy of the laws of the community.
15
 
This principle should be applied to prioritize an ‗incorporated customs law‘ when it conflicts with 
a national law. 
The prospect of community law losing its specificity when it is not directly applicable and 
the resulting dangers for it is illustrated in the South African case of Moolla Group Ltd. v. 
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Commissioner, South African Revenue Service.
16
 The case involved a conflict between a South 
African statute incorporating a bilateral trade agreement between South Africa and Malawi and the 
bilateral agreement itself. It was held that, in cases of such conflict, the national legislation should 
prevail. In the words of the court:  
If there were to be an apparent conflict between general provisions of the statute 
and particular provisions of an agreement, difficulties of interpretation might 
indeed arise. The Act must, of course, prevail in such a case: the agreement once 
promulgated is by definition part of the Act.
17
 
The dictum seems to suggest wrongly that, by incorporation, international law loses its 
independent existence.
18
 It shows a danger inherent in ‗nationalizing‘ international agreements. 
Some economic integration treaties provide for direct applicability of community law,
19
 but 
none of the African communities examined here provides for it. This does not imply that the 
importance of the principle is not appreciated. Indeed, in his commentary on the draft treaty 
establishing the East African Community, Mvungi advocated the introduction of a provision for 
the ‗direct application of community law and decisions in the domestic jurisdiction of the Partner 
States‘.20 Unfortunately, this call was not heeded by drafters of the EAC Treaty. Rather, what exist 
are provisions that leave it to member states to resort to their respective constitutional procedures 
to give effect to community law.
21
 For example, under article 5(2) of the COMESA Treaty: 
Each Member State shall take steps to secure the enactment of and the 
continuation of such legislation to give effect to this Treaty and in particular: … 
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(b) to confer upon the regulations of the Council the force of law and the 
necessary legal effect within its territory. 
This provision, without a defined time frame for enacting the legislation or a sanction for 
non-compliance, is susceptible to breach.
22
 To my knowledge, it is only within the EAC, that all 
the founding-member states have enacted legislation giving ‗the force of law‘ to ‗the provisions of 
any Act of the Community … from the date of the publication of the Act in the Gazette‘.23 Indeed, 
although the principle of direct applicability is not expressly provided for in the EAC Treaty, it 
appears that it was adopted in implementing the East African Community Customs and 
Management Act, 2004. This Act, together with the EAC Treaty and the East African Community 
Customs Union Protocol form the legal framework for the East African Customs Union, which 
became operational from January 2005. The Act applies to all member states
24
 and commenced 1 
January 2005, a date appointed by the Council of Ministers.
25
 Consistent with article 8(4) of the 
EAC Treaty, article 253 of the Act provides that it ‗shall take precedence over the Partner States‘ 
laws with respect to any matter to which its provisions relate‘. 
In general, member states of the other communities have been remarkably coy about 
implementing or giving the force of law to community laws. For example, Bethlehem has noted 
that ‗in most instances, the trade, financial and economic agreements to which South Africa is a 
party have not been enacted into municipal law‘.26 Within ECOWAS, of the five protocols on free 
movement of persons, residence and establishment,
27
 only one, which provides for a visa-free entry 
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 Compare EAC Treaty, ibid. art. 8(2). It provides that ‗each Partner State shall, within twelve months from the date 
of signing this Treaty, secure the enactment and the effective implementation of such legislation as is necessary to give 
effect to this Treaty, and in particular - 
... 
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 See Kenya: Treaty for the Establishment of East African Community Act 2000, art. 8(1); Uganda: East African 
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 East African Community Customs and Management Act, 2004, art. 1(2). 
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 Ibid. art. 1(3). 
26
 Daniel Bethlehem, ―International Economic Relations‖ in John Dugard, International Law: A South African 
Perspective (Lansdowne: Juta & Co Ltd., 2005) at 434. 
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Protocol A/SP.1/7/85 on the Code of Conduct for the implementation of the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, 
the Right of Residence and Establishment; 1986 Supplementary Protocol A/SP.1/7/86 on the Second Phase (Right of 
Residence) of the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, the Right of Residence and Establishment; 1989 
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for up to ninety days for citizens of member states, has been completely implemented in all 
member states. The lack of implementation of community law creates a disjunction between 
community and national legal systems in Africa‘s economic integration processes. 
The reliance on national constitutional measures to give effect to community law is a 
principal reason for the failure of Africa‘s economic integration process, at least to the extent that 
the community law is not immediately implemented at the national level. Firstly, the provisions 
that mandate reliance on national constitutional measures are too broad and do not discriminate 
between various types of community laws. For the reason discussed below, it is appropriate to 
subject the founding treaty to national constitutional procedures. But, there is no reason why some 
defined laws emanating from duly-constituted community institutions that have followed the laid 
down legislative procedures should not be immediately or directly applicable in member states. 
This is especially so if the states have already given legal effect to the founding treaty – the 
foundation of subsequent community laws. This approach is worth exploring by Africa‘s RECs to 
overcome the perennial problem of states not giving, or delaying giving, effect to community law. 
Relying on national constitutional measures to implement community law is not wholly 
disadvantageous. It can be used to boost Africa‘s integration if extensive national debates and 
people‘s involvement are made key aspects of the process. Economic integration has serious 
national implications. Accordingly, membership in a community and the implementation of some 
community laws should not be sanctioned casually in parliament or by the executive. People 
should be involved in the process through organized debates and, perhaps, referenda. Indeed, it is 
arguable that some constitutions demand a referendum before treaties such as economic integration 
treaties can be implemented nationally.
28
 But, so far, no referendum on the community treaties has 
been held in any country. Involving people directly in matters relating to economic integration is 
important for its ultimate success. 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
 
Supplementary Protocol A/SP.1/6/89 amending and complementing the provisions of Article 7 of the Protocol on Free 
Movement, Right of Residence and Establishment; and 1990 Supplementary Protocol A/SP.2/5/90 on the 
implementation of the Third Phase (Right of Establishment) of the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, Right of 
Residence and Establishment. These protocols are reproduced in ECOWAS Secretariat, An ECOWAS Compendium on 
Free Movement, Right of Residence and Establishment (Abuja, ECOWAS Secretariat, 1999). 
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 See e.g. Constitution of the Central African Republic, 1994, art. 70 [Central Africa Constitution]; Constitution of 
Republic of The Gambia, 1997, art. 79(2) [The Gambia Constitution]. 
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To be sure, there are provisions in the community treaties that may be interpreted as 
implying the direct applicability of community law. For example, article 9(6) of the ECOWAS 
Treaty provides that decisions of the Authority of Heads of State and Government ‗shall 
automatically enter into force sixty days after the date of their publication in the Official Journal of 
the Community‘.29 Almost identical provisions are contained in the EAC30 and COMESA 
treaties.
31
 In the light of the fact that the treaties already envisage the use of national constitutional 
measures to give the ‗force of law‘ to community law, it can hardly be argued that these provisions 
were meant to enshrine the principle of direct applicability.
32
 In other words, these provisions give 
the force of law to community law at the international and not the national level. This view is 
supported by the fact that publication of the relevant law is envisaged at the community level – in 
the Official Journal or Gazette – and not the national level. Indeed, a cursory reading of article 10 
of the COMESA Treaty, which was obviously borrowed from article 249 of the Treaty establishing 




7.2.1.3 The Principle of Direct Effect of Community Law 
As discussed in Chapter Two, the principle of direct effect enables individuals to invoke 
community law before national courts.
34
 It allows national courts to use community law as an 
independent, direct and autonomous basis of decisions. It turns national courts and individuals into 
private enforcers of community law. In sum, direct effect ‗nationalizes‘ rights created at the 
community level. The COMESA, EAC and ECOWAS treaties are silent on the issue of whether 
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 The same rule applies to regulations adopted by the council of ministers. See ECOWAS Treaty, supra note 14 art. 
12(4). 
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 See article 14(5) which provides that ‗the Council of Ministers shall cause all regulations and directives made or 
given by it under this Treaty to be published in the Gazette; and such regulations or directives shall come into force on 
the date of publication unless otherwise provided therein‘. 
31
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 See COMESA Treaty, supra note 13 art. 5(2)(b); EAC Treaty, supra note 15 art. 8(2)(b); ECOWAS Treaty, supra 
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note 13 provides that ‗a regulation shall be binding on all the Member States in its entirety‘. The other paragraphs in 
the two articles on directives, decisions, recommendations and opinions are similarly worded. 
34
 See generally P.P. Craig, ―Once upon a Time in the West: Direct Effect and the Federalization of EEC Law‖ (1992) 
12 Ox. J. L. Stud. 453. 
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they or laws generated under them have direct effect. This is despite the fact that they all envisage, 
through various mechanisms or principles, a role for individuals in their economic integration 
processes.
 
An example is the preliminary reference procedure, which allows national courts to refer 
questions of community law to the community courts for binding answers.
35
 Implicit in this 
procedure is an assumption that issues of community law can arise before national courts through 
means which include the direct invocation of community law by parties to a dispute.  
To date, the jurisprudence of the community courts has not dealt with the issue of direct 
effect of community laws. However, unlike in other trade agreements, the principle of direct effect 
is not explicitly denied.
36
 Accordingly, if the community courts adopt a teleological or purposive 
approach to interpreting the community treaties, they can make direct effect part of their respective 
community‘s legal system.37 This will be realized if the courts‘ interpretation of the treaties is 
informed by the goal of facilitating national implementation of community law. Already, the 
purposive approach to interpretation is the dominant approach to interpretation in national courts
38
 
from where most community court judges are usually drawn. Hopefully, the judges will bring to 
bear on their work the purposive approach when interpreting the community treaties. Indeed, 
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 See COMESA Treaty, supra note 13 art. 30; EAC Treaty, supra note 15 art. 34; Protocol of the Economic 
Community of West African States Community Court of Justice (as amended), art. 10(f) [ECOWAS Court Protocol]; 
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 See e.g. North American Free Trade Agreement between the United States of America, Canada and Mexico, 17 
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Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, Case 26/62 [1963] E.C.R. 1 that the principle became 
part of EC law. 
38
 See e.g. In re: the question of Crossing the Floor by Members of Parliament, Presidential Referral No. 2 of 2005 
(High Court, Malawi, 2006); S.K. Asare, ―Plain Meaning v Purposive Interpretation: Ghana‘s Constitutional 
Jurisprudence at a Crossroad‖ (2006) 3 U. Botswana L.J. 93. 
200 
 
article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
39
 which has already been invoked by 
some community courts, enjoins this approach to interpretation.
40
 
Another means for direct effect to be given to community law is for member states to 
legislate that a cause of action can be directly based on community law. An example of this is the 
Uganda Law Reform Commission‘s proposed WTO (Implementation) Agreement Bill.41 Article 




7.2.1.4 ‘Automatically Enforceable’: Direct Applicability, Direct Effect or Both? 
The Treaty establishing the African Economic Community (AEC Treaty)
43
 contains a 
unique provision which, with a view to ensuring the effective implementation of community law at 
the national level, may be interpreted as entailing both direct applicability and direct effect. Article 
10 of the treaty provides that decisions of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government are 
‗automatically enforceable‘ thirty days after they are signed by the Chairman of the Assembly. 
Similarly, article 13 provides that regulations of the Council of Ministers must be approved by the 
Assembly and are also ‗enforceable automatically‘ thirty days after they are signed by the 
Chairman of the Council. 
The concept of ‗automatically enforceable‘ is unique to the AEC Treaty. The COMESA, 
EAC and ECOWAS treaties, all of which were adopted after the AEC treaty, contain provisions 
akin to articles 10 and 13 of the AEC Treaty, but it appears that they consciously avoided the 
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 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; 8 I.L.M. 679 [Vienna Convention]. 
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 See e.g. East African Law Society v. Attorney General of the Republic of Kenya, Reference No. 3 of 2007 (East 
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 Uganda Law Reform Commission [ULRC], Report on the Background Study on the Legal Implementation of the 
World Trade Organization Agreements (Law Commission Publication No. 32 of 2004), online: ULRC 
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 Compare Canada: World Trade Organization Agreement Implementation Act, S.C 1994, C.47, sec. 5 and 6. 
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phrase ‗automatically enforceable‘.44 The AEC Treaty is silent on where the enforceability is 
envisaged. Is it at the community level or within member states? The treaty is also silent on who 
can enforce the relevant decision or regulation at the locus of enforcement. Is it only the 
community, its institutions and states, or does it include individuals? A purposive interpretation of 
the provisions suggests that automatic enforceability should not be limited to enforcement at the 
community level. Decisions and regulations of the Assembly and Council are likely to be of 
national significance or have impact on member states. For the decisions or regulations to be 
enforceable only at the community level, and not within member states, will run counter to 
member states‘ duty to ‗observe the legal system of the community‘45 and potentially undermine 
the effectiveness of community law. Accordingly, I argue that automatic enforceable envisages 
enforcement at both the community and national levels. 
This still leaves unanswered the question as to what automatic enforceability of regulations 
and decisions entails at the national level. The concept of automatic enforceability could mean 
directly applicable, that is, no national implementing or incorporating measures are necessary to 
implement the decision or regulation at the national level. It could also mean directly effective, that 
is, the decision or regulation creates rights which individuals can invoke in national courts. This 
uncertainty surrounding the concept is further deepened by the fact that under article 5(2) of the 
AEC Treaty, member states are obliged to take all necessary measures to ensure the enactment and 
dissemination of such legislation as may be necessary for the implementation of the provisions of 
the AEC Treaty. To enact legislation to implement a decision or regulation is inconsistent with the 
principle of direct applicability.  
At present, there is no community jurisprudence on the meaning and effect of the concept 
of automatic enforceability. I argue for an interpretation that entails both direct effect and direct 
applicability of decisions and regulations of the AEC. The treaty uses the concepts of ‗automatic‘ 
and ‗enforceable.‘ If the drafters intended to limit it only to incorporation, they could definitely 
have used a more limiting concept such as ‗automatically incorporated‘. Enforceability suggests 
that rights can accrue under the relevant decision or regulation. No individual rights accrue under 
                                                          
 
44
 The ECOWAS Treaty uses the phrase ‗automatically enter into force‘. The COMESA and EAC treaties adopt the 
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an international law at the national level unless it becomes (in this instance automatically) part of 
state law. I argue that, by using automatic enforceability, the drafters sought to achieve the two 
ends of direct effect and direct applicability.  
This view is strengthened by what could be considered an elaboration on the full meaning 
of articles 10 and 13 of the AEC Treaty in the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of the African 
Union (AU) [Assembly Rules],
46
 and the Rule of Procedure of the Executive Council [Executive 
Council Rules].
47
 As subsequent agreements by parties to the AEC Treaty, which were adopted 
under the aegis the African Union of which the AEC is an integral part, they could shed light on 
the meaning of the AEC Treaty.
48
 Under rule 33 of the Assembly Rules, decisions of the Assembly 
can be in the form of Regulations, Directives, Recommendations, Declarations, Resolutions and 
Opinions. Regulations are applicable in all member states which shall take all necessary measures 
to implement them.
49
 Directives are addressed to any or all member states, to undertakings or to 
individuals. They bind member states to the objectives to be achieved while leaving national 
authorities with the power to determine the form and the means to be used for their 
implementation.
50
 Recommendations, Declarations, Resolutions and Opinions are not binding and 
are intended to guide and harmonize the viewpoints of member states.
51
 Regulations and Directives 
shall be automatically enforceable thirty days after the date of the publication in the Official 
Journal of the African Union or as specified in the decision.
52
 Regulations and Directives shall be 
binding on member states, Organs of the African Union and RECs.
53
 All these provisions are also 
contained in the Executive Council Rules. But there is one significant clarification or addition, 
which is, as regards Regulations of the Executive Council, not only are they ‗binding and 
applicable in all Member States‘, but also ‗national laws shall, where appropriate, be aligned 
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accordingly‘.54 From these provisions, it is evident that community law will be applied in member 
states and may create rights and obligations for individuals. 
From the perspective of enabling the implementation of community law in member states, 
these forms of AU decisions are useful, especially the Regulations and Directives. However, my 
examination of Assembly and Executive Council decisions, 2002-2009, does not reveal any 
attention to these categories of decisions.
55
 Decisions taken by the Assembly and Executive 
Council are still labelled ‗―decision‖ on…‘. There is no attempt to distinguish between decisions 
using the stipulated categories. Occasionally, there are Declarations and Resolutions, but, so far, 
there appear to be no Directives or Regulations, or, at least, they have not been so described. 
Surely, this is worrying. It casts real doubt on whether these forms of decisions are meant to have a 
meaningful legal impact on the mode of implementing decisions of the AU. 
Apart from this worrying trend, it must be admitted that the above view on the meaning of 
automatically enforceable will be difficult to sell to member states of the AEC. Automatic 
enforceability, if interpreted and applied as advocated here, will represent a serious limitation on 
member states‘ sovereignty. The idea of a legal system existing independently of a state, yet 
having its norms directly applicable and effective within the state‘s legal system, is a radical 
departure from the traditional legal approach in many states to the implementation of international 
law. As will be discussed below, African states have varying constitutional procedures for 
implementing international law. In some states, before the suggested interpretation of automatic 
enforceability can be applied, a constitutional amendment will be needed.  
From a comparative perspective, the principle of automatic enforceability captures the 
essence of the principles of direct applicability and direct effect in EC law, and the concept of self-
executing treaties used in the United States of America and other states.
56
 A self-executing treaty 
does not require specific implementing legislation. It may create rights inuring directly to 
individuals without implementing legislation. In other words, no legislation is needed to give the 
treaty the force of law within the state. In this regard, it can be argued that, if direct effect and 
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 See e.g. South Africa Constitution, art. 231(3)(4); Elias M. Ngolele, ―The Content of the Doctrine of Self-execution 
and its limited Effect in South African Law‖ (2006) 31 South Afr. Yearbk. Int‘l L. 141. 
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direct applicability are European doctrines, and self-execution is an American doctrine, then 
automatic enforceability is Africa‘s contribution to the perennial problem of how to bridge the gap 
between international and national law.  
The experience of Europe and America with direct effect, direct applicability and self-
execution indicates that their effectiveness depends on the complementing role of national courts 
and, in Europe, the procedure of preliminary reference to the European Court of Justice. Under the 
AEC Treaty and the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights 
[Protocol on African Court of Justice],
57
 these complementing factors are absent. As discussed in 
Chapter Six, neither the treaty nor the protocol envisages any direct role for national courts and 
there is no procedure for reference from national courts to the African Court of Justice. 
Accordingly, the concept of automatic enforceability, which could have provided a versatile means 
for implementing decisions and regulations of the AEC in member states, is likely to be 
ineffective.  
Ultimately, it will be left to the African Court of Justice to work out the full meaning and 
effect of automatic enforceability. It also remains to be seen whether and how national courts will 
accommodate automatic enforceability in light of the fact that they are given no express role in the 
enforcement of community law under the AEC Treaty or the Protocol on the African Court of 
Justice. Unless there is a direct or indirect means for individuals to access the African Court of 
Justice,
58
 and national courts are involved in the enforcement of AEC law, an otherwise potent 
concept for enforcing AEC law in member states may be rendered useless. 
7.2.1.5 Protecting Implemented Community Laws 
An economic community has an interest in ensuring and facilitating the implementation of 
its laws in member states. This interest should be matched by mechanisms and principles aimed at 
protecting nationally implemented community laws from inimical treatment, which may render 
them ineffective. As noted above, the ECOWAS, COMESA and EAC treaties have adopted what 
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58
 Under article 30 of the Statute on the African Court of Justice, ibid., individuals or relevant Non-Governmental 




is arguably a less effective, but perhaps politically expedient, means for implementing community 
laws in member states. Their founding treaties rely on national constitutional procedures instead of 
the principle of direct applicability. The treaties are also silent on the issue of direct effect of 
community law and, accordingly, have rendered uncertain the issue of whether an individual can 
invoke community law before a national court and argue that the law creates enforceable rights.  
Notwithstanding the above, the treaties contain principles and mechanisms that can be 
characterized as aiming to protect implemented community laws from inimical treatment in 
member states. Firstly, the principle of supremacy of community law, which is enshrined in only 
the EAC Treaty,
59
 envisages that conflicts between community and national law will be resolved in 
favour of the former. Secondly, the preliminary reference procedure
60
 anticipates that, ultimately, 
questions of community law arising before national courts will be authoritatively decided at the 
community level. Through this, the interests of the community will be protected and conflicting 
national interpretations will be avoided. The preliminary reference procedure is a means for 
diffusing into member states a uniform understanding of community law. However, this can be 
achieved only when national courts are prepared to make references to the community courts. The 
procedure is mandatory under the COMESA and EAC Treaty, but a national court has first to 
make a determination whether a ruling from the community court on the issue at stake is 
‗necessary to enable it give judgment‘.61 Unless national courts approach this condition liberally, 
the utility of the reference procedure will be hampered. Finally, the direct access individuals have 
to the community courts
62
 will ensure that breaches of community law occurring within member 
states are brought to the communities‘ attention for remedy. Without this, some breaches might 
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 See COMESA Treaty, supra note 13 art. 30; ECOWAS Court Protocol, supra note 35, art. 10(f); EAC Treaty, ibid. 
art. 34; SADC Tribunal Protocol, supra note 35 art. 16. 
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 See e.g. COMESA Treaty, ibid. art. 26; SADC Tribunal Protocol, supra note 35 art. 15(1)(2); EAC Treaty, ibid. art. 
30; ECOWAS Court Protocol, supra note 35 art. 10. 
63
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each of its Member States‘. 
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These mechanisms and principles would be useful elements to look at when the community 
courts are faced with an issue relating to the member states‘ implementation of community law, 
especially the extent to which the treaties envisage the integration of community law into member 
states‘ legal systems. It can be argued that these mechanisms and principles envision a stronger 
place for community law in member states than the treaties prima facie suggests. With the active 
involvement and cooperation of national courts such a vision can be realized. 
A mechanism for protecting the interests of a community in ensuring adherence to and 
proper interpretation of its laws will be to grant it the right to join, intervene, or appear as amicus 
curiae in national judicial proceedings in which community law becomes an issue. Put differently, 
instead of making a preliminary reference to a community court, a national court can, on its own 
motion or at the request of a party, notify the community of the issue and invite submissions from 
it. This procedure will be important where national courts are reluctant to make references to the 
community courts. It is also important because, at present, there is no national legislation which 
gives national courts the jurisdiction to seek preliminary rulings from the community courts. The 
community treaties endow the communities with international legal personality.
64
 The COMESA 
and EAC Treaties also provide that ‗disputes to which the Community is a party shall not, on that 
ground alone, be excluded from the jurisdiction of the national courts‘.65 Thus, the treaties 
anticipate that the communities may become parties to national judicial proceedings. 
As with the jurisdiction to seek preliminary rulings, the right to join, intervene, or appear as 
amicus curiae should be provided for in member states. The Kenya courts have held that where 
artificial legal personality is conferred on or denied to an entity by a foreign legal system, it will be 
recognized for the purposes of deciding whether that entity should be allowed to sue in Kenya.
66
 
This decision is sound and is likely to be followed in other African countries. It implies that the 
                                                          
 
64
 COMESA Treaty, supra note 13 art. 186(1); EAC Treaty, supra note 15 art. 138(1); ECOWAS Treaty, supra note 
14 art. 88(1). 
65
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legal personality conferred on the communities by their founding treaties will be recognized 
nationally so as to allow them to sue, be sued, join or intervene in proceedings.
67
 Currently, the law 
in some countries allows a person to intervene in defined proceedings to protect that person‘s 
interests.
68
 To be able to intervene, one must have a direct and substantial interest in the 
judgment.
69
 At any stage in proceedings in Ghana, the court, on its own motion, can order any 
person ‗whose presence before the Court is necessary to ensure that all matters in dispute in the 
proceedings are effectively and completely determined and adjudicated upon to be added as a 
party‘.70 Similar rule exists in other countries.71 All these suggest that the legal infrastructure 
already exists in member states for the procedure advocated here.  
What is left is to attune the existing national rules and procedures to the specific demands 
of community law. Among the issues which must be addressed are: the procedure to be followed 
by a community; the time frames within which a community must act; whether the original parties 
to the action can oppose the joinder, intervention or admission of a community‘s amicus curiae 
brief; and the effect of the judgment given in the case for the community which intervened and 
other member states, especially as regards the court‘s interpretation of the relevant community law. 
In terms of protecting community law from diverse interpretation and application in member 
states, the right to intervene or submit an amicus curiae brief is the second best option to the 
preliminary reference procedure; it is unlikely to lead to the uniform interpretation of community 
law. However, it is an important procedure which can complement the preliminary reference 
procedure. It is suggested that the communities should work with member states in designing this 
procedure which, as far as possible, should be uniform in all member states.  
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7.3 CONSTITUTIONS, JURISPRUDENCE AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES 
7.3.1 Community Law and National Constitutions 
7.3.1.1 Acknowledging the Communities’ Existence 
The implementation of community law in member states is greatly influenced by national 
constitutions
72
 and the judicial philosophy on the relations between international and national 
law.
73
 Because states are sovereign, giving effect to or enforcing a non-domestic law should often 
have the express or tacit approval of that state. Where the judiciary enforces or uses foreign laws 
without this approval, it can be accused of inappropriate judicial activism and of blurring the lines 
between executive, judicial and legislative functions. This is especially the case where foreign laws 
are used to create rights which were hitherto non-existent in member states. 
A discussion on how African constitutions may influence the implementation of 
community law should begin with an examination of the extent to which they acknowledge the 
existence of the communities. In some constitutions, there are passing references to the 
communities (here one should include the Organisation of African Unity, the African Union) and a 
constitutional commitment to abide by their principles, or work towards the achievement of their 
goals. For example, article 40 of the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana provides that: 
In its dealings with other nations, the Government shall adhere to the principles 
enshrined in or, as the case may be, the aims and ideals of …. (ii) the Charter of 
the Organisation of African Unity; … (iv) the Treaty of the Economic 
Community of West African States.
74
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Other constitutions include foreign policy objectives such as ‗promoting sub-regional, regional and 
inter-African co-operation and unity‘,75 ‗promotion of African integration and support for African 
unity‘,76 and ‗respect for international law and treaty obligations‘.77 
Although very superficial, these provisions are useful. They demonstrate sensitivity to the 
existence and ideals of African economic integration processes. However, as channels for 
integrating community law into member states‘ laws, they are of limited use. They mainly relate to 
the conduct of interstate relations, a view reflected in the fact that they are often contained in the 
‗foreign policy‘ provisions of the constitutions. They do not purport to make community law part 
of national law. It will take a great deal of stressful legal arguments and convoluted judicial 
reasoning before effect can be given to community law on the basis of these provisions. In other 
words, they are unlikely to be bases on which individuals can claim, before national courts, the 
enforcement of community laws that have not been made part of national law using the laid down 
constitutional procedures. Notwithstanding these observations, courts can have regard to the 
provisions in the interpretation and enforcement of national law vis-à-vis community law. 
7.3.1.2 Constitutions’ Visions of National-Community Law Relations 
The fact that the constitutions acknowledge the existence of the communities and the 
objectives of economic integration is important. But, even more salient, are the constitutions‘ 
visions of the relations between national and international law.
78
 This vision directly affects the 
implementation of community law in member states. Traditionally, the relationship between 
national and international is discussed from monist-dualist perspectives.
79
 Monism has its root in 
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natural law theories which see all law as the product of reason. It envisions international law as 
being automatically part of national legal systems. The foundation of dualism is in legal 
positivism. It posits that international and national laws operate on separate legal planes: 
international law governs relations between states; and national law regulates relations between 
individuals and the state. Under dualism, international law can play no role in the national legal 
systems except in so far as it has been received or adopted by them. The monism-dualist paradigm 
has been a target for trenchant academic criticism, but it is still useful for understanding how states 
implement international law, especially treaties.
80
 
African constitutions reflect the monist-dualist perspectives.
81
 There are other 
constitutional provisions that appear to merge aspects of both perspectives.
82
 Generally, the former 
British colonies have provisions that tend towards dualism; international law does not have the 
force of law in the Commonwealth countries unless it has been expressly given that force by a 
national measure, usually an Act of Parliament.
83
 Many other African countries, most of them 
former French colonies, have constitutional provisions that adopt the monist perspective. Their 
provisions are modelled on article 55 of the French Constitution of 1958. In general, they provide 
that treaties or agreements duly ratified or approved shall, upon their publication, have an authority 
superior to that of domestic legislation, subject, for each agreement or treaty, to application by the 
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 These provisions give the force of law to international law, and also determine its 
status within the national hierarchy of laws. Under these provisions, as soon as an international 
treaty or agreement is signed, it has precedence over national laws, subject to implementation by 
the other parties to the treaty or agreement. The international treaty becomes applicable as law in 
those monist states as soon as it is ratified. It may be invoked directly in national courts. 
Although the constitutional provisions in the francophone countries make treaties superior 
to domestic law, there are conditions that must be satisfied for this to happen.
85
 Firstly, the 
agreement has to be duly ratified or approved, and published. Due ratification usually entails 
ensuring legislative, and sometimes judicial, approval or participation.
86
 This contrasts with the 
approach in the anglophone countries where the executive negotiates and concludes treaties that 
must subsequently be approved by the legislature; the judiciary rarely has a role in the treaty-
making process.
87
 The second requirement is that of reciprocity in the application of the treaty.
88
 
This requirement does not exist for the common law jurisdictions. Indeed, in the context of 
economic integration, making the domestic application of community law contingent on its 
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reciprocal application by another state can be inimical to the coherent development of a 
community‘s legal system.89 
7.3.1.3 The Status of Community Law 
The implementation of community law in member states using the constitutional provisions 
above still leaves unanswered the question of the status of community law and the community 
itself within member states‘ legal systems. This is especially the case in the dualist countries. What 
is the position of community law within national hierarchies of laws? Will community law trump 
national law in case of conflict? Will all national courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate matters in 
which community law or a community is engaged?
90
 These are weighty issues, and, for answers, 
one must look again at existing national constitutions. 
A feature of many African constitutions, especially those of the Commonwealth countries, 
is provisions which self-proclaim the constitution as the supreme law of the land.
91
 Article 1(2) of 
the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana captures this feature. It provides that ‗this Constitution 
shall be the supreme law of Ghana and any other law found to be inconsistent with any provision 
of this Constitution shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void‘.92 Other constitutions are less 
flamboyant; they shy away from spelling out the consequence of the constitution being supreme. 
For example, article 1(6) of the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia, 1990, tersely provides 
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that ‗this Constitution shall be the Supreme Law of Namibia‘.93 Whatever the phraseology 
adopted, the import is the same: the constitution is the grundnorm of the national legal system 
from which all laws derives their legal validity.  
The proper implementation of community law within states demands that the grundnorm 
validates community law. Also, the grundnorm should, in some instances, allow itself or a national 
law to be displaced by community law. Given the current structure of the constitutions, these will 
not be possible without a constitutional amendment. To make room for these may be politically 
unpalatable; it may be deemed as surrendering sovereignty, a key component of statehood. 
However, unbridled adherence to sovereignty may be an obstacle to an effective economic 
integration process. In this respect, it is noteworthy that in the preamble to the ECOWAS Treaty 
member states were ‗convinced that the integration of the Member States into a viable regional 
Community may demand the partial and gradual pooling of national sovereignties to the 
Community within the context of a collective political will‘. It is suggested that an additional 
demand is for member states to create a favourable constitutional climate for the implementation of 
community law. 
In the absence of a constitutional amendment allowing for community law to prevail over 
conflicting national constitutional provisions, domestic courts may have no choice other than to 
obey the dictates of the constitution. As Peters has observed, the position of many international 
courts is that international law takes precedence over all national laws, including the constitution. 
But, national courts have not come to this conclusion, especially as regards the relations between 
international law and the constitution.
94
 This is because the jurisdiction of courts is constrained by 
specific constitutional provisions, such as those declaring the constitution as the supreme law, as 
well as broader principles such as separation of powers, which allocates the functions of national 
institutions in treaty making and implementation. 
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What is significant from the above exposition is the fact that, so far, it appears African 
governments have not appreciated that economic integration makes constitutional demands and, on 
some issues, requires a rethink or amendment of existing constitutional or legislative provisions to 
accommodate community law and the community itself within their respective states.
95
 The fact 
that there appear to be no national laws which address the many challenges created by economic 
integration is testament to the lack of appreciation of the legal demands for successful integration. 
The non-appreciation of the legal demands of integration is, in part, attributable to the fact that the 
rates of ratification and national implementation of community laws have been slow. This hinders 
integration at the community level, and minimizes the interaction between community and national 
law. It is this interaction that generates many of the constitutional challenges or questions raised 
above. This is borne out by the fact that, within the EAC, where the EAC Treaty has been given 
the force of law in member states,
96
 and a number of community laws have been implemented,
97
 a 
body of case law is emerging on issues related to the interaction between community and national 
law at the national level.
98
 But, even within the EAC, the ratification and national implementation 
of community laws have not been perfect. For example, at its September 2008 meeting, the 
Council of Ministers noted five protocols which were concluded in 2006 and 2007 that had not yet 
been ratified by member states, and suggested that the belated ratification hampers ‗the enactment 
of legislation based on them‘.99  
7.3.1.4 Community Law in Constitutions: Looking back and comparatively 
Comparatively, it is worth noting that many European countries have effected significant 
constitutional amendments in response to the legal demands of European integration.
100
 In the 
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words of Vereshchetin, ‗European integration had a serious impact on several Western European 
constitutions … [and] required the adoption of special constitutional provisions in a number of 
States‘.101 Article 148 of the Constitution of Romania, a recent new member of the European 
Union, is an example in this respect. It provides: 
(1) Romania's accession to the constituent treaties of the European Union, with a 
view to transferring certain powers to community institutions, as well as to 
exercising in common with the other member states the abilities stipulated in such 
treaties, shall be carried out by means of a law adopted in the joint sitting of the 
Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, with a majority of two thirds of the number 
of deputies and senators. 
(2) As a result of the accession, the provisions of the constituent treaties of the 
European Union, as well as the other mandatory community regulations shall take 
precedence over the opposite provisions of the national laws, in compliance with 
the provisions of the accession act.  
(3) The provisions of paragraphs (1) and (2) shall also apply accordingly for the 
accession to the acts revising the constituent treaties of the European Union.  
(4) The Parliament, the President of Romania, the Government, and the judicial 
authority shall guarantee that the obligations resulting from the accession act and 
the provisions of paragraph (2) are implemented.  
Presently, this level of constitutional accommodation, which definitely facilitates the 
implementation of community law, has no parallels in African constitutions. Admittedly, the stage 
of development of the European Community makes constitutional demands on member states very 
different from those that apply at the present stage in Africa‘s economic integration processes. 
Given the jurisprudence of the European Community on the interaction between community and 
member states‘ laws, it is impossible to become a member of that community without the 
prospective member taking a critical look at its constitution. Indeed, in Europe, the interactions 
between community law and national constitutions did not become a dominant issue until the 
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period immediately before the Maastricht Treaty in 1992.
102
 Notwithstanding these admissions, it 
is undeniable that African constitutions have remained largely ambivalent towards community law. 
After decades of a professed commitment to economic integration, one would have expected 
significant provisions in national constitutions on the subject. 
Historically, there existed in Africa constitutional provisions that anticipated the 
strengthening of integration and were prepared to accommodate that. The immediate post-
independence constitutions were imbued with preambles that extolled the virtues of African unity 
and Africans uniting. They also contained specific and legally binding provisions that envisaged 
the ultimate surrender of national sovereignty to aid African unity. In article 13 of the Constitution 
of the Republic of Ghana, 1960, it was provided that ‗the independence of Ghana should not be 
surrendered or diminished on any ground other than the furtherance of African unity‘. In article 2, 
Ghanaians ‗in the confident expectation of an early surrender of sovereignty to a union of African 
states and territories‘ conferred on Parliament ‗the power to provide for the surrender of the whole 
or any part of the sovereignty of Ghana‘. Article 34 of the Constitution of the Republic of Guinea, 
1958, had earlier provided that ‗the Republic may conclude with any African State agreements 
providing for association or the establishment of a community and involving partial or total 
relinquishment of Sovereignty with a view to the achievement of African Unity‘. Similar 
provisions in other African countries have been chronicled by Schwelb.
103
 The speed with which 
the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was formed is a testament to the importance of these 
constitutional provisions that encapsulated a consciousness favourable to uniting Africa. 
It is, however, ironic that, contrary to these provisions, when the Charter of the 
Organization of African Unity
104
 came to be drafted and the organization was formed in 1963, 
‗sovereign equality of all Member States‘, ‗non-interference in the internal affairs of States‘ and 
‗respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and for its inalienable right to 
independent existence‘, were entrenched as cardinal guiding (ultimately, debilitating) principles.105 
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The OAU never purported to be an economic integration organization or, at least, did not set out a 
clear economic integration agenda. Accordingly, the effect the post-independence constitutional 
provisions could have had on any economic integration process and, especially, on the 
implementation of community law in member states, remains uncertain.  
What is certain is that these constitutional provisions did not make their way into 
subsequent constitutional revisions in many states. However, a few countries, all non-anglophone 
countries, still retain constitutional provisions that envisage relinquishing national sovereignty to 
promote African unity.
106
 Article 133 of the Constitution of the Republic of Niger, 1999, is perhaps 
the most detailed on this subject. It provides that: 
The Republic of Niger may conclude with any African State agreements of 
association or community bringing partial or total abandonment of sovereignty 
with the view to realizing African unity.  
The Republic of Niger may conclude agreements of cooperation and of 
association with other States on the basis of reciprocal and advantageous rights. 
It accepts to create with these State intergovernmental organisms of common 
management, of coordination and of free cooperation. 
These organisms may in particular have as objectives: the harmonization of 
economic, finance and monetary policy; the establishment of union endeavoured 
to the economic integration through promotion of production and exchanges; the 
cooperation in judicial matters. 
 
 The fact that such constitutional provisions have largely disappeared from African 
constitutions says a lot about the national legal commitment to Africa‘s economic integration 
processes. Indeed, one recent constitution severely constrains the possibility of the state 
surrendering sovereignty – a key requisite for integration - to aid economic integration.107 It is 
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worth noting that these constitutions, which seem to pay very little attention to the legal demands 
of economic integration, were promulgated after the signing of the Treaty establishing the African 
Economic Community in 1991. 
7.3.2 National Constitutions in the Community Legal System 
The interaction between community and national law is not unidimensional. As community 
law is implemented at the national level, so must a community take account of existing national 
laws when making community law. The latter is important for the effective implementation of 
community law. It also reflects the fact that membership of a community entails only a partial 
surrender of sovereignty; in making laws, a community should not lose sight of the areas still 
within the competence of member states. Through a number of provisions, community treaties 
acknowledge the existence of national constitutions, adopt conclusions legitimized by them, or 
utilize their procedures for the implementation of community law.
108
 One area noted above where 
this is visible is that of giving effect to the treaties or other community laws. Under article 5(2) of 
the ECOWAS Treaty, ‗each Member State shall, in accordance with its constitutional procedures, 
take all necessary measures to ensure the enactment and dissemination of such legislative and 
statutory texts as may be necessary for the implementation of the provisions of this Treaty‘. 
Although the COMESA and EAC treaties do not make reference to constitutional procedures, this 
can be inferred from reading the relevant provisions.
109
  
Community institutions also draw on existing national institutions for their make-up. The 
composition of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, Council of Ministers and 
community parliaments is contingent on national institutions. Indeed, article 1 of the EAC Treaty 
defines a Head of State and Head of Government as ‗a person designated as such by a Partner 
State‘s Constitution‘. Similarly, under article 50(2)(b), a person shall be qualified to be elected a 
member of the Assembly of the EAC by the National Assembly of a Partner State if such a person 
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is, among others, ‗qualified to be elected a member of the National Assembly of that Partner State 
under its Constitution‘. 
Community law also sometimes reflects values already entrenched in national 
constitutions. This is so on issues such as human rights, the rule of law and democracy. At first 
sight, this may appear superfluous when these values are already entrenched, at least on paper, at 
the national level. However, that is not so. Firstly, compliance with these provisions within 
member states creates the necessary democratic and rule of law oriented environment in which 
economic integration thrives. Secondly, community law becomes an added layer of legality by 
which the conduct of national governments may be tested. This becomes important in instances 
where governments act in violation of their own national constitutional values. For example, in the 
Ugandan case of Katabazi v. Attorney General of Uganda,
110
 the applicants, who were being tried 
for treason, were granted bail by the High Court of Uganda. However, armed security agents 
surrounded the court premises and prevented the execution of bail. They re-arrested the applicants, 
re-incarcerated them and re-charged them to appear before a court martial. They were not released 
even after the Constitutional Court of Uganda so ordered. This conduct was held to be a violation 
of the rule of law enshrined in article 6(d) of the EAC Treaty.
111
 It is worth remembering that the 
Constitution of the Republic of Uganda contains a bill of rights.
112
 
From the above, it is evident that relations between community law and national 
constitutions go beyond issues bordering on giving effect to community law or resolving conflicts 
between community law and national law.
113
 Community law may influence national constitutional 
values on issues such as democracy, the rule of law and human rights. Indeed, the community 
treaties contain provisions stipulating democracy, respect for the rule of law and human rights as 
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 These principles can inform constitutional design and interpretation at the 
national level. Adewoye has rightly observed that, there is a strong positive correlation between 
constitutionalism at the national level and the effectiveness of economic integration processes.
115
 
The community treaty provisions can also be useful in adjudicating, at the community level, the 
legality of conduct at the national level. 
The interactions between community and national law go beyond national constitutions; the 
constitutions provide only the initial platform for receiving community law. Equally important are 
the existing statutory laws. Often, community law defers to national courts on certain matters, or 
allows member states to escape from the full breadth of their community obligations. For example, 
the East African Community Customs Management Act, 2004, contains over fifteen direct 
references to the law in force in member states. Deference to national law is important; it 
recognizes state sovereignty and allows law to be adapted to local circumstances. But, it could 
sometimes affect the effective implementation of community law. For example, under article 4 of 
the ECOWAS Protocol Relating to the Free Movement of Persons, Residence and Establishment, 
1979, member states reserved the right to ‗refuse admission into their territory any Community 
citizen who comes within the category of inadmissible immigrants under its laws‘. Studies on 
national laws, most of which predate the protocol, suggest that they often conflict with the letter 
and spirit of the protocol and its supplements, and have been used to exclude community citizens 
without explanation or process for review.
116
  
To overcome the challenge deference to national law poses for the effective 
implementation of community law, the communities must be attentive to national laws in their 
legislative processes. They should also keep abreast of changes to national laws on an ongoing 
basis through mechanisms such as annual reporting. These will help avoid potential conflicts 
between community and national laws, and also ensure that exceptions provided by community 
law do not become a national refuge for denying effect to it. 
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7.3.3 Community Law and National Judicial Philosophy 
7.3.3.1 Introduction 
It was argued in Chapter Five that, as an institution, national courts are important for 
economic integration.
117
 Equally important is the judicial philosophy that informs their decisions, 
especially in disputes in which community law is involved. Judicial philosophy has a direct impact 
on the implementation of community law. This is especially so in instances where community law 
has not been incorporated into national law or is not directly applicable. Judicial philosophy that is 
attuned to the goals and demands of economic integration, but is nonetheless sensitive to national 
constitutional limits on the exercise of judicial power, especially on issues of foreign policy, is 
important for ensuring the effectiveness of community law in member states. A state‘s external 
economic relations or policies may fall into the domain of foreign policy. Courts should act with 
restraint in intervening or judicially reviewing the direction of such relations or policies. However, 
in appropriate cases, especially where individual rights are involved, judicial intervention, 
including a criticism of the direction of such relations or policies may be appropriate.
118
 Apart 
from criticizing government policies inimical to economic integration, judicial philosophy, which 
takes account of the goals of economic integration, can be relevant in courts‘ approaches to the 
principle of consistent interpretation, general reliance on foreign laws, taking of judicial notice, 
and application of the rules on proof of foreign law. These can also be utilized to enhance the role 
of community law in member states. 
7.3.3.2 International (Community) Law as an Aid to Interpretation 
As noted above, in African countries, some executive or parliamentary act is required for 
international law to have the force of law. However, it is legally possible for courts to give 
domestic effect to a treaty, and hence community law, even though it has not been incorporated 
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into national law. The extent to which a court can do this depends on the character of the relevant 
law, what the government has already done in relation to that law, the state of the existing law, and 
the court‘s approach to the doctrine of separation of powers. In Africa, courts‘ reliance on 
unincorporated treaties has been very visible in cases involving human rights issues. In a number 
of cases, courts have relied on unincorporated human rights treaties.  
For example, in Unity Dow v. Attorney General,
119
 the Botswana court‘s interpretation of a 
statute was ‗strengthened‘ by the fact that Botswana was a signatory to the OAU Convention on 
Non-Discrimination even though Botswana had not ratified it, a fact which the judge expressly 
acknowledged. On appeal, the Attorney General specifically took issue with the court‘s reliance on 
unincorporated treaties, but the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court‘s use of unincorporated 
treaties.
120
 It held that, even if treaties and conventions do not confer enforceable rights on 
individuals within the state until parliament gave them the force of law, they could still be used as 
aids to interpretation. In Ghana, Justice Archer in New Patriotic Party v. Inspector General of 
Police
121
 held that the fact that Ghana had not passed specific legislation to give effect to the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples‘ Rights did not mean it could not be relied upon in 
adjudication.
122
 In Kenya, the Court of Appeal has held that, even though Kenya subscribes to the 
common law view that international law is only part of domestic law where it has been specifically 
incorporated, current thinking on the common law theory is that both international customary law 
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Past and Assessing the Future‖ (2004) 29 South Afr. Yearbk. Int‘l L. 42 for other cases in South Africa where courts 
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and treaty law can be ‗applied by state courts where there is no conflict with existing state law, 
even in the absence of an implementing legislation‘.123 
The judicial philosophy that gives effect to unincorporated treaties has also been felt in 
other areas. In Ghana, Justice Ocran was influenced in Products (GH) Ltd. v. Delmas America 
Africa Line Inc.
124
 by the United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea. He found 
article 5 on the liability of carriers ‗highly relevant‘ even at a time when the convention had not 
been incorporated into Ghanaian law. In South Africa, the Supreme Court of Appeal in De Gree v. 
Webb was influenced by the principles of the Hague Convention on the Protection of Children and 
Co-operation in respect of Inter-Country Adoption which, although ratified by South Africa, had 
not been implemented domestically at the time.
125
 Similarly, in Roger Parry v. Astral Operations 
Ltd.,
126
 the South African Labour Court was prepared to be ‗guided by‘ article 6 of the European 
Community‘s Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations.127  
All these cases suggest that it is possible for courts to give effect to community law even 
when it has not been expressly incorporated into national law. Indeed, this should be encouraged. 
The extent to which this can be done will vary from case to case. It will also depend on the ability 
of counsel, at times, to draw the court‘s attention to the relevant community law. As discussed 
below, there are cases emerging in which this has been done. 
7.3.3.3 Community Law as Creator of Rights and Guide to Remedies 
Apart from using community law as an aid to interpretations with a view to enhancing its 
effectiveness in member states, judicial philosophy may also be used to allow community law to 
confer rights on individuals under the doctrine of legitimate expectation. The doctrine of legitimate 
expectation is well accepted in the public law of many common law jurisdictions, including those 
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 It began its life as a doctrine aimed at safeguarding procedural fairness and legal 
certainty, but it is now well accepted that it can, albeit rarely, create substantive rights for 
individuals. The doctrine extends to ratified unincorporated treaties
129
 but, in Africa, decided cases 
on this issue are scant. 
In Abacha v. Fawehinmi,
130
 the Nigerian Supreme Court accepted that an unincorporated 
treaty might give rise to a legitimate expectation that the government would observe the terms of 
the treaty.
131
 But, in the Zimbabwean case of Movement for Democratic Change v. The President 
of the Republic of Zimbabwe,
132
 the court rejected this possibility. The applicant argued that, 
although Southern African Development Community Principles and Guidelines Governing 
Democratic Elections (SADC Guidelines) had not been incorporated into domestic law, the court 
could use the doctrine of legitimate expectation to hold that the provisions of the SADC Guidelines 
are relevant and applicable in the court.
133
 The court rejected this argument. It held that although 
the SADC Guidelines had been approved by the Zimbabwean government, they were not a direct 
source of rights and obligations under Zimbabwean law. In the court‘s view, by assenting to the 
SADC Guidelines, the government indicated to the national and to the international community 
that it subscribed to the minimum standards set out in the guidelines.
134
 But, it did not give the 
applicant or any other citizen of Zimbabwe a cause of action that was enforceable in a domestic 
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 Indeed, the court noted that after approving the SADC Guidelines, government ‗initiated and piloted through 
Parliament, two specific pieces of legislation aimed at regulating the conduct of elections in accordance with the 
SADC Principles and Guidelines‘. 
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law court. Admittedly, this is the correct position in law. However, the failure of the court to 
investigate whether at least some procedural rights could have been indirectly founded on the 
SADC Guidelines can be criticized. 
In seeking a foundation for a decision based on legitimate expectation arising out of an 
unincorporated community law, a national court will have to pay attention to the conduct of its 
executive at both the international and national levels. The fact that the relevant community law 
has been signed or ratified, pronouncements of the government during the negotiations on the law, 
and the government‘s action on the law since signing may all be relevant considerations. 
From the above, it can be argued that, apart from instances where community law has been 
directly incorporated into national law or made a source of domestic law,
135
 the doctrine of 
legitimate expectation, the principle that legislation should be interpreted consistently with 
international law, and a judicial philosophy that generally allows courts to be guided by non-
domestic norms, may be used to give some effect to community law in member states. In other 
words, they can provide an avenue through which unincorporated community laws can be 
implemented in member states. This will be advantageous to the community, individuals and, 
indeed, government officials. For example, an administrative decision founded on international law 
is more likely to withstand judicial scrutiny than one which is not.
136
 
It remains to be seen whether and how African courts will help implement community law, 
especially in the light of the fact that, generally, governments have been reluctant to implement 
community laws through incorporation. There have been a few cases in which reliance has been 
placed on the objects or goals of the communities. Although they are not laws as such, the objects 
and goals of the communities can shape courts‘ jurisprudence and the remedies they provide in a 
manner that enhances economic integration. In R v. Obert Sithembiso Chikane,
137
 the Swaziland 
court held that ‗in cases where cross-border criminals are convicted, the Courts must [through the 
sentence] express the displeasure of the Southern African Development Community that serious 
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cross-border crime shall not be tolerated‘. And, in Shah v. Manurama Ltd,138 the Uganda court 
held that, in East Africa, there could no longer be an automatic and inflexible presumption for the 
courts to order security for costs against a plaintiff resident in the East African Community. One 
factor which influenced the court in its decision was the fact that, among the objects of the 
community, as outlined in article 5 of the EAC Treaty, was the need to develop policies and 
programmes aimed at widening and deepening cooperation among the member states in legal and 
judicial affairs for their mutual benefit.  
Judicial reliance on community objects when deciding cases is important at the present 
stage of the communities‘ development in which the body of community law is not enormous, and 
states have been slow in incorporating community law. By paying attention to the objects of the 
communities, courts can fashion remedies or produce judgments that ultimately strengthen 
integration. Areas where this could be useful include the enforcement of judgments from other 
African countries, national restrictions on cross-border commerce,
139
 rights of migrant workers and 
treatment of assets of foreigners. 
In addition to relying on community objects, there have been instances where courts drew 
on substantive community laws to bolster their decisions. For example, in Friday Anderson Jumbe 
v. Humphrey Chimpando,
140
 the Malawian court relied on the Southern African Development 
Protocol against Corruption for guidance on principles relating to corruption.
141
 In Chloride 
Batteries Ltd. v. Viscocity,
142
 the Malawian court took judicial notice of article 55 of the COMESA 
Treaty, which deals with competition, in granting an injunction restraining the defendant, from 
marketing in Malawi, alleged counterfeit batteries imported from Kenya.
143
 In Hoffman v. South 
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 which dealt with the constitutionality of South African Airways‘ practice of 
refusing to employ as cabin attendants people who are living with HIV, the South African 
Constitutional Court referred to the Code of Conduct on HIV/AIDS and Employment in the 
Southern African Development Community, 1997. The court took cognizance of the fact that, 
under the Code: HIV status should not be a factor in job status, promotion or transfer; pre-
employment testing for HIV is discouraged and no compulsory workplace testing for HIV is 
required. Finally, in the Lesotho case of Molifi v. Independent Electoral Commission,
145
 the male 
applicant challenged the constitutionality of legislation that designated particular electoral 
divisions as reserved for women candidates only, including the one in which he wanted to stand for 
election into the local assembly. One of the international instruments the court found useful in 
rejecting the applicant‘s challenge was the Southern African Development Community Declaration 
on Gender and Development, 1997. 
In many of the above cases, the courts did not engage in depth with the community laws or 
objects they used. Had this been done, one would have had a better sense of the courts‘ attitude 
towards community law and the goals of economic integration. One would also have been able to 
predict better the extent to which future legal submissions based on community law, even if 
unincorporated, would be received. Notwithstanding this limitation, the cases are important first 
steps. They demonstrate a level of awareness on the part of lawyers and judges of the existence and 
relevance of community law. It is hoped that, with time, this awareness will translate into more 
rigorous judicial and legal engagement with community law and its place in member states. In 
furtherance of this, academics and institutions have a crucial role to play. They must sow the seeds 
of community law in the minds of future generations of lawyers and judges. This can be done 
through specific courses on economic integration in Africa or integrating relevant aspects of 
community law into already existing courses such as international law and commercial law. 
Economic integration studies should not be confined to postgraduate students. The presence of a 
strong juristic community with interest in community law is one of the surest ways of ensuring the 
effective implementation of community law in member states. 
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Admittedly, in the absence of specific national legislation implementing community law, 
the role courts can play is limited. Courts are constrained by constitutional arrangements on the 
separation of powers. Equally important is the degree to which judges and lawyers are aware of 
community laws and are willing to deploy them in adjudication and litigation. Also, the role of 
courts is contingent on litigation in which community law is engaged and legal arguments in which 
community issues are raised.
146
 Where, perhaps due to a lack of awareness, there is a culture of 
settling disputes out of court or of not invoking community law in litigation, there is not much 
courts can do through their jurisprudence to facilitate the implementation of community law.  
7.3.4 Community Law and National Legal Culture 
A discussion of the implementation of law is incomplete without an assessment of the 
effect of factors outside the ‗formal‘ structures of institutions, judicial decisions, statutes and 
constitutions which make up the legal system. Legal culture is such a factor. Friedman‘s work on 
the concept of legal culture emphasizes the fact that law is best understood and described as a 
system that is a product of social forces. Social forces shape the evolution, content, enforcement 
and efficacy of law.
147
 Unlike legal principles, legal culture which is an aspect of culture – the way 
of life of a people – is largely country-specific, diverse and evolutionary.148 Indeed, legal culture 
may vary across different branches of law and, even, within parts of the same country. Thus, it 
may not be entirely accurate or appropriate to talk about an African legal culture as if there were a 
homogenous ‗African‘ way of life as regards the law. 
Notwithstanding these caveats, there are a number of factors about African legal systems 
that could potentially affect the implementation of community law. These factors include the 
under-developed nature of the legal systems, legal pluralism, and the minimal use of litigation as a 
channel for addressing disputes. Griffiths defines legal pluralism as ‗the state of affairs, for any 
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social field, in which behaviour pursuant to more than one legal order occurs‘.149 So defined, it can 
be said that most, if not all, states are pluralistic. What is distinct in Africa is that the existence of 
multiple legal orders is statutorily recognized, and laws and conduct founded on those legal orders 
are legitimized by the state.
150
  
Legal pluralism in Africa provides for multiple legal regimes and avenues for legal redress. 
In some countries, native courts administering customary (and sharia) law co-exist with the 
national courts.
151
 In others, the national courts administer both customary law and the general law. 
The making and implementation of community law will have to take these into account. The 
existence of multiple legal orders implies multiple demands on people‘s commitment to law; some 
may feel more attached to customary law, some to the general state law, and others possibly to 
community law. A pluralistic tradition can be adaptable to specific situations and problems. 
However, it also suggests the need for a robust conflict of laws regime which can offer certainty 
for foreign investors and economic transactions. Unfortunately, as I have argued elsewhere, the 
current regime in most African legal systems is underdeveloped and may not be able adequately to 
cope with the challenges of integration.
152
  
To be sure, the potential adverse impact legal pluralism can have on the implementation of 
community law and, generally, on economic integration in Africa should not be exaggerated. In 
many African countries, legal pluralism is mostly manifest in family, succession and property law 
related issues.
153
 Family law and succession may not be directly relevant for economic transactions 
at the present stage of economic integration in Africa. But, they will become relevant as the 
communities start the process of integrating the ‗social and cultural‘154 dimensions of life in 
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When people move freely within the communities, and form personal relationships with 
people subject to different customs, questions on the content and application of customary law will 
emerge. What happens when community law provides for rights not recognized under the 
customary law of a group? What happens when community law conflicts with customary law? 
Will community law prevail in such instances? Will customary law be deemed of such importance 
to the lives of its adherents that it will remain unaffected by community law? Will traditional 
private international law rules be appropriate in this context? Surely, social issues addressed by 
customary law also have economic dimensions and the communities cannot remain neutral or 
ambivalent towards them. Thus, it is not surprising that the European Community has legislated in 
the area of family law,
156
 and is currently working on wills and succession.
157
 In Africa, these 
issues will also have to be addressed, with customary law being a complicating factor. This 
complication is made more difficult by the fact that customary laws are diverse across the 
continent and are largely unwritten. Accordingly, there is no written law to ‗look up‘, but there are 
many laws that one may have to investigate on site, rather than in the comfort of a library.  
The impact on economic integration of legal pluralism in property law is, however, more 
immediate and can be adverse. Multiple regimes for the transfer and ownership of property as well 
as customary law restrictions on alienation of property can be a disincentive to establishing 
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business and undertaking commercial activities.
158
 For example, the land tenure system in Ghana, 
which mixes customary law with state law, has been noted as a major obstacle to foreign 
investment.
159
 In general, legal pluralism in Africa has economic significance since it will 
ultimately increase transaction costs for businesses to investigate multiple sources of law. One 




Another feature of African legal culture that is likely to impact on the implementation of 
community law is the minimal use of law and litigation as channels for redressing wrongs. 
Friedman has observed that legal culture ‗determines when and why and where people turn to law 
or government, or turn away‘.161 African legal culture emphasizes reconciliatory and non-
adversarial modes of settling disputes. Adjudication is ‗guided negotiation‘ for a settlement.162 For 
example, customary arbitration is a key aspect of dispute settlement in most African countries. 
Dispute settlement in traditional African societies also made minimal use, if at all, of specialist 
legal professionals. The rise of lawyers, the emergence of a neutral, ignorant of the facts and 
disinterested adjudicator, and their role in settling disputes appears to be the product of 
colonization.
163
 These features of African legal culture can be problematic for community law.  
In this thesis, I have consistently emphasized the role of law, lawyers, litigation and the 
courts as mechanisms for promoting the development of community law in member states. In a 
setting where these mechanisms are not frequently resorted to, this can be problematic. For 
example, the ECOWAS protocols on free movement of persons have been implemented in member 
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states for over thirty years. But, I have been unable to locate a single decided case in the principal 
law reports of the English-speaking member states dealing with this issue or invoking the 
protocols. National borders have been arbitrarily closed, illegal fees have been levied at border 
posts, and nationals have been deported from member states, but, to my knowledge, none of these 
issues have been challenged judicially.
164
 We have already noted that, notwithstanding many years 
of economic integration processes in Africa, reliance on community law before national courts has 
been minimal. Indeed, law reporting is itself something that is not approached seriously in most 




 To an extent, the above state of affairs reflects the realities in Africa and cannot be wholly 
attributed to a deep-seated and immutable cultural bias. Indeed, historical accounts of African legal 
culture reveal deep attachment to the law. This was due to the fact that there was popular 
participation in lawmaking and the administration of justice was highly localized rather than 
remote.
166
 Also, contrary to perceptions today, in the past, Africans have been labeled as ‗naturally 
and typically litigious, ready to resort to law at the slightest opportunity‘.167 Allott has argued that 
this claim was borne out by judicial statistics at the time, but it could be explained on the ground of 
the traditional availability of courts of law. In his words, ‗the judicial arena was not something 
strange and forbidden; it was rather like a football pitch, to which everyone might resort for 
entertainment and excitement and to challenge‘.168 Surely, this is not the case today. Among the 
factors contributing to this are: litigation cost; poverty; physical inaccessibility of legal and judicial 
institutions; mistrust in the ability and independence of judges to deliver justice; political 
instability and politicization of the judicial process; ignorance of individual rights; and illiteracy. 
These could be overcome through the provision of legal aid, education, greater protection of the 
                                                          
 
164
 There is only one reported case from the ECOWAS Court of Justice in which the applicant challenged Nigeria‘s 
closure of its border with Benin as a breach of the ECOWAS Treaty. See Afolabi Olajide v. Federal Republic of 
Nigeria, 2004/ECW/CCJ/04 (ECOWAS Court of Justice, 2004) 
165
 For example, my research found that the latest-issued law report in Tanzania is the 1997 Tanzania Law Reports! 
166
 Allot, supra note 162 at 135. 
167
 Ibid. at 147.On litigation and legal culture see generally Erhard Blankenburg, ―Civil Litigation as Indicator of Legal 





integrity and independence of the judicial process, and improving people‘s physical access to legal 
and judicial institutions. 
An important lesson from African legal culture that is relevant in the implementation of 
community law is the fact that customary law is inextricably linked with the societies in which it 
operates. In other words, there is an intimate linkage between customary law and the socio-cultural 
environment; customary law evolves from within and is not imposed from above.
169
 The intimate 
linkage between customary law and society is the basis for the continued endurance of customary 
law, even on matters on which attempts have been made by states (and formerly by colonial 
powers) to impose uniform law. This suggests that a top-down approach as regards community 
lawmaking and implementation may not always be appropriate. In some instances, communities 
should leave decision-making and implementation to the member states so that policies will be 
localized and not seen as imposed from above and, accordingly, ignored. Surely, the communities 
would like to avoid the experiences of the former colonial powers in Africa who imposed so much 
law from above only to have them ignored by the colonized. 
7.4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter reveals difficult challenges to the implementation of community law in 
African states. The approach of the economic integration treaties to the issue has left uncertainties 
in their wake. Member states have not implemented fully obligations assumed at the community 
level. National laws have not systematically dealt with the issue of implementing community law. 
This is reflected in the constitutions and the jurisprudence of the courts. Indeed, it has been 
revealed that, in some instances, existing constitutional provisions may be inimical to effectively 
implementing community law. Currently, community law does not enjoy any preferential legal 
status in member states. It is treated like any other international law. Admittedly, community law‘s 
genesis in international law cannot be denied. But, the effective implementation of community law 
will demand an approach very different from that accorded by international law. 
After many years of economic integration, the above state of affairs on the implementation 
of community law in member states is difficult to fathom. The lack of attention to the issue of 
implementing community law creates a disjunction between community and national legal 
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systems, and works against the effectiveness of economic integration. It is suggested that because 
the communities envision progression through the various stages of integration – from free trade 
areas into customs unions, common markets and economic communities – they should become 
more attentive to this issue. Implementation issues will become increasingly more important as 
economic integration progresses; the farther economic integration moves through the stages, the 
more intensive the interactions between community and national law will become. The 
communities will have to provide a more robust and defined legal framework for these 
interactions.  
Similarly, member states should analyze the challenges their laws and jurisprudence pose 
for implementing community law and, where necessary, effect amendments or legislate to 
overcome the challenges. This task for member states should be founded on their undertakings in 
the communities‘ treaties to create conditions favourable for the development and achievement of 
the goals of the communities, abstaining, at the same time, from measures likely to jeopardize the 
achievement of their aims.
170
 The traditional explanation of the lack of political will as the main 
obstacle to progress of economic integration in Africa is inadequate. This chapter reveals that, even 
if governments were willing to implement community law, serious legal limitations exist that must 
be addressed first. 
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8 CHAPTER EIGHT: STRENGTHENING INTER-INSTITUTIONAL RELATIONS: 
SELECTED PUBLIC-PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW ISSUES 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
For centuries, private international law has been used to address legal problems generated 
by interactions among legal systems. It deals with problems that arise when transactions or legal 
claims involve a foreign element. Private international law issues are most frequent in settings that 
allow for the growth of international relationships or activities with transnational implications. 
Economic integration provides this setting: it compels interaction among multiple legal systems; 
allows for the free movement of persons, goods, services and capital across national boundaries; 
and fosters the intensification of transnational economic activity. These generate problems which 
private international law can help resolve.  
Accordingly, a developed private international law regime is an indispensable part of 
economic integration. Private international law impacts on the free movement of persons, goods, 
services and capital. It affects economic transactions within a community and, therefore, merits 
attention in any economic integration process. An economic community does not, and cannot, 
function solely on the basis of substantive rules. The procedural rules for resolving issues arising in 
cross-border transactions are equally important. These rules may be useful in dispute settlement at 
both the community and national levels. In other words, true integration should aim not only at the 
removal of barriers to the movement of persons, goods, services and capital, but also the 
strengthening of the legal infrastructure for settling cross-border disputes. A developed private 
international law regime is a key aspect of this infrastructure. 
From a relational perspective, private international law provides a means through which the 
horizontal and vertical relations between the multiple legal systems in the community can be 
structured and managed. It creates linkages between legal systems without necessarily unifying 
them. For example, the rules on recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments allow effect to 
be given to the judicial acts of foreign states. International civil procedure rules enable states to 
work together for the smooth and effective administration of justice in transnational disputes. 
Choice of law rules allow parties to choose which legal system will govern their transactions. 
These rules often operate outside the context of economic integration. But their true foundation is 
in the interactions of legal systems which result from the transnational activities of their 
inhabitants. As Foote has noted, ‗if society of each legislating State was entirely isolated, so that 
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the individuals composing it were cut off from intercourse with all but their fellow subjects, the 
law of each State would have full operation within its own domain, and could claim to extend itself 
no further‘.1 Transactions between people subject to different legal systems, which is made more 
prevalent by community economic integration, provides the raison d’être for private international 
law. 
But the utility of private international law in economic integration is not limited to (as 
discussed in Chapter Nine) its impact on individual economic transactions or interstate relations. 
Its principles can also be important in how community institutions relate to each other as well as to 
national institutions. I characterize this as inter-institutional relational issues. Admittedly, these 
issues would ordinarily be the domain of public international law or the internal relationships 
between the relevant institutions. Private international law may, however, be relevant in addressing 
some of the issues. Indeed, increasingly, scholars are exploring the interactions between public and 
private international law problems, including interactions between international institutions.
2
 
Inter-institutional relational issues are the focus of this chapter. It assesses how community 
institutions in Africa interact with each other as well as with national institutions through the lens 
of public-private international law principles. Some writers have, albeit cursorily, identified a role 
for private international law in Africa‘s economic integration.3 But their focus has been on how 
private international law impacts on individual economic transactions. This chapter advances the 
discourse in this area by examining how private international law is equally important for 
community institutional arrangements.  
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8.2 PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND AFRICA’S ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
LAWS 
8.2.1 Introduction  
Palpably missing from the discourse on economic integration under the Treaty establishing 
the African Economic Community [AEC Treaty]
4
 is any discussion of the role of private 
international law.
5
 The various laws for the pursuit of integration in Africa are also silent on this. 
Ignoring reciprocal agreements for the recognition and enforcement of judgments in national 
statues, there is no private international law international convention negotiated by African states.
6
 
This state of affairs is troubling. As discussed in Chapter Nine, the under-developed nature of 
private international law in Africa is a key obstacle to economic transactions. It may equally 
handicap its utility in addressing inter-institutional relational issues.  
Africa‘s economic integration treaties have been inattentive to potential private 
international law issues arising from their design of community institutions, especially in cases 
where it is envisaged that community and national institutions will interact. This may hamper the 
effective operation of community institutions and undermine their relations with national 
institutions. Consistent with the thesis that effective economic integration results from properly 
structuring and managing relational issues, this section examines how the effective operation of 
one community institution, the community courts, can be enhanced or constrained by private 
international law. It will be argued that, although developed for individual cross-border 
transactions, attention to private international law rules can enhance institutional effectiveness. 
However, it will be shown that these rules may not be wholly appropriate in the context of inter-
institutional relational issues.  
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8.2.2 Arbitral Jurisdiction of the Community Courts 
8.2.2.1 Introduction  
The community courts of the communities under review, namely COMESA, EAC and 
ECOWAS, have jurisdiction to determine cases which are referred to them by persons (the 
community, its institutions or individuals) who choose them (not the individual judges in their 
personal capacity) as forums for the arbitration of disputes.
7
 Judges sitting on such arbitration sit as 
the court and not as persona designata. The arbitral jurisdiction is conferred on the court, not on 
individual judges. In other words, when the community courts arbitrate a dispute, it sits as a ‗court 
of arbitration‘.8 The judges do not sit in their personal capacity. Individual judges are designated to 
sit on this court of arbitration
9
 just as they are when the court sits to settle a dispute through 
litigation. Like in any arbitration proceedings, the parties retain a measure of control over the 
process on issues such as the judges who are to sit as arbitrators,
10






As a marked departure from what is assumed, traditionally, to be the preference for the 
settlement of disputes in Africa,
13
 neither the AEC Treaty
14
 nor the Protocol on the Statute of the 
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African Court of Justice and Human Rights
15
 contains any provision conferring arbitral jurisdiction 
on the African Court of Justice and Human Rights [African Court of Justice]. Comparatively, it 
appears that the combination of an adversarial and arbitral jurisdiction in the same community 
court is largely unique to Africa.
16
 Indeed, it appears to be a recent phenomenon; the first 
generation of African economic integration treaties did not provide for any such dual jurisdiction 
in their respective community courts.
17
  
I have been unable to identify the specific rationale for the inclusion of the dual jurisdiction 
provisions; the treaties have no explanatory memoranda to them and academic writings do not 
address this issue. However, I speculate that they reflect the preference for arbitration as a mode of 
settling disputes in Africa,
18
 the general rise of arbitration as a means of dispute settlement, and a 
consolidation of existing practice.
19
 Historically, there had also been calls for the establishment of 
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240 
 
permanent arbitration centres in Africa.
20
 Indeed, one organization to respond early to this call was 
the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern African States (PTA) which helped in 
establishing the PTA Center for Commercial Arbitration in Djibouti. It is also possible that these 
provisions were inspired by the Treaty establishing the European Community [EC Treaty], but, as 
will be noticed below, their wording and scope are very different. Article 238 of the EC Treaty 
confers an arbitral jurisdiction on the European Court of Justice (ECJ)
21
 However, as one author 
has accurately noted, article 238 of the EC Treaty does not make the ECJ ‗simply an arbitrator in 
the normal sense of that term‘.22 It can accordingly be argued that the arbitral jurisdiction of 
community courts is novel and, apparently, African. 
8.2.2.2 Jurisdiction and Choice of Law 
As noted above, in addition to hearing cases through contentious litigation, the COMESA, 
EAC and ECOWAS courts have jurisdiction to hear cases through arbitration. Both arbitration in 
interstate disputes and commercial arbitration are covered. Indeed, the EAC Treaty provision, 
which is cited below, specifically refers to an arbitration clause in ‗a commercial contract or 
agreement‘. Article 28 of the COMESA Treaty provides that:  
The Court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine any matter: 
(a) arising from an arbitration clause contained in a contract which confers such 
jurisdiction to which the Common Market or any of its institutions is a party; and 
(b) arising from a dispute between the Member States regarding this Treaty if the 
dispute is submitted to it under a special agreement between the Member States 
concerned. 
 
 Article 32 of the EAC Treaty is wider in scope. It provides: 
The Court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine any matter: 
(a) arising from an arbitration clause contained in a contract or agreement which 
confers such jurisdiction to which the Community or any of its institutions is a 
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party; or (b) arising from a dispute between the Partner States regarding this 
Treaty if the dispute is submitted to it under a special agreement between the 
Partner States concerned; or (c) arising from an arbitration clause contained in a 
commercial contract or agreement in which the parties have conferred 
jurisdiction on the Court. 
 
 Article 16 of the ECOWAS Treaty is less definite. It provides that: 
1. There is hereby established an Arbitration Tribunal of the Community. 2. The 
status, composition, powers, procedure and other issues concerning the 
Arbitration Tribunal shall be as set out in a Protocol relating thereto. 
 
 At present, the arbitral jurisdiction of the court is seldom invoked.
23
 In the case of Building 
Design Enterprise v. Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa,
24
 the COMESA court sat 
as a court of arbitration. However the parties settled and the arbitral proceedings were 
discontinued. Notwithstanding its current minimal invocation, the arbitral jurisdiction is important. 
It creates an avenue for individuals to become active participants in the economic integration 
processes by providing forums for the settlement of disputes that may be generated by their 
transactions within communities. For people transacting commercially in Africa, who seek a 
neutral, expedited, and ‗party controlled‘ forum for dispute settlement, the arbitral jurisdiction may 
be equally useful.  
Indeed, the community courts can be developed into forums for the resolution of inter-
African commercial and political disputes through arbitration. The arbitral jurisdiction may serve 
to ensure harmonious interstate relations within the communities by providing a non-adversarial 
means of settling interstate disputes. This is important for the development of the communities; 
harmonious interstate relations will allow the communities to focus on economic integration. 
African governments are reluctant to choose international litigation as a means of settling disputes 
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inter se. Indeed, as already noted, of all the cases so far brought before the COMESA, EAC, 
ECOWAS courts as well as the Southern African Development Community Tribunal, only one 
involved interstate parties.
25
 It appears African governments give preference to non-adversarial 
means of settling disputes.
26
 The arbitral jurisdiction injects a measure of rule orientation into the 
processes of amicably settling interstate disputes.  
Despite the importance of the arbitral jurisdiction and its apparent novelty, the relevant 
provisions in the treaties are scant. Left on their own, they could not provide meaningful guidance 
for the community courts when exercising that jurisdiction.
27
 Happily, both the COMESA and 
EAC courts have adopted detailed rules on arbitration.
28
 However, the rules leave complex issues 
unaddressed. If the issues are not addressed, they could undermine the utility of the jurisdiction. 
Among the issues are: the role that the goals or objects of economic integration should play in the 
arbitral process; the administrative costs of the community courts‘ dual jurisdiction; the 
competence of the judges to perform the dual role; whether the community courts lose their 
‗community‘ character and become private international commercial arbitration centres when they 
are exercising their arbitral jurisdiction; and the extent to which principles developed in the context 
of international commercial arbitration could be extended to arbitration in the context of economic 
integration.  
From a public-private international law perspective, other issues emerge. Firstly, what 
substantive law governs arbitral proceedings before the community courts? Secondly, will arbitral 
proceedings before the community courts be subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of national 
courts of the place of arbitration? Presumably parties to arbitration could specify the governing 
law.
29
 In cases where they do not, the issue becomes more difficult. Should the court apply 
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community law, if there is any, on the issue in dispute, international law, the laws of the member 
states, or the law of a non-member state? The arbitration rules of the COMESA and EAC courts 
address these issues. Under Rule 6 of the EAC Arbitration Rules: 
(1) The Tribunal shall decide the dispute in accordance with the law chosen by 
the parties. But if the parties expressly authorise it to do so, the Tribunal shall 
decide on the substance of the dispute according to considerations of justice and 
fairness without being bound by the rules of law.  
(2) The choice of the law or legal system of a designated state shall be construed, 
unless otherwise agreed by the parties, as directly referring to the substantive law 
of that state and not its rules of conflict of laws.  
(3) Failing a choice of the law by the parties, the Tribunal shall apply the rules of 
law it considers to be appropriate given all the circumstances of the dispute.  
(4) In all cases, the Tribunal shall decide in accordance with the terms of the 
particular contract and shall take into account the usages of the trade applicable 
to the particular transaction.
30
 
 Under Rule 24 of the COMESA Arbitration Rules: 
1. (a) The Court shall apply the law designated by the parties as applicable to the 
substance of the dispute.  
(b) Failing such designation by the parties, the Court shall apply the law 
determined by the conflict of law rules, which it considers applicable.  
2. The Court shall decide as amiable compositeur or ex aequo et bono only if the 
parties have expressly authorized the Court to do so and if the law applicable to 
the arbitral procedure permits such arbitration.  
3. In all cases, the Court shall decide in accordance with the terms of the contract 
and shall take into account the usage‘s of the trade applicable to the transaction.31 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
 
Tribunal was to decide the dispute according to treaties concluded between the parties, international law, the Charter of 
the Organization of African Unity, the Charter of the United Nations and, if the parties agree, ex aequo et bono. 
30
 This rule appears to have been borrowed from article 29 Kenya‘s Arbitration Act 1995, Chapter 4 of 1995 which has 
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An issue unaddressed by either the treaty provisions or the Arbitration Rules of the courts 
is the extent to which community goals should or would inform the choice of law processes when 
the courts are exercising their arbitral jurisdiction. Party autonomy is upheld under the rules. 
However, they are silent on what limitations could or should be placed on parties‘ choice of the 
applicable law. It is now generally recognized that the choice of law process is not a neutral or 
disinterested exercise. Substantive and policy considerations underlie or may even compel the 
choice of the applicable law.
32
 The communities definitely have an interest in ensuring that their 
laws are not circumvented through ingenious choice of law agreements by parties who conduct 
business within them.
33
 An illustration of how parties‘ choice of the applicable law can be used to 
circumvent community law and how this may be judicially overcome is the ECJ‘s case of Ingmar 
GB Ltd. v. Eaton Leonard Technologies Inc.
34
  
Ingmar GB Ltd. (Ingmar) was a company established in the United Kingdom, and Eaton 
Leonard Technologies Inc. (Eaton) was a company established in California. They concluded a 
contract under which Ingmar was appointed as Eaton‘s commercial agent in the United Kingdom. 
The contract was governed by the law of the State of California. The contract was terminated in 
1996. Ingmar instituted proceedings in England seeking, pursuant to Regulation 17 of Commercial 
Agents (Council Directive) Regulations 1993, compensation for damage suffered as a result of the 
termination of the contract. The regulation implemented Council Directive 86/653/EEC of 18 
December 1986 on the Co-ordination of the Laws of the Member States relating to Self-employed 
Commercial Agents.
35
 The directive was intended to harmonize the laws of member states.  
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The English Court of Appeal made a preliminary reference to the ECJ, and asked whether 
articles 17 and 18 of the directive must be applied where the commercial agent carried on his 
activity in a member state although the principal is established in a non-member state and a clause 
of the parties‘ contract stipulates that it is to be governed by the law of the non-member state. The 
court reasoned that articles 17 and 18 were mandatory. They were to protect, for all commercial 
agents, the freedom of establishment and the operation of undistorted competition in the internal 
market, and must be observed throughout the EC to achieve the objectives of the EC Treaty. The 
court held that it is essential for the community legal order that a principal established in a non-
member state, whose commercial agent carries on his activity within the community, cannot evade 
those provisions by the simple expedient of a choice of law clause. To the court, the purpose 
served by the articles requires that they be applied where the situation is closely connected with the 
community, in particular where the commercial agent carries on his activity in the territory of a 
member state, irrespective of the law by which the parties intended the contract to be governed. 
Rule 6(3) of the EAC court‘s arbitration rules provides a basis on which the interests of the 
EAC can be made to influence the choice of law process. In the absence of the parties‘ choice, the 
court can apply ‗the rules of law it considers to be appropriate given all the circumstances of the 
dispute‘. I argue that the interest of the EAC will be one such circumstance. Even in the absence of 
this provision, it can still be argued that the court should have and indeed has the inherent power to 
protect community interest. It should refuse recognition to a choice of law agreement which would 
undermine essential community objectives or laws. In addition to being forums for the settlement 
of disputes, the community courts should also see themselves as being entrusted with a mandate 
for serving as an engine for economic integration through their decisions. 
An equally difficult issue is whether the community courts, when exercising their arbitral 
jurisdiction, would be subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the courts of the place of 
arbitration. Naturally, these courts are located and sit in a specific country. But, unlike other 
arbitral tribunals, they are not governed by the procedural laws of the country in which they sit or, 
at least, this issue is unsettled. Nor is it settled whether, as in international commercial arbitration, 
arbitral proceedings before the community courts may be regulated by the national courts of the 
states in which they sit. Can national courts exercise supervisory jurisdiction over the community 
courts? Can national courts restrain arbitral proceedings before the community courts? Can 
national courts grant remedies in aid of the arbitration proceedings? The possibility of subjecting 
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the arbitral proceedings of the community courts to national laws and the supervisory jurisdiction 
of national courts will upset the balance of relations between community and national legal 
systems. Writing from the perspective of article 238 of the EC Treaty, Hartley has rightly observed 
that ‗…in many countries the activities of arbitrators are subject to the supervision of the court. 
There cannot, of course, be any question of this with regard to the European Court [of Justice]… 
‘36 In the case of the community courts, the issue remains open and needs to be clarified. 
8.2.2.3 Enforcement of Community Arbitration Awards 
Another issue arising from the arbitral jurisdiction of the community courts is the 
enforceability of their awards. As will be discussed below, it is envisaged that national courts will 
be used to enforce judgments of the community courts.
37
 The same procedure is anticipated for the 
awards of the community courts.
38
 Accordingly, it is to national laws on the enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards that we must turn to examine whether community awards can be effectively 
enforced, and how the national laws might impact on the relations between community and 
national legal systems.  
In Africa, the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards is regulated mainly by statute.
39
 If an 
award does not qualify for enforcement under statute, many of which operate on the basis of 
reciprocity,
40
 it is possible that it may be enforced at common law.
41
 As of March 2009, thirty-one 
African countries were parties to the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and 
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Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.
42
 Therefore, the convention may also be important in the 
enforcement of awards in these countries. Subject to specified limitations, even under the 
convention, the enforcement of an arbitral award should be ‗in accordance with the rules of 
procedure of the territory where the award is relied upon… ‘.43 Equally important for the 
enforcement of community awards may be the UNCITRAL Model Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration.
44
 Its award enforcement provisions are very similar to those of the 
convention. As of March 2009, nine African countries - Egypt, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, 




A perennial issue concerning the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards is the extent to 
which the enforcing court can or may review, set aside or modify an award. This power exists 
under the statutes of various African states which deal with the enforcement of foreign awards. For 
example, under sections 35 and 36 of Kenya‘s Arbitration Act, 1995, the court may, on application 
of a party or suo motu, set aside or refuse to enforce an arbitral award.
46
 To my knowledge, no 
exceptions have been made for awards from the community courts. In other words, an award from 
the EAC or COMESA court enjoys no privileged position as regards enforcement in Kenya and, 
indeed, in other African countries where such provisions exist.
47
 In the context of economic 
integration, and with a view to ensuring the vertical community-state relations, this is an important 
issue. If national courts can review, set aside or modify a community court‘s award that upsets the 
vertical relations which should exist between community and national courts. Generally, it will 
undermine the utility of the community arbitration process.  
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The national statutes on the enforcement of foreign awards usually codify the grounds of 
non-enforcement contained in international conventions. The conventions provide grounds for 
non-enforcement which must be decided under ‗the law of the country where the award was made‘ 
or ‗in accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration took place‘.48 From a relational 
perspective and in the context of economic integration, this raises two difficulties. The first, as 
noted above, is the possibility that the award may be denied recognition with the consequence that 
a judicial act of a community – an arbitration award - is rendered ineffective within a member 
state. The second is that a community judicial act will be validated in a member state using a 
national law instead of community law. The non-enforcement of a community award on grounds 
of non-compliance with the laws of the state in which the community court sat will upset vertical 
community-state relations. Let us assume, for example, the High Court of Kenya refuses to enforce 
an award from the EAC court because the court did not comply with Tanzanian law – the law of 
the place where the court is currently located. Such a position will mean the Kenyan court 
privileges the law of another member state rather than a judicial act of the EAC. 
Perhaps, with a view to maintaining vertical community-state relations, a solution to these 
enforcement issues would be for communities to adopt a rule comparable to article 53 of the 
International Centre for the Settlement of Investments Disputes Convention on the Settlement of 




The award shall be binding on the parties and shall not be subject to any appeal 
or to any other remedy except those provided for in this Convention. Each party 
shall abide by and comply with the terms of the award except to the extent that 
enforcement shall have been stayed pursuant to the relevant provisions of this 
Convention. 
 This provision prevents national courts from modifying or setting aside an award from the 
Centre. In other words, there can be no external review of an ICSID award. The ICSID Convention 
has its own self-contained procedures for reviewing awards. A party to an ICSID proceeding 
cannot initiate action before a national court to set aside or review the award; the court of a state 
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which is party to the convention is under an obligation to dismiss any such action. This distinct 
feature of the convention is important for the finality of ICSID awards. It provides a clear 
advantage over other international arbitration forums.
50
 
As of November 2007, forty-five African countries were parties to the ICSID Convention.
51
 
Indeed, some have enacted legislation implementing the convention. Examples are Zimbabwe‘s 
Arbitration (International Investment) Act,
52
 Zambia‘s Investment Dispute Convention Act,53 and 
Kenya‘s Investment Dispute Convention Act.54 Significantly, and compared with other statutes for 
the enforcement of foreign awards, none of the ICSID Convention-implementing statutes contain a 
provision which allows the court enforcing an award from the Centre to refuse to enforce it on any 
ground. Consistent with the provisions of the convention, what is provided is that the enforcing 
court should stay the enforcement proceedings for the parties to return to the Centre to settle their 
differences as regards the award.  
I argue that if African governments are willing to privilege awards from an institution 
which is not of their creation and which sits in far away Washington D.C. USA, they should be 
more willing, or at least less reluctant, to extend similar privileges to awards emanating from a 
community court of their own creation, which sits on their doorstep, and whose judges are chosen 
by them. A national or community enactment comparable to article 53 of the ICSID Convention 
has the advantage of ensuring that an award from a community court will not be subject to national 
law in a manner that will undermine its effectiveness or enforceability, or upset vertical 
community-state relations. A privileged status for community awards might improve the chances 
of individuals choosing the community courts as the place to settle their disputes. 
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Another issue worth noting relates to the position of states and community institutions in 
arbitral proceedings before the community courts. Because arbitration is consensual, a claim of 
immunity by a state or community institution from the jurisdiction of the community courts is 
unlikely to be made, let alone accepted. That may not be so when it comes to enforcing the award. 
This issue is left unaddressed in the treaties as well as the existing rules of the community courts 
on arbitration. It is submitted that the public policy considerations, which underlie the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity from execution,
55
 can be consistently maintained even for awards emanating 
from community courts in the context of economic integration. Unlike the non-recognition of a 
community arbitral award on the basis of non-compliance with a national law, restrictions on the 
scope of assets available to satisfy a community arbitral award do not adversely affect the balance 
of the relations between community and national legal systems.  
On the whole, the above exposition reveals that, for the effective implementation of the 
arbitral jurisdiction of the community courts, a number of issues must be addressed. This will 
ensure that the arbitral jurisdiction aids economic integration and also avoids unnecessary tensions 
between community and national legal systems. Perhaps the fact that, at present, the arbitral 
jurisdiction is seldom invoked has made these issues less immediate and concrete. Even so, these 
issues are important, and will become increasingly so as individuals become aware of the 
jurisdiction and utilize it to settle their disputes. 
8.2.3 Enforcing Judgments of Community Courts 
8.2.3.1 Introduction 
There has been a proliferation of community or international courts in recent decades. 
Currently, Africa is host to at least five active community courts.
56
 The proliferation of 
international courts has been matched by an improvement in the legal status of individuals 
appearing before them. Historically, individuals have been granted no or restricted standing rights 
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 The traditional view prevailed: only states are subjects of public 
international law. Recently, individuals have been granted locus standi to litigate before some 
international courts. What was essentially the preserve of states has witnessed a fundamental shift. 
Individuals can now bring action against states, international organizations and their institutions 
under various treaties.
58
 In this context, individuals include all non-state entities such as natural 
persons, companies, associations and non-governmental organizations. 
The granting of individual right of action has not been matched by a clear articulation, in 
the realm of private and public international law, of how successful individuals may enforce 
judgments secured from these courts. This is especially so when an individual wants to enforce the 
judgment before a national court. For example, how does an individual in whose favour a 
pecuniary award has been made against a community institution or a state go about enforcing the 
judgment? Should he rely on the goodwill of the community to pay? Can he rely on his country to 
diplomatically assist him secure the judgment debt? Can he proceed to a national court and enforce 
the judgment debt as a foreign judgment? What about a judgment which orders a state or 
community institution to do something, for example, an order to release goods unlawfully seized in 
breach of community law? 
8.2.3.2 National Courts as Enforcers of Community Judgments 
Historically, various mechanisms have been used to enforce judgments of international 
courts. They include the use of international non-judicial institutions, self-help, and diplomatic 
negotiations. Generally, these mechanisms were devised at a time when the individual had no locus 
standi before international courts.
59
 It was reasoned that ‗the function of enforcing a decision of an 
international tribunal is an executive function, and as such should be confined, in the ordinary case 
at any rate, to a body which is invested with executive powers. It becomes in any event, a political 
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as distinguished from a judicial matter’.60 To Rosenne, ‗in international law the separation of the 
adjudicative from the post-adjudicative phase is a fundamental postulate of the whole theory of 
judicial settlement … this leads to the consequence that enforcement partakes of the quality of an 
entirely new dispute to be regulated by political means’.61  
These observations suggest that international law did not contemplate direct enforcement of 
the decisions of international courts by national courts. Rather, it contemplates enforcement 
through diplomatic means. As between states, such an enforcement mechanism, which is power-
oriented, is unproblematic. As between an individual and a state or international institution 
judgment debtor, the absence of a rule-orientated enforcement mechanism can be disadvantageous. 
Historically, in the few cases which exist on the subject, national courts have been reluctant 
to recognize and/or enforce judgments of international courts at the instance of individuals who are 
directly or indirectly affected by the judgments. In Socobel v. Greek State,
62
 a company sought to 
enforce a judgment of the Permanent Court of International Justice before a Belgian national court. 
The action failed because the company was not, and indeed, could not have been, a party to the 
action before the Permanent Court. To the Belgian court, it was inconceivable that, ‗a party which, 
by definition, was not admitted to the bar of an international court should be able to rely on a 
decision in a case to which it was not a party‘.63 More recently, the Supreme Court of the USA 
held that a judgment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) was not directly enforceable as 
domestic law and could therefore not prevail over state procedural rules.
64
 Like Socobel, this action 
was instituted by an individual who was not party to the ICJ proceedings. It is open to question 
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whether both judgments would have been different had the international judgments been issues as 
a result of actions instituted directly by the affected individuals. 
Notwithstanding this judicial reluctance, it has long been recognized that diplomatic 
protection is ineffective or often inaccessible to individuals who seek to rely on or enforce 
judgments of international courts. Some commentators advocate using national courts to enforce 
judgments of international courts.
65
 For example, Reisman advocated an enhanced role for national 
courts in enforcing the judgments of the ICJ.
66
 He proposed a ‗Draft Protocol for the Enforcement 
of I.C.J. Judgments’. Signatories to this protocol were to undertake ‗to enact such internal 
legislation as is necessary to require domestic courts and tribunals to enforce international 
judgments, and rights arising thereon, solely and exclusively upon certification of the authenticity 
of said judgment‘.67 Schachter had earlier suggested that there seemed to be ‗good reasons‘ for 
national courts to recognize international awards.
68
 Nantwi left open the possibility of using 
national courts to enforce judgments of international courts, and noted that ‗the special 
circumstances of any particular case‘ may merit this.69 Jenks also discussed the possibility that 
specific judgments of international courts may be treated as equivalent to a foreign judgment and 
enforceable by municipal procedures available for the enforcement of such foreign judgments.
70
 
These suggestions by commentators have now found their way into treaties.
71
 Some of 
Africa‘s economic integration treaties contain provisions that seek to use national courts to enforce 
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judgments of community courts. Article 44 of the EAC Treaty provides that ‗the execution of a 
judgment of the [EAC court] which imposes a pecuniary obligation on a person shall be governed 
by the rules of civil procedure in force in the Partner State in which the execution is to take place‘. 
Similar provisions are found in the ECOWAS and COMESA treaties.
72
 There are two notable 
differences in the provisions. Firstly, while the EAC and COMESA provisions refer to judgments 
which impose ‗a pecuniary obligation‘, the ECOWAS Court Protocol refers to ‗any judgments‘.73 
For individuals litigating before community courts, this is significant as some of the courts‘ 
judgments are likely to be for non-pecuniary relief. Secondly, it appears that national courts in 
COMESA and the EAC have the discretion to enforce such judgments. Under the ECOWAS Court 
Protocol, enforcement, which is to be made by a designated competent national authority, is 
mandatory.  
The Statute on the African Court of Justice and Human Rights
74
 adopts a different approach 
to enforcing judgments of the court. The statute does not envisage using national courts to enforce 
its judgments. Under article 46(3) parties ‗guarantee‘ execution of judgments. Non-compliance 
may be referred by the court to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, which shall 
decide on measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment. There is also a general undertaking 
by the contracting parties to refrain from measures that will hinder the attainment of the objectives 
of the AEC.
75
 This expectation has been described as ‗naive‘ given past experience with the 
enforcement of judgments from international courts in Africa.
76
 
The provisions, which seek to adopt national rules for enforcing foreign judgments to 
enforce the judgments of community courts, provide a means of linking community and national 
legal systems. They aim at integrating community and national judicial structures, and offer an 
opportunity for co-operation and dialogue between them. This opportunity should be explored to 
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enhance integration in their respective sub-regions. For individuals, these provisions represent a 
positive change in the direction of international law. The post-adjudicative phase of litigation 
before international courts is often politicized. There is inherent in the traditional international law 
enforcement mechanisms elements of power relations that weigh heavily against individual 
judgment creditors. Although it has its own challenges, enforcement through national courts is 
rule-oriented, and can therefore be beneficial to individuals. 
The provisions which seek to use national courts to enforce community judgments are yet 
to be tested. However, there have been a few instances in which the community courts have made 
pecuniary awards in favour of individuals. For example, in Muleya v. Common Market for Eastern 
and Southern Africa (No. 3),
77
 the COMESA court awarded damages of $2000 against the 
respondent for publishing defamatory matter about the applicant. More recently, the ECOWAS 
court award damages of $100,000 in favour of an applicant, a journalist who was unlawfully 
detained by the Gambian government,
78
 and compensation of CFA Francs 100,000 in favour of an 
applicant who was adjudged to have been enslaved in Niger.
79
 These cases make an examination of 
the issue of using national courts to enforce community judgments more than one of theoretical 
importance. Can these individual judgment creditors use national courts within COMESA and 
ECOWAS to enforce the judgments as envisaged under the laws of both communities? It is 
suggested that, these individual judgment creditors are likely to face a number of challenges which, 
so far, have not been addressed in the literature on the community courts. 
8.2.3.3 Challenges of using National Courts 
There are a number of challenges in trying to use national courts to enforce community 
judgments. Among the challenges are the following. Firstly, can the existing national common law 
and statute law regimes for the enforcement of foreign judgments be suitably adapted for the 
purpose of enforcing community judgments?
80
 Secondly, if they can be suitably adapted, can 
national courts review community judgments? Thirdly, will the use of civil procedure rules, which 
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differ from country to country, afford equal or adequate protection to individual judgment 
creditors? If these challenges are not addressed, then they may deny individuals the benefits of the 
judgments, and could also undermine the relations between national and community courts. In 
general, I argue that, given the demands of economic integration, the extant national regimes for 
the enforcement of foreign state court judgments cannot, unthinkingly, be extended to community 
judgments.  
The effective enforcement of community judgments will demand review of national laws. 
For example, it is envisaged, under Rule 41(4) of the Rules of the Court of Justice of the Common 
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa [COMESA Court Rules]
81
, that penalties imposed on non-
attending witnesses will be enforced by national courts under the provision of article 40 of the 
COMESA Treaty. This may, however, not be possible in some COMESA countries. Under both 
the common law and statute law, the court will not enforce a judgment which is a penalty.
82
 Thus, 
the effective implementation of this Rule, which is essential for the administration of justice within 
the COMESA, will demand changes in the laws of some member states.  
The use of national courts to enforce community judgments also raises constitutional 
questions as to the relations between community and national courts: what limitations exist on the 
constitutionally-conferred jurisdictional powers of national courts when it comes to enforcing 
community judgments? Can national courts review those judgments, set them aside or modify 
them? So far, there appear to be no answers to these questions. National courts are slow to review 
foreign state judgments. However, the power to review remains, especially where there is 
allegation of fraud. If national courts review community judgments, it will undermine the 
administration of justice within the community, and render the community‘s legal system subject 
to the varying demands of member states‘ laws. I propose that, firstly, in the context of economic 
integration, national courts should not have the power to review or invalidate community 
judgments.
83
 Secondly, national courts should not have jurisdiction to decline to enforce 
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community judgments. This is especially so when the applicable law for such a decision will be 
national law.  
The former proposition finds support in international law. In the Chorzow Factory case,
84
 
the Permanent Court of International Justice held that a national court did not have the power to 
invalidate an international judgment. Both propositions are consistent with the view that the 
community legal system should not be subjected to national legal systems. Admittedly, both 
propositions offend the long-established discretion in national courts to enforce foreign judgments. 
They also challenge national constitutions which make the judiciary the ultimate source of judicial 
power. To grant community judgments this privileged status will require amendment of national 
laws. At the community level, the acceptance of these propositions demands greater responsibility 
from community courts to ensure the integrity of the processes that result in their judgments. This 
will make up for the proposed absence of discretion in national courts to decline to enforce them. 
Another drawback in using the existing national regimes to enforce community judgments 
is that some do not provide for the enforcement of non-monetary judgments. However, in the 
context of economic integration, non-monetary judgments are more likely to be a major component 
of community judgments.
85
 There is a movement in some countries towards enforcing foreign non-
monetary judgments.
86
 With the exception of South Africa, which is currently considering 




Most community judgments are likely to be against sovereign states. It is thus troubling 
that the treaties are silent on the issue of state immunity from enforcement actions at the national 
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level. States often enjoy exemption from execution against their assets in their own territory or 
elsewhere.
88
 Thus, national law on this issue will be highly relevant regarding enforcement actions 
brought by individual judgment creditors. A successful claim of immunity from execution will rob 
individuals of the benefits of a community judgment. Although there has been a perceptible trend 
towards restrictive state immunity, it still remains a formidable challenge.
89
 
The above has assumed that the provisions in the community treaties which seek to use 
national courts to enforce community judgments are binding on national courts. However, the 
absence of domestic legislation, especially in dualist countries, implementing the community 
treaties
90
 raises questions as to the binding effect of the provisions. A treaty is not effective within 
a state unless implemented by domestic legislation.
91
 Without domestic legislation, courts may be 
incompetent to give effect to the provisions and use them as the basis to enforce community 
judgments. From a comparative perspective, this problem appears to have been explicitly 
acknowledged by the drafters of article 26 of the Agreement establishing the Caribbean Court of 
Justice.
92
 Accordingly, they provided: ‗The Contracting Parties agree to take all the necessary 
steps, including the enactment of legislation to ensure that … any judgment, decree, order or 
sentence of the Court given in the exercise of its jurisdiction shall be enforced by all courts and 
authorities in any territory of the Contracting Parties as if it were a judgment, decree, order or 
sentence of a superior court of that Contracting Party‘. Reisman‘s Draft Protocol for the 
Enforcement of I.C.J. Judgments also suggested the need to enact ‗internal legislation‘. It is 
unfortunate that the community treaties do not recognize, or at least are silent, on the need for 
domestic legislation, especially on this issue. To my knowledge, no African country has as yet 
enacted legislation on the enforcement of community judgments. 
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Legislation is particularly important for a community judgment raises issues which are not 
present with a foreign state judgment for which the existing national regimes have been designed. 
For example, unlike a foreign state judgment, which has its sole source in a foreign state, a 
judgment from a community court may actually be a ‗review‘ of an earlier decision of a court of 
the country in which the enforcement is now sought. Ordinarily, this would be a conflicting 
judgment and, therefore, unenforceable.
93
 Let‘s assume, after exhausting local remedies, an 
individual proceeds to a community court.
94
 He obtains a judgment contrary to that of national 
courts that the individual had ‗exhausted‘. His attempt to enforce the community judgments may 
meet significant challenges. Firstly, a national court will be reluctant to enforce a judgment which 
contradicts its own judgment, and, even more so, if the first judgment was from a superior court in 
that country. It is worth pointing out that, at present, there are no constitutionally-mandated 
hierarchical relations between national and community courts. The community courts exist outside 
national judicial structures. Accordingly, without legislation, a national court is not bound by 
decisions of any community court no matter how exalted the community court is. 
Secondly, from the above illustration, the community judgment will, in principle, be a 
review of earlier decisions of national courts. In some countries, this will raise a constitutional 
question as to the locus of final judicial power.
95
 For example, under article 125(3) of the 
Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, the judicial power of Ghana shall be vested in the Judiciary 
and neither ‗the President nor Parliament nor any organ or agency of the President or Parliament 
shall have or be given final judicial power‘.96 Ordinarily, this is a classic separation of powers 
provision. However, when read in the context of international adjudication and its effect on states, 
it is debatable whether it would be constitutional to give the ECOWAS court final judicial power 
in Ghana, even if that power was restricted to defined matters. In the absence of a specific 
constitutional provision, which makes community law supreme over domestic law, transfers some 
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state powers to the community, or legislation to regulate enforcement in such cases, enforcing a 
community judgment could amount to an unconstitutional subjection of Ghana‘s legal systems to 
the community legal system.
97
 
The above exposition reveals that, as in the case of community arbitral awards, the 
proposed use of national courts to enforce community judgments is riddled with problems. So far, 
these problems have not been carefully thought through, let alone resolved. Member states of the 
communities should examine these problems and legislate to resolve them. There is the need for 
community input here to ensure that community judgments are not subjected to varying national 
laws, which might result in accordingly dissimilar effect to community judgments. For example, as 
regards pecuniary judgments, national law may vary on issues such as prescription, the currency in 
which the obligation may be discharged, and the mode of calculating interest on the judgment. 
Indeed, what is needed is detailed and well-considered community law setting out the legal 
framework for the enforcement of community judgments in member states. Simply providing that 
the execution of community judgments shall be governed by the rules of civil procedure in force in 
the member state in which enforcement is sought is not enough. Various reasons have been given 
for non-compliance with community judgments, including arguments about national sovereignty, 
absence of strong economic interdependence among African countries, and a preference for 
negotiation instead of adjudication.
98
 Whether the use of national courts to enforce community 
judgments will assist individuals overcome or bypass these argument remains to be seen. 
8.2.4 Conflict of Jurisdictions between Community Courts 
Recent decades have witnessed a proliferation of international and community courts. This 
has brought up the issue of conflict of jurisdictions and how it affects the effective administration 
of justice. Conflict of jurisdiction exists when the same issue between the same parties is pending 
before two or more courts.
99
 A feature of Africa‘s economic integration is the multiplicity of 
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communities and their respective courts with potentially overlapping jurisdictions.
100
 Overlapping 
jurisdictions result from the fact that states are often members of more than one community and the 
subject matter jurisdiction of community courts is primarily identical, namely, to interpret and 
apply the often similarly-worded treaties of the communities. States and individuals may have 
standing before multiple community courts on the same subject matter. This is especially so since 
it does not appear that the jurisdiction of the community courts is exclusive to the jurisdiction of 
other courts and, thus, parties may forum shop in a manner which is currently unregulated. This 
state of affairs may lead to conflict of jurisdictions and other related problems, such as parallel 
proceedings and conflicting judgments.
101
 
The issue of conflicting jurisdictions between international courts and how to approach or 
resolve them is not an ‗African problem‘.102 Nor will such conflicts be limited to inter-African 
community courts. They can take the form of a conflict between the jurisdiction of an African 
community court and another international court. For example, article 28(d) of the Statute on the 
African Court of Justice and Human Rights
103
 gives the African Court of Justice jurisdiction over 
‗any question of international law‘. This sets up a potential direct conflict with the jurisdiction of 
the ICJ,
104
 and the WTO dispute-settlement institutions. In principle, there is nothing which 
prevents two African states from submitting a trade dispute arising under a WTO agreement – 
which is ‗international law‘ – to the African Court of Justice. Similarly, conflict may exist between 
the jurisdiction of the community courts and that of the WTO dispute-settlement institutions on 
                                                          
 
100
 See Maurice Oduor, ―Resolving Trade Disputes in Africa: Choosing between Multilateralism and Regionalism: The 
Case of COMESA and the WTO‖ (2005) 13 Tulane J. Int‘l & Comp. L. 177; Joost Pauwelyn, ―Going Global, 
Community, or Both - Dispute Settlement in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and Overlaps 
with the WTO and Other Jurisdiction‖ (2004) 13 Minn. J. Global Trade 231; Kenneth P. Kiplagat, ―Jurisdictional 
Uncertainties and Integration Processes in Africa: The Need for Harmony‖ (1995-1996) 4 Tulane J. Int‘l & Comp. L. 
43. See generally Rafael Leal-Arcas, ―Choice of Jurisdiction in International Trade Disputes: Going Regional or 
Global?‖ (2007) 16 Minn. J. Int‘l L. 1. 
101
 This problem should be distinguished from issues of conflict of jurisdictions. Conflicting judgments deal with 
conflicts between the jurisprudence, both in terms of the principles developed and the remedies provided, by the 
relevant courts. However, the two problems are related. For example, inconsistent principles developed by community 
courts may encourage forum shopping and give rise to the prospect of conflict of jurisdictions. 
102
 Shany, supra note 2. 
103
 Supra note 15. 
104
 See Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, 1 U.N.T.S. XVI arts. 33 and 95; and Statute of the International 
Court of Justice, supra note 57 art. 36(2).  
262 
 
issues relating to international trade.
105
 Proceedings before the judicial institutions of the EC and 
NAFTA have been fertile sources of conflict with WTO dispute settlement proceedings.
106
 
Another source of conflict could be the African community courts. 
In contrast with developments elsewhere,
107
 there are, at present, no treaty provisions for 
resolving potential conflicts between the community courts, and between the community courts 
and other international courts.
108
 The Protocol on Relations between the African Union and the 
Regional Economic Communities [Protocol on Relations]
109
 is equally silent on this issue. The 
absence of conflict-of-jurisdictions-resolution provisions is troubling. In international law, 
jurisdictional co-ordination between international courts is largely not mandatory. It is often 
subject to the goodwill of individual judges.
110
 There is, therefore, no defined set of rules that 
African judges confronted with this problem can readily resort to. One would have expected that, 
with a view to ensuring jurisdictional harmony among the community courts, conflict-of-
jurisdictions-resolution provisions would have been included in the Protocol on Relations. Conflict 
of jurisdictions between community courts can undermine the effectiveness of the overarching 
AEC legal system. 
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Historically, the East African Community was attentive to the problem of conflict of 
jurisdictions. Article 41(1) of the Treaty for East African Co-operation
111
 provided that ‗the Partner 
States undertake not to submit a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this Treaty, 
so far as it relates to or affects the Common Market, to any method of settlement other than those 
provided for in this Treaty‘. It is quite intriguing that this provision is not in the present EAC 
Treaty. Indeed, given the proliferation of community and international courts, this is the time when 
such a provision would be very much needed. 
In the absence of conflict of jurisdiction-resolution provisions, community judges may have 
to resort to jurisdiction regulating norms that have been applied by national judges to address 
similar issues in the area of international litigation. In private international law, the common law 
doctrines of comity
112
 and forum non conveniens, and respect for party autonomy as regards choice 
of forum agreements serve as jurisdiction-regulating norms between national courts.
113
 They may 
provide a solution to the problem of conflicting jurisdictions between the community courts.
114
 
Indeed, the ECOWAS court has already invoked one of the doctrines. In Chukwudolue v. Republic 
of Senegal,
115
 it declared itself incompetent to hear the case on the grounds of a choice of forum 
clause in a document submitted by the plaintiff. The clause provided that claims were to be 
referred to ‗the World Court at the Hague or the International Court of Arbitration‘.  
Chukwudolue affirms the relevance of private international law doctrines in resolving 
conflicts of jurisdictions between community courts. However, it is suggested that in their 
application of private international law doctrines, community courts should prioritize the interests 
of the community. Given the nature and demands of economic integration, disputes affecting the 
interests of a community should be submitted exclusively to its community court or, at least, there 
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should be a presumption in favour of litigating such disputes before its community court.
116
 
Accordingly, community courts should be slow to decline jurisdiction or stay proceedings in 
favour of another court in such disputes. 
8.2.5 Judicial Co-operation between Community and National Courts 
The jurisprudence of African national courts reveals instances where they have grappled 
with judicial co-operation with foreign courts. In these instances, issues including the service of 
documents abroad and admissibility of foreign evidence were discussed.
117
 Indeed, international 
judicial co-operation is now indispensable for the effective administration of justice in cases 
involving a foreign element. Some African countries have responded to this by becoming parties to 
international treaties dealing with judicial co-operation. Four African countries – Egypt, Botswana, 
Malawi, and Seychelles – are parties to The Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial 
and Extra-Judicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters,
118
 and two – South Africa and 




Presently, no regional or continental convention on judicial co-operation exists in Africa. 
The legal framework for judicial co-operation with foreign courts in civil matters is regulated by 
national statutes.
120
 However, the same cannot be said of co-operation with international courts, 
especially when they are exercising ‗civil‘ jurisdiction. Admittedly, when most of these statutes 
were enacted, international courts were rare, especially in Africa. With the emergence of 
community courts, the importance of providing a legal framework to regulate judicial co-operation 
between community courts and national courts, and perhaps among community courts themselves, 
is evident. Can national courts help community courts to gather evidence from member states? Can 
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national courts help to serve documents on natural and legal persons within their jurisdiction? If 
they can, what will be the legal basis and procedure for such co-operation? Do the legal basis and 
procedure provide an adequate regime to ensure efficient administration of justice at the 
community level? Will a community court stay its proceedings if a similar issue is pending before 
a national court? Will procedures adopted by national courts in co-operating with community 
courts be conducive to the effectiveness of community law?  
These are important issues which have not been examined in the discourse on community 
courts in Africa. Apart from legislation in Zimbabwe, there does not appear to be any statute that 
explicitly envisages judicial co-operation with an international court. Zimbabwe‘s Civil Matters 
(Mutual Assistance) Act, 1995, allows the Minister of Justice to extend provisions of the Act to 
‗any international tribunal‘.121 To my knowledge, this is the first provision of its kind in the field of 
judicial co-operation in civil matters in Africa.
122
 With the proliferation of community courts in 
Africa, the importance of such co-operation for the effective administration of justice cannot be 
overemphasized.  
Unfortunately, treaties and laws on the community courts have not provided a clear legal 
framework for co-operation between them and national courts on issues such as taking evidence, 
summoning witnesses and serving documents.
123
 It appears that the only area where co-operation is 
explicitly anticipated, and a framework provided for, is that of enforcing community judgments. 
Surely, judicial co-operation goes beyond the enforcement of judgments. The need for co-
operation with national courts is important, especially as the community courts allow individuals to 
litigate directly before them and also have jurisdiction to arbitrate disputes between individuals.  
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266 
 
The lack of a legal framework on the issue of judicial co-operation between national and 
community courts is somewhat remedied by the rules of procedure of the community courts. Under 
Rule 74(1)(a) of the COMESA Court Rules,
124
 the court may, suo motu or on application, stay its 
proceedings where the court and a national court are seized of a case in which the same relief is 
sought, the same issue of interpretation is raised, or the validity of the same act is called into 
question. Such a stay of proceedings will be an act of deference by the community court to the 
national court. It is likely to improve relations between the two courts. From the perspective of 
national courts, the existence of lis pendens is a factor that weighs heavily in their decisions to stay 
proceedings, but they still retain the discretion not to do so under both common and statute law.
125
 
Under Rule 27 of the East African Court of Justice Rules of Procedure, 2008 [EAC Court 
Rules],
126
 a national court may be requested to serve notice on a person. A national court to which 
a request for service of notification is sent may, upon receipt, proceed as if the notification had 
been issued by it, and then return the notification to the EAC court together with the record, if any, 
of its proceedings regarding it. In other words, national courts have discretion to serve the 
notification. What happens when discretion is exercised against the service of a notification is left 
unanswered. Article 74(1) of the Rules of the Court of Justice of the Economic Community of 
West African States [ECOWAS Court Rules] seems not to envisage the need to use national courts 
for serving documents.
127
 It provides that where the rules require that a document be served on a 
person, the Chief Registrar of the court should ensure that service is effected at that person‘s 
address either by the dispatch of a copy of the document by registered post with a form for 
acknowledgement of receipt, or by personal delivery of the copy against a receipt. It is very likely 
that such a process of serving documents will be considered an infringement of the sovereignty of 
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 Also, without the use of national legal processes, it is unlikely any 
sanction can be imposed on an individual who does not acknowledge service from a community 
court. 
Under article 41(6)(7) of the COMESA Court Rules, the court may order that a witness or 
expert be heard by the judicial authority of his place of permanent residence. The order shall be 
sent for implementation to the competent judicial authority under conditions laid down in its rules 
of procedure.
129
 Under article 41(8), a member state shall treat any violation of an oath or 
affirmation by a witness or expert in the same manner as if the offence had been committed before 
one of its courts with jurisdiction in civil proceedings. At the instance of the court, the member 
state concerned shall prosecute the offender before its competent court. This provision is unlikely 
to sit well with constitutional provisions in member states which confer the discretion to prosecute 
criminal offences solely with the Attorney General.
130
 
The above suggests that the community courts acknowledge the limitations on their 
jurisdiction. They seek to overcome their limitation through co-operation with national courts. 
However, it does not appear that careful thought has been given to the issue of whether the existing 
national law are tailored to facilitate this co-operation. To ensure effective co-operation, it is 
important for member states to enact statutes regulating co-operation between community and 
national courts. A particular issue that demands attention should be whether national courts should 
still maintain the discretion they currently enjoy in deciding whether or not to meet the demands of 
a foreign court. Pending such legislation, it is suggested that national courts should treat the 
community courts as foreign courts for the purposes of their civil procedure rules. However, it 
must be admitted that, in their current form, the definition of a foreign court in national statutes 
often tends towards meaning a foreign state‘s courts.131 
                                                          
 
128
 It is envisaged under article 99(a) of the ECOWAS Court Rules that the court will adopt supplementary rules on 
letters rogatory. 
129
 COMESA Court Rules, supra note 80 Rule 41(7)(a). 
130
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This chapter has examined how inter-institutional relations can be enhanced using the rules 
of public and private international law. The chapter reveals that the effectiveness of community 
institutions, in this instance community courts, can be affected by how they relate to each other and 
also to national institutions. Using the relations between community and national courts, the 
chapter has argued that inattention to important public and private international law issues is likely 
to affect the effectiveness of community courts. In general, community laws in Africa 
acknowledge the role of national courts in enhancing the effective operations of community courts. 
However, community and national laws have been largely inattentive to whether the existing 
national laws provide an adequate legal framework for performing that role. National courts relate 
to each other using private international law principles. However, it is unlikely that these principles 
can be wholly adopted as the legal framework for the relations between community and national 
courts. They have to be complemented by specifically-tailored national and community laws. So 
far, it appears community and national laws have been drafted on the unwritten assumption that 
private international law principles provide an adequate legal framework for the relations between 
community and national courts. This chapter has exposed difficulties with this assumption. 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
 
similar definition. It remains an open question as to whether it can be argued that the COMESA and EAC courts, 
neither of which is geographically situated in either Kenya or Uganda, has authority in either country. The EAC Court 




9 CHAPTER NINE: INTERSTATE RELATIONS, ECONOMIC TRANSACTIONS AND 
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
Interstate relational issues are a key aspect of economic integration. Regional economic 
communities operate within the context of multiple state legal systems. The legal relations between 
the member states of a community are just as important for effective community development as 
community-state relations. Such relations directly impact on economic transactions within a 
community. A number of issues arise in this context. Are normative acts
132
 in one state recognized 
and/or enforced in other member states? Are there any constraints attached to the recognition 
and/or enforcement of foreign normative acts? Do member states share the same legal traditions – 
common law, civil law, Roman-Dutch law and so on – and how does that impact upon their 
relations with one another? What is the degree of harmonization of laws between the member 
states? Should harmonization of laws be pursued as part of the integration processes? In the 
absence of harmonization, are there any approaches or techniques that could be adopted? To what 
extent do judges take account of each other‘s jurisprudence? These are weighty issues which 
communities are likely to face, especially as they progress through the stages of economic 
integration.  
This chapter has two principal aims. Firstly, it investigates the extent to which African 
states relate with each other using private international law as the barometer. Economic integration 
fosters interaction among states. These interactions provide evidence of the strength of the 
integration process. The deeper the level of integration, the stronger one would expect the level of 
interaction to be. Put differently, there should be a positive correlation between the intensity of 
interstate legal relations and the strength of an economic integration process. The choice of private 
international law as the barometer is appropriate. Apart from public international law and, to a 
lesser extent, comparative law, no other law subject deals with interstate legal relations more than 
private international law. Secondly, the chapter assesses how private international law can affect 
economic transactions generated by strengthened economic integration in Africa. It makes 
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court judgments, arbitration awards, and administrative acts such as the registration of companies. 
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proposals for reforming private international law in Africa to serve better the needs of cross-border 
economic transactions. 
9.2 PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION – GENERAL 
AND COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW 
In settings which foster intense economic relationships, private international law has been 
used to address some interstate relational issues necessary for these relationships to thrive.
133
 
Private international law is concerned with claims or matters within a state that involves a foreign 
element. In addition to its principal function of ensuring justice for individuals whose relations 
touch more than one state
134
, private international law performs a regulatory function between 
states. It can be used to regulate the conduct of persons who transact across states with a view to 
achieving the objectives of an economic community.
135
 For example, choice of law rules could be 
used to ensure adherence to standards set by a community, and protect community interests by 
preventing any resort to laws that may defeat community goals.
136
 The rules on the enforcement of 
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foreign judgments can be used to ensure greater effectiveness of judgments and, thus, aid cross-
border settlement of disputes within a community.
137
 
Indeed, without an effective private international law regime, important community goals 
might not be achieved. There can be no meaningful implementation of factor mobility, which is the 
free movement of persons, goods, capital and services, without attention to the facilitative role of 
private international law. Factor mobility is envisioned by Africa‘s economic communities.138 
Private international law affects the functioning of any economic community that promotes factor 
mobility. Indeed, it was social and commercial relations between individuals of independent 




In economic communities and the world at large, private international law can be a tool for 
multi-level governance. By co-operating with other national courts, a state can maintain adherence 
to its norms even though litigation is pursued outside its borders. Indeed, private international law 
is a force for ensuring order and stability in legal relationships that transcend national legal 
systems.
140
 This role is most visible in federal states – a more advanced form of economic 
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of each legislating State was entirely isolated, so that the individuals composing it were cut off from intercourse with 
all but their fellow subjects, the law of each State would have full operation within its own domain, and could claim to 
extend itself no further‘. 
140
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In economic communities, private international law provides an avenue for harmony in 
decision-making in the face of legal pluralism. In other words, regardless of the multiplicity and 
diversity of legal traditions, the application of private international law rules can provide some 
comfort for individuals transacting across states. Indeed, this is the very essence of the role of 
private international law in economic integration. Economic integration assumes and fosters the 
dismantling of state boundaries, private international law is founded on the existence of 
boundaries, but it provides principles for managing cross-border co-existence.  
Politically, private international law‘s approach to managing the co-existence of states is 
suitable for states which may want to maintain their distinct legal traditions and laws while 
integrating.
142
 Private international law maintains the integrity of the national legal systems; it 
defines the applicable law for the resolution of a particular problem, but leaves the content of that 
applicable law untouched. This characteristic can be useful in the harmonization of laws since it 
reassures executives and legislatures of their control over their substantive laws. African states are 
in the early stages of economic integration. They have concerns about sovereignty and some might 
equally be concerned about the erosion of the ideals of their legal traditions. In such a setting, a 
developed private international law regime can provide legal certainty for cross-border 
transactions, and, at the same time, ensure that substantive national laws are not fundamentally 
changed. But the virtues of private international law as a tool for addressing interstate relational 
issues and promoting economic transactions should not blind us from its limitations. The need to 
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ascertain foreign law and the possibility that courts may be pro lex fori
143
 can be costly for 
businesses. The guarantees private international law offers for maintaining the integrity of the 
substantive laws of national legal systems may also be thwarted by other community laws which 
may displace national laws.
144
 
Given the importance of private international law in economic integration, it comes as no 
surprise that it is an essential component of economic integration in parts of the world.
145
 For 
example, considerable institutional and academic attention is given to it within the European 
Community (EC).
146
 The Organization of American States (OAS) is another organization with 
economic integration among its objectives.
147
 Through its Inter-American Conference on Private 
International Law, the OAS has supervised the negotiation and adoption of over twenty 
conventions by its members.
148
 These conventions cover various issues including the recognition 
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and enforcement of judgments and choice of law in contracts.
149
 The topics for recent Conferences 
have focused on the free trade agenda of the region.
150
 The Common Market of the Southern Cone 
(MERCOSUR) sees the ‗harmonization of legislation in relevant areas‘ as a key to strengthening 
its integration process.
151
 Private international law has attracted MERCOSUR‘s attention, and 
progress there has been described as ‗impressive‘.152 Indeed, the history of co-operation on private 
international law issues in the Americas dates back to the nineteenth century. As early as 1928, the 




Against this background, it is baffling that, despite decades of economic integration in 
Africa, none of the communities has or has had private international law on its agenda. This is so 
despite the fact that the treaties contain provisions that may be interpreted as enjoining the 
communities to adopt private international law initiatives. For example, article 57(1) of the 
Revised Treaty establishing the Economic Community of West African States [ECOWAS 
Treaty],
154
 member states undertook ‗to co-operate in judicial and legal matters with a view to 
harmonizing their judicial and legal systems‘. The modalities for the implementation of this article 
were to be the subject matter of a protocol. So far, none has been concluded. Article 126 of the 
Treaty establishing the East African Community [EAC Treaty]
155
 also obliges member states to 
‗encourage the standardization of judgments of courts within the community‘, and ‗harmonize all 
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their national laws appertaining to the community‘. I am, however, unaware of any initiative on 
private international law of significance undertaken under it. 
9.3 INTERSTATE RELATIONS IN AFRICA’S ECONOMIC COMMUNITIES 
9.3.1 Through a Private International Law Lens 
9.3.1.1 Introduction 
As noted above, private international law provides a barometer for measuring the extent to 
which states interact with other, especially through the medium of litigation. It creates linkages 
between legal systems without unifying them. As states become more interconnected – a 
concomitant of economic integration – and their residents interact, the number of private 
international law issues should, in theory, increase and the need to address those issues should 
become more immediate. In other words, the theory is that strong economic integration enhances 
cross-border activities resulting in disputes whose resolution will engage private international law 
principles. Admittedly, private international law is only one of the means through which legal 
systems interact. And, even if it was the only means, it is unlikely to give a wholly accurate 
picture. Many cross-border economic disputes do not make it to the courts, and where they do, the 
court may miss the private international law issue at stake.  
The extent to which African states are interacting with one another on private international 
law issues provides an insight into how they are related and the strength of the economic 
integration process. It can be argued that an appreciable volume of inter-African private 
international law cases
156
 is evidence of interactions between African countries. These interactions 
could be the result of cross-border trade, or investment and movement of people, all of which are 
being promoted by the various communities. Evidence of interaction could be located in the extent 
to which African courts assume jurisdiction over persons domiciled or resident in each other‘s 
states, apply each other‘s laws, assist in judicial proceedings in each other‘s countries, and enforce 
each other‘s judgments. The findings on these points can inform us on the state of the strength of 
economic integration in Africa. 
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Africans have been promoting African unity for over forty years.
157
 Indeed, African 
economic integration initiatives date back to 1910.
158
 So what does the level of inter-African 
private international law problems teach us about the interconnected African legal systems? To 
answer to this question, I studied over three hundred and fifty private international law judgments 
given by courts at all levels in thirteen Commonwealth African countries over a decade, 1997-2007 
[case study].
159
 The decade coincides with the emergence of the communities examined in this 
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was mitigated by reliance on various websites hosting both reported and unreported judgments. I also relied on the 
index to the law reports in making the selection of cases. Thus, where the editors of the reports missed the private 
international law point in a judgment, such cases will not have come to my attention. See Richard Frimpong Oppong, 
―A Decade of Private International Law in African Court Part I‖ (2007) 9 Yearbk Priv. Int‘l L. 223; Richard Frimpong 
Oppong, ―A Decade of Private International Law in African Court Part II‖ (2008) 10 Yearbk. Priv. Int‘l L. 367. 
160
 See e.g. Ssebaggala & Sons Electric Centre Ltd. v. Kenya National Shipping Line Ltd. [2000] LawAfrica L.R. 931 
(enforcement of judgment from Uganda); Willow Investment v. Mbomba Ntumba [1997] T.L.R. 47 (enforcement of 
judgment from Zaire); Mtui v. Mtui 2000 (1) B.L.R. 406 (recognition of divorce decree from Tanzania); Molly 
Kiwanuka v. Samuel Muwanga [1999] Swaziland High Court 13 (maintenance of a child in Uganda); Sello v. Sello 
(No. 2) 1999 (2) B.L.R. 104 (order to return child in Lesotho to Botswana). 
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9.3.1.2 Enforcing African States’ Judgments 
Enforcing foreign judgments is, perhaps, the best evidence of interstate relations from the 
perspective of private international law. An effective foreign judgment enforcement regime is a 
key component of any integration initiative likely to achieve significant success. Indeed, in federal 
states, it is often given constitutional foundation.
161
 So far, it appears careful thought has not been 
given to this issue in Africa. From the case study, there were cases in which judgments from other 
African countries were denied recognition or enforcement. This was due to the fact that the foreign 
judgment emanated from a country which had not been designated as a beneficiary under the 
statutory regime for registration of foreign judgments.
162
 In Heyns v. Demetriou,
163
 it was held that 
a South African judgment could not be registered under Malawi‘s British and Commonwealth 
Judgments Act, 1922 and the Judgment Extension Act 1922.
164
 In Barclays Bank of Swaziland v. 
Koch,
165
 it was held that a Swaziland judgment could not registered under Botswana‘s Judgments 
(International Enforcement) Act (Cap 11: 04).
166
 It is worth remembering that Botswana, Malawi, 
South Africa and Swaziland are all members of the Southern African Development Community.  
The cases in which African judgments were denied registration reflect a wider problem. It 
is that, under the statutes on the registration of foreign judgments, not many African countries have 
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 See e.g. Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia, art. 118. It provides that: ‗Full faith and credit shall be 
given, throughout the Commonwealth to the laws, the public Acts and records, and the judicial proceedings of every 
State‘. Constitution of the United States of America, art. 4(1). 
162
 The statutory regime for the registration of foreign judgments co-exists with a common law regime. A judgment 
which is not eligible for registration under statute may be enforced at common law. 
163
 [2001] Malawi High Court 52. See also Willow Investment, supra note 29 (the Tanzanian court refused to enforce a 
judgment from Zaire); SDV Transmi (Tanzania) Limited v. MS STE Datco, Civil Application No. 97 of 2004 (Court of 
Appeal, Tanzania, 2004) in which the absence of a regime for the reciprocal enforcement of judgments between 
Tanzania and Democratic Republic of Congo was the determinative consideration that made the court grant a stay of 
execution in favour of the applicant against the Democratic Republic of Congo resident respondent judgment creditor 
who had no assets in Tanzania.  
164
 The court was, however, prepared to consider the possibility of enforcing the judgment under the common law rules 
and allowed the applicant to proceed by writ for that purpose. 
165
 1997 B.L.R. 1294. 
166
 The court held that it could have been enforced at common law, but in this instance the plaintiff failed to meet some 
procedural requirements. For some cases outside the scope of the case study see e.g. Italframe Ltd.v. Mediterranean 
Shipping Co. [1986] K.L.R. 54 (judgment from Tanganyika (now Tanzania) denied registration in Kenya); Re 
Lowenthal and Air France 1966(2) A.L.R. Comm. 301 (judgment from Zambia denied registration in Kenya). 
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been designated as beneficiaries.
167
 Even for the designated countries, only judgments from 
specified courts, usually the designated state‘s superior courts, can be registered. This state of 
affairs evinces inattention to a pertinent relational issue in economic integration. It can undermine 
economic transactions in the communities as they progress. Perhaps, the paucity of inter-African 
judgment enforcement cases has made this less than an immediate issue. But it is a damning 
indictment on Africa‘s economic integration that a judgment from the United Kingdom – a former 
colonial power – is more likely to be registered in member states of the various communities than 
judgments from their respective member states. 
After years of promoting economic integration, this is a troubling. National statutes deny 
judgments from other African countries the expedited and simplified procedure for enforcing 
foreign judgments through registration. Registration is a simplified and expedited procedure for 
enforcing foreign judgments. One would have expected that African governments,
168
 in their 
‗determination to promote unity, solidarity, cohesion and cooperation among the peoples of Africa 
and African States‘,169 would make the procedure available to African judgments. Of all the 
communities, it is only between the founding members of the East African Community (EAC)
170
 – 
Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda – that judgments can be registered in each other‘s countries.171 To be 
certain, I am not arguing that a judgment from an African country should be automatically 
enforced in another African country. Indeed, there are factors that can justify the non-registration 
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 For example, South Africa‘s regime designates only Namibia. Namibia‘s regime designates only South Africa. 
Swaziland‘s regime has been extended to Lesotho, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Zanzibar, Malawi, Kenya, and 
Tanzania. Ghana‘s designates only Senegal (see First Schedule of Foreign Judgments and Maintenance Orders 
(Reciprocal Enforcement) Instrument, 1993, L.I. 1575). Tanzania‘s regime designates Lesotho, Botswana, Mauritius, 
Zambia, Seychelles, Somalia, Zimbabwe, and the Kingdom of Swaziland (see Reciprocal Enforcement of Foreign 
Judgments Order, GN Nos. 8 & 9 of 1936); Kenya‘s regime designates Malawi, Seychelles, Tanzania, Uganda, 
Zambia and Rwanda ( Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) (Extension of Act) Order, sec. 2).  
168
 Under the statute for the registration of foreign judgments, it is the executive that designates countries whose 
judgments may benefit from that regime.  
169
 Constitutive Act of the African Union, 11 July 2000, (2005) 13 Afr. J. Int‘l & Comp. L. 25, preamble.  
170
 Burundi and Rwanda recently became members of the EAC. Under Kenya‘s Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal 
Enforcement) (Extension of Act) Order, judgments from Rwanda can be registered. See generally S. Thanawalla, 
―Foreign Inter Partes Judgments: Their Recognition and Enforcement in the Private International Law of East Africa‖ 
(1970) 19 Int‘l & Comp. L. Q. 430. 
171
 See e.g. Ssebaggala, supra note 29; Pioneer General Assurance Society Limited v. Zulfikarali Nimji Javer [2006] 
eK.L.R. (Kenyan court registered judgments from Uganda); Société de Transports International Rwanda v. H. Abdi, 
Civil Application No. NAI 298 of 1997 (Court of Appeal, Kenya, 1997) (appeal against a decision setting aside the 
registration in Kenya of a Rwanda judgment); Pioneer General Assurance Society Limited v. Zulfikarali Nimji Javer 
[2006] eK.L.R. (payment of interest on a Ugandan judgment registered in Kenya). 
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of an African judgment.
172
 What I am arguing is that an effective economic community should 
have judgments easily enforceable among member states. Currently, in Africa, as far as 
enforcement through registration is concerned, this is not the case. 
It is recommended that, to remedy this problem, each African state should designate many 
more African states as beneficiaries of its statutory regime for the registration of foreign 
judgments. A more ambitious and long-term project would be to conclude an African foreign 
judgment enforcement convention.
173
 But, given the paucity of inter-African judgment 
enforcement cases, the similarities in the provisions of existing national statutes on foreign 
judgment enforcement, the challenges of negotiating an international convention
174
 and the general 
ambivalence towards private international law issues, the statutory designation of more African 
states may be the only feasible option, at least for the immediate future. Indeed, statutory 
designation is an easier course to take and can be done immediately. Negotiating an African 
convention could take years. However, with the benefit of the experiences of others such as the EC 
and OAS, this need not be the case. 
9.3.1.3 Applying African States’ Laws 
The application of each other‘s laws is also another manifestation of relations between 
states. Comity sometimes demands that individuals are not allowed to evade foreign state laws 
merely by litigating in another state or choosing a different applicable law. Thus, in Herbst v. 
Surti,
175
 the Zimbabwean court refused to enforce a contract which was illegal under the proper 
law of the contract, in this instance South African law. From the case study, choice of forum 
agreements which designate an African state, and choice of law agreements which adopt an 
African state‘s law were at issue in some cases.176 Courts have been prepared to uphold these 
                                                          
 
172
 See e.g. Cairo Bank v. Mohamed Ali Bahaydar 1966 (1) A.L.R.Comm. 33 (Sudanese court refused to enforce an 
Egyptian judgment on the ground that the judgment debtor had not been served with notice of the Egyptian 
proceedings nor appeared before the Egyptian court). 
173
 Richard Frimpong Oppong, ―Private International Law in Africa: The Past Present and Future‖ (2007) 55 Am. J. 
Comp. L. 677 at 704. 
174
 The collapse of the attempt by The Hague Conference on Private International Law to negotiate one such 
convention illustrates this challenge. 
175
 1990 (2) Z.L.R. 269. 
176
 In the absence of such agreements, the courts applied various tests including the place of performance and the real 
and substantial connection test. See e.g. Georgina Ngina v. Inter Freight East Africa Ltd. [2006] eK.L.R. (a contract 
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agreements. In Friendship Container Manufacturing Ltd. v. Mitchell Cotts Ltd.,
177
 the Kenyan 
court upheld an exclusive choice of forum agreement contained in a bill of lading which vested 
jurisdiction in South African courts. In Barlows Central Finance Corporation Ltd. v. Joncon 
Limited,
178
 a sales agreement contained a South African choice of law and forum clause. The 
Swaziland court upheld the choice of law clause, but declined to enforce the choice of forum 
agreement. One factor that influenced the court‘s latter determination was that Swaziland and 
South African law were similar in many respects. As economic integration in Africa strengthens 
and spurs on cross-border transactions, issues of applying other African countries‘ laws are likely 
to increase. In this regard, the present judicial attitude of generally upholding party autonomy, 
which sometimes translates into an application of foreign law, is important. 
Admittedly, neither Friendship Container Manufacturing nor Barlows Central Finance 
Corporation involved the direct application of the law of another African country. But, the fact 
that courts uphold parties‘ choice of law or forum will ultimately prove important for economic 
transactions within the communities. As discussed in Chapter Four, apart from the initiative of the 
Organization for the Harmonization of Business Laws in Africa, there appears to be no present or 
immediate future initiative on the agenda of the communities to harmonize member states‘ laws. In 
the absence of such harmonization, judicial enforcement of parties‘ choice of law and forum 
agreements is an alternative which individuals may use to regulate the law which governs their 
transactions. There are definitely limitations on this alternative. The courts may not give effect to a 
choice of law agreement which violates mandatory rules of the forum.
179
A badly-drafted choice of 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
 
was entered into in Kigali (Rwanda). The place of performance was in Kenya. It was held that the Kenya courts had 
jurisdiction). Roger Parry v. Astral Operations Ltd., Case No. C 190/2004 (Labour Court, South Africa, 2005) a 
central issue in the case was the applicable law for a contract of employment which was performed in Malawi. The 
South African court rejected the respondent‘s argument that the contract was governed by Malawi law as that was the 
place of performance. The court found there were strong enough factors connecting the contract with South Africa to 
make its law the applicable law. 
177
 [2001] East Afr. L.R. 338.  
178
 Case No. 2491/99 (High Court, Swaziland, 1999). See also Afinta Financial Services (Pty) Limited v. Luke Malinga 
T/A Long Distance Transport, Civ. Case No. 123/2001 (High Court, Swaziland, 2001) A lease agreement provided 
that it ‗shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the Republic of South Africa and the 
Kingdom of Swaziland‘. The Swaziland court applied Swaziland law. It held that the agreement was entered into in 
Swaziland by parties domiciled, resident and carrying on business in Swaziland and the agreement was to be 
performed wholly in Swaziland. 
179
 See e.g. Roger Parry, supra note 45. (The employment contract at issue did not contain a choice of law clause but, 
even if it did, the court was willing to uphold that choice only if it did not deprive the employee of the protections 
afforded by the mandatory rules of South African law). 
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law clause may place the courts in a difficult position regarding the parties‘ intentions.180 
Notwithstanding these limitations, this alternative is one which individuals may have to be content 
with for some time. 
While courts are prepared to uphold African choice of law and choice of forum agreements, 
few such choices are made compared with agreements which choose non-African states and 
laws.
181
 The minimal use of African state choice of law and forum agreements tells us a lot about 
individuals‘ perceptions of the adequacy of courts and laws in Africa to deal with the complex 
issues involved in cross-border transactions. 
9.3.2 Through a Comparative Law Lens 
9.3.2.1 Introduction 
To the extent that it deals with an analysis of the operation of rules in multiple legal 
systems, comparative law bears some affinity with private international law.
182
 Both subjects deal 
with foreign legal systems, albeit from different perspectives.
183
 The importance of comparative 
law as a means for creating and strengthening relations between states, however, goes beyond its 
affinity with private international law; to Tunc, comparative law could be a source of peace among 
nations.
184
 In Chapter Two, it was argued that inter-system jurisprudential communication, which 
often takes the form of a comparative law exercise, is useful in all branches of law. It can be used 
to strengthen relations between member states within a community and aid the harmonization of 
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 See e.g. Afinta Financial Services, supra note 47. (‗This agreement shall be governed by and construed in 
accordance with the laws of the Republic of South Africa and the Kingdom of Swaziland‘.); Ekkehard Creutzburg v. 
Commercial Bank of Namibia [2006] All S.A. 327. (‗This suretyship shall in all respects be governed by and construed 
in accordance with the law of the Republic of South Africa and/or the Republic of Namibia, and all disputes, actions 
and other matters in connection therewith shall be determined in accordance with such law‘.). 
181
 See e.g. Raytheon Aircraft Credit Corporation v. Air Al-Faraj Ltd. [2005] 2 K.L.R 47 (Kansas state, USA choice of 
law and forum agreement); Fonville v. Kelly III [2002] 1 East Afr. L.R. 71 (Florida state, USA, choice of law and 
forum agreement); Valentine Investment Company Ltd. v. Federal Republic of Germany [2006] eK.L.R. (Bonn, 
Germany, choice of law and forum agreement); Nika Fishing Co Ltd.v. Lavinia Corporation [2001] 16 N.W.L.R. 556 
(Argentina choice of law and forum agreement). 
182
 Peter de Cruz, Comparative Law in a Changing World, 3rd ed. (London: Routledge Cavendish, 2007) at 9. 
183
 Professor Reimann has described the relationship between the two disciplines as ‗intimate‘. See Mathias Reimann, 
―Comparative Law and Private International Law‖ in Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., Oxford 
Handbook of Comparative Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) at 1364. 
184
 See André Tunc, ―Comparative Law, Peace and Justice‖ in Kurt H. Nadelmann et al. eds. XXth Century 
Comparative and Conflicts Law: Legal Essays in Honor of Hessel E. Yntema (Leyden: A.W. Sythoff, 1961) at 80. 
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law. This section looks at the state of jurisprudential communication among African states using 
private international law. However, the discussion here may equally apply to other branches of law 
relevant to strengthening economic integration in Africa such as contract, investment and labour 
laws.  
9.3.2.2 Looking to African Cases 
Comparative law and the use of comparative foreign materials enrich judicial decisions. 
For private international lawyers, this has been argued as a path to harmonization in the absence of 
international conventions.
185
 Southern Africa provides a good example of how comparative law 
aids international (in this case regional) harmonization of law.
186
 Judgments of southern African 
courts, but mainly those of South Africa,
187
 have been relied on frequently in other southern 
African countries. In part, this may be attributed to the fact that they all share the same legal 
tradition – the Roman-Dutch law. Also, law reporting (and access to legal materials) is fairly up to 
date in the major states of the region namely, South Africa, Namibia, Botswana and Zimbabwe.  
As noted above, there has been no systematic examination of the significance of private 
international law in Africa‘s economic integration. Nor has there been any attempt to harmonize 
private international law in the communities. Given this state of affairs, jurisprudential 
communication can be used to achieve a degree of harmonization in laws across the communities. 
Indeed, it is refreshing to notice that there is a high level of harmony between the jurisprudence of 
the various Roman-Dutch law countries that are members of the Southern African Customs Union, 
the Southern African Development Community and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
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 Christopher F. Forsyth, ―The Eclipse of Private International Law Principle? The Judicial Process, Interpretation 
and the Dominance of Legislation in the Modern Era‖ (2005) 1 J. Priv. Int‘l L. 93. 
186
 See e.g. American Flag plc v. Great African T-shirt Corporation 2000 (1) S.A. 356 in which it was held that where 
a foreign defendant had submitted to the jurisdiction of the court, attachment was neither necessary nor permissible. 
This decision was followed in Botswana. See Bizy Holdings Ltd. v. Eso Management Ltd. 2002 (2) B.L.R. 125. 
187
 In Silverston Ltd. v. Lobatse Clay Works 1996 B.L.R. 190, Justice Tebbutt held that ‗…the common law of 
Botswana is the Roman-Dutch law … The courts of Botswana have never been reluctant, in their own adaptation of 
the common law to the requirements of modern times, to have regard to the approach of the South African courts and 
to the writings of authoritative South African academics‘. 
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Africa. Through judicial decisions
188
 and recent proposed legislative reforms,
189
 the Roman-Dutch 
law jurisprudence is also converging with the common law.  
The jurisprudence of the common law countries within the EAC and ECOWAS is also 
largely similar.
190
 But, unlike the Roman-Dutch law countries, there is infrequent jurisprudential 
communication between them. In other words, the common law countries, especially those in West 
Africa, do not demonstrate an appreciable level of reliance on each other‘s case law.191 Rather, the 
source of the harmony in their jurisprudence is England from where they borrow principles of law. 
From the perspective of economic integration and with a view to strengthening interstate relations, 
this state of affairs among the common law countries is problematic. With the increasing 
Europeanization of English private international law, a development currently reflected in the 
minimal amount of textbook space devoted to ‗the traditional rules‘, there is a need for the 
common law African countries to diversify their sources of law. Southern Africa may be a good 
place to look at. As noted earlier, there are a number of issues on which the common law 
converges with Roman-Dutch law.
192
 Indeed, two recent judgments from the South African 
Supreme Court of Appeal have brightened up the prospect of closer convergence.
193
 
Communication between judges of the common law and Roman-Dutch law traditions can be an 
important step in creating a judicially-engineered harmonized private international law regime in 
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 See Richard Frimpong Oppong, ―Roman-Dutch Law meets the Common Law on Jurisdiction in International 
Matters‖ (2008) 4 J. Priv. Int‘l L. 311. 
189
 See South African Law Reform Commission (SALRC), Report on Consolidated Legislation Pertaining to 
International Judicial Co-operation, Project 121, 2006.  
190
 Ghana, Gambia, Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania, Sierra Leone, Uganda. 
191
 But see Eastern and Southern African Trade v. Hassan Basajjabalaba [2007] Uganda Commercial Court 30. The 
Ugandan court referred to two decisions on the effect of choice of law agreements on the court‘s jurisdiction. They 
were Fonville v. Kelly [2002] 1 East Afr. L.R. 71 and Tononoka Steels Ltd. v. East & Southern African Trade & 
Development Bank [2002] 2 East Afr. L.R. 536. It noted in respect of one of the cases, ‗it is a case from a Sister 
Republic, with comparable jurisprudence. The decision, though not binding upon the High Court of Uganda, is 
pleasantly persuasive‘. The court followed that decision. The demise of the West African Court of Appeal Reports and 
the East African Law Reports (recently revived) which reported cases from the common law countries of West and 
East Africa respectively, account in part for the infrequent jurisprudential communication between the courts in these 
regions. 
192
 See generally Peter B. Kutner, Common Law in Southern Africa: Conflict of Laws and Torts Precedent (New York: 
Greenwood Press, 1990). 
193
 See Richman v. Ben-Tovim 2007 (2) S.A. 283 which accepted mere presence as a basis of international competence, 
a position well entrenched, albeit highly criticised, at common law; Bid Industrial Holding v. Strang 2008 (3) S.A. 355 
which abolished arrest of foreign defendants as a basis of jurisdiction and accepted mere presence as a basis of 
jurisdiction and the prospect of applying the principles of forum non conveniens in such cases. 
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Africa. A study that distils the common core of principles between both legal traditions will be an 
important aid to this pursuit.  
In general, there is need to enhance jurisprudential communication within the communities 
by making jurisprudence – case law, statute and academic commentary – more accessible. My case 
study revealed that occasionally courts in two neighbouring states faced a similar issue, and yet 
came to different conclusions, often in ignorance of an earlier decision on the same point in the 
other country.
194
 I illustrate this with two pairs of cases addressing two different issues. The first 
related to whether or not a plaintiff, who was resident in an EAC country, should be ordered to pay 
security for costs when litigating in another. In the Kenyan case of Healthwise Pharmaceuticals 
Ltd. v. Smithkline Beecham Consumer Healthcare Ltd.,
195
 the court rejected the applicant‘s 
argument that it was a resident of the EAC and therefore the defendant would have no difficulties 
in recovering any costs that may be awarded. However, in the Ugandan case of Shah v. Manurama 
Ltd.,
196
 the court held that given the establishment of the EAC there could no longer be an 
automatic and inflexible presumption for the courts to order security for costs with regard to 
plaintiffs who are resident in the EAC.  
The second issue related to whether a court might assume jurisdiction to grant an in 
personam interdict against an incola in respect of conduct in another country. In Bozimo Trade and 
Development Ltd. v. First Merchant Bank of Zimbabwe Ltd,
197
 the Zimbabwean court drew a 
distinction between mandatory and prohibitory interdicts. It held that it had no jurisdiction to grant 
a mandatory injunction for acts committed abroad as that would infringe the sovereignty of the 
foreign country. A different conclusion was reached in the South African case of Metlika Trading 
Ltd. v. Commissioner, South African Revenue Service,
198
 the court held that it had jurisdiction to 
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 But see Coutts v. Ford 1997 (1) Z.L.R. 440 and Society of Lloyd’s v. Price 2006 (5) S.A. 393 where both the 
Zimbabwean and South African courts adopted the via media approach to solving the problem of gap in 
characterization as to substance and procedure. Detmold v. Minister of Health and Social Services 2004 N.R. 175 and 
Minister for Welfare and Population Development v. Fitzpatrick 2000 (3) S.A. 422 where both the Namibian and 
South African courts sanctioned inter-country adoption of children by foreign nationals, and held their respective 
national legislation prohibiting such adoptions unconstitutional. 
195
 [2001] LawAfrica L.R. 1279. 
196
 [2003] East Afr. L.R. 294. 
197
 2000 (1) Z.L.R. 1. 
198
 2005 (3) S.A. 1. 
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issue such an interdict and it did not matter that is was mandatory or prohibitory. Fortunately, in 
both examples, the later decision (given without reference to the earlier case) was, in my opinion, 
better than the earlier one. 
9.3.2.3 Looking Beyond Africa 
It is important that jurisprudential communication should not be limited to that between 
African states. National legal systems and, indeed, community legal systems should communicate 
with the international legal system too. They must demonstrate awareness of and partake in 
relevant developments on the international plane. Judges and lawyers must show awareness of the 
growing volume of private international law jurisprudence by international and regional 
institutions. This is especially so if the private international law regimes in the communities are not 
to be isolationist. Indeed, it is reassuring that in a number of recent cases, judges and counsel 
showed an awareness of relevant international conventions.
199
  
9.4 PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ECONOMIC TRANSACTIONS 
9.4.1 General Overview 
Private international law, like any domestic private law regime, can in effect be a non-tariff 
barrier to international trade and a disincentive to economic transactions.
200
 Unbridled application 
of the lex fori, disrespect for choice of law and forum agreements, and the non-recognition or 
enforcement of foreign judgments by states may all evince protectionism. These can act as a clog 
on the free flow of ‗wealth, skills and people‘ across national boundaries.201 Diversity in private 
international rules can impose undue transaction costs on businesspeople and encourage forum 
shopping and other strategic behaviour inimical to international trade. Rules that clearly allocate 
international jurisdiction, respect parties‘ choice of law and forum agreements, and provide certain 
and expedited means of enforcing foreign judgments are an essential part of a private international 
law regime meant to facilitate economic transactions. 
                                                          
 
199
 See e.g. Sello v. Sello (No. 2) 1999 (2) B.L.R. 104 at 109; De Gree v. Webb 2007 (5) S.A 184 at [11], [17], [47]-
[55], [85]-[94]; Roger Parry v. Astral Operations Ltd. 2005 (10) Butterworths Labour L.R. 989; Kisko Products Ltd. v. 
Delmas America Africa Line Inc., Civil Appeal No. J4/28/2005 (Supreme Court, Ghana, 2004). 
200
 See generally Paolo Mengozzi, ―Private International Law and the WTO Law‖ (2001) 292 Recueil des Cours 249. 
201
 Morguard, supra note 10 at 1096.  
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The need to make private international law responsive to the needs of international 
economic transactions has been recognized in academic writing and judicial decisions.
202
 African 
courts have also recognized this need. For example, South African courts have emphasized the 
need for the country‘s trade and commercial relations to be an important consideration in applying 
its laws on jurisdiction.
203
 Namibia‘s High Court has held that commercial considerations 
influence parties in agreeing to choice of law and forum clauses, and that this should be considered 




Indeed, historically, the first major private international law legislation in common law 
Africa was aimed at facilitating commerce in the colonies. It was legislation for the enforcement of 
foreign judgments. Patchett
205
 traces the genesis of the first Gold Coast (now Ghana) legislation in 
this area, the Foreign Judgment Extension Ordinance, 1907, to a complaint to a District 
Commissioner from a trading company in the Gold Coast regarding debtors who absconded to the 
Ivory Coast (now Cote d‘Ivoire), which was then under French rule, ostensibly to avoid payment. 
The company suggested that extradition arrangements should be instituted, but the Colonial 
Secretary did not respond positively to this idea. He was of the view that the fault lay with the 
traders who allowed credit indiscriminately. This response incensed the company. They wrote 
directly to the Secretary of State. They reiterated their earlier plea, and further suggested that the 
problem of fleeing debtors existed even among the British colonies in West Africa. The colonial 
office, after some hesitation, took a second look at the matter. It suggested that the system of 
registration of judgments, then in force in the United Kingdom, would be a better solution. This led 
to the enactment in the Gold Coast of the Foreign Judgment Extension Ordinance. Similar statutes 
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 See e.g., Ronald A. Brand, ―Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments as a Trade Law Issue: The Economics of 
Private International Law‖ in Jagdeep Bhandari & Alan O. Sykes eds., Economic Dimensions of International Law: 
Comparative and Empirical Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) at 592; Alan O. Sykes, 
―Transnational Forum Shopping as a Trade and Investment Issue‖ (2008) 37 J. Leg. Stud. 339.  
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 See e.g., American Flag plc v. Great African T-shirt Corp. 2000 (1) S.A. 356, 375; Hay Management Consultants 
(Pty) Ltd. v. P3 Management Consultants (Pty) Ltd. 2005 (2) S.A. 522. 
204
 Argos Fishing Co. Ltd. v. Friopesca SA 1991 (3) SA 255. 
205
 Keith W. Patchett, Recognition of Commercial Judgments and Awards in the Commonwealth (London: 
Butterworths, 1984) at 20. 
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were enacted for the other colonies.
206
 In our present climate of easier communication and 
movement of assets, the dangers of ‗absconding debtors‘ and, I may add, ‗absconding assets‘ is an 
even greater reality. 
Private international law can be a direct source of investment in Africa‘s economic 
communities if, working with some member states, they create a climate which encourages what I 
term ‗jurisdictional tourism‘. Note the British pride in Lord Denning‘s famous statement that 
England is a good place to forum shop.
207
 Private international lawyers have generally shied away 
from statistical or empirical measures of the effect of the subject on issues like international 
business decision-making or international corporate behaviour, or even economic development. 
These issues, however, are often the unarticulated background to the development and application 
of private international law rules and judicial decisions.
208
 Undeniably, the status of London as an 
international commercial litigation centre provides money and employment to the Queen‘s 
Counsel and to many others who practise there. This provides foreign currency for the country. 
Contracting parties with no association to England are attracted to litigate there because of its 
accommodating jurisdiction rules, respect for choice of law and forum agreements, and effective 
foreign judgments enforcement regime. This is not to suggest that the English rules have been 
deliberately developed to encourage jurisdictional tourism, but in practice they facilitate it. Of 
course, these rules must be combined with a judicial system that is neutral, modern, efficient and 
independent.  
Reflecting on the Roman-Dutch rules on jurisdiction in South Africa, Forsyth has noted the 
impossibility of a peregrine (foreigner) suing another peregrine in South Africa unless they have 
some other association with the jurisdiction other than their choice-of-forum agreement.
209
 At 
common law this will not ordinarily be a problem; the presence of an exclusive jurisdiction 
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agreement, without more, will be enough to confer jurisdiction.
210
 As economic integration in 
Africa progresses and trade and investment grows, African countries with advanced and 
independent legal systems should, with the support of their respective communities explore the 
possibility of developing into jurisdictional tourist sites for the resolution of commercial disputes, 
including those involving non-African parties.
211
 A contract between a Ghanaian and a Kenyan 
businessperson or a Ghanaian and a Dutch exporter could have a South African choice of law and 
forum clause rather than an English one. Jurisdictional tourist sites will provide a neutral, easily 
accessible, and potentially less costly forum for resolving commercial disputes in Africa. They will 
also be a source of investment, employment, and foreign exchange for the countries involved.  
Aside from national courts, it has been discussed in Chapter Eight that some community 
courts also have jurisdiction to determine cases referred to them by private parties who choose 
them as forums for arbitration of their commercial disputes.
212
 For people transacting in Africa and 
seeking a neutral forum to settle disputes, the community courts can provide a viable dispute 
settlement forum. The community courts‘ arbitral jurisdiction can be used to develop them into 
forums for the resolution of commercial disputes in Africa. To develop national and community 
courts into jurisdictional tourist sites, corruption within the judiciary must be eliminated. This can 
be done through institutional reforms, independent oversight of the operations of courts, which 
should not compromise their independence, and the adoption of strict and enforceable codes of 
judicial conduct. 
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9.4.2 Enforcing Foreign Judgments 
9.4.2.1 Introduction  
Enforcing a judgment from another state is, perhaps, the best testament to the recognition 
that an enforcing state gives to validity of normative acts performed in the foreign state. As noted 
above, in economic integration, a regime for the enforcement of foreign judgments is needed to 
facilitate commercial transactions. A judgment given against a person resident in one state should 
easily be enforced in a state where that person has assets. Individuals who transact across national 
boundaries are concerned about the extent to which foreign judgment enforcement regimes are 
cheap, rapid and uncomplicated. In summary, an effective regime for foreign judgment 
enforcement offers practical benefits for individuals. There are limitations on existing state 
regimes for the enforcement of foreign judgments that affect the extent to which they can give 
effect to judgments from other countries.  
9.4.2.2 Reciprocity and International Competence 
We have already noted the reciprocity requirement in the statutory regimes for the 
enforcement of foreign judgment in common law countries and the limited number of African 
countries that have been designated. It is, however, worth adding that under South Africa‘s 
Enforcement of Civil Judgment Act 32 of 1988, reciprocal treatment from a designated country is 
not mandatory, but the country must be designated nonetheless. Reciprocity also exists for some of 
the civil law regimes but it appears that here, unlike in the common law countries, it is a judicial 
rather than an executive decision.
213
 The fact that very few African countries have been designated 
under these statutory regimes means that not many countries benefit from statutory regimes. 
Another problem relates to the diversity in bases of international competence. This implies 
that not all judgments from other countries will be enforced despite having been validly decreed in 
the foreign country. The principle that the foreign court should have been competent in accordance 
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with the enforcing court‘s rules of private international law is a requirement in all the countries.214 
What differs is what each country treats as international competence. In South Africa, and indeed 
the other Roman Dutch law jurisdictions of southern Africa, namely Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, 
Swaziland and Zimbabwe, residence and submission are recognized bases of international 
competence. More recently, mere presence was also accepted as a basis of international 
competence in South Africa.
215
 It remains to be seen whether the other Roman Dutch law countries 
will also adopt this basis of international competence. There is continuing debate as to whether 
other grounds such as nationality, domicile, and attachment of property should suffice for 
international competence in Roman Dutch law.
216
 At common law, and for the common law 




When these differences in the bases of international competence are read with the 
differences in the bases of domestic competence in international matters, it becomes evident that 
the scope of judgments from some African countries that can be enforced in other African 
countries is reduced. This is so despite the fact that such judgments might have been legitimately 
decreed in the foreign jurisdiction. For example, attachment of property and arrest of a peregrine 
defendant are bases of jurisdiction in international matters in Roman Dutch law jurisdictions of 
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 However, it is unlikely that a judgment given on either bases will be enforced 
in the common law jurisdiction where, as noted above, presence, residence and submission are the 
only recognized bases of international competence. 
Indeed, even where countries have the same basis of international competence, they may 
interpret it differently or require different standards of proof. Submission is a case in point. In 
Blanchard, Krasner & French v. Evans,
219
 the Full Bench of the Witwatersrand Local Division 
rejected the trial court‘s ruling that submission must be proved as a matter of legal certainty. It held 
that submission must be proved on the balance of probabilities.
220
 In Richman v. Ben-Tovim,
221
 the 
trial court laid down the test as being conduct which clearly indicated, and was consistent only 
with, an unqualified acceptance of or acquiescence to jurisdiction. These cases appear to suggest 
that although the South African courts have accepted that submission to jurisdiction may be 
express or implied, they have set a high threshold test for it, especially where it is to be inferred 
from conduct. It is arguable whether other jurisdictions adhere to this high threshold test. What is 
certain from the case study I have carried out is that, in the Ugandan and Nigerian cases where 
submission was also argued, enforcement was refused.
222
 
9.4.2.3 Judgment for a Fixed Sum 
 Equally constraining to the enforcement of foreign judgments within the communities is the 
fact that the present enforcement regimes, especially those of the common law countries, are 
restricted to the enforcement of foreign money judgments. At common law, only judgments for a 
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fixed sum of money can be enforced.
223
 This means that injunctions, orders of specific 
performance and other non-monetary remedies cannot be enforced in many states. These remedies 
are important in international litigation. Occasionally, there may be the need to seek their 
recognition and enforcement in other countries. If, in these instances, they cannot be enforced, that 
can be problematic for the relevant party. 
9.4.2.4 Defences to Enforcement Actions 
Another limitation worth examining relates to the bases on which a foreign judgment can 
be denied recognition. These bases include the fact that the judgment is contrary to public policy, 
infringes the rules of natural justice or was procured by fraud. These grounds often give rise to 
interpretive difficulties and leave a lot of room for judicial discretion. Public policy is an example 
of an ill-defined basis for non-recognition. Its unbridled invocation and application, especially in 
the context of economic integration where states are expected to respect each other‘s laws and 
legal acts, can affect the horizontal relations between states and negatively impact on economic 
transactions. It is comparatively significant that within the European Community, which has a 
well-established community regime for the enforcement of foreign judgments,
224
 the jurisprudence 
favours restricting the scope of public policy in actions to enforce foreign judgments.
225
 
From the case study, it does not appear that public policy is often invoked as a defence in 
actions to enforce foreign judgments. Indeed, the study revealed only two cases, both involving 
judgments from non-African countries, in which the courts grappled with the defence and its 
scope. In Eden v. Pienaar,
226
 the respondent challenged the recognition and enforcement of an 
Israeli judgment as contrary to South African public policy. The judgment contained a linkage 
provision, the effect of which was to ensure that depreciation of the Israeli currency did not 
redound to the benefit of the judgment debtor. The trial court refused enforcement on the grounds 
that the linkage provision escalated the face value of the debt to an unconscionable amount, and 
that the Israeli statute on which the action was based (the statute created liability for failure to 
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negotiate in good faith) was contrary to South African law. In allowing the appeal, the court held 
that the linkage provision was an aspect of revalorization, which increased the face value of the 
debt, but did not affect its real value. The purchasing power of the debt remained the same and 
there was nothing unconscionable or contra bonos mores about revalorization. It was further held 
that the mere fact that a foreign statute embodied concepts not recognized by South African law 
did not of itself constitute a ground for refusing to enforce the judgment. There was nothing 
contrary to South Africa public policy in requiring a party to pay damages for not negotiating in 
good faith.  
9.4.2.5 Protectionist Statutes 
Statutes with inappropriate nationalistic or protectionist undertones need to be re-examined 
to ensure the free flow of judgments within communities in Africa. The much-criticized South 
African Protection of Business Act 99 of 1978
227
 is an example. The Act provides that, except with 
the permission of the Minister of Economic Affairs, no judgment, order, direction, arbitration 
award or letter of request, or any other request delivered, given or issued or emanating from 
outside the Republic, shall be enforced in the Republic if it arises from an act or transaction which 
took place at any time and is connected with the following defined matters, namely, mining, 
production, importation, exportation, refinement, possession, use, or sale of, or ownership of any 
matter or material, of whatever nature, whether within, outside, into or from the Republic.
228
 
Regardless of the Minister‘s consent, the recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment for 
punitive or multiple damages arising out of the defined matters is prohibited.
229
 A defendant who 
has already paid part of such awards can recover it from the judgment creditor.
230
 The Act was to 
protect South Africans from the adverse effects of foreign laws such as those which allow for penal 
or multiple damages. Indeed, other countries have statutes with similar purpose.
231
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The South African Act is, however, unique in its breadth and has rightly been described as 
the clearest example of ‗legislative overkill‘,232 and conveying a ‗discouraging message to 
foreigners seeking the assistance of [South African] courts‘.‖233 If applied to the letter, its effect on 
business confidence might be devastating. Schulze has observed that it is nothing but a stumbling 
block to much-needed foreign investment in South Africa.
234
 Happily, it has seldom been invoked, 
and even where it has, the courts have been careful to construe its scope narrowly.
235
 Indeed, the 
South African Law Reform Commission has recommended repeal of the Act.
236
  
Thomashausen‘s study of the judgment-enforcement regimes in Angola and 
Mozambique,
237
 both civil law countries in southern Africa, also reveal a protectionist tenor. One 
of the conditions that a foreign judgment must meet before it will be recognized and enforced is 
that where the rules of private international law of the enforcing court provide that its substantive 
law should have been applied, a foreign court‘s decision, which affects an Angolan or 
Mozambican, must not disadvantage that citizen in relation to the decision that would have been 
reached had the law of the enforcing court been applied. In other words, a national of the forum 
should not be treated by the foreign court less favourably than he would have been in his national 
court. Also the foreign judgment must originate from a court that had jurisdiction in accordance 
with Angolan or Mozambican law. However, unlike in the Roman-Dutch law and common law 
countries, the international jurisdiction of the foreign court will be acknowledged only when the 
Angolan or Mozambican courts do not claim international jurisdiction of their own as regards the 
dispute at issue. Professor Thomashausen rightly describes the enforcement regimes in the two 
countries as a ‗―home-bound‘ system‘.238 
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9.4.2.6 Foreign Judgments in Foreign Currency 
Another area of interest to business is currency issues in foreign judgment enforcement. 
Should foreign judgments be converted into the local currency? When should the conversion be 
effected
239
 and at whose rate? Given the currency inconvertibility and fluctuating exchange rates 
problems in Africa, these issues are particularly important. Some of these issues were raised in 
Ssebaggala & Sons Electric Centre Ltd. v. Kenya National Shipping Line Ltd.
240
 The applicant 
sought to register and enforce, in Kenya, a Ugandan judgment which, interestingly, was 
denominated in British pounds. The application was brought under the Foreign Judgment 
(Reciprocal Enforcement) Act.
241
 Two issues that arose for determination were the currency in 
which the judgment was to be registered and the time for conversion of currency. The court held 
that under section 7 of the Act, a foreign currency judgment may be registered as a judgment for a 
sum payable in such sums in Kenya currency as are equivalent thereto on the basis of the rate of 
exchange prevailing at the time of registration. Also, the time of conversion was when the 
judgment was registered and not the date of enforcement.  
Some African countries have departed from the common law rule that the courts cannot 
give judgments in foreign currency.
242
 In the absence of other exchange control restrictions, the 
courts‘ jurisdiction to grant judgments in foreign currency enures to the benefit of judgment 
creditors who bring common law actions to enforce foreign judgments or secure payment of other 
debts denominated in foreign currency.
243
 However, where a party seeks to register a foreign 
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judgment, a number of the registration statutes compel the conversion of the judgment into the 
currency of the enforcing forum.
244
 The provision in the Ghanaian legislation, which can be said to 
be representative of those in other jurisdictions, reads:  
Where the sum payable under a judgment, which is to be registered, is expressed in a 
currency other than the currency of Ghana, the judgment shall be registered as if it 
were a judgment for a sum in the currency of Ghana based on the rate of bank 
exchange prevailing at the date of the judgment of the original court.
245
  
Some jurisdictions, such as Kenya, however, make the date of registration rather than the 
date of the original judgment the conversion date.
246
  
These currency conversion provisions may be of great financial significance to individuals, 
especially in an era of fluctuating exchange rates which may work to the prejudice of one party. 
Recognizing the potential hardship and injustice that can result, especially to the foreign judgment 
creditor, legislation in Australia and New Zealand gives a judgment creditor the option to state in 
his application for registration whether he wishes the judgment to be registered in the currency of 
the original judgment.
247
 This choice mitigates the potential hardship that can be caused by the 
provisions, at least from the perspective of the judgment creditor. It appears from the discretionary 
language of the Kenya legislation that such an option is available to foreign judgment creditors.
248
 
I suggest that subsequent reform of legislation for the enforcement of foreign judgments in Africa 
should incorporate a provision similar to the New Zealand and Australia statutes. 
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With a view to strengthening interstate relations and facilitating economic integration in 
Africa, the above limitations must be reviewed either nationally or, more appropriately, through an 
African convention on the enforcement of foreign judgments. A well thought-out foreign judgment 
enforcement regime is indispensable to the success of any economic community. Where the 
enforcement of private legal claims is impossible, unduly complicated, time-consuming or 
expensive, it hinders closer economic relations and hampers the development of a stable economic 
community.
249
 The development of a common regime for the enforcement of foreign judgments in 
Africa will benefit individuals who utilize the regime. It will also strengthen the relational bond 
existing between legal systems in Africa. 
9.5 DEVELOPING A PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REGIME TO AID 
INTEGRATION 
9.5.1 Introduction 
The above discussion demonstrates the importance of private international law in economic 
integration, but, as was suggested, there is palpable inattention to it in Africa‘s economic 
communities. To strengthen interstate relations and to aid economic transactions, there is need for 
African countries to embark on a comprehensive look at and reform of their private international 
law regimes. This is especially important as the communities progress through the stages of 
integration. The goal of ensuring ‗the free movement of persons, goods, services and capital and 
right of establishment and persons‘ outlined in the AEC Treaty250 and also pursued in other 
communities will be seriously hampered or not materialize without these reforms.
251
 With deeper 
integration, one can foresee not only increased development of cross-border personal relationships, 
such as through marriages, but also an increase in cross-border economic transactions. This will 
mean greater resort to private international law principles. Indeed, there may be a need to 
harmonize private international law rules to govern the operation of divergent national substantive 
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 At the continental level, although the vision of an African common market under the AEC 
Treaty looks distant, it can be inferred from the treaty that it must happen within the next fifteen 
years. This thesis contends that the time to begin preparation for it is now. For the RECs 
communities this call is even more immediate and strong. Luckily, Africa has the benefit of 
learning from other regions‘ efforts.  
Among the areas that should receive immediate attention are choice of law in contract and 
tort, in personam jurisdiction in international matters and the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judgments and international civil procedure. These areas are of direct and immediate 
impact on economic transactions, and there is either inappropriate diversity of rules across Africa 
or an absence of any authoritative legal positions. Choice of law in torts is illustrative of this. 
Industrial and technological developments, as well as advancements in international transportation, 
have made international torts a fertile area of private international law problems. But, so far, the 
position in many African countries is unclear due to the absence of any law on the subject.  
A recent opportunity to discuss the subject came in the Kenyan case of Rage Mohammed 
Ali v. Abdullahim Maasai.
253
 The case arose out of an accident in Uganda. Both parties were 
citizens and residents of Kenya. The plaintiff brought a claim in contract (instead of tort) for 
general and special damages arising from injuries sustained in an accident. The court disallowed 
the claim. The plaintiff was unable to prove that he was an employee of the defendant. To the 
court, ‗this is a simple and straightforward case of a motor vehicle accident that took place in a 
foreign country outside the limits of the jurisdiction of the courts in Kenya‘. Neither counsel nor 
the court raised the possibility of a claim in tort and the concomitant choice of law issues that 
would have called for resolution.
254
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There is currently a trend towards upholding the lex loci delicti commissi as the choice of 






courts have abandoned the English double 
actionability rule. The United Kingdom has also reformed its law on this issue by statute.
258
 
Whether African countries will follow this trend remains to be seen. In Nigeria, case law relating 
to intra-state torts supports both the double-actionability rule and the lex loci delicti principle.
259
 
However, the position on international torts is unclear. A Ghanaian court has expressed a 
preference for parties to sue in the state in which ‗the cause of action arose and according to whose 
law the liability is to be determined‘,260 but it is yet to be decided what law will apply if the court 
decides to assume jurisdiction.
261
 In South Africa, the consensus amongst scholars is that the issue 
is res nova, and thus for the Courts to decide which of the various approaches to choice of law in 
torts they want to adopt.
262
  
In the area of international civil procedure, the existing laws are often very dated, and most 
African countries have not taken advantage of international developments in the area. Indeed, the 
case study suggests it is a difficult area.
263
 This can be problematic when courts are invited to settle 
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disputes arising from cross-border economic transactions and there is a need for co-operation with 
another African court in terms of serving documents, securing witnesses or evidence. 
9.5.2 Role of Constituencies 
9.5.2.1 Academics and Academic Institutions 
The development of private international law to enhance interstate relations and aid 
economic transactions within the communities demands constituencies with interest in the subject 
and a consciousness that allows them to look beyond the confines of their own legal systems. 
These constituencies have a role to play in reforming private international law to meet the 
challenges of economic integration in Africa. The reform agenda should be approached at both 
national and community levels. The ultimate aim should be to ensure a well-thought-through 
private international law regime that will engender stability, security and predictability in 
international commercial transactions within an economically-integrated Africa. African 
academics and academic institutions have a crucial role to play. Through their research and 
writings, they can expose areas in need of reform and suggest ways of addressing them. 
It is noteworthy that there are efforts to enhance the institutional development of the 
subject. In 2000, the Institute for Private International Law in Southern Africa was established as a 
part of the University of Johannesburg.
264
 Its current goal is to draft a code of private international 
law of contract for the Southern African Development Community and/or the African Union. The 
Institute of Foreign and Comparative Law of the University of South Africa strives to be the 
premier research institution in the development and application of private international law, public 
international law, and comparative law in Africa. It aims to maintain and develop a database of 
private international law, particularly in the area of family law.
265
 The Hague Conference on 
Private International Law has also established a document centre for southern Africa at the 
University of Johannesburg. These efforts have so far been concentrated in southern Africa and are 
likely to benefit the economic integration processes there. There is a need to expand these 
initiatives into other regions of Africa and the various law faculties have a crucial role to play.
266
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9.5.2.2 National Legislatures and Courts 
The lack of written rules is very much a feature of the common law and Roman-Dutch law 
countries; very few areas of private international law have legislation on them in Africa. There is 
an urgent need to legislate or reform existing legislation on some private international law 
issues.
267
 Law Reform Commissions and parliaments are important here. Legislation takes time. 
Before then, courts will be the principal institution for reform. Indeed, historically, courts have 
been at the forefront of the development of private international law and they will continue to 
perform that role in Africa.
268
 
National constitutions and the courts‘ visions of their role in the development of law will 
influence the extent to which they can be helpful on this score. In a number of cases in the case 
study, African judges have encountered difficult private international law issues and chosen to 
defer to the appropriate legislative institution for solution. For example, in Raytheon Aircraft
269
 the 
Kenya court found as problematic the absence of rules of court on how a defendant, who had been 
sued in Kenya for being in breach of a choice of forum agreement, could challenge the court‘s 
jurisdiction. It did not create a rule to fill that vacuum. Instead, it called on the Rules Committee to 
look at the issue. There were other cases in which courts reformed the law without reference to 
parliament. In Bid Industrial Holding v. Strang
270
 the South African court abolished the rule that a 
foreign peregrinus can be arrested to found or confirm jurisdiction in a claim sounding in 
money.
271
 It also sanctioned mere presence as a basis of jurisdiction in international matters, a 
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basis of jurisdiction previously unknown to South African law. Earlier, in Richman v. Ben-
Tovim,
272
 the court held that mere physical presence suffices as a basis of international competence 
in actions to enforce foreign judgments.  
The challenges of economic integration coupled with the underdeveloped state of private 
international law in Africa is likely to bring up issues which courts may have to address without 
any national precedent. On such issues, attention to international developments and a judicial 
philosophy informed by the needs of economic integration will be useful. ‗Internationalist policy 
consciousness‘273 in private international law refers to an approach to resolving problems on the 
basis of internationalist visions or goals. The internationalist objects of promoting international 
trade and commerce, aiding international uniformity or harmonization of rules and fostering 
harmonious interstate relations are examples of these goals. All these objects are relevant in 
economic integration. Internationalist consciousness is a source of reform in private international 
law through the adoption of international conventions and judicial decisions informed by its goals. 
African states are parties to a small number of private international law conventions.
274
 Therefore, 
international conventions are unlikely to be a significant and immediate source of reform and 
development of private international law to aid Africa‘s economic integration. Rather, it is to the 
courts that we must look. 
The case study revealed judgments that already reflect the existence of this internationalist 
consciousness in African judges. But, it must be admitted, the way the courts approached 
internationalist objects was often superficial. In Barclays Bank of Swaziland v. Koch
275
 the 
Botswana court held that ‗the comity of nations and international commerce required that foreign 
judgments be recognised and enforced in each other‘s countries as far as possible‘. In Sunrise 
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Travel and Tours Ltd. v. Wanjigi,
276
 the Kenyan court suggested that, in an ‗era of increased 
globalization‘, it would be a good thing for defendants to be sued where they are domiciled.277  
The radical changes in South African law introduced by Richman and Bid Industrial 
Holding were also in part justified by internationalist objects. In Richman v. Ben-Tovim,
278
 the 
court found ‗compelling reasons why … in this modern age, traditional grounds of international 
competence should be extended, within reason, to cater for itinerant international businessmen‘. In 
Bid Industrial Holding, the fact that neither counsel nor the court was able to identify any other 
countries which required arrest as a prerequisite for jurisdiction over foreign defendants in claims 
sounding in money
279
 influenced the court‘s decision to abolish arrest as a basis of jurisdiction.  
But, perhaps, the most significant reform informed by internationalist objects was in the 
Ugandan case of Shah v. Manurama Ltd.
280
 In Shah, the court held that, given the re-establishment 
of the East African Community, there could no longer be an automatic and inflexible presumption 
for the courts to order security for costs with regard to plaintiffs resident in the East African 
Community when they bring claims against Ugandan residents. Among the factors that informed 
this decision were the facts that the EAC Treaty made express provision for the unification and 
harmonization of the laws of the member states, and that there existed a regime for the reciprocal 
enforcement of judgments among the member states.  
It must be admitted that advancing internationalist object can sometimes unfairly subject 
the parties‘ interests to systemic and states‘ interests. As Wai has observed:281  
Private international law in the Commonwealth traditions ... has traditionally 
focused on the conflicts between the interests and preferences of individual 
parties. A significant danger in promoting international system objectives is that 
the interests and values of individual parties are dealt with unfairly.  
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 I have also argued that the Richman decision, which was informed by various 
internationalist objects, potentially undermines defendants‘ rights to a fair hearing and defeats their 
legitimate expectations as to the venue of trial.
282
 Notwithstanding these objections, it is worth 
emphasizing that, for the purpose of using private international law to aid Africa‘s economic 
integration, courts cannot be inattentive to internationalist objects, especially when they will 
enhance integration by facilitating economic transactions. 
9.5.3 Need for Continental and International Engagement 
National efforts to reform private international law should be complemented by continental 
efforts, spearheaded by the African Union (of which the AEC is an integral part), and aimed at 
harmonizing private international law rules. Despite their diverse legal traditions, it is definitely 
possible for African nations to achieve this. The Institute for Private International Law in Southern 
Africa is already doing some work in that direction in Southern Africa. This work of the Institute 
should be encouraged, possibly adopted, by the AU and made a continent-wide initiative. In 
Chapter Four, I outlined a path to harmonization of laws in Africa which builds on the diverse 
legal traditions in Africa. Indeed, as it was argued there, the extent to which African laws are 




 From the perspective of the AEC, I advocate the establishment of a body with a specific 
mandate to look into Africa‘s private international law rules and how they relate to economic 
integration. Article 25(2) of the AEC Treaty, which allows the Assembly of Heads of State or 
Governments to establish additional specialized technical committees can provide the basis for 
establishing such an institution. A similar case can be made for the various RECs. In this regard, it 
is significant that the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the African Union adopted, 
in February 2009, the Statute of the African Union Commission on International Law.
284
 The 
eleven-member commission, whose members are yet to be elected, is to undertake activities 
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relating to the codification and progressive development of international law in Africa.
285
 It is also 
mandated to conduct studies on legal matters of interest to the African Union and its member 
states.
286
 It is suggested that, in addition to the many public international law problems identified 
in this thesis, private international law should also find a place on the agenda of the commission. 
Parallel to these, there is a need for states and the communities to increase their co-
operation with the international institutions working on private international law.
287
 The principal 
institution in this regard is The Hague Conference on Private International Law. Co-operation 
could start with the ratification of Hague conventions by African countries. The Hague 
conventions and methods of the Conference could also serve as a model for the development of 
African conventions on private international law. The Conference can make an input in the 
development of African regional conventions.
288
 Significantly, the idea of an African convention 
on private international-law issues has already been advocated by scholars,
289
 and, as already 
noted, is being pursued by the Institute of Private International Law.  
Co-operation with the Conference could also take the form of sending official delegations 
to participate in the Conference‘s proceedings as a prelude to membership. Currently, only three 
African countries, Egypt, Morocco and South Africa, are members of the Conference.
290
 In an era 
of globalization, Africa and its economic communities cannot be oblivious to international 
developments.
291
 It is significant that although all members of the EC are members of the 
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Conference, the EC itself has recently become a member.
292
 MERCOSUR also co-operates with 
the Conference and an agreement has been concluded between the Conference and the Inter-
American Children‘s Institute, a specialized organization of the Organization of American 
States.
293
 A strong relationship with the Conference should be a key aspect of any strategy within 
the communities to develop their private international law regimes. 
9.5.4 Values to Inform Africa’s Private International Law Regime 
The above exposition suggests that to meet the challenges and demands of economic 
integration, the communities will need to develop a private international law regime that suits the 
ends of integration. As noted earlier, similar regimes, founded principally on treaties and 
community legislation, have already been developed by some economic communities outside 
Africa. So far, such a regime is absent in Africa. At best, what the case study reveals is an 
emerging, judicially-led, academically-unexplored, and institutionally-inactive body of law that 
provides adequate, appropriate and fair solutions to private international law problems. It is also 
receptive to the influence of external values such as human rights, internationalism and the use of 
comparative foreign materials. These can be useful for the ends of economic integration.  
This body of law is currently riddled with difficult, unsettled and underdeveloped areas. Its 
evolution into a regime comparable to those of the economic communities outside Africa is 
inextricably linked with the progress of economic integration in Africa.
294
 Any movement to 
develop a regime that suits Africa‘s economic integration should combine community laws with 
national case law. I propose ten values that should influence this regime:  
 It should not be isolationist. It should be sensitive to and participate in international 
processes in the field. 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
 
21 J. L. & Commerce 157; J.J. Fawcett, ―The Europeanization of Private International Law: The Significance for 
Singapore‖ [1997] Singapore J. Int‘l & Comp. L. 69.  
292
 The Community became a member on 3 April 2007. See Andrea Schulze, ―The Accession of the European 
Community to the Hague Conference on Private International Law‖ (2007) 56 Int‘l & Comp. L. Q. 939. 
293
 <http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=events.details&year=2006&varevent=116>.  
294
 See Richard F. Oppong, ―Private International Law and the African Economic Community: A Plea for Greater 
Attention‖ (2006) 55 Int‘l & Comp. L.Q. 911. 
307 
 
 It should emphasize the importance of harmonizing and/or unifying private international 
law rules across Africa. This can be done through the adoption of international conventions 
and the active use of comparative law in resolving private international law problems. 
 It should recognize the multiple interests at stake in the resolution of private international 
law problems and, as far as possible, prioritize the interests of the disputing parties. 
 It should not be overtly discriminatory, but be sensitive to the interests of African residents 
and domiciliaries when deciding private international law cases or adopting rules. 
 It should ensure a proper balance between the role of courts in the development of private 
international law and legislative interventions in areas where the law is undeveloped, 
underdeveloped or uncertain. 
 It should have rules that are sensitive to the demands of international human rights laws. 
 It should aim at making Africa an attractive place for the resolution of international 
commercial disputes by adopting and providing rules conducive to that goal. 
 It should be responsive and receptive to alternative modes of settling disputes such as 
international arbitration and litigation before regional courts by providing rules which 
facilitate their processes, including supportive judicial remedies. 
 It should respect party autonomy in international transactions and uphold parties‘ rights to 
regulate their transactions through choice of law and forum agreements. 
 It should pay attention to the institutional development of the subject by acknowledging, 
supporting and facilitating the work of academics and academic institutions working in the 
field. 
9.6 CONCLUSION 
 This chapter has argued that private international law can perform a dual role in Africa‘s 
economic integration. Its principles may be used to strengthen interstate relations and facilitate 
cross-border economic transactions within the communities. To perform both roles effectively, 
there is the need for radical reform of Africa‘s private international law. The reform should be 
approached at both national and community levels. The rules adopted should be tailored to meet 
308 
 
the needs of economic integration in Africa. To this end, a set of values has been suggested. 
Reform at national and community levels should be combined with increased participation in 
international institutions working on private international law. It is only through participation that 
Africa can learn, be heard and make the emerging international conventions take account of its 




10 CHAPTER TEN: CONCLUSION 
10.1 INTRODUCTION 
This thesis set out to examine how relational issues of law in economic integration are 
being approached in Africa. At its core, relational issues deal with the legal interactions among 
community, national, regional and international legal systems within the context of economic 
integration. The theory was that effective economic integration is the product of properly 
structuring and managing, within well-defined legal frameworks, vertical, horizontal and vertico-
horizontal relations among states, legal systems, laws and institutions. Put differently, an economic 
community must have well-structured and managed relations between itself and other legal 
systems as a necessary condition for its effectiveness.  
After expounding this theory and applying it to the state of affairs in Africa, the conclusion 
of the thesis can be captured in a few words: Africa‘s economic integration processes have not paid 
systematic or rigorous attention to relational issues. The interactions between community and 
member states‘ legal systems, among the various communities, as well as among member states‘ 
legal systems have neither been carefully thought through nor placed on a solid legal framework. 
Where attempts have been made to provide a legal framework, they have been incomplete, 
unsatisfactory, and, sometimes, grounded on questionable assumptions. The thesis has argued 
consistently that unless these shortfalls are remedied, the growth and effectiveness of Africa‘s 
economic integration will be seriously undermined. Put differently, even if all the socio-economic 
and political challenges that bedevil Africa‘s economic integration were to disappear, there 
remains much in the realm of law which, if unaddressed, will hinder its success and effectiveness. 
So far, the impact of relational issues has not been felt due to the slow pace at which 
Africa‘s economic integration is progressing. That will not remain so for ever. Indeed, the 
communities are progressing through the various stages of integration – from free trade areas to 
customs unions, common markets, economic unions and complete economic integration. The 
Southern African Customs Union (SACU) as a customs union dates back to 1910; the Common 
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) became a customs union in 2009; the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) became a free trade area in 2008, plans to be 
a customs union in 2010 and a common market by 2015; the Economic Community of West 
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African States (ECOWAS) is edging closer to creating a customs union; and the East African 
Community (EAC), which is already a customs union, is currently negotiating a common market 
protocol. Relational issues become more evident as integration progresses; the deeper the level of 
integration, the greater the demands that the community makes on member states become. 
Accordingly, sooner rather than later, the inadequacies in the existing legal framework will be 
exposed and will have to be addressed, if the communities are to be effective. 
In terms of their architecture, as reflected in their constitutive treaties, some communities 
have utilized a number of the relational principles and mechanisms discussed in Chapter Two. For 
example, the COMESA, ECOWAS and EAC treaties provide for a preliminary reference 
procedure,
1
 envisage a role for national courts in the implementation and enforcement of 
community laws and judgments,
2
 and allow individuals to access their community courts.
3
 Also, 
within the EAC, a fairly adequate regime for enforcing member states‘ judgments and 
jurisprudential communication among the three founding members – Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda 
– exists. These are important first steps. The first generation of Africa‘s economic integration 
treaties were very much inattentive to relational issues
4
 and did not utilize many of the relational 
principles examined in Chapter Two. 
Although the community treaties adopt some relational principles, they have also shied 
away from others. For example, only the Treaty establishing the East African Community provides 
for the supremacy of community law. All the treaties provide that the implementation of 
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community law will be done through national legislation.
5
 Although the treaties provide for 
various categories of community laws with varying legal effects, these categories appear to be 
largely ignored in the making of community laws.
6
 For example, we noted that the law of the 
African Union, of which the African Economic Community (AEC) is an integral part, provides for 
various categories of decisions including regulations. Regulations are directly applicable and 
member states are obliged to align their laws with the demands of regulations. However, since the 
AU‘s inception, the categorization of decisions has been ignored, and no use has so far been made 
of regulations. It was argued in Chapter Seven that reliance on national legislation to implement 
community law is likely to create a disjunction between community and national legal systems and 
adversely affect the status of community law in member states. National governments may not 
prioritize implementation of community laws.
7
 This stalls the development of the communities and 
poses significant problems for individuals who seek to rely on community law in member states. 
Indeed, we examined, in Chapter Seven, cases in which individuals in dualist countries 
unsuccessfully relied on community laws because of the absence of domestic implementing 
legislation. 
The full practical impacts of the adopted relational principles on Africa‘s integration 
processes remain to be seen. The progress of integration has been slow, and also, although in 
existence, the principles have not been invoked by individuals, national and community 
institutions.
8
 In view of Africa‘s longstanding commitment to economic integration, and in light of 
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 See e.g. Treaty establishing the African Economic Community, 3 June 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1241, art. 5(2) [AEC Treaty]; 
Treaty of the Southern African Development Community, 17 August 1992, 32 I.L.M. 120, art. 6(5) [SADC Treaty]; 
Revised Treaty establishing the Economic Community of West African States, 24 July 1993, 35 I.L.M. 660, (1996) 8 
Afr. J. Int‘l & Comp. L. 187, art. 5(2) [ECOWAS Treaty]; COMESA Treaty, supra note 1 art. 5(2); EAC Treaty, 
supra note 1 art. 8(2). 
6
 See e.g. COMESA Treaty, supra note 1 arts. 10-12 
7
 Article 8(2) laid down a 12-month period within which member states were to enact legislation to give the force of 
law to the EAC Treaty in their national legal systems. This provision has been complied with. See Tanzania: Treaty for 
the establishment of East African Community Act 2001; Kenya: Treaty for the establishment of East African 
Community Act 2000; Uganda: East African Community Act 2002. However, these Acts are not detailed enough. 
They do not take account of all the consequences of giving force of law to community law in member states. Compare, 
for example, the United Kingdom‘s European Communities Act 1972 which gave force of law to the treaties of the 
European communities. 
8
 For example, resort to the community courts has been relatively minimal. Between January 2007 and November 
2007, 12 applications were filed with the ECOWAS court. Five final judgments were delivered, and nine interim 
decisions were also given. See Annual Report of the ECOWAS Court of Justice, 2007 at [13]-[14], online: ECOWAS 
Court of Justice <http://www.ecowascourt.org/annual.html>. So far, none of the community courts has received a 
preliminary reference from a national court.  
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the demonstrated significance of relational issues in economic integration, it is ironic that not much 
practical use has been made of relational principles. National courts appear largely unaware of 
their role in economic integration and the nature of their relations with the communities‘ legal 
systems. In a few instances, community law was invoked in national courts. A preliminary 
reference
9
 or recognition of community decisions would have been appropriate.
10
 However, in 
those instances, national courts seemed oblivious of their duties under community law. For 
example, the supremacy of the community law principle is enshrined in the EAC Treaty
11
 and 
Kenya has implemented the treaty.
12
 However, a Kenyan court has held that if the treaty were in 
conflict with the Kenyan constitution, the municipal court‘s first duty would be to uphold the 
supremacy of the constitution.
13
 To be fair, it has been noted that some national courts have relied 
on the interpretative and adjudicative relational principles. They have utilized community law and 
the goals of the communities in their decisions.
14
 
Individuals are an important medium for linking the communities with member states. 
Individuals have invoked community law before national courts with varying degrees of success.
15
 
They have achieved greater success before the community courts. In a number of actions brought 
directly to the community courts by individuals, member states‘ measures have been found to be in 
breach of community law. Indeed, in Chapter Five, we noted that, but for actions brought by 
individuals, the community courts would have fallen into desuetude. In general, there do not 
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 See Peter Anyang’ Nyong’o v. Attorney General [2007] eKLR (High Court, Kenya, 2007) [Peter Anyang’ Nyong’o]. 
The issue in the case was whether amendments of the EAC Treaty should follow the procedure laid down in the Kenya 
Constitution or that set out in the EAC Treaty. 
10
 In Mike Campbell (Private) Limited v. Minister of National Security Responsible for Land, Land Reform and 
Resettlement, Judgment No. S.C. 49/O7 (Supreme Court, Zimbabwe, 2008), the court appears to have given a 
judgment in disregard of an injunction that had been granted earlier in favour of the plaintiff by the SADC Tribunal in 
the case of Mike Campbell Limited v. Republic of Zimbabwe [2007] SADC Tribunal 1. 
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 EAC Treaty, supra note 1 art. 8(4). 
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 Kenya: Treaty for the establishment of East African Community Act 2000. 
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 Peter Anyang’ Nyong’o, supra note at 9.  
14
 See e.g. R v. Obert Sithembiso Chikane, Crim. Case No. 41/2000 (High Court, Swaziland, 2003); Friday Anderson 
Jumbe v. Humphrey Chimpando, Constitutional, Case Nos 1 and 2 of 2005 (High Court, Malawi, 2005); Chloride 
Batteries Limited v. Viscocity, Civil Cause No. 1896 of 2006 (High Court, Malawi, 2006); Hoffman v. South African 
Airways 2001 (1) S.A.1. 
15
 See e.g. Healthwise Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Smithkline Beecham Consumer Healthcare Ltd. [2001] LawAfrica L.R. 1279; 
Shah v. Manurama Ltd. [2003] 1 E.A. 294; Movement for Democratic Change v. The President of the Republic of Zimbabwe, 
HC 1291/05 (High Court, Zimbabwe, 2007).  
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appear to have emerged in Africa constituencies who have interest in the integration processes and 
are prepared to champion it at both domestic and community levels. This is in part because 
economic integration and its law are not taught in most African universities, either as a 
freestanding undergraduate course or as sections of courses such as commercial, constitutional or 
public international law. As a result, awareness of Africa‘s economic integration processes remains 
limited. Most lawyers do not view them relevant to their practice. Scholars have not taken much 
interest, and there are yet to emerge journals, private institutions or non-governmental 
organizations dedicated to economic integration. 
Despite the fact that some community courts have found national measures that are in 
breach of community law, their jurisprudence does not demonstrate a conscious attempt to 
articulate the place of relational principles in Africa‘s economic integration. Indeed, in Anyang’ 
Nyong’o v. Attorney General16 the East African Court of Justice was presented with an opportunity 
to affirm the principle of supremacy of community law enshrined in article 8(4) of the EAC 
Treaty. However, the court did not even make reference to the article, let alone expand on its 
significance for community law. In Frank Ukor v. Alinno,
17
 the ECOWAS court held that the 
ECOWAS treaty was ‗the supreme law of the ECOWAS, and it may be called its Constitution‘. 
This dictum may be favourably interpreted as supporting the supremacy of ECOWAS law but, 
admittedly, it is too cursory for one to launch a forceful argument on it. In Jerry Ugokwe v. 
Federal Republic of Nigeria
18
 the ECOWAS Court observed that the kind of relationship existing 
between the ECOWAS court and national courts of member states is not of a vertical nature, but 
demands an ‗integrated Community legal order‘.19 One can infer from the court‘s vision of an 
‗integrated community legal order‘, that it recognizes the importance of the bond that should exist 
between the community and national legal systems. The jurisprudence of national and community 
courts on matters directly related to economic integration is comparatively scant and cursory. 
However, the jurisprudence suggests that there is prospect for integrating community law into 
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 [2008] 3 K.L.R 397. 
17
 Suit No. ECW/CCJ/APP/01/04 (ECOWAS Court of Justice, 2005) at [21]. 
18
 Case No. ECW/CCJ/APP/02/05 (ECOWAS Court of Justice, 2005) at [32]. 
19
 This observation was made in the context of the issue of whether one can appeal, to the Community court, a decision 
of a national court. 
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national legal systems in Africa. This should be exploited for the purposes of strengthening 
Africa‘s economic integration. 
In economic integration, it is not only community-state relations that matter. Interstate 
relations are equally important. Indeed, integration is principally concerned with the latter. In this 
regard, the thesis has revealed a number of worrying issues that can affect interstate relations and 
hinder integration. Cross-border economic activity thrives in a setting where the relations between 
states are harmonious. Inadequate foreign judgment enforcement regimes, diversity in laws, and 
the absence of any systematic attempt to harmonize aspects of national law were identified as 
potential obstacles to integration and innovative solutions to overcoming them have been 
proffered.  
On interstate relations, private international law has an important role. However, its role in 
integrating legal systems has been largely ignored by the communities despite calls by many 
writers.
20
 The thesis has suggested values that should inform the development of a private 
international law regime that can serve the needs of an economically integrated Africa. In addition 
to private international law, jurisprudential communication between courts is useful for 
strengthening interstate relations. Indeed, in Chapter Four, it was offered as a path to 
harmonization of national laws. Jurisprudential communication currently exists among African 
courts, but it is largely sporadic and concentrated within geographical regions and legal traditions. 
This thesis has suggested improved access to legal materials, and a study that distils the common 
core of African laws as undertakings that could improve communication between courts. 
10.2 ISSUES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The sparse adoption of relational principles in the founding treaties of the communities, and 
the rare invocation of those adopted, raise a question. Is Africa suitably conditioned to make 
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 See generally Richard F. Oppong, ―Private International Law and the African Economic Community: A Plea for 
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effective use of them? Socio-cultural, economic, political and constitutional factors condition the 
effectiveness of relational principles. Africa is plagued with issues that may work against their 
effective operation. These include: the lack of activist and independent national and regional 
judiciaries; the presence of potentially-inimical constitutional provisions; the dominance of politics 
in the integration processes; the perceived absence of a litigation culture;
21
 the lack of public 
awareness about the activities and laws of the communities; and the lack of interest of African 
lawyers
22
 and private institutions
23
 in economic integration processes. Empirical studies on how 




Another important issue is how the communities relate with each other and with the 
international legal system. Africa‘s integration treaties have paid some attention to community-
state relations. However, the same cannot be said of the communities‘ relations with each other, 
and with the international legal systems, especially that of the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
There are treaty references to international law as a source of community law,
25
 and the need for 
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the communities to co-ordinate with other communities, especially the AEC.
26
 But, these 
references are not enough. They do not provide a concrete or structured legal framework for the 
many complex issues that could arise in this area. Chapter Three addressed some of the complex 
issues that arise from the relations between the communities and the AEC. Many more remain 
unexamined let alone addressed. Does AEC law enjoy supremacy over a conflicting law of a 
community? Are there any subjects on which only the AEC can legislate? How are breaches of 
AEC decisions and directives by the communities to be remedied? How is AEC law enforceable in 
the communities? Are the regional communities competent before the African Court of Justice? 
Can the AEC intervene in an action before a community in which the interest of the AEC is 
affected? These issues are worth further exploration. 
Equally important are the relations between Africa‘s communities and the WTO. The status 
of WTO law within the legal systems of the communities, how to reconcile the multiple 
commitments of African states under community law and WTO law, the rules for resolving 
conflicts between WTO law and the communities‘ laws are all important issues that have been 
addressed neither by the communities‘ treaties nor in academic writing.27 These are important 
issues for the stability of the world trade system and Africa‘s economic integration. Indeed, these 
issues will become even weightier as economic integration progresses in Africa. Differences 
between community laws, or national laws founded on community law, and WTO law are 
susceptible to challenge under the WTO dispute settlement system. So far, the WTO trade policy 
reviews of some of the communities have not found them to be directly or significantly in breach 
of WTO laws.
28
 It remains to be seen whether this will be the case as they progress and strengthen 
their integration processes. Indeed, already, concerns have been expressed about overlapping 
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African states‘ membership of regional communities, and the tendency of the communities to 
detract from the multilateral trade regime.  
10.3 CONCLUSION 
Relational issues of law are endemic in economic integration. Broadly, these issues focus 
on the interactions among community, national, regional and international legal systems. The 
extent to which relational issues manifest themselves and the degree of attention devoted to them 
often varies with the level or stage of integration reached. Economic communities around the 
world have acknowledged the challenge that relational issues pose for their development and 
effectiveness. They have used various relational principles and mechanisms as part of the legal 
framework to address relational issues.  
Africa‘s economic communities have deployed some relational principles and mechanisms, 
but they also shy away from others. As regards the relational principles adopted their true impact 
on economic integration in Africa remains to be seen. Indeed, it remains an open question whether 
Africa is socio-culturally, economically, politically and constitutionally conditioned for the 
effective use of them. However, in the few instances in which they have been invoked before the 
courts, their potential to aid economic integration has been evident. To an extent, the future success 
of Africa‘s economic integration will depend on how relational principles are utilized to bridge the 
gap between the communities and member states. 
Moving forward, it is worth recalling that this thesis has exposed a number of relational 
issues that currently bedevil Africa‘s economic integration processes. All the issues cannot be 
addressed at the same time. There should be prioritization in any attempt to address them. In my 
opinion, the most important and immediate first steps are the rationalization of the relations 
between the various communities, overcoming the canker of multiple memberships of the 
communities, and putting the path to the formation of the African Economic Community on solid 
legal foundation. Another important step would be for member states to enact legislation 
implementing the respective community treaties. This should be preceded by detailed national 
studies on any potential conflicts between existing community and national laws. Member states 
should iron out any differences to ensure smooth national implementation of the treaties and other 
community laws. These steps should be followed by concrete community and national measures 
aimed at creating constituencies with interest in community law. In this regard, three important 
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constituencies are judges, lawyers, and law enforcement and training institutions. The integration 
of community law into national education curricula, educational campaigns aimed at creating 
awareness about the communities, and litigation aimed at testing unsettled aspects of community 
law should be encouraged and pursued. As the communities move up the stages of integration – 
and they are – relational issues will become more important. The earlier the communities, states, 
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